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6LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Art. – article;
Aut.note. – comment by the author;
Bail-in – restructuring mechanisms to recapitalise a bank in resolution or effectively 
capitalise a bridge bank under the specified conditions, through write-down, conversion 
or exchange of debt instruments and other senior or subordinated unsecured liabilities 
of the bank in resolution into, or for, equity or other instruments in that bank, the parent 
company of that bank or newly formed bridge bank, in accordance with the legal frame-
work and market capacity of a certain jurisdiction; 
Bail-out – any transfer of funds from public sources to a failing or likely to fail bank 
or a commitment by a public authority to provide funds with a view to sustaining a failed 
bank that results in benefit to the shareholders or uninsured creditors of that bank, or the 
assumption of risks by the public authority that would otherwise be borne by the bank and 
its shareholders, where the value of the funds transferred is not regained from the bank; 
Basel III – new international financial regulatory standards on bank capital adequacy 
ratios and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion. The third regulatory package of financial regulations was reviewed in the light of the 
financial crisis. The package strengthens bank capital requirements on bank liquidity and 
bank leverage requirements;
BCBS – Basel Committee on Banking Supervision;
BIS – Bank for International Settlements; 
BRRD – Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; 
Chap./Sec. – chapter/section;
CoE – Council of the Europe;
DGS - Depositors Guarantee Scheme;
DIA – Deposit Insurance Agency;
Dodd-Frank – Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; 
EBA – European Banking Authority, an independent EU Authority which seeks to 
ensure effective and consistent prudential regulation and supervision across the European 
banking sector. Its overall objectives are to maintain financial stability in the EU and to 
safeguard the integrity, efficiency and orderly functioning of the banking sector;
ECB – European Central Bank;
EC – European Commission;
ECHR – the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms of 4 November 1950. The members of the Convention are the members 
of the EU; 
7ECoHR – the European Court of Human Rights
e. g. – for example;
EU – European Union, international organisation established on 7 February 1992 un-
der the Maastricht Treaty;
CJEU – The Court of Justice of the European Union;
EP – the European Parliament;
FDIA – US Federal Deposit Insurance Act;
FSB – The Financial Stability Board;
FINMA – The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory and Bank Resolution Authority 
FDIC – The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, competent Authority in the US 
that carries out prudential regulation, insuring deposits and performing bank resolution 
functions. Preserves and promotes public confidence in the US financial system by insur-
ing deposits in banks, by identifying, monitoring and addressing risks to the deposit in-
surance funds; and by limiting the effect of bank failure on the economy and the financial 
system.
IMF – The International Monetary Fund;
IFS – International Financial Standards;
US – Unites States of America;
UK – United Kingdom;
LR – Republic of Lithuania;
No. – number;
SIFI – systemically important financial institutions;
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – official title of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, renamed from 1 December 2009 after entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
SRM – Single Resolution Mechanism;
V. – versus;
UNCITRAL – United Nations Commission on International Trade Law;
WB – World Bank;
* Other abbreviations used in the thesis are presented in the text below.
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Bank – any credit institution that takes deposits or repayable funds from the public 
and is defined as a bank by relevant national legislation.
Bank liquidation – ultima ratio model of distressed bank resolution, when bank activ-
ity is terminated, a liquidator is appointed, who must sell the bank’s assets and distribute 
the funds to creditors and ultimately exclude the insolvent entity from civil circulation. At 
the same time, for the purposes of the dissertation, bank liquidation is conceived as the last 
stage of bank resolution, when the bank resolution tools have already been applied (e.g., 
when the bank is split into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bank by the decision of the relevant resolution 
authorities), and only then the ‘bad’ bank assets are liquidated due to insolvency.
Bank insolvency – for the purposes of the study, bank insolvency is considered as a 
financial condition of the bank at which several different solutions can be taken. In general 
terms, for the purposes of the dissertation, bank insolvency is understood as either a situ-
ation when a bank that is de facto insolvent can be restructured and under certain circum-
stances the procedure can be initiated to restore the solvency of the entire bank or any part 
of it, by maintaining and developing its activities, while the remaining part of the bank is 
liquidated.
Bank resolution – one of the bank insolvency procedures, administrative procedure 
and legal tools dedicated for bank restructuring or managing dissolution of failing banks 
while preserving insured deposits and other services essential for maintaining financial 
stability. Bank resolution also means any action taken by a relevant public authority in 
respect of a bank that meets the resolution threshold, including the exercise of resolution 
powers or seeking resolution targets specified in the national law and taking into account 
the specific features of the bank. At the same time, it is the last step of actions taken by 
supervisory authorities, often initiated as soon as possible and justified after applying early 
intervention tools, when private sector solutions or regulatory actions taken within a rea-
sonable period of time and according to the existing circumstances are not sufficient to 
protect the bank from bankruptcy and it is determined that general insolvency laws and 
procedures might pose a threat to the public interest.
Bank resolution regime – the elements of legal framework and the policies governing 
the application of resolution powers by national authorities. It is based on the “Key At-
tributes of Effective Resolution Regime for Financial Institutions”, adopted by the Finan-
cial Stability Board and other relevant international organisations, agreed at international 
level.
Non-performing loan – includes loans where payment of interest or principal pay-
ment are past due and the obligor is in default with regard to the borrower, or when there 
are good reasons to believe that the payment will not be repaid in full.
Banking Union – a system governed by the legislative package for the banking sec-
tor crisis management. Integrated financial system in the EU seeking to ensure financial 
stability and reduce the cost of bank insolvency. This system consists of a common super-
9visory mechanism and a new, integrated deposit guarantee schemes and resolution system 
of credit institutions, a comprehensive and detailed rulebook on distressed banks conduct.
Financial contracts – any securities contracts, commodities contracts, forward con-
tracts, repurchase agreements, option contracts, swap agreements and any similar agree-
ment that, in every case, is explicitly identified under the legal framework of a particular 
jurisdiction as subject to special treatment with regard to resolution and insolvency (in 
relation to early termination rights or in order to preserve the effect of netting agreements) 
and distinct from non-financial contracts.
Depositor – a natural or legal person holding deposit in a bank or its branch.
Official intervention – any actions, including formal corrective action, taken by su-
pervisory or resolution authorities in response to weaknesses of a financial bank prior to 
resolution. Normally taken in the form of financial assistance, including in conjunction 
with nationalisation of financial institutions, when the bank is no longer able to operate 
independently.
Ordinary bankruptcy – collective bankruptcy proceedings aimed at selling all or any 
part of the debtor’s assets. This procedure generally involves the designation of a liquidator 
or receivership, usually initiated against credit institutions according to national law only 
on the basis of certain procedures, or according to the law applicable to all natural and 
legal persons in general.
Bail-in – legal bank resolution tool for exercising write-down and conversion powers 
of a resolution authority in relation to liabilities of a bank under resolution in accordance 
with national law.
Competent resolution authority – an authority, acting independently or together 
with other competitive authorities, that manages the conduct of resolution procedures 
applied to banks established and operating under its jurisdiction (including the resolution 
planning functions).
Bridge bank – an entity authorised or licensed following the applicable requirements 
under national law, established on a temporary basis in order to take over and maintain 
the specific assets, liabilities and operations of a failed bank, and viewed as one of the reso-
lution tools for the purposes of this dissertation. 
Insolvency – a particular financial condition experienced by the debtor, which can 
be temporary or permanent in nature. Insolvency is not only legal but also an economic 
category.
Equity instruments – shares, other instruments granting equity or property, tools that 
can be converted into shares or other equity instruments or granting the right of purchase, 
and measures as a combination of shares or other equity instruments.
Resolution threshold – conventional evaluation of bank resolution conditions by the 
public authorities, when a bank matches the conditions under which resolution proce-
dures or execution of resolution powers may be initiated according to the statutory powers 
conferred on the competent authorities.
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Resolution powers – powers available to public authorities under the legal framework 
and resolution regime for the purposes of resolution.
Resolution actions – a decision to commence bank resolution procedure or apply 
bank resolution tool or implementation of one or several resolution powers.
Supervisory authority – an authority responsible for bank licensing, compliance with 
license requirements and prudential regulation. The supervisory authority shall take ap-
propriate legal measures to protect the interests of bank depositors, determine bank insol-
vency, take corrective action to maintain discipline in the market, adopt decisions on bank 
resolution and/or bank liquidation procedures.
Systemic risk – risk of disruption of the financial system, which could have serious 
negative consequences for the financial system and the real economy.
Systemically important financial institution – a financial institution or a group 
thereof, when due to its size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, it may, in the 
opinion of the relevant authority, cause significant disruption to the domestic or broader 
financial system and economic activity, if it were to fail in a disorderly manner.
Systemically important or critical functions – bank activity or operations is systemi-
cally significant or critical, if its interruption, suspension or discontinuation could lead to 
a disruption of services vital for the functioning of the financial system or real economy.
Financial leverage – the ratio of credit institution’s own funding and of bank assets, 
off-balance sheet liabilities and contingent liabilities incurred to fulfill an obligation, to 
provide collateral, including obligations for received funding, commitments, derivatives 
or repurchase agreements, but excluding obligations, the execution of which can be guar-
anteed only by liquidating the credit institution.
International financial standards – legal recommendations based on ‘soft law’. Regu-
latory guidelines developed by international organisations for model regulation of bank 
insolvency procedures.
Asset separation tool – bank resolution tool, necessary for the resolution authority 
to transfer bank assets, rights or obligations to the asset management company or a third 
party in accordance with the law. 
Managing body – means body or bodies of a bank, appointed in accordance with na-
tional law, and empowered to set the bank’s strategy, objectives and overall direction, and 
which oversee and monitor decision-making of the management; they include persons 
who effectively direct the business of the bank.
Sale of business – bank resolution tool for effecting a transfer by a resolution authority 
of shares or other equity instruments issued by an institution under resolution, or assets, 
rights or liabilities, of an institution under resolution, to a purchaser that is not a bridge 
institution.
*Other remarks on the terms used in the dissertation are contained in sections 1.1., 
1.6.1., 1.6.2., 2.1. and 5.1.
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PREFACE
Issues and interest of the research. Despite their significant dynamics in the field 
of financial services, banks are the most widespread financial institutions all over the 
world, they undertake essential, crucial functions and play a significant role in sovereign 
economies1. Consequently, the banking crisis is ever more associated with rather sensitive 
and provocative social, political, budgetary and legislative events2. Efficient, reliable and 
predictable regulation of banking activities at national and international level helps to 
maintain critical banking functions and solvency. Efficient and practical legal regulation 
of banking activities primarily relates to quantitative risk management activities of a bank 
and numerous limitation criteria of prudential regulation. However, the recent banking 
crisis highlighted the equally important role of qualitative risk criteria of banking prac-
tice and their impact assessment important, especially bank insolvency crisis management 
rules, legal measures and bank insolvency procedures.
The doctrine highlights that bank insolvency is an unavoidable phenomenon in a free 
market economy3. In spite of that, the legal rules and tools that assist, indeed facilitate, in 
coping with these dilemmas arising from insolvent banks have been explored for many 
years4. This fact is inter alia confirmed by statistics5. The initial bank bankruptcy proceed-
1 See more Chapter 1 Sec. 2 
2 Hoelscher D.S. Bank restructuring and resolution. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006. P. 3.
3 Despite regulatory controls, banks can also fail, just like other corporations. The goal of banking super-
vision is not fully prevent bank insolvencies. It is not possible and would be run counter the essence 
of free market economy. Moreover, this is impractical, since it would excessively limit bank’s business 
activities. Thus, this could result in the destruction of overall economy. In order to protect the financial 
stability of the banking system as a whole, supervisory authorities must be able to timely close and 
liquidate banks whenever a bank no longer meets its extensive licensing requirements and appears in 
a position where even the most reliable bank is no longer able to recover its financial situation. Hüpkes 
E. Insolvency-why a special regime for banks? Current developments in monetary and financial law. Vol. 
3, IMF, Washington DC, 2003. Preface. BCBS. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Basel, 
2012 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-03-25]. <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf >.
4 Particularly, around 2000, international financial regulatory authorities began boosting bank insol-
vency law issues and concerns regarding lack of regulation. However, international authorities failed 
to solve relevant and important problems (banking group problems, systemic risks, etc.) prior to the 
beginning of recent last banking crisis. Financial Stability Forum. Guidance for Developing Effective 
Deposit Insurance Systems. September 2001[interactive]. [accessed on 29-12-2014]. <http://www.fi-
nancialstabilityboard.org/2001/09/r_0109b/>. BCBS. Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak 
Banks: Report of the Task Force on Dealing with Weak Banks, March 2002 [interactive network]. 
[accessed on 29-12-2014]. <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs88.pdf>.
5 Between 2008 and 2014, around 508 cases of bank insolvency proceedings were initiated in the US. 
FDIC. Failed Bank List [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-29]. < https://www.fdic.gov/bank/indi-
vidual/failed/banklist.html>. Between 2009 and 2014, bank insolvency proceedings were initiated 
against around 186 banks in Switzerland. FINMA. Enforcement, Insolvency, Insolvencies [interac-
tive]. [accessed on 2014-12-29]. <http://www.finma.ch/e/sanktionen/insolvenz1/insolvenzen/Pages/
insolvenzen.aspx> . In the EU, in 2007-2009 more than 500 banks faced insolvency. The largest bank 
insolvency cases were observed in Ireland, Greece, France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Spain, Germany, 
UK. Claessens S., Kose A.M., Laeven L., Valencia F. Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy 
Responses. IMF- Business & Economics, 2014. P. 412. Valiante D. Framing Banking Union in the Euro 
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ings emerged in the Middle Ages6. Since that time, accurate administration of these bank 
insolvency procedures was a relevant yet problematic matter. Accordingly, cases of bank 
insolvency have caused many obstacles and adverse outcomes, not solely with regard to 
individuals, lenders, shareholders, but also for the public and the society as a whole.
Bank insolvency law and procedure, including their complexity, is commonly known 
as a “Gordian knot” in the legal doctrine7. In theory, from the very inception of mod-
ern financial markets8, insolvency procedures of financial institutions and correlated legal 
relations have served as a point of reference for economists, bankers, lawyers and legal 
researchers9. In practice, until the recent banking crisis10, the substance and procedure of 
bank insolvency laws largely diverged, and a systematic approach was missing. Typically, 
in order to address the sensitive bank insolvency issues general corporate insolvency law – 
lex generalis11 – was applied without taking into account and observing the unique char-
Area. Some empirical evidence. CEPS Working Document. No. 389, 2014. P. 9. It must be noted that, 
starting from the independence period up to nowadays, 15 banks became insolvent in Lithuania. Re-
cently, the bank ‘Snoras’ was declared insolvent, and afterwards the liquidation procedures were initi-
ated and early intervention tools were applied. This case had considerable repercussions in the Lithu-
anian society. The bank ‘Ūkio Bankas’ was also declared insolvent, and its banking license was revoked. 
Given that the transferring of bank’s assets, rights, transactions and liabilities to another bank would 
allow maintaining depositor confidence in the banking system and banking sector stability and secure 
the public interest, as compared to liquidation (bankruptcy), the bank was placed under resolution. The 
Lithuania Ministry of Economy. Bankruptcy Management Department. Insolvent banks [interactive] 
[accessed on 2014-12-10] <http://www.bankrotodep.lt/Bankrotas.php?Tipas=3>. 2011-12-12 Vilnius 
Regional Court judgment in civil case Lietuvos bankas v. Bank Snoras, AB No. B2-7791-611/2011 and 
judgment of the Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania of 18 February 2013, No. 03-31.
6 See more Chapter 1 Sec. 4 Subsec. 1.
7 Bank insolvency procedures are characterised by their complexity and are governed by the insolvency 
law and company law, financial law and private law, administrative and banking law.
8 The starting point of modern financial markets is in the 20th century when advanced technologies 
stimulated the evolution of the banking industry. It must also be noted that the financial markets are 
associated with asset markets, while property markets refer to the concepts of assets and liabilities. 
Classic trading in assets originated by banks also flourished in the 1980s and 1990s. However, in the 
21st century the definition was transformed into the idea of financial markets. This approach was based 
on the classic fact that these days the financial markets principally deal with the issues of obligations 
(debt) rather than the value of actual properties. The difference is quite significant as most investments, 
physical commodities or services are purchased on a long-term basis, which accordingly affects the 
value of the assets in short term. Chorafas N.D. Basel III, the Devil and Global Banking. Palgrave Mac-
millan Studies in Banking And Financial Institutions. Great Britain, 2012. P. 25. Wright S., Smithers A., 
Warburton P. Practical History of Financial Markets. UK. Edinburgh Business School, 2011. P. 76.
9 Robert C. Clark. The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 86. No. 1, 1999. 
Swiret P.P. Bank Insolvency Law Now That it Matters Again. Duke Law Journal. Vol. 42, No. 3, 1992.
10 See more Chapter 1 Sec. 1. 
11 WB. Public statistical data of 2007 m. regarding the banking regulations and supervision in 143 juris-
dictions worldwide [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-10-15] <http://www.worldbank.org/financialde-
velopment>. Angkinand A. Wihllborg C. Bank Insolvency Procedures as a foundation of Market Disci-
pline. LEFIC Working Paper, 2005-2008. P. 4. Cihak M., Demirguc-Kunt A., Maria Soledad Martinez 
P., Mohseni-Cheraghlou A. Bank regulation and supervision around the world: a crisis update. Policy 
Research working paper. No. WPS 6286. Washington, DC, WB, 2012. Specific regulations for bank in-
solvency procedures are a distinguishing feature of the US system. Legally, FDIC cannot apply direct 
liquidation and general insolvency rules, but started acting as a receivership. From 1898, bank insol-
13
acteristics, functions and purpose of the banks.12 In addition, most legislation imposed 
minimum regulation with regard to legal principles of bank resolution, and was therefore 
unpredictable, incomplete, lacking legal certainty, with no alternative solutions available13. 
Normally, former regulations were restricted to the application of governmental stabilisa-
tion measures, while alternative solutions describing how to manage cases of bank insol-
vency were neither established nor developed. As time went by, deregulation and the lack 
of balance of rights and obligations of diverse groups of stakeholders operating in bank in-
solvency procedures, namely the state, public institutions, bank administrators, creditors, 
shareholders became more obvious. Due to the lack of proper legal safeguards, including 
the former inadequate legal framework, uncertainty and the risk of litigation increased. 
Accordingly, from the inception of the financial crisis, up to the present day, academics, 
regulators, policy-makers, and related international organisations have undertaken effort 
to examine possibilities for more effective sound legal measures that could assist in ad-
dressing insolvent bank issues without resulting in the chaos of the financial sector and 
by avoiding other severe consequences. At that point, a reasonable question arises as to 
the types of bank insolvency regulation procedures that have been modified since the recent 
global banking (financial) crisis, with its peak period in 2008-200914?
From a practical point of view, a question arose as to whether lex generalis was ad-
equate to resolve the problems of an insolvent bank effectively15. Legal mechanisms for re-
vency cases were separated and no longer heard by ordinary corporate bankruptcy courts. Starting 
from 1933, bank insolvency procedures were governed by the US FDICA by means of special rules. 
Lex specialis for bank insolvency procedures was repeatedly revised in 2010. Hynes M. R., Walt D. S. 
Why Banks are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy. Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2010-
03, 2009. P. 14. In 2004 Switzerland implemented special legal rules on bank insolvency to a limited 
extent. The main legal acts governing bank insolvency law were revised in 2011 and 2012, including 
rules governing bank resolution. Other regulations governing bank insolvency procedures were also 
modified, for this reason consistent legislation was created only at the end of 2012. Since the recent 
banking crisis, some of the EU Member States have undertaken individual efforts to reform their bank 
insolvency laws (Germany, UK, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium). However, in substance, legal acts on 
bank insolvency procedures were harmonised only with the entry into force of the Banking Union 
acts. FSB. Thematic review on resolution regimes. Peer review Report. 2013.
12 See more Sec. 1 sub-sec. 3.
13 Several practical examples could illustrate this statement. In 2008, the UK had to react promptly and 
adapt changes in the banking laws, by creating special bank insolvency procedures enpowering public 
authorities to nationalize the failing Northern Rock bank. Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands 
were bound to apply bail-out to Fortis Bank, as it was found that in the case of liquidation, uncontrolled 
procedures could severely damage the real economy. Firstly attempts were made to sell the bank, but 
the shareholders of the bank did not agree for the sale. The Brussels Court of Appeal suspended the 
transaction until the time when the consent of the shareholders was obtained. Marinč M., Rant V. A 
cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes. Journal of Financial Stability, No. 13, 2014. P. 134. 
Koch B.E. Challenges at the Bank for International Settlements. Berlin-Springer, 2007. P. 36.
14 See more Chapter 1 sec. 5. 
15 The conclusion reached in the doctrine is based on the fact that during liquidation the value of the bank’s 
assets is severely damaged, in addition, it reduces the possibilities for bank creditors to restructure and 
rescue the bank, increases the risk of financial contagion in the financial markets and threatens the real 
economy. Such negative consequences double in particular where a large and complex bank is failing or 
likely to fail. IMF. European Department. The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial Institu-
tions – The Case of the European Union. Prepared by Cihak M. and Nier E, 2009. Abstract.
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structuring banks were limited, while ordinary bankruptcy procedure was hardly suitable 
for banks16. In parallel, it was generally recognised that ordinary bankruptcy is not suitable 
for banks. An issue arose: how a country should respond to the symptoms revealed by one 
or several banks, showing serious financial and (or) operational difficulties, distress, or 
that a bank is failing or likely to fail, or is insolvent? What are the legal and administrative 
measures that the state must have in place and what are the steps to be taken to deal with 
bank insolvency problems effectively? These issues became fundamental in the context of 
the reforms of bank insolvency law.
According to WB data, in 2008, which was the peak period of the global banking (fi-
nancial) crisis, only 18% of all states in the world had lex specialis, although abstract and 
often ineffective legal procedures regulating bank insolvency 17. Naturally, a conceptual 
question arises as to what has changed and are we witnessing the development of a new 
bank insolvency paradigm?18.
Before the recent banking crisis, bank insolvency regulation in most countries lacked 
legal certainty, and the effect of this was that bank insolvency rules and procedures were 
created, administered and conducted on an ad hoc basis, by a spontaneous process of 
banking crisis management. While the states often employed public finances and bail-out 
for solving and addressing bank insolvency problems and saving banks, bank liquidation 
procedure was applied as an alternative19. At the same time, banks were prevented from 
initiating bankruptcy proceedings, even if they could avoid the adverse consequences for 
the real economy. This resulted in spill-over effects and different risks, such as moral haz-
16 Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority. Resolution of Global Systemically Important Banks. 
FINMA position paper, 2013 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-09] <http://www.finma.ch/e/finma/
publikationen/Documents/pos-sanierung-abwicklung-20130807-e.pdf>. P. 4. IMF. Supra note 15. P. 
6.
17 Čihák M., Demirgüç-Kunt A., M.S.M. Pería, A. Mohseni-Cheraghlou. Bank Regulation and Supervi-
sion around the World. A Crisis Update. Policy Research Working Paper No. 6286, 2012 [interactive]. 
[accessed on 2014- 12-01]. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12159/
wps6286.pdf?sequence=1>. Marinč M. Rant V. A cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes. 
Journal of Financial Stability. Vol. 13, 2014. P. 134-150. 
18 In his book, Thomas Kuhn described a paradigm as admitted scientific knowledge, which serves the 
particular scientific community in promoting and solving practical and theoretical problems with 
the help of methodological approach during particular time. With time, the concept of paradigm 
was replaced by research performance theory. An essential element of paradigm’s performance is its 
solid core, which is typical, consisting of observations, principles and assumptions. After significant 
changes in the bank insolvency legal system and legislation at both national and international level, 
we can talk about a paradigm’s transformation in the financial system. In addition, problems related to 
bank insolvency procedures and their solving methods were changed, science admitted the predomi-
nance of bank insolvency deregulation, and the paradigm of bank insolvency law was changed. See 
Kuhn. T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Pradai, Vilnius, 2003 [1962]. Chorafas N.D. Supra 
note 8. Introduction (ix). See more Chapter 1 Sec. 8.
19 Although normally public support maintained the bank as a going concern for some time and the 
bank continued its operation, a bail-out distorted shareholder, creditor and management initiatives 
and incentives to restructure the bank. Acknowledging that taxpayers ‘stand’ for all the other stake-
holders created an unfair competitive advantage over the other banks, competitors and even increased 
the competitive advantage of the countries whose authorities were more prone to save public money. 
Hüpkes E. Allocating costs of failure resolution. Shaping incentives and reducing moral hazard. (in) 
Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. New York, Oxford university press, 2011. P. 105.
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ard, systemic risk, distortions of competition, protection of the depositor’s rights, threat 
for financial stability, etc. In addition, nearly every official bank restructuring decision was 
taken, or at least confirmed, with the approval of the political leadership. The competent 
authorities and the governments could choose one of the two equally undesirable options: 
either to initiate expensive public rescue of the failing banks by using public finances (bail-
out), or to apply ordinary bankruptcy procedures as an alternative even to systemically 
important banks with the ensuing negative impact on the financial system as a whole and 
the economy in general.
G20 authorised an action plan in November 2008, and suggested that the legislators, 
regulators and other competent authorities “review the legal regulation of bank restructur-
ing and bankruptcy laws, according to a new experience and [...] ensure that the states would 
assist for the orderly winding up of banks20”. It was concluded that it was vital to establish 
and develop effective legal instruments that could accurately liquidate insolvent banks 
in an ordinary way while maintaining the systemically important banking functions. A 
well-defined approach, namely the bank resolution regime was supported21. The central 
purpose of the bank resolution system was to provide the “third insolvency alternative and 
a new direction” between uncontrolled or inadequately managed bank liquidation pro-
cedure (bankruptcy), which usually operates together with reducing the impact of bank 
assets and other bank insolvency jeopardies, covered when the bank’s shareholders and 
the majority of creditors are rescued by using public finances. Bank liquidation proceed-
ings generally have an adverse effect. They swiftly interrupt and disturb the bank’s conduct 
and business operations and further destroy the value of the property22. During the tran-
sitional period and in the final outcome, the continuity of critical banking functions and 
business continuity presumption is not met. Therefore, the first priority was to resolve the 
bank as a going concern, by applying resolution tools and avoiding any significant adverse 
20 Declaration at the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy of 15 November 2008. 
Washington DC [interactive]. [accessed on 2014 -12-05] <http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/com-
mission/declarationG20.pdf>.
21 October 2011, on the international level the Financial Stability Board has developed and introduced, 
and the G20 determined a new bank resolution regime, including the related characteristics. The most 
significant international rules and guidelines described the degree of regulation of bank insolvency 
procedures by means of “The Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Régime for Financial Institutions”. 
The document presented the legal basis for the implementation of a particular legal regime of bank 
resolution. Another official international organisation, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
likewise adopted recommendations regarding insolvent bank resolution and/or liquidation, and the 
creation of a new legal regime for bank resolution. Essentially, this was the first time in world his-
tory when essential and general bank resolution legal systems and regulatory backgrounds and legal 
criteria have sustained efforts to identify and unify bank insolvency procedures at the global level, 
based on “soft law” measures. The obligation set for the G20 countries to implement the legal regime 
of resolution in their jurisdictions was established. See more Chapter 1 sec. 10. With regard to the as-
similation of the definitions see more Chapter 2 sec. 2.
22 EC. Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assesment. Accompanying the document. Pro-
posal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 
77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/
EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. Brussels, SWD, No.166 final, 2012. P. 17.
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effect on the financial system23. At the international level, jurisdictions were required to 
undertake a broad range of legislative measures, in particular, to restructure banks while 
extending banking business activities, meanwhile non-viable or systemically insignificant 
parts of the banking business were subject to regular liquidation procedures. 
Bank resolution procedures are an extremely complicated economic, social and le-
gal phenomena, featuring complexity and interaction of substantial and procedural legal 
norms. Among other items, bank resolution regime needs to be designed not only to pro-
tect shareholders and creditors, but simultaneously to achieve the other objectives set by 
public authorities and vital for the efficient functioning of the economy as a whole24. When 
formulating the source of legal regulation of social bank resolution regime and the related 
legal rules in the form of community conventions, at least five principal issues to be dealt 
with and related to the balancing of private and public interests in bank resolution regime are 
addressed in the dissertation. 
First of all, only after making the adjustments at the international level, the issue arose 
with regard to the extent of the loss resulting from a bank’s insolvency and those respon-
sible for the loss. An equally important question then arises: is it possible to rely on public 
interest, placing it above private interests? If so, what is the legal basis and the legal prin-
ciples to be followed. 
Secondly, the existing regulation governing bank resolution was reviewed or modern 
regulation was created in the relevant jurisdictions. The new era of bank resolution regime 
is indissociable from the broad powers exclusively delegated to competent authorities (e.g. 
the right to convert bank debt instruments into capital by financing bank recapitalisation, 
official intervention in the bank, etc.). Simultaneously, as demonstrated in practice, apply-
ing resolution tools can create similar obstacles, where the impact on the ownership rights 
23 Bank liquidation procedures are costly, complex and lengthy. Costs of bank bankruptcy can be very 
significant. Moreover, additional risks may arise, such as loss of confidence in the entire financial 
system. Direct costs include the costs incurred by bank liquidators or administrators or public institu-
tions, such as courts, the Ministry of Finance. Indirect costs include the costs related to the reduction 
of bank assets and loss of income. In addition, a bank’s operation may also be negatively affected by 
the lack of liquidity, operational or funding problems, lack of investment. Loans can become “non-
performing”, commitments unfulfilled, and the bank’s customers may face difficulties in finding alter-
native funding sources in short term, and therefore the existing obligations would be challenged with 
the necessity to be restructured or refinanced in short term. Costs may be incurred by the creditors, 
including depositors, not only due to their assets becoming illiquid, but also due to their obligation 
to take part in administrative proceedings, litigation and undertake efforts by proving the validity of 
their financial claims and size. Costs may be interrelated. Administrative problems and delays inevita-
bly increase the cost of illiquidity and credit quality decline. These facts are confirmed by various em-
pirical studies. Scmieder C., Scmieder P. Impact of Legislation on Credit Risk – Comparative Evidence 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. IMF Working Paper WP/11/15, 2011 [in-
teractive]. [accessed on 2014-12-15] <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1155.pdf>. 
Hardy C.D. Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance. Bankruptcy Costs. 
IMF Working Paper. WP/13/172, 2013 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-15] <http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13172.pdf>. P. 4-7.
24 The powers granted to public authorities may inevitably affect the rights of shareholders and creditors 
in the bank resolution procedures, potentially reduce the economic value of their ownership rights 
and interests. Among other things, the legal regime of bank resolution should have been designed 
not only to protect shareholders and creditors, but also to attain other objectives pursued by public 
authorities and considered vitally important for the efficient functioning of the economy as a whole.
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and expenses of creditors and shareholders are potentially interconnected (e.g. the sale of a 
business tool requires neither the consent of the shareholders of the bank nor of any third 
party other than the purchaser). For this reason, it is important to properly regulate legal 
principles and criteria in positive law and to establish legal safeguards that could optimally 
balance private and public interests, which would accordingly help protecting public inter-
est against potential counterparty claims. 
Thirdly, given that the banks in distress experience financial difficulties, additional 
funding is needed. This has led to the establishment of provisions on the international 
level, namely that public authorities must have the power to impose bail-in instruments25 
for banks, which essentially means that the application of these legal instruments prior to 
liquidation of the bank can write off capital instruments and convert them into the bank’s 
capital (shares). 
Fourthly, international financial standards have encouraged the banks to apply a vari-
ety of resolution tools available to them and to assure the assumption of the banks’ going 
concern. Moreover, the provisions were established for bank resolution procedure to be 
applied in accordance with the “least cost” principle26 or creditors’ “no-worse-off-princi-
ple”. Accordingly, no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if 
the bank had been liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings; otherwise it could 
destabilise the financial system. Additionally, steps should be taken in order to ensure 
that systemically important functions of the bank are rapidly transferred and continued 
where necessary. Notably, when no alternative private sector solutions could be reasonably 
expected, including capital injections of shareholders or third parties, this would suffice to 
recover the viability of the entire bank. 
Fifthly, a new approach (different from the general insolvency approach) was estab-
lished to consider the satisfaction of creditor claims and a hierarchy of claims in the bank 
insolvency procedures. Bank resolution regime is inconceivable without considering the 
negative impact on creditor and shareholder rights, such as interference in the contrac-
tual relations (netting agreements, collateral agreements, financial collateral arrangements 
under which ownership is transferred). As a result, legal protection of creditors and share-
holders becomes problematic, encouraging scientists to reconsider whether the existing 
regulation of bank resolution procedures adequately balances public and private interests. 
On the one hand, the bank resolution regime is based on public interest purposes, while 
maintaining financial stability and legal protection of deposits. On the other hand, bank 
insolvency procedures are indissociable from the limitations of private interests – share-
holder, creditor ownership rights.
25 The idea of bail-in originated from the fact that bank rescue by using public finances (bail-out) cre-
ates the burden for public finances, distorts competition and undermines market discipline. If a failed 
bank’s assets are insufficient to protect the claimants that society wishes to protect then the question of 
who should cover a shortfall arises. This amounts to a choice between the taxpayers and the financial 
services industry. Huertas F.T. The case for Bail-ins. International Institute of Finance, 2012. P. 1. 
26 In the United States, following the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, it became a require-
ment that an insolvent bank and any related bank resolution procedure was based on the “least cost” 
principle for the Deposit Insurance Fund. An exemption may be requested only if it could affect the 
country’s payment system disruptions or its meltdown, or affect severe adverse consequences for the 
economy, financial stability, and if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation agrees on the course of 
resolution.
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As long as no equal approach has been adopted towards the treatment of bank insol-
vency procedures, the legal framework, and the international harmonisation, it is useful 
to examine the appropriate national legal framework of bank insolvency procedures from 
the comparative perspective. It is necessary to disclose not only how separate jurisdictions 
succeeded to comply with the international guidelines, but also to research and explore the 
types of legal models that certain jurisdictions have chosen, to compare the particularities, 
to find the convergences and divergences and, after examining the positive law of different 
jurisdictions, to disclose the approaches to the balance of public and private interests, and 
to suggest the recommendations and proposals.
Based on the above, the primary focus of this dissertation is placed on the main ques-
tion of the research: whether the legal regime of bank resolution appropriately balances 
public and private interests?
The aim of the dissertation: to analyse theoretical and practical issues of the bank 
resolution regime in terms of compatibility of public and private interests.
In order to achieve this purpose, the following research tasks are formulated:
1) To disclose the change of bank insolvency paradigm and the reasons behind it; to 
analyse general conceptual terms of a new bank resolution paradigm.
2) To distinguish the scientific conception of bank resolution regime, as compared 
to other bank insolvency procedures, and to crystallise the characteristic features, 
thresholds, to analyse bank resolution tools, by discovering their implementation 
benefits and shortcomings.
3) Following a comparative approach, to examine the public authorities involved in 
bank resolution procedures, the decision-making mechanisms of bank resolu-
tion and the relevant role of public authorities.
4) Based on the identified characteristics of the regime governing bank resolution, 
to analyse the impact of bank resolution on public and private interests and their 
compatibility in the positive law of various jurisdictions.
The objective of the research: operational and functional implications on the bank 
resolution regime. 
Scope and delimitations of the research. Within the limits of the research, the 
jurisdictions at issue do maintain distinct models of bank insolvency procedures, with 
different legal traditions (common law or civil law), variations in the judicial system, 
etc. It is important to note that the EU, the US and Switzerland are one of the dominant 
countries in the global banking sector. For instance, the EU and the US banking sector 
holds two thirds of the global banking industry market (according to the data provided 
in the international symposium entitled ‘Concept paper for the Symposium on build-
ing the financial system of the 21 st century’. New York, 2014). Regardless of the latest 
bank insolvency crisis and its outcomes, the EU, the US, and the Swiss governments 
were forced to take the most severe bank resolution measures in the world history so 
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far, including massive central bank liquidity-providing cases, capital injections, guar-
antees to banks and redemption of bank assets in order to prevent systemic financial 
crisis27. In the consequence of that, the abovementioned governments sought to avoid 
a situation that would result in the collapse of the entire financial system. It should be 
taken into account that this study will not address traditional banking or financial stabi-
lisation measures, such as central bank liquidity support (monetary policy operations or 
emergency liquidity assistance), various equity recapitalisation schemes (except for bail-
in as a legal tool with regard to the scope of the investigation), government guarantee, 
or temporary liquidity means. Instead, the study concentrates on the particular analysis 
of bank resolution tools (sale of business, bridge bank, asset separation and bail-in tool) 
and their comparative analysis. The author’s position is based on the premise that, in 
the context of a modern bank resolution regime, financial stabilisation tools should be 
perceived only as a measure of last resort and can be used only in the unfavorable case 
scenario, including taking over the ownership of banks by the state (nationalisation). 
The study is featured by the fact that the powers of bank resolution and its financing 
structure is organised in a way that taxpayers do not suffer any losses due to bank(s) in-
solvency and have access to net income, which can be achieved by successfully restruc-
turing the bank. The study also will not cover the analysis of bank recovery and resolu-
tion plans, as in the new bank insolvency paradigm they are treated as preventive bank 
insolvency management measures rather than bank resolution measures. In addition to 
the above, the reference jurisdictions have established a valuable and developed practice 
of bank restructuring and (or) liquidation proceedings, but also, in the consequence of 
different regulation and different legal traditions, different regulatory models and dif-
ferent solutions of practical problems were chosen. Among other elements, in order to 
preserve the critical banking functions, the government and the supervisory authorities 
of these jurisdictions have realised the need for exclusive, special rules governing bank 
resolution. The crucial part of the regulation was dedicated to developing the powers 
of public authorities, which should be clearly established in the legal acts and unam-
biguous regulation. This would enable the bank to transfer viable part of its business or 
systemically important banking operations, such as other private sector financial service 
provider, a public sector entity or a bridge bank, and only then liquidate the rest of the 
bank under normal bankruptcy procedures.
US. Lex specialis of bank resolution originated in the US28. The origins of the bank res-
olution institute influenced other legal systems and their development. The United States 
is to be investigated since already in early 1991, the US adopted a separate section in the 
 
27 Norton J.J., Arner W.D. International Responses to the Global Financial Crisis. (in) Financial Crisis 
Management and Bank Resolution. Edt. by Labrosse R.J., Caminal-Olivares R., Singh D. Informa. 
London, 2009. P. 19. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. Final report of the National Commision 
on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. Authorized Edtion. Public 
Affairs. New York, 2011. P. 52-67.
28 Swire P.P. Supra note 9. P. 478-481.
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Bankruptcy Code dedicated to regulating banking insolvency procedures29. Simultane-
ously, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act was revised by the policy makers in 
order that the FDIC, whenever a bank is failing or likely to fail, begins acting as the bank’s 
receiver, while at the same time performing the functions of the regulator. This is exactly 
the opposite model in comparison with classical bank insolvency regulation model, for 
instance, found in the EU. In that case, usual deposit insurance activities are limited to the 
collection of contributions to the fund, payment of compensations to insured depositors, 
in the event of subrogation, the presence of bankruptcy process. In addition, the Dodd-
Frank Act established a new Orderly Liquidation Authority (hereinafter – OLA), which is 
responsible for the administration of all financial companies posing a threat to the sys-
temic risk. The new authority amended the Bankruptcy Code and addressed the moral 
hazard problem created by situations when shareholders, management and unsecured 
creditors were protected from the consequences they would have suffered in liquidation 
under the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, according to the US legal practice, among other 
legal points, several other significant differences between bank insolvency and corporate 
insolvency legal regimes should be considered30. Additionally, the recent banking crisis 
has resulted in the diversity of banks failure practices in the US. The Washington Mutual, 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers31 (in doctrine they are often described as the largest and 
most complicated bankruptcy cases in the history of financial institutions) bank insol-
vency cases deserve special mention. Thus, the global financial crisis not only started in 
29 While The 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Institutions Improvement Act was well developed, ad-
dressing medium-sized bank insolvency problems, current regulation could not solve very large, 
cross-border banks or excessively complex bank insolvency problems without harming financial sta-
bility and without adverse systemic risks, such as the risk of moral hazard. The U.S. Congress recog-
nized the importance of deposit protection in providing stability in the economy following the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Federal law grants additional powers to FDIC that lead to critical differences 
between bankruptcy and the FDIC receivership law. This allows the FDIC to both expedite the liq-
uidation process for banks and thrifts in order to maintain confidence in the banking system and to 
maximise the cost-effectiveness of the receivership process to preserve a strong insurance fund. FDIC. 
Chapter 7 – The FDIC’s role as a receiver [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-20] <https://www.fdic.
gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch7recvr.pdf>.
30 For example, the FDIC can turn into a receivership of a bank and take over the administration of the 
bank if the latter is not adequately capitalised for a period of more than 90 days. After the entry into 
force of the Dodd Frank Act a new institution was established, empowered to recognize systemically 
important financial institutions and execute insolvency procedures not under state laws, but accord-
ing to the Federal Reserve regulations. In addition, after the latest financial crisis, the US was one of 
the first countries all over the world to review its bank insolvency procedures and legal regulation, 
and the scope of systemically significant financial institutions, and to expand the extent of particular 
corrective actions, in addition, it also founded the bank restructuring fund, developed the competent 
authority’s powers, and broadened the scope of the special bank insolvency law.
31 The Lehmans bankruptcy case was extreme, but revealing. While the bank had no liabilities to de-
positors, its bankruptcy nevertheless perfectly illustrates the challenge faced while attempting to re-
pay creditors’ claims. The nominal value of assets of that investment bank was USD 639 billion, and 
the bankruptcy liquidation costs amounted to USD 2 billion. It is anticipated that in average credi-
tors will recover 18% of their claims. It is predicted that their claim procedures will continue until 
2015.  S. Linda, Paulden P. Lehman‘s Year - End Fees, Filings Match Up With Biggest Bankruptcy. 
Bloomberg. 2012, [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-10]. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar-
ticles/2012-12-21/lehman-s-year-end-fees-filings-match-up-with-biggest-bankruptcy>.
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the US, but also caused enormous losses to the US economy since the Great Depression 
in 193032: the market crash resulted in multiple deposit withdrawal from banks and rapid 
freezing of all credit markets33. While the lawmakers of other countries were still in the 
process of legal and regulatory reforms in a sense of bank resolution, on 21 July 2010 the 
US president signed the Dodd-Frank Act34, extremely significant in the context of bank 
insolvency procedures, which had tremendous impact on the entire financial service in-
dustry. As a result, other states analysed the US legal regulation and made efforts to adapt.
Switzerland. Switzerland is to be examined since it is an extremely relevant country 
in the global banking sector35. Swiss banks were largely created for providing services and 
exporting capital (capital funded both nationally and in foreign countries)36. By the end of 
2012, the off-balance sheet assets of the two largest Swiss banks – UBS and Credit Suisse – 
amounted to CHF 2.5 trillion, a figure four times exceeding the total annual GDP of Swit-
zerland37. The distinguishing feature of this jurisdiction is that the Swiss banking industry 
is dominated by large, universal banks, with a high degree of bank concentration and, at 
the same time, banks are exposed to additional risks that can affect the financial system 
as a whole. Although Switzerland is a particularly strong country in the banking industry, 
historically, however, bank insolvency crisis was not an uncommon phenomenon. Bank-
ing crises occurred in the Great Depression period during 1931–1936, after the Second 
World War, and during the housing loan crisis in 1990. The recent international banking 
32 In the case of deregulation of bank insolvency procedures, the state’s response to the banking crisis 
and the bank rescue was usually taking place by using public finances, meaning the taxpayers’ money. 
This was based on the concern that it might destroy the financial sector, and the real economy can 
reach its critical state. During the period from 2007 to March 2009, the US Congress employed USD 
700 billion for bailout. Through its state assistance programme, the FDIC issued guarantees to finan-
cial institutions in the form of loans of more than USD 1.5 trillion; the US Treasury issued guarantees 
for money market funds to secure the commitments arising from obligations for USD 3.5 trillion, and 
the Federal Reserve provided multiple liquidity measures to secure against potential liabilities for the 
amount of USD 7 trillion. Gordon N., Muller Ch. Confronting Financial Crisis: The case for a Systemic 
Emergency Insurance Fund, Yale J. Reg. Vol. 28, No. 151, 2011.
33 Ringe G.W., Gordon N.J. Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Translantic Perspective on 
What It Would Take, 2014. P. 5.
34 The act essentially seeks balancing bankruptcy and consumer protection laws and objectives, while 
maintaining financial stability and public confidence. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021. 12 U.S.C. § 5511. 21 
July 2011.
35 Banking area is the most important for Swiss service industry. Switzerland hosts about 300 banks. 
Banking Barometer. Economic trends in the Swiss banking industry, 2014 [interactive]. [accessed on 
2014-12-28] <http://www.swissbanking.org/en/2014_bankenbarometer_en.pdf>. IMF. Switzerland 
Financial Sector Stability Assesment, 2014 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-28] <https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14143.pdf>. Duc-Quang N. Is Switzerland really the country of bank-
ers? [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-28] < http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/is-switzerland-really-the-
country-of-bankers-/40473658>.
36 Meier B.H., Marthinsen E.J., Gantenbein A.P. Swiss Finance. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jer-
sey, US, 2013. P. 37.
37 FINMA. Supra note 16. P. 4. Swiss National Bank. Financial Stability Report, 2011. P. 14 (box1). Lan-
noo K. Concrete Steps towards More Integrated Financial Oversight, CEPS Task Force Report, 2008. 
P. 11, 49. Thevenoz. L. The Rescue of UBS by the Swiss Confederation. (in) Giovanoli M., Devos 
D. International Monetary and Financial Law – The Global Crisis. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010. P. 379.
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crisis also influenced the Swiss banking system38. Moreover, most notably, Switzerland is 
a unique country on the European continent, as the legal, political and economic system 
significantly differs from the other European countries39. The financial sector is built on 
the basis of self-regulation, based on the assumption that such regulatory approach is the 
most effective and efficient way to manage and monitor banking activities40. Switzerland 
was one of the first countries in the world, which in 200441 began developing special bank 
insolvency regulation and subsequently was one of the first countries to comply with the 
requirements of the FSB42. Most notably, in response to the 2004 banking crisis, the prin-
ciples of Swiss banking law underwent certain changes43. The new version of the Bank-
38 Drechel B.S.D. Banks and the Swiss Economy. Dissertation for the Faculty of Economics, Business 
Administration and Information Technology of the University of Zurich. Zurich. Cuvillier Verlad. 
2010. P. 16-17.
39 The legal system of the Federal Republic of Switzerland (consisting of 26 cantons and lands), is not 
based on case law, but more on the codified legal system. Switzerland is unique not simply because it 
is not a member of the EU, but also since it has a particular banking industry and successful economy. 
Switzerland has a legal system that protects the rights and freedoms from excessive impact of the state. 
Due to the stable political position, intense democratic traditions, Switzerland has developed into a 
solid state for accumulating assets from all over the world. Likewise, Switzerland possesses high level 
infrastructure and differentiated payment and clearing systems, is characterised by sound financial 
justification because of its education in the banking sphere, business-friendly tax legal base, the stability 
of the Swiss franc, etc. Bauen M. Rouiller N. Swiss Banking. Schulthess. Switzerland, Basel. 2013. P. 4.
40 Self-regulation has deep traditions in Switzerland and forms a crucial part of the Swiss banking regu-
lation and financial center in general. It stands out for its flexibility and high degree of differentia-
tion. The literature recognises the following types of self-regulation: optional (or independent) self-
regulation; self-regulation acknowledged as a minimum standard, with the binding powers of the 
legislature. The main advantages of self-regulation are cost savings and avoiding the most problematic 
level of governmental legal regulation. FINMA. Selfregulation [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-13] 
<https://www.finma.ch/e/regulierung/Pages/selbstregulierung.aspx>. Hüpkes, E. “Regulation, Self-re-
gulation or Co-regulation?” Journal Of Business Law, No. 5, 2009. P. 427-446. Bauen M., Rouiller N. 
Supra note 39. P. 43.
41 The first changes were based on lessons learned from the regional savings banks and cantonal banks’ 
crisis, which took place in 1990. Since 1991 up to 1996 more than half of the regional savings banks 
(about 180) were liquidated. Since 2004, the new rules in Swiss Banking law came regarding the spe-
cific insolvency proceedings of banks and foreign bank branches. General insolvency law was appli-
cable for banks only when the Banking law did not determine the special rules to deal with bank in 
distress. Burgi J. A., Muller T. Banking rehabilitation and insolvency reform in Switzerland. Restructur-
ing and insolvency Handbook, 2011. P. 1.
42 It should be noted that even though the new bank insolvency provisions came into force in July 2004, 
it was not possible to verify the practical procedures because of the global financial crisis. FINMA. 
Bank insolvency. The situation in Switzerland and internationally. A report by the SFBC, 2008 [inter-
active]. [accessed on 2014-12-10] <http://www.finma.ch/archiv/ebk/e/aktuell/20080128/20080128_e.
pdf>. P. 10.
43 Historically, the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks has been revised on numerous occasions. 
Its requirements are primarily of a public nature, but part of the provisions are treated as civil or 
even criminal in nature. It must be noted that the implementing banking regulations (ordinances) 
and implementing bank insolvency regulations (secondary banking legislation) are more technical in 
nature and are rather designed for technical reasons, in order to clarify in detail the main principles 
regulating the primary banking law. Burgi J. A., Muller T. Banking rehabilitation and insolvency reform 
in Switzerland. Restructuring and insolvency Handbook, 2011. P. 1.
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ing Law entered into force in 2011–201244. The Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority on the Insolvency of Banks and Securities Dealers of 30 August 
2012 (recast) (January 1st, 2015), brought significant technical changes in bank insolvency 
procedures, which meant that banks would no longer be obliged to liquidate and revoke 
their licenses if there was a prospect of restructuring a failing bank. Bank insolvency pro-
cedures were accompanied by the legal act of FINMA45, which came into force on 1 No-
vember 2012, and was improved on 1 January 2013. The general legal provisions govern-
ing bank insolvency were fully transformed to the lex specialis. Finally, it should be noted 
that the Swiss regulatory reforms were influenced by recent cases of banking insolvency. 
Two globally and systemically important financial institutions faced financial difficulties 
(UBS and Credit Suisse46). Although losses related to the bank insolvency procedures were 
very significant (e.g., UBS wrote off non-performing loans worth about USD 53.1 billion), 
we will mention the entirely successful and unprecedented bank resolution cases in this 
dissertation.
The EU. The recent bank insolvency crisis fully revealed the loopholes of the EU legal 
system47 in the field of bank insolvency procedures, the absence of transparent and predict-
able regulation that would allow managing financial restructuring of distressed banks and/
or normal liquidation (bankruptcy)48. Between 2007 and 2009, most EU Member States 
had no regimes governing bank resolution that could ensure ordinary bank restructuring 
44 FINMA. New Banking Insolvency Ordinance. A key element in the effective restructuring and orderly 
market exit of banks. 22 October 2012 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-10] <http://www.finma.
ch/e/regulierung/anhoerungen/Documents/fb-biv-finma-e.pdf>.
45 In June 2007 the Swiss Parliament adopted the Federal Act of the Swiss financial market supervisory 
authority, which came into force on 1 January 2009. According to this Act, the supervision of banks, 
insurance companies, and other financial intermediaries was put into the hands of a single supervi-
sory authority - the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, whose initial task was to protect 
creditors, investors, and insured depositors. Another significant aim was to assure the effective func-
tioning of financial markets and strengthen the competitive position and reputation of Switzerland. 
Meier B.H., Marthinsen E.J., Gantenbein A.P. Swiss Finance. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jer-
sey, US, 2013. P. 17.
46 These Swiss banks are systemically important on account of their size, complexity, business organisa-
tion and activities, as well as the importance of the financial system. Financial Stability Board. Update 
of Group Systemically Important Banks, 2013. P. 3 (Annex 1). FINMA. Supra note 16. P. 4-7.
47 It should be noted that this study considers the EU legal system as a whole rather than the individual 
legal systems of the Member States. At the same time, it should be noted that prior to the entry into 
force of the Banking Union legislation, some of the EU Member States were encouraging national 
bank and insolvency laws, changing banking insolvency legislation or were introducing new, specific 
provisions dedicated to bank restructuring. As an illustration, the legal regimes for bank resolution 
were implemented in the UK in 2009, in Germany in 2011, and etc.
48 In practical terms, the procedures were largely restricted. Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution 
of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Direc-
tives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council. Recitals (1), (4). Schillig M. Bank Resolution Regimes in Europe II – Resolution 
Tools and Powers. School of Law, King‘s College, London, 2012. P. 70. [interactive]. [accessed on 2014 
12 13] < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136084>.
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and/or the liquidation of failing banks49. The EU insolvency law was mainly regulated by 
national legal systems, and the lack of harmonisation was apparent50. When a significant 
number of banks faced severe distress problems in 2008, including the major market play-
ers such as Fortis, Dexia, the effective bank resolution regime was absent. For the reasons 
stated above, public authorities of the EU Member States were required to take legal bank 
restructuring measures in a chaotic way, and they therefore struggled to fight the prob-
lems of distressed banks, froze their property and seized bank assets located within their 
jurisdiction. In addition, national authorities have taken ad hoc legislative measures pro-
viding government guarantees and capital injections into a failing financial institution51. 
The EU bank insolvency regulations developed very dynamically. Before the entry into 
force of the Banking Union, bank resolution procedures lacked even the minimum level 
of harmonisation, their substance and procedures diverged significantly, depending on the 
Member State52. Prior to the adoption of the Banking Union’s proposals, some Member 
States individually began adopting the related amendments to the bank insolvency laws at 
the national level, while the others waited until the harmonisation of the bank resolution 
49 Attinger J.B. European Central Bank. Crisis management and bank resolution. Quo vadis, Europe? Legal 
Working paper Series, 2011. P. 36. Sarra J. Prudential, Pragmatic, and Prescient, Reform of Bank Reso-
lution Schemes. International Insolvency review. Vol. 21, 2012. P. 18-19.
50 The previous EU Winding-up Directive 2001/24/EC was more concerned with cross-border coor-
dination of insolvency processes, but did not introduce special resolution regimes as alternatives to 
bank insolvency. Nevertheless, most notably, the Directive did not regulate bank resolution schemes, 
but similarly did not apply to the needs of the Member State law and practice, there was no harmoni-
sation, the legislation was fragmentary and misleading (for example, competent authorities lacked the 
appropriate powers for bank resolution, insolvency of the banking groups and trans-national bank 
insolvency cases were not regulated. The lack of bank insolvency crisis management tools was appar-
ent. Previous law did not take into account the systemically important bank insolvency highlights, 
reorganisation of individual actions of national authorities was uncoordinated, ordinarily designed to 
defend national economic interests of depositors and to maximize bank assets in their interest, etc.). 
Viewed systemically, it could also be assumed that the Directive was unclear in terms of regulating 
bank restructuring procedure or bank liquidation, and each national legal system had the discretion 
to determine what was bank resolution and winding-up. This resulted in legal uncertainty and differ-
ent legal interpretations. Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions. Recitals (14), (15), 2 Art. 
51 According to the IMF estimates, the recent banking crisis-related losses experienced by the European 
banks between 2007 and 2010 amounted to approximately EUR 1 trillion or 8 percent of the total EU 
GDP. In particular, from October 2008 to October 2011, the European Commission approved 4.5 tril-
lion (37% of the EU GDP) in State aid measures dedicated to financial institutions.
52 Some Member States applied corporate insolvency law to banks, and some of them had very general, 
special insolvency rules for distressed banks. Some countries relied on judicially administered special 
insolvency procedures (Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), other countries dealt with 
bank insolvency procedures in ordinary courts, which inter alia administered insolvency proceedings 
(France, Hungary, Germany, Ireland, Spain). Due to different national laws on bank resolution rules 
and the associated varieties in administrative practices while dealing with bank restructuring effects, 
the confidence in the banking sector was decreasing and the volatility of the market increased, as there 
was no possibility to predict the consequences of the possible insolvency of a bank. Regulation (EU) 
No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms 
in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending 
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010. Art. 2. 
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framework at the EU level53. However, eventually, the need for an efficient bank resolution 
regime arose. The aim was to ensure a standardised bank resolution mechanism, to man-
age bank insolvency cases at the home Member States’ disposal, which could ensure that 
the use of internal markets was not limited and the right of establishment of banks was not 
restricted due to the financial resources designed to manage their failure. Prior to the legal 
project of the Banking Union, it was possible to classify bank insolvency legal regulation54 
both in general and special terms, but the main regulation governing insolvency proce-
dure in EU clearly excluded the specific regulation of financial institutions, and banks, 
from the scope and operation of primary insolvency law55. Initially, only the procedural 
aspects of insolvency law were harmonised at the EU level56. Eventually, the EU’s legal sys-
tem should be considered also because of the fact that, in practice, insolvency proceedings 
were initiated for such significant banks as Northern Rock57, Fortis58, Dexia59. It must be 
noted that in Lithuania, the two resonant and unprecedented bank insolvency cases where 
those of bank Snoras and Ūkio Bankas.
53 Otherwise, this would have resulted in the interference in the internal market and the smooth func-
tioning of the national authorities to collaborate in determining the dilemmas linked with falling 
cross-border banking groups or individual banks. For example, due to different methods, national 
authorities do not ensure a uniform level of control or do not have equal chances to restructure banks. 
In summary, this can differently impact bank funding costs in different Member States and distort 
competition between banks.
54 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May, 2000 on insolvency proceedings.
55 Ibid. Art. 1 (2).
56 The principles of universality and territoriality.
57 In September 2007 the Bank of England provided liquidity support and government guarantees for 
particular liabilities of the bank. In February 2008 the bank was nationalised by the British Govern-
ment.
58 The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg provided EUR 11.2 billion amount in capital. In Septem-
ber 2008 each country additionally took over 49% of bank shares. Subsequently, the bank was sold in 
parts, and the main part of the bank’s assets was sold to BNP Paribas in May 2009.
59 The bank was further re-capitalised by the French and Belgian Governments with over EUR 3 billion 
bank capital injections. These injections were placed in the framework of State aid in order to reopen 
access to the financial markets.
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THE ORIGINALITY AND THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
The originality of the research. The scientific analysis of bank insolvency law issues 
is valuable and novel in many scientific aspects. The vulnerabilities of the legal acts gov-
erning bank insolvency procedures and the gaps left by legislators become evident only 
during the banking crisis and/or in the case of systemically important cross-border bank 
insolvency. As a result, after the latest banking (financial) crisis, these loopholes became 
particularly sharp and resulted in abundant case-law on bank insolvency, which was not 
scientifically analysed neither in Lithuania nor in Switzerland. Moreover, this study is 
distinguished by the fact that in the context of bank insolvency procedures the legal doc-
trine is regarded as an essential source of jurisprudence. This position is based on the fact 
that most countries have ordinary, non-specialised courts, which often lack knowledge 
about banking activities necessary for handling bank insolvency cases. Since there are no 
specialised insolvency courts in Lithuania and Switzerland and the case-law analysis is 
lacking, this research provides novelty and explores new possibilities.
Based on the above-mentioned analysis and the problematic perspectives of existing 
banking and insolvency law, systemic and practical aspects of the research are beneficial. 
What solutions were adopted to resolve the legal dilemma in different jurisdictions, and 
have the problems been resolved? Given the intimate link between the international na-
ture of modern economy (globalisation), the spread of international (multinational) banks 
and the prevalence of banking group influence on the development of the world economy, 
bank insolvency law and research analysis is now the international point of reference. The 
lack of legal certainty and clarity affects the integration of unresolved problems into larger 
conflicts related to the variety of legal interpretations. Hence, the effect of the function of 
the law in terms of governing public relations and regulatory harmonisation of conflicting 
interests and functional performances is not ensured. On the contrary, the hypotheses that 
could prevent the stability of social ties are not eliminated, and this seems inconsistent 
with the individual development of certain relations and the extension of interpretations. 
To summarise, that does not meet the purposes of legal science and modern, sustainable 
business development trends, that is why the analysis of the research will also be useful in 
this particular regard.
Despite global attention for the research subject, to date Lithuania and Switzerland 
clearly lack the analysis of scientifically approved information, different regulatory models 
and approaches in different jurisdictions. After performing a qualified and comprehensive 
scientific study on the subject at issue, assumptions could be established for addressing 
these gaps, by improving the analysis in the field of legal and regulatory framework of 
bank insolvency procedures, by presenting the relevant proposals and recommendations. 
The originality of this scientific topic finds its expression in the complexity of the investi-
gation. Moreover, in the nearest future Lithuania will have to implement particular Bank-
ing Union directives and transpose them into national law60, meanwhile the SRM regula-
60 The BRRD Directive was adopted on 15 May 2014, and had to be transposed into national law by 31 
December 2014. However, it should be noted that the Member States shall apply the bail-in provisions 
from 1 January 2016 at the latest, but some of the transposition of the relevant provisions of the Direc-
tive will continue until 31 May 2016. The fact that the Directive coordinates general aspects of bank 
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tion will be directly applicable, that is why this study could form the basis of a review of 
the Lithuanian legal system.
In Lithuania and Switzerland, the extensively escalated bank insolvency law is still 
at the level of legal uncertainty. The supervisory response is further prevented by ‘secret’ 
decisions of the supervisory authority and the strongly restricted scope of the studies con-
ducted by the competent authorities related to the analysis of the insolvency procedures in 
Lithuania. Henceforth, the resonating practical processes taking place in the society and 
poor justification of scattered individual opinions also highlight the intended theoretical 
novelty of the dissertation. The complexity and significance of the research is determined 
by the reasons stated in this introductory part. In addition, the introduction itself likewise 
describes the grounds for research. It is anticipated that this qualitative scientific study 
will encourage to produce other reliable studies and help formulating uniform case-law 
meeting social needs. It is assumed that the research conclusions will serve the Lithu-
anian and the Swiss scientific legal doctrine and could be employed for pedagogical and 
educational activities. Among other things, the interest in the subject and the need for 
the analysis was also noted at the time of the author’s lecturing work at Mykolas Romeris 
University on the subjects of bankruptcy law and banking law61. It is assumed that the 
author presents a comprehensive study on bank insolvency law, which will encourage the 
scientific community to perform additional research in the aforementioned area and will 
prompt a discourse that will empower and foster bank insolvency law and banking law in 
general. What is more, the doctrine of the structure, development and improvement of the 
bank insolvency procedures also serves the interests of the related public and private in-
terests and their legal protection through providing greater legal certainty in this field. So 
far, in Lithuanian and Swiss private law, the current status of education is disappointing. 
Additionally, the dissertation proposes an important topic both in practice and in theory.
It should be further noted that a well-functioning legal system of the state encourages 
both the operation of financial markets and financial intermediaries. The established pre-
sumption found in the literature states that countries can be divided into categories by com-
paring the efficiency of the national legal system, especially that of financial transactions.62. 
Such a position is based on the fact that different financial systems have different regulatory 
levels, especially with regard to the protection of creditor and shareholder rights and the re-
lated regulatory rules. Thus, the financial development of each state also depends on the level 
of sound legal measures as a whole and their efficiency. Among other elements, the research 
resolution, and the technical features will be implemented through the EBA draft regulatory technical 
standards (EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission no later 
than the end of 2015, 3rd July.) is also an equally significant aspect. These rules will specify bank 
resolution procedures and content, and the legal obligation resulting from the Directive. In order to 
encourage restructuring and supervision, EBA publishes guidelines and specifies the methodology. 
Although the DGS directive has entered into force, the transposition of some of the relevant provi-
sions of the directive will continue until 31 May 2016.
61 E.g. the new banking law study programme approved by the MRU Business Law Department on 27 
April 2012 by the minutes No. 1VRTK-8 covers the topic “The global financial crisis and the legal 
consequences of a bank failure”, and is also closely related to the subject of financial markets designed 
for Master students.
62 Haan D.J., Oosterlo S., Schoenmaker D. European Financial Markets and Institutions. Cambridge 
University Press, UK, 2009. P. 25.
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might be relevant for lawmakers, especially governments performing particular operations 
in the context of bank insolvency procedures. First, the government aims to protect owner-
ship rights and guarantee the execution of contracts. Second, governmental regulation is 
needed to encourage the appropriate legal provisions on the protection of investor funds, so 
that their money is used in the most appropriate manner, and that the investors are able to 
adopt suitable investment decisions by using their funds. Third, governments organise legal 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions in order to maintain bank solvency. 
The study is mostly based on comparative law methodology. It was presumed that most 
regulatory questions could not be resolved by laws without sound comparative legal assis-
tance63, whether it takes the form of a general study or any kind of comparative analysis, or 
an analytical report on a particular topic. Among other things, comparative law specialists 
normally provide suggestions to be adopted and implemented in their national legal system, 
taking into account the relevant problems at issue and their solutions that proved successful 
in other countries, including differences in judicial procedures, powers of different institu-
tions, economic capacity, and the general social context. An equally important fact is that 
comparative law is based on the interpretation of national legal rules. In addition, compara-
tive law plays a significant role for the courts while interpreting and applying the law. Finally, 
comparative law plays a significant part in legal education64. Limiting general legal education 
to the studies of national law would be unexcusable, as modern society is very mobile, and it 
also helps better understanding one’s own domestic legal system and learning from others. 
The author expects that this study will serve as a practical and useful tool to courts 
dealing with such types of cases, to legislators in terms of improving and developing legal 
regulation, and to legal theoreticians and related experts. It is also assumed that the study 
will assist in analysing scientific problems.
The review of references. No comprehensive research on bank insolvency law and pro-
cedures, in particular in the field of bank resolution, has been conducted in the Lithuanian 
jurisprudence so far. Nor is there any comprehensive research on these issues in Switzerland. 
In Lithuania, general insolvency law has long been overlooked and as such is in the embry-
onic state65. In principle, the subject of bank insolvency law has been largely abandoned. 
Examination of the literature reveals that bank insolvency law remains terra incognita in the 
Lithuanian educational system. Besides the author’s publications on bank insolvency proce-
dures, some research work could be found in several research papers in Lithuanian language. 
In their publication entitled ‘Bankruptcy Law’, Kavalnė and Norkus give a general insight in 
banking and other financial institutions and their bankruptcy features, providing a brief de-
scription of bank liquidation procedures, key elements, and general characteristics of bank 
bankruptcy66. Toločko and Černius provide a general description of bank reorganisation, liq-
uidation and bankruptcy procedures67. Some causes and consequences of commercial bank 
63 Comparative law seems to present itself as a science pure and is enormously valuable for private law. 
Zweigert K., Kotz H. An Introduction to Comparative Law. Second Edition. Oxford Clarendon Press, 
UK, 1992. P. 4-5.
64 Hantrais, L. Improving Policy Responses and Outcomes to Socio-Economic Challenges: An International 
Social Research Methods Case Study. SAGE Publications Ltd., London, UK, 2014.
65 Kavalnė S., Norkus R. Bankroto teisė. Antroji knyga. Justitia, Vilnius, 2011. P. 13.
66 Ibid. P. 331-335.
67 Černius R., Toločko V. Teisinė bankų veiklos aplinka. Lietuvos bankininkystės, draudimo ir finansų 
institutas. Vilnius, 2002. P. 26.
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insolvency were analysed by Šadžius from a economical, historical perspective68. Šenavičius69 
published the original idea of the Banking Union in the context of public administration 
(before the political agreement on the Banking Union legislation was reached). The author 
of the article briefly refers to the essential elements of the Banking Union. 
It is necessary to point out that scientific publications referred above are commit-
ted to fragmented extent. However, they do not primarily analyse specific issues. In the 
above-mentioned works, bank insolvency procedures are examined restrictedly in order 
to introduce to conventional regulatory trends without reflecting the recent change of 
paradigm. Consequently, due to a significant change in the legal base of bank insolvency 
procedures, previous researches no longer satisfy the existing rules and regulatory cir-
cumstances. None of the individual studies examine bank insolvency procedures using 
a complex approach: examination of banking law, finance, corporate and insolvency law. 
None of the aforementioned studies have comprehensively accomplished and considered 
the bank resolution regime or examined the conditions for establishing bank insolvency, 
nor have they investigated the protection of shareholders’, depositors’ and other creditors’ 
rights, etc. In conclusion, this relevant subject receives little attention in the Lithuanian 
and Swiss doctrine and practice.
Compared to the Lithuanian legal doctrine, foreign legal sources devote much more 
attention to regulation of bank insolvency procedures, uncertain aspects of bank insol-
vency treatment, and various regional and international unification trends related to bank 
insolvency legal relations. Swire70, Hüpkes71, Asser72 and Hoelscher73 are the pioneers of bank 
insolvency procedures. In addition, problematic aspects of bank insolvency law were dis-
cussed by a number of other notable scientists, such as Lastra74, Bliss and Kaufman75, Marinč 
and Vlahos76. It should be noted that the vast majority of international legal scientists dealt 
68 Šadžius L. Lietuvos komercinių bankų raida 1988-2004, Socialinių mokslų tyrimų institutas. Vilnius, 
2005. P. 268-323.
69 Šenavičius V. Europos Sąjungos viešosios politikos tendencijos bankų sektoriuje. Viešoji politika ir 
administravimas Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Kauno technologijos universitetas. Vilnius. No. 3, 
2013. P. 405-416.
70 Swiret P.P. Supra note 9. 
71 Hüpkes E. The legal aspects of bank insolvency. A comparative analysis of Western Europe, the United 
States and Canada. Kluwer Law International. MPG Books Ltd, Great Britain, 2000. Hüpkes E. Reso-
lution in an international context-what‘s new? Schweizerische Zeitschrift Wirtschafts- und Finanz-
markrecht. Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, S.486, 2013. Hüpkes E. Insolvency-why a special regime 
for banks? Current developments in monetary and financial law, Vol.3. IMF, Washington DC, 2005.
72 Asser T.M.C. Legal Aspects of Regulatory Treatment of Banks in Distress. Washington DC, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2001.
73 Hoelscher D. Supra note 2.
74 Lastra R.M. Bank failures and bank insolvency law in economies in transition. Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 1999. Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Oxford university press, New York, 2011. Lastra 
R.M. Responses to the Financial Crisis. Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation Vol. 26, No. 
7, 2011. P. 307-312.
75 Bliss R., Kaufman G. US Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Eval-
uation. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper, 2006.
76 Marinč M., Vlahu R. The Economics of Bank Bankruptcy law. Springer – Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 
Berlin, 2012.
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with the problem of compatibility of public and private interest in bank resolution regime 
indirectly, by investigating various legal principles or institutes. For example, they have ana-
lysed the “too big to fail“ doctrine, the interaction of private and public authorities (Deposit 
Insurance Agencies, Ministry of Finance, the judiciary system, the Central Bank), by legally 
assessing the systemic banking insolvency crisis, examining creditors’ and shareholders’ 
rights, etc. At the same time, from the banking crisis up to now, regulation of bank insol-
vency has been swiftly progressing. The most relevant pieces of legislation were adopted 
quite recently, providing the author with an excellent opportunity to provide a critical in-
sight into bank insolvency law-related doctrine of different jurisdictions.
However, only some scientific papers analyse and disclose the legal aspects of bank 
insolvency related to the research object. In particular, the interaction of public and pri-
vate interests is examined by Hüpkes77, Alexander78, Hadjiemmanuil79. Individual issues 
of bank resolution regime, such as the bail-in mechanism, are analysed by Huertas80, 
Smits81, Coffee82. Legal and regulatory reforms of bank insolvency are discussed by Sar-
ra83, Boonstra84, also Giovanoli85. Furthermore, a variety of authoritative publications of 
international organisations and public institutions, such as the International Bank of Set-
tlements, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund86, and others analyse bank 
resolution and liquidation-related and regulatory problems. It is equally important to 
note that due to the extreme sensitivity of the topic, various scientific studies, often in 
collaboration with the academics, were commissioned by the European Commission87, 
77 Hüpkes E. Special bank resolution and shareholders’ rights: balancing competing interests. Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 17, No.3, 2013.
78 Alexander K. Bank Resolution Regimes: Balancing Prudential Regulation and Shareholders Rights. 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 2009. Vol. 9, No.1. P. 197-227.
79 Hadjiemmanuil C. Special Resolution Regimes for Banking Institutions: Objectives and Limitations. 
London School of Economics and Political Science. Law department. Working Paper No. 21, 2013.
80 Huertas F.T. Supra note 25.
81 Smits R. Is my money safe at European banks? Reflections on the „bail-in“ provisions in recent EU legal 
texts. Capital Markets Law Journal. Oxford University Press. Vol. 9, No. 2, 2014. 
82 Coffee J.C. Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk. Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 380, 2010.
83 Sarra J. Prudential, Pragmatic, and Prescient, Reform of Bank Resolution Schemes. International Insol-
vency Review. Vol. 21, No. 1, 2012. P. 17–66.
84 Boonstra W.V.B. Will better regulation and better supervision contribute to a more stable banking sec-
tor? Economic research Department, Rabobank, Nederland, 2014.
85 Giovanoli M., Devo D. International Monetary and Financial Law. The Global Crisis. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010. (in) Giovanoli M. The International Financial Architecture and its reform after the 
global crisis.
86 Parker D.C., IMF. Closing a Failed Bank: Resolution Practices and Procedures. Washington, D.C, 
2011. IMF, WB. An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insol-
vency. IMF, European Department, 2009. Cihak M., Nier E. The Need for Special Resolution Regimes 
for Financial Institutions- The Case of the European Union, 2009. WB. Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditors‘ Rights Systems, 2001.
87 EC. A roadmap towards a Banking Union. Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council, COM.510 final, 2012. EC. An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Finan-
cial Sector. Brussels, 20.10.2010 , COM(2010) 579 final. EC. Staff working document. Proposal for a BRRD 
directive. Impact assessment. Accompanying the document. Brussels, 6.6.2012.SWD (2012) 166 final.
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the European Council88, the European Parliament89, the Financial Stability Board90, etc. 
The study is also based on authoritative conference materials91 or publications issued on 
their basis92.
Ultimately, it must be noted that the object of the research is rather limited in the Swiss 
jurisprudence. Excluding above mentioned Hüpkes scientific works, only a few materials 
can be distinguished as a scientific projects. Some cross-border bank resolution aspects of 
the EU dealt within Grünewald93 dissertation (the thesis is written based on undeclared 
EU legislation before a compromise was taken in the EP – aut. note). DGS related issues 
in the context of financial stability discussed by Reiser94. The interaction of banks and the 
Swiss economics is addressed in the Drechel95 dissertation.
The published references were addressed and taken into account up to 1 January 2015.
Interdisciplinary nature of the research. This study has an interdisciplinary char-
acter. This is determined by the selection of the object under investigation and the 
specific nature of bank insolvency law. This branch of law couples the accomplishments 
of several scientific disciplines. Among them, the most important ones are economic 
and legal sciences. Occasionally, the study discusses theories based on economic cri-
teria, impact assessment, and the definitions provided by the science of economics. 
For example, the assessment of bank insolvency conditions is related to the economic 
analysis and criteria, or the effect of bank insolvency on the market and its participants. 
However, the study takes into account the fact that it has been prepared by a legal 
researcher and will be defended in front of the Committee of Doctoral Legal Studies, 
which is why the scientific analysis is concentrated and based on traditional private 
law instruments. Particular attention is paid to addressing the current and potential 
regulatory mechanisms.
88 European Council. Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Report by President of the 
European Council Herman Van Rompuy. EUCO 120/12 and EUCO 205/12, 2012.
89 EP. Economic and Monetary affairs. Directorate General for Internal Policies. Banking Union: The 
Single Resolution Mechanism. Compilation of notes, Monetary Dialogue. Brussels, 2013. EP. Prepared 
by A. Sibert. Economic and Monetary affairs. Directorate General for Internal Policies. Bank Resolu-
tion Regimes. Brussels, 2012. 
90 FSB. Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions. 2011. FSB. Thematic re-
view on resolution regimes. Peer review Report, 2011 and 2013.
91 Sarra J. INSOL International Insolvency Review, Reform of Bank Resolution Schemes. John Wiley & 
Sons, Ltd, International Insolvency Review, Vol. 21, 2002.
92 Haentjens M., Wessels B. Bank Recovery and Resolution. A conference Book. Hazelhoff. Center for Fi-
nancial Law. Eleven International Publishing. The Netherlands, 2014. The EUROFI Financial Forum, 
organised in association with the Lithuania EU Presidency. Improving the resilience of the financial 
sector to foster EU economic recovery. Summary of discussions. Vilnius, Conference book, 2013. Bank 
of England. Speech given by Paul Tucker. Resolution and future of finance. At the INSOL International 
World Congress, the Hague, 2013
93 Grünewald S.N. The Resolution of Cross-Border Banking Crises in the European Union – A Legal Study 
from the Perspective of Burden Sharing. Dissertation. University of Zurich, Zurich, 2014.
94 Reiser N. Deposit Insurance and its Contribution to System Stability. Swiss Review of Business and 
Financial Market Law, Vol. 86, Nr. 1, 2014.
95 Drechel B.S.D. Supra note 39.
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Defensive arguments of the dissertation:
1. The paradigm of bank insolvency procedures has changed recently in the juris-
dictions relevant for the purposes of the research. The change resulted in the 
particular aspect, namely that private interests of shareholders and creditors have 
become subordinated to the public interest, which is to secure the continuity of 
banking services and at the same time the stability of the financial system. Bank 
resolution in the first place and then the ensuing ordinary liquidation of the bank 
helps to ensure the optimal balance of public and private interests.
2. Public administrative authorities initiate resolution of failing or likely to fail 
banks, while the court plays a secondary role. Although actions in the field of 
bank resolution affect the bank’s shareholders and creditors, the administrative 
model of resolution decision-making is more rapid and efficient, as compared 
with judicial solutions of bank resolution, by maintaining financial stability and 
better protecting credit discipline in the market. 
3. The procedural rights of the creditors and shareholders of the bank that is failing 
or likely to fail are essentially limited to the ex-post option of judicial review, so 
that the legal framework for opposing the decisions of the competent resolution 
authorities is very limited. Such limitation of individual rights is necessary in or-
der to achieve wider purposes of financial stability, but at the same time it should 
be compatible with fundamental rights (the right of judicial review, the right to 
compensation) of related persons and the legal principles developed in case-law 
(principles of legitimate expectations and proportionality).
4. After the shift in the paradigm of legal regulation governing bank insolvency 
in the relevant jurisdictions, bank resolution measures are sufficient to prevent 
bank insolvency ex ante–and to effectively deal with the consequences of bank 
insolvency ex post.
The approval of research results. The results of the research are published in three 
peer-reviewed, official Lithuanian publications96. The principal results of the thesis were 
presented in different international conferences and accordingly published in their official 
collections of materials97. 
96 January 2014, “Bank Resolution Mechanisms According to the Lithuanian Case Study”, peer review 
journal Jurisprudence. September 2014 “Bank Liquidation As Interference of Public and Private Inter-
ests”, peer review journal Jurisprudence. November 2014 “Financial Arrangements under the Single 
Resolution Mechanism. Several Problematic Aspects”, peer review journal Justitia.
97 (i) Legal aspects of bank restructuring. Practice and research in private and public sector – 2013: 3rd 
international scientific conference: conference proceedings, 11–12 April 2013. Vilnius, Mykolas Rom-
eris University; (ii) Protection of uninsured depositor rights in bank insolvency proceedings. Social 
transformations in contemporary society: proceedings of an international scientific conference for 
young researchers. Mykolas Romeris University. Association of Doctoral Candidates. Vilnius, Myko-
las Romeris University, 2013; (iii) Towards a banking union: single resolution mechanism enhanc-
ing banking industry? SOCIN 2013: international, interdisciplinary conference on social innovations 
“Social innovations: theoretical and practical insights”. Vilnius, Mykolas Romeris University, 2013; 
(iv) A legal perspective of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Social Transformation in Contemporary 
Society, Vilnius, Mykolas Romeris University, 2014; (v) Bank restructuring and insolvency tendencies 
in Lithuania and the European Union. 2013. New Challenges in the European Area: Young Scientist’s 
1st International Baku Forum, International conference in Azarbaijan; (vi) Financial arrangements 
under the last pillar of the Banking Union a few controversial legal aspects”. SOCIN 2014: interna-
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The outcome of the research was also delivered in different universities, public lec-
tures, debates and workshops98. 
In addition, in May 2013 the author co-organised, managed and presented a report at 
the national scientific conference “Fraudulent bankruptcy: causes, typology, legal conse-
quences”, hosted by Mykolas Romeris University, under the presentation title “Fraudulent 
bankruptcy features of the banks. Lithuanian case study”, and the author also discussed 
certain aspects of bank insolvency procedures in the same workshop. The results of the re-
search were also relied on in 2013 and 2014 in cooperation with the expert in the Council of 
the EU in Brussels, in the Lithuanian Presidency team responsible for an extremely impor-
tant field of the EU legislation, namely the Banking Union project99. The author also relied 
on the results of the research by reading lectures in civil law and banking law at Mykolas 
Romeris University, and by conducting his practical and professional activities. To con-
tinue, the research results were also deliberated and reflected in the work of the Lithuanian 
Insolvency Law Network. It is also necessary to highlight that the author relied on the re-
sults of the study while preparing and submitting a legal opinion together with the Business 
Law Department of Mykolas Romeris University on a resonant case heard in the Lithua-
nian Constitutional Court, revealing the interpretative peculiarities of the legal regulation 
concerning setting-off counterclaims, hierarchy of bank creditors in the event of bank 
insolvency and the related issues of Lithuania bank insolvency law100.
tional, interdisciplinary conference on social innovations “Social Innovations: theoretical and practi-
cal insights 2014”, 2014. Vilnius, Mykolas Romeris University.
98 11 November 2014, University of Bern, “Sciex Fellows Event 2014”. The presentation title “Why bank 
insolvency cases are so special”? 16 December 2014 in the Swiss Comparative Law Institute, Laus-
anne, the public event of “Rencontres informelles de l’Institut Suisse de droit compare”, where the 
topic of “Regulatory convergences and divergences of a new bank resolution paradigm in the EU and 
Switzerland” was introduced. Moreover, the results of the thesis were delivered to the Ph.D. student 
society at the University of Basel, 30-31 October 2014, at the transferable skills seminar “Bring Your 
Science to the People: Media Strategies and Skills for Communicating Science”. Eventually, on 19 June 
2015, the results of the thesis were presented at the international symposium of Mykolas Romeris and 
Basel Universities, entitled “Innovations and developments in the business law. EU and Switzerland 
approaches”, under the title “Bank insolvencies: a unique bank resolution regime?”.
99 The author’s core responsibilities were also directly related to Bank Recovery and Resolution Direc-
tive, Single Resolution Mechanism and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive. The Lithuanian 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, has achieved significant results in the regulatory 
context of bank insolvency. One of the most significant results was the agreement with the European 
Parliament on the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive laying down the rules for bank resolu-
tion. The Directive will have to be transposed into national law and will take effect in January 2015 
(with some restrictions). In addition, a part of the abovementioned elements of the Directive will be 
incorporated in the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. On 18 December 2013 the Lithuanian 
Presidency had also reached a compromise agreement in the European Council. The Directive and the 
Regulation, inter alia, regulate the legal relations of bank resolution and bank insolvency procedures, 
harmonise the legal procedures and the basic rules in the EU.
100 On 5 July 2013 the Constitutional Court of Lithuania delivered a ruling on the constitutionality of (i) 
creditor ranking in bank insolvency; (ii) the possibility to set-off claims against an insolvent bank only 
to the extent of the insured amount under the deposit insurance scheme; (iii) the restrictions on chal-
lenging decisions related to the split up of the bank, if the insolvent bank‘s assets are split into ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ bank prior to insolvency.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research is based on the qualitative methodological approach101. This approach, 
relying on qualitative methods, allows perceiving the bank resolution regime and liqui-
dation procedures together with the relevant obstacles. The research was largely based 
on theoretical and empirical methods: linguistic, systematic, logical, critical, document 
analysis.
The study is further based on methodological legal research outlines (basic methodo-
logical principles) better suited for dynamic form of law102. The research is dominated 
by active methodology, conventional science, conceiving law as an entirety of legal rules, 
accurately reflected in national legislation. The research also employed the methods of 
typical scientific knowledge, hermeneutics (interpretation), all helpful for understanding, 
interpreting and executing the law. Legal science is determined not only by the facts, as 
inter alia it implies interpretations and application of the existing knowledge to new fields 
of research. Thus, the object of the research is mainly based on the theory of analysis and 
understanding and characterised by qualitative methods, by combining experience and 
effort to explain the genuine meaning. The author of this study construes the text, crystal-
lises and defines bank insolvency relations, by exploring the balance of public and private 
interests in the bank resolution regime. Based on such methodological grounds and ac-
cording to the formulated aims and objectives of the study, various methods of data collec-
tion and data analysis were applied. The research is in compliance with the jurisprudence: 
(1) to determine social certainty of the facts, phenomenon and their characteristics; (2) 
to explain these facts and expose causal connections; (3) to assess the factual basis of the 
regulation at issue and to examine its value.
1) The method of linguistic analysis was applied for interpreting the diversity of na-
tional laws, court judgments, internationally acknowledged guidance and rele-
vant readings, including the wording of international and the EU, US, Swiss laws 
and legal concepts.
2) The method of document analysis was employed by collecting and examining 
the regulation, non-binding international legislation, explanatory documents of 
competent authorities, court judgments and legal doctrine, such as special scien-
tific publications, monographs, textbooks, journals in Lithuania, the US, Switzer-
land and the EU. The aforementioned method was also used for the purposes of 
the research to analyse different publications of international bodies and public 
institutions. The abovementioned method had no improper influence on the ap-
proach selected by the researcher. Initial research data was obtained from gen-
eral law, insolvency law, banking and financial law, administrative law, deposit 
insurance law, and other legislation governing failing or likely to fail banks in the 
relevant jurisdictions. The same method was also used for collecting the data for 
101 Bitinas B., Rupšienė L., Žydžiūnaitė V. Kokybinių tyrimų metodologija. Jokužio leidykla, Klaipėda, 
2008.
102 Mackuvienė E. Teisės mokslo ir jurisprudencijos moksliškumo problema. Socialinių mokslų studijos. 
Vol. 1, No.5, 2010. P. 301.
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the dissertation in the EU, the US, Swiss and Lithuanian universities libraries and 
databases or internet references. 
3) The method of systemic approach was used to estimate and classify the prevail-
ing bank insolvency procedures, more specifically bank resolution procedures, 
their legal context and regulation at national and international level. This method 
allowed the author to examine the bank resolution regime as a complex legal 
phenomenon together with social, economic context and assisted in determining 
the correct position of bank insolvency law in the legal systems, the systemically 
connection between lex generalis and lex specialis. 
4) The logical method was applied by consciously reviewing the available facts and 
details related to bank resolution relationships, by inferring interim and final 
conclusions of the research. 
5) The method of generalisation was applied in conjunction with the logical method, 
in order to highlight the features of the regime governing bank resolution, clas-
sify common and specific components, abstracted in the conclusions and recom-
mendations. 
6) The teleological approach encouraged the author to disclose the objective reasons 
underlying regulation of different bank resolution tools; in addition, this method 
was adopted in examining and revealing the purposes of bank insolvency law and 
the limits of interpretation. Similarly, this method served the analysis of national 
and international laws, different court judgments, and was useful in identifying 
the factors and circumstances triggering bank insolvency cases, impact on share-
holders’ and creditors’ rights, public institutions’ activities and decision making 
mechanisms. The method proved helpful for revealing the meaning of legal texts 
and diagnosing limits of interpretation. It should be noted that this method was 
used in parallel with the historical, linguistic and systematic methods of analysis 
in determining the position of the legislator with regard to a particular issue of 
the research. 
7) The comparative method remained crucial for distinguishing diverse classes of 
banks, different types of bank insolvency procedures, legal constructs of different 
countries and distinct legal traditions, as well as for the evaluation of enduring 
scientific concepts, their legal framework and practice. In principle, the method 
implies a comparison of the EU, US, and Swiss legal systems and countries. It is an 
intellectual activity with the law as its objectives, limitations and the comparison 
as its process. This method allowed crossing the boundaries of one legal system 
and investigating more acceptable and reliable solutions applied in other juris-
dictions. It also enabled the author to align the specific features of regulation and 
the implementing institutes applied in different countries and to identify innova-
tive approaches and controlling ideas in order to maintain the argumentation of 
the research. This method reveals differences and similarities of the legal systems 
and purifies universal problems. It determines original alternatives for resolving 
enduring puzzles. To be noted, the method was used both in terms of macro (to 
compare the spirit and style of various legal systems, legislative practices and 
procedures) and micro (compare a range of specific, selected legal systems, the 
particular rules used to solve relevant problems or particular conflicts of interest) 
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approach103. The study draws an admittedly flexible dividing line between macro 
and micro comparison. The research was performed by relying on and processing 
legal materials and procedures. The aforementioned method explores how the 
related rules have been designed and developed by legislators or courts of dif-
ferent jurisdictions, in an attempt to identify and clarify the practical context of 
application, so that the reader can understand the reasons for particular solutions 
of the relevant problems in foreign legal systems. 
8) The method of analytical and critical thought was used to analyse the weaknesses 
and implementation dysfunctional, the causes of bank resolution and (or) the liq-
uidation legal regulatory procedures, and consideration of the public and private 
interests. Relying on this method, it was evaluated how the law is satisfying the 
protection requirements of a special period of law. The method applied for legal 
critique and desired law vision.
Some other research methods were employed in the scientific study: the genetic meth-
od served in establishing the emergence and development of bank insolvency law; the 
deductive method was relevant for analysing general rules established in legal norms and 
by specifying their practical application; the inductive method assists in examining the 
case-law specific matters and the appropriate conclusions; the historical method was ap-
plied for revealing the genesis of the bank resolution regime, the meaning of legal rules 
and the factors determining the variety of regulation and interpretation of the law and the 
development of regulation in different countries, and the factors influencing insolvency of 
the banks, seeking to identify the fundamental elements of the legal relationship; while the 
statistical method was useful for processing the statistic material.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH
In line with the formulated tasks of the research, the operative part of the study con-
sists of four main chapters. 
In the first chapter, which is the opening chapter of the study, author addresses and 
analyses the general provisions, preconditions for and the conceptual framework of 
bank insolvency procedures. This chapter clarifies several terminological aspects of the 
thesis, defines the essential features of banks, highlights the public interest-related func-
tions of the banks, overviews the influence of the recent banking crisis on the economy, 
and comments on the roots of the bank insolvency proceedings. Moreover, this chapter 
demonstrates why bank insolvency dilemmas are irrelevant from the perspective of gen-
eral insolvency law. This section explores the conception of bank insolvency procedures, 
analyses the interrelation of bank insolvency procedures, problematic issues related to the 
establishment of bank failure, by distinguishing quantitative and qualitative as well as dis-
cretionary criteria. This chapter concludes with a summary of the types of bank insolvency 
procedures in different jurisdictions, reviews and summarises the unification of regional 
and international trends, and analyzes the recent change in the paradigm of bank insol-
vency law. 
103 Zweigert K., Kotz H. An Introduction to comparative law. Second Edition. Oxford Clarendon Press. 
Great Britain, 1992. P. 4-5.
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The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the bank resolution regime itself. Given 
that the regulation of bank resolution should be designed not only to protect the private 
interests (shareholders and creditors), but must also to serve broader objectives of public 
regulatory nature that are vital for the effective functioning of the economy, this section 
analyses the concept of bank resolution in different jurisdictions and the related adminis-
trative practices. The concept of bank resolution is revealed and the reasons determining 
the importance of bank resolution are analysed. Relevant focus is placed on the resolution 
conditions of banks in different jurisdictions, by detailing the specific objectives of resolu-
tion. Eventually, given the fact that the efficiency of the legal measures for bank resolution 
is necessary in order to avoid preventable damages in the banking industry, this part of the 
thesis is dedicated to the crystallisation of specific bank resolution tools (sale of bank busi-
ness, the bridge bank, bail-in, asset separation tool) and their implementation schemes, 
depending on the objective to preserve financial stability and minimise the economic and 
social impact of bank insolvency. 
The third chapter analyses the public authorities that aim to ensure swift measures 
of bank resolution and to guarantee sovereignty, seeking to avoid conflicts of public and 
private interests. Particular consideration is given to decision-making and controlling 
mechanisms in the field of bank resolution, the right to judicial review (the right to due 
process and effective remedy), and the procedures and objectives underlying valuation of 
assets and liabilities. This chapter researches the optimal regulatory model that would be 
the most productive in addressing the possible decision-makers in the field of bank reso-
lution: administrative authorities, creditors or courts? This chapter inter alia assesses the 
decision-making models in different jurisdictions, overviews the key public authorities 
and their role in the bank resolution procedures.
The fourth chapter, which is the most crucial chapter, administers the main question 
of the research, analyses bank resolution procedures and their impact on the bank’s share-
holders and creditors. It explains that the restriction of fundamental rights of individuals 
is necessary for the sake of broader financial stability objectives, by assessing the propor-
tionality of such limitations. The resolution objectives are examined in cases where the 
application of resolution measures and legal powers can limit shareholders’ and credi-
tors’ rights and whether the interference of the resolution-related actions with the rights 
of creditors and shareholders complies with the fundamental rights of individuals and 
is proportionate. The review also establishes the rights and interests of shareholders and 
creditors from different perspectives. The presented case-law analysis identifies the fun-
damental legal principles and legal safeguards best balancing private and public interests 
in the bank resolution regime. This chapter discusses the impact on individual property 
rights, by analysing the loss allocation order, the implementation of creditors’ claims and 
priority of claims. It also discusses the options of different treatment of creditors, inves-
tigates legal safeguards (by analysing the impact on shareholders and creditors), explains 
the concept that creditors should not incur losses that exceed the ones incurred in case of 
straight liquidation of the bank (based on ordinary bankruptcy procedure) supporting the 
balance of public and private interests in bank resolution procedures. 
The study is finalised by presenting the relevant conclusions and recommendations. 
38
I. THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF  
BANK INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES
Banks perform vital economic functions, and their primary mission is to provide fi-
nancial “lifeblood” to the real economy104. In order to understand the precise notion of 
banks, in the spirit of the dissertation, and particularly in the context of bank insolvency 
regulation, to analyse the object of the research, to detect and investigate the main ques-
tion of the research, it is necessary to conceive what a ‘bank’ is and especially a bank as a 
business entity and why its legal determination is different from that of other entities. In 
Lithuania, the methodological material in the field of banking law is lacking105. According 
to the well-established conventional belief, a bank is a financial institution that accepts 
deposits from the public and re-lends the collected money. However, it should be noted 
that even the simplest conception of a bank as a legal person is much more complex and 
challenging and banking functions are considerably wider than those of the remaining 
conventional businesses. Therefore, in a society the ‘mainstream’ approach to banking is 
too narrow and worth of a broader scientific judgment.
Despite very rapid dynamics in financial services106, banks still play a vital role in na-
104 Theissen R. Are the EU Banks safe? What functions do banks have? Eleven International Publishing, 
Netherlands, 2013. P. 30.
105 This conclusion is based on the analysis of electronic researches and dissertations information system 
in Lithuania, virtual Lithuanian university libraries, subscription databases, publicly available data of 
the competent authorities, taking into account conferences or other events organised on a national 
level in the field of bank insolvency law. In addition, financial literacy determines a reliable and sound 
banking system, therefore, financially well-educated individuals are more likely to be engaged in sound 
financial planning and adopt better financial decisions. Financial education contributes to better finan-
cial solutions, market discipline and the maintenance of financial stability. Sabourin P.J. Rethinking the 
Role of Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis. (in) Supra note 27. P. 137.
106 The dynamics is reflected by the fact that, on the one hand, recently the range of financial services 
has greatly expanded. In addition to unlicensed financial services, such as lending, payment card re-
leases, financial guarantee and surety of financing, etc (for instance, the full list of unlicensed financial 
services in Lithuania is contained in Article 3(1) of the Financial Institutions Act), and conventional, 
licensed financial services, such as deposits or other repayable funds from unprofessional market 
players, commercial banks start actively supplying other licensed services, such as investment services 
and other activities related to the provision of financial services: cash operations, non-maturity de-
posits, termed deposits, securities, shares, and a long list of other financial contracts treated as finan-
cial assets of the bank. The doctrine still equates other financial assets to the bank’s contractual rights. 
Contractual bank rights are legally based financial means to obtain cash or another financial asset 
from another counterparty or to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another legal 
person under the conditions that are potentially more useful for the property holder, or the issuer. The 
bank’s contractual rights include debts and capital securities viewed as an asset from the perspective of 
their holder and as liabilities from the perspective of the issuer. On the other hand, it should be noted 
that the global development of e-commerce has accordingly influenced the banking sector: electronic 
banking services and products, including electronic payment, were rapidly developing, which could 
in turn create new opportunities for banks to expand their markets from the traditional deposit col-
lection and lending activities to new products and services. Thirdly, the extent of bank financial inter-
mediation activities has highly increased, and despite the growing capital market activities, mobilising 
capital for the parties concerned, banks still remain the primary source of liquidity for enterprises. 
Hüpkes E. Supra note 3. P. 3-5. Chorafas N.D. Supra note 8. P. 28.
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tional economies107 and implement unique features. Recently, the regulatory framework 
of the banking sector has been globally reviewed. Bank capital and liquidity reserves were 
increased and it was recognized as a more suitable macro-prudential policy tools108. In par-
allel, legal and regulatory reforms of bank insolvency were implemented within individual 
jurisdictions both at regional and international level with an attempt to reduce the likeli-
hood of future bank insolvencies and similarly to enhance the resilience of credit institu-
tions, even under the most unfavorable economic conditions (regardless of the determinant 
reasons – disorders of the entire system or several insolvency events specific to a particular 
bank). Nevertheless, it is not possible to create a regulatory and supervisory legal frame-
work for banking that would prevent banks from experiencing financial difficulties109.
This chapter analyses the general conceptual aspects of legal relations surrounding 
bank insolvency: it reveals the connection between banks and the public interest, provides 
the definition of bank insolvency procedures, identifies the types and the principal objec-
tives of bank insolvency procedures. It also deals with the impact of the banking crisis on 
the economy as a whole and the development of the bank insolvency legal systems (har-
monisation and unification at international and regional level). Furthermore, this chapter 
distinguishes legal and economic features that affect the specific regulation of insolvent 
banks, compared with conventional general insolvency regulation. While looking for an 
answer to these questions, first of all, it is necessary to analyse the reasons why lex generalis 
107 For example, banks of the EU financial system account for approximately three-quarters of the real 
economy. The EU banking market consists of 28 national banking systems. Each national banking 
system has its unique features, different number of banks at various levels of concentration and dif-
ferent levels of intensity of competition among banks. It should be emphasized that the contribution 
of banks to the GDP of the EU by 2007 was growing intensively. It continued to grow in 2007, when 
total bank assets increased, and GDP ratio was about 300%. By December 2008 the number of banks 
in Europe have attained the highest level. 23.37% of all banks were located in Germany, 9.61%in Italy, 
and 8.55% in France. It should also be noted that in 2007, the profit achieved by European commercial 
bank groups was higher compared to the profit obtained by the US commercial bank groups (exclud-
ing investment banking groups and their profit). Barnier M. The G20 must remain committed to global 
implementation of financial reforms. The EUROFI Financial Forum. Supra note 92. P. 37. Olgu O. Eu-
ropean Banking. Enlargement, Structural Changes and Recent Developments. Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011. P. 90-91, 131, 140. Swiss banking sector contributions to the entire national eco-
nomic performance is approximately 6.2%. Also, Swiss banks are among the world leaders in offshore 
banking. In 2012, according to the data of the Swiss National Bank, Swiss bank accounts contained 
about CHF 5.3 trillion in cash. According to the data of 2012, the banking industry in Switzerland 
collected around CHF 11.2 billion of income taxes to the Swiss budget. In addition, 5.8% of all Swiss 
employees operate in the financial services sector and the financial sector’s contributions to the coun-
try’s GDP is around 10.5%. Bauen M., Rouiller N. Supra note 39. P. 3. Nguyen D. Q. Is Switzerland re-
ally the country of bankers? Swissinfo [interactive]. [accessed on 04-10-2014] <http://www.swissinfo.
ch/eng/is-switzerland-really-the-country-of-bankers-/40473658>. In the US, from 1978 up to 2007, 
the monetary funds held in the financial sector increased from USD 3 trillion to 36 trillion, i.e. more 
than twice, compared to the country’s GDP. Furthermore, a significant change of nature in banking 
and banks themselves was obvious. From conservative private partnerships to companies with shares 
publicly traded on the stock exchange. On the eve of the financial crisis, the profit of the financial sec-
tor accounted for 27% of the profit of all the remaining US corporations. The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report. Supra note 28. Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Preface. (xv-xxviii). 
Čihak M., Nier E. Supra note 15. P. 4.
108 Chorafas N.D. Supra note 8. P. 105-123.
109 Bonstra W.V.B. Supra note 84. P. 17.
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is insufficient for effective regulation of bank insolvency procedures. In order to provide a 
scientifically-based answer to these questions, it is first necessary to analyse and identify 
the specific features of banking activities, mainly the public interest inherent in such ac-
tivities, the reasons why banks around the world are treated and regulated in an exclusive 
manner. Only after a general analysis it would be possible to accurately disclose the nature 
of the bank resolution legal regime and to explore the problematic aspects of the object 
under research.
At the beginning of the research, it is equally important to perceive that banking is 
characterised by high degree of assimilation in definitions. Therefore, in order to fully 
understand the uniqueness and complexity of the regulatory framework governing bank 
insolvency, it is useful to distinguish and define several aspects of banking and related 
terminology used in the dissertation. First, in modern times traditional commercial banks 
normally concurrently carry out many special functions characteristic to non-traditional 
(investment) banks. Second, it is assumed that activities unrelated to banking, such as as-
set management, or insurance services may not adversely affect the stability of the finan-
cial system (if the banking system remains unaffected). Therefore, such types of banks are 
outside the scope of this study. Third, this study concentrates on and examines traditional 
commercial banks as deposit-taking and credit-financing institutions. According to the 
common understanding widespread and dominant in Europe (this understanding is also 
followed in this study), the definition of a bank may in some cases include investment 
firms, and in a rare occasions it involves other financial institutions incorporated into 
banking groups or holding structures110. In certain exceptional cases it includes banks, 
inter alia, operating on a cross-border basis. Fourth, it should be noted that the study 
occasionally uses the terms of a bank111 and credit institution interchangeably. According 
to the legal systems of the relevant jurisdictions coming within the scope of the research, 
these notions are essentially indistinguishable. According to the most relevant EU leg-
islation ‘a credit institution’ is understood as a company that accepts deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and grants credits on its own account, and this concept 
includes investment firms, except for central banks and credit unions112. Although Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive draws a clear distinction between the extent of busi-
ness structure of investment firms (investment banks113) and credit institutions, both com-
panies come within the scope of the Directive and accordingly fall within the concept of 
110 BRRD. 2 art.
111 The study follows the concepts of a ‘bank’ commonly accepted in the EU. The term ‘bank’ means credit 
institution, a company that accepts deposits or other repayable funds from the public and grants 
credits on its own account, except for investment firms, central banks, credit unions (save for the 
Central Credit Union). Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit insti-
tutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC 
and 2006/49/EC (1), 2 (5) art. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (1), 4 (1) (1) art.
112 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June, Art. 2 (5). Regula-
tion (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, 4 Art. (1) (1). 
113 See more Gleeson S. International Regulation of Banking. Investment Banking. Second Edition. Ox-
ford University Press, UK, 2012. P. 209-281.
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a credit institution. However, for the sake of structural convenience of the dissertation, an 
investment firm as well as traditional banks are understood as a “bank”, whereas a banking 
group is understood as defined in the EU law, i.e., a parent bank, a legal entity belong-
ing to a banking group, and its subsidiaries. A cross-border banking group is a banking 
group whose entities have been established in more than one Member State114. A banking 
group is a parent company and its subsidiaries, consisting of entities operating as credit 
institutions and their parent companies, including financial holding companies and mixed 
financial holding companies for investment firms and financial institutions115.
In the Swiss legal system, the term “bank”116 has been used in legislation since 1935, 
i.e. the time of adoption and entry into force of the first Swiss banking law117. Under the 
existing banking act, a bank can only be understood in terms of a legal person meeting 
the following requirements: legal personality, license, operating in the financial sector, and 
particularly on a commercial basis, with the purpose of collecting deposits from the public 
or publicly recommending the latter. A ‘bank’ is also a company seeking to fund an unde-
fined number of people or companies (with its own funds and the funds collected from 
depositors) and having no personal, advance economic ties with such entities118. Thus, 
according to the Swiss legal framework, a bank is a legal person that accepts deposits 
from the public on a commercial basis (deposit business) and issues loans to its customers 
(lending business)119. Basically, this is a classic concept of banking, associated with the fact 
that a bank receives interest and its conduct relates to various banking operations. The US 
legal system distinguishes national and state banks, whereas a bank refers to any state or 
national bank, an association of banks, an investment firm, a savings bank, a commercial-
industrial bank or similar financial institution collecting deposits, with a director or a 
board determining the primarily commercial mode of operation of the bank. A bank in-
cludes some other banking institutions which (a) collect deposits (except for trusts and 
mutual funds); (b) are bound by the laws of any state or act in accordance with the Code of 
District of Columbia, including any co-operative or non co-operative bank whose deposi-
tors are insured according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act120. 
Based on the conception of a ‘bank’ existing in different jurisdictions we can conclude 
that the primary objective of the bank’s business is that a bank pays lower interest on de-
posits of public interest, as compared to the interest received by the bank for issuing credit 
114 BRRD. 2 Art. (26), (27), (31). 
115 Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council No. 806/2014. Supra note 53. Art. 3 
(23). 
116 Legal entities may use these terms alone or in a combination of words, if they hold the operational 
license issued by the Swiss supervisory authority.
117 Swiss Federal Act of 8 November 1934 on Banks and Savings Banks (January 1st, 2015). Art. 1 (4). 
118 Ibid. Art. 1-3.
119 It should be noted that in the Swiss Banking Act, banks are commonly divided into banks, private 
banks, saving banks, the scientific literature presents a much broader classification of banks, based 
also on some other criteria. In the Swiss doctrine, the following basic types of banks could be distin-
guished: private banks, cantonal banks, foreign banks, savings banks, regional banks and agricultural 
cooperative banks, commercial banks, investment banks, securities dealers, internet banks. See also 
Bauen M. Rouiller N. Supra note 39. P. 4.
120 FDIA. 3 Section (1). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. H. R. 4173. 2010. 
Section 2, 18 (A). Codified in 12 U.S.C. 1813.
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to customers. The profit margin of a bank amounts to the difference between the interest 
received and the interest paid. At the same time, it should be noted that, in addition to 
traditional banking business activities, modern banking is indissociable from currency 
trading, metal trading and securities trading. Banks also provide investment advice to its 
customers, and sometimes act as customer asset managers, and perform local and inter-
national customer payments121. Such banking transactions are based on the commission 
paid to the bank, (as opposed to the interest-based transactions) and they are therefore 
excluded from the bank’s balance sheet122. Although, depending on the jurisdiction, bank-
ing sector is characterised by individual features and entails various differences, recently 
traditional banking business and the functions of financial institutions in general have 
been gradually deforming123. Therefore, rapid change of primary activities exercised by 
banks forced legislators and state policy-makers to review their legal regulation, including, 
but not limited to bank insolvency law, and accordingly to take into account the existing 
general developments and the level of development of the banking system.
1.1. The Impact of Banking Crisis on the Economy
A financial crisis is an index point referring to the development of the financial sys-
tem124 and leading to the decline of the latter. It usually begins shortly after business cycle 
upturns125. Banking crisis forms an integral part of the financial crisis and can significant 
affect the real economy126. In broader terms, the recent financial crisis127 is commonly un-
121 See more 1 chapter 2 sec.
122 Bauen M., Rouiller N. Supra note 39. P. 5.
123 See more 1 chapter 4 sec. 3 subsec.
124 For each country, it is highly important to have a well-functioning financial system, which can direct 
the cash circulating in a particular country for productive use, thus smooth functioning of the finan-
cial system is an essential prerequisite for sustainable economic development. The financial system 
consists of all financial intermediaries and financial markets and their inter-relationships, related cash 
flow ‘to’ and ‘from’ households, governments, businesses, foreigners, as well as the financial infra-
structure. The main objectives of the financial system are to channel funds from certain profitable 
sectors of the economy producing surpluses to the sectors struggling to raise capital. To this end, the 
financial sector performs two primary functions: (i) reduces information and financial transaction 
costs; (ii) promotes trade, economic diversification and development and risk management (diversifi-
cation). In practice, the financial system is always a mixture of certain financial markets and financial 
intermediaries. Haan D.J., Oosterlo S., Schoenmaker D. Supra note 62. P. 3. IMF classifies the finan-
cial system according to degree of performance of financial transactions, based on direct relations 
between two entities (in long term), generally a bank and the client. Such transactions take place on 
the basis of the principles governing free competition, where parties do not normally have specific 
knowledge about each other, and information is not available to the public. IMF. World Economic 
Outlook. Chapter 4. Washington DC, 2014.
125 Kindleberger P. C., Aliber Z. R. M. Panics and Crashes- A History of Financial Crises. Sixth Edition. 
London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. P. 4, 15, 21.
126 Drechel B.S.D. Supra note 39. P. 121.
127 It is believed that the global financial and economic crisis began in the form of the US subprime crisis, 
with higher than usual risk of mortgage loans and mortgages linked to securities markets (mortgage-
backed securities) in August 2007. At a later time, these events resulted in bank liquidity insufficiency 
in the United States, and then in some other countries around the world. The most significant bank 
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derstood as the global financial crisis which has manifested itself as a massive economic 
recession that officially outbroke in December 2007128 and peaked in 2008-2009129. The re-
cent financial crisis had a tremendous effect and resulted in enormous economic and legal 
consequences all over the world130. It is argued that the crisis of this magnitude occurs 
once in a hundred years and could be compared to the US banking crisis during the Great 
Depression period in 1929-1933131. However, no doubt that it was the largest financial crisis 
in the world in more than 60 years. Some studies can reveal and prove it to be the largest 
financial crisis in the world history. For instance, a special US financial crisis inquiry com-
mission found “panic and uncertainty in the financial system faced people into the longest 
and deepest recession in the history”132. It is believed that the recent financial crisis is the 
product of evolution of market and financial services because, in the past fifteen years, the 
structure and the key features of the global financial system have changed dramatically. 
However, legal regulation of the financial markets133 was unable to keep pace and revealed 
insolvency cases worth to be mentioned are Northern Rock bank insolvency in September 2007, Bearn 
Stearns rescue by public finances in March 2008, failure of the one of the largest investment banks in 
the world Lehman Brothers in September 2008. These and other cases of bank insolvency opened a new 
page in the history of bank insolvency procedures and the related regulatory reforms. Moreover, the 
situation degenerated into a systemic crisis, one of the largest economic crises in the last hundred years, 
when by reason of large systemic risks insolvency of one financial market participant triggered a chain 
of insolvencies of many other corporate and personal structures. The insolvency of the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers was the result of serious deterioration of the financial conditions throughout 
the financial system, so that the IMF has described the financial situation as raising‘serious doubts 
about the viability of the entire financial system’. IMF. Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress 
and Deleveraging- Macrofinancial Implications and Policy. Washington DC, 2008. Ferran E., Moloney 
N., Hill G. J., etc. The Regulatory Aftermatch of the Global Financial Crisis. International Corporate 
Law and Finance Market Regulation. Observations about the crisis and reform. Cambridge University 
Press, Great Britain. 2013. P. 11. Marinč M. ir Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 5.
128 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. Supra note 28. P. 390. Preface. (xi-xii). See more www. fcic.gov
129 Savona P. Kirton J., Oldani C. Global Financial Crisis. Global Impact and Solutions. Ashgate, England. 
2011. P. 5.
130 Ferran E., Moloney N., Hill G.J. etc. Supra note 127. Preface (ix).
131 Savona P., Kirton, J., Oldani C. Supra note 129. P. 4. See more Carlson M. Alternatives for Distress 
Banks during the Great Depresion. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 42, No. 2-3, 2010.
132 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. Supra note 27. P. 389. The financial crisis inquiry commission 
was established on the basis of ‘Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act’, on public law grounds. This 
piece of legislation was adopted by the US Congress and approved by the US President in May 2009. 
The commission consisted of 10 independent individuals, a panel consisting of private US citizens 
with relevant experience in economic, financial market regulation, banking, consumer protection 
and other relevant areas. In essence, the Commission analysed the insolvency cases of financial insti-
tutions, in particular 22 separate topics related to the insolvency of financial institutions, including 
regulation of bank insolvency procedures, by reviewing millions of pages of documents, interviewing 
more than 700 witnesses and organising 19 public hearings in Washington, New York and in other 
places in the US.
133 The doctrine distinguishes the modern financial market according to the following features (i) interna-
tional, characterised by large capital movements; (ii) prevailing fierce competition between financial 
service providers and market participants; (iii) increased costs for investors, financial institutions and 
regulators in monitoring and managing the activities of the financial market players and the risks 
inseparable from the dramatically increased quantity of compound products; (iv) no longer a barrier 
between historically independent financial products, sectors and players; (v) differences between li-
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lack of control. That fact was recognized by the G-20, launching wide-ranging political and 
legal reforms in order to stabilise and strengthen the global financial system134. It should be 
noted that in June 2010 the G20 Summit committed to design and implement the systems 
whereby authorities would have the powers and tools to restructure or resolve all types of 
crisis-stricken credit institutions, so that the burden ultimately did not pass on taxpayers. 
The states were also obliged to review bank insolvency legal regimes in order to orderly liq-
uidate cross-border credit institutions even characterised by large and complex structure135. 
Scientific literature usually describes banking crisis as a component of the financial 
crisis phenomenon. The banking crisis has been described as a sort of financial situation, 
resulting from particular bank insolvency, or a combination of several bank insolvencies 
or illiquidities, which may accordingly pose a threat to the bank and/or the continuity of 
its business in short or long term136. A banking crisis usually begins from a credit lending 
boom, during which private financial institutions assess lending risks on an irrational and 
inappropriate basis or issue loans funded by weak, short-term lending. For this reason any 
general economic downturn may lead to significant changes in bank assets management 
(asset depreciation) and lead to financial panic in a given market, so that the bank can no 
longer implement its commitments in a successful and timely manner137. After analysing 
scientific literature it could be said that, first of all, we can distinguish a situation in the 
financial market, when the harmonious functioning of the entire banking system is es-
sentially deteriorating by reason of one large bank insolvency case. Secondly, the market 
situation worsens when a large number of banks are in distress, or, thirdly, a sense of panic 
dominates the financial system138. Meanwhile, a financial crisis covers a much wider range 
quidity of deregulated financial markets and regulated markets; (vi) rapid technological development. 
The doctrine distinguishes the modern financial market according to the following features (i) interna-
tional, characterised by large capital movements; (ii) prevailing fierce competition between financial 
service providers and market participants; (iii) increased costs for investors, financial institutions and 
regulators in monitoring and managing the activities of the financial market players and the risks 
inseparable from the dramatically increased quantity of compound products; (iv) no longer a barrier 
between historically independent financial products, sectors and players; (v) differences between li-
quidity of deregulated financial markets and regulated markets; (vi) rapid technological development. 
Haan J., Oosterloo S., Schoenmaker D. Supra note 62. P. 61-103.
134 In April 2009 the G20 leaders adopted a statement at the summit, which was designed to discuss 
financial markets and global economic issues. It was found that it was necessary to have a well-func-
tioning financial system with adequate legal regulation as a prerequisite and a precondition for sus-
tainable economic development. The financial system consists of all types of financial intermediaries 
and financial markets and their mutual relations, taking into account both the flow of funds from 
households as well as governments, businesses, foreigners, and the financial infrastructure. The main 
tasks of the financial system: (i) minimise information and transaction costs; (ii) facilitate trade, com-
prehensive economic development and risk management. Ibid. P. 3.
135 FSB. Reducing the moral hazard of systemically important financial institutions. 2010 [interactive]. [ac-
cessed on 25-03-2014]. <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.htm>.
136 It is believed that all financial crises start from a liquidity crisis. Companies have no access to sources 
of financing, and the reason behind this is that the money-lending financial institutions face financial 
difficulties or are not creditworthy. Gleeson S. The Role of Government, Central Banks and Regulators 
in Managing Banking Crisis. (in) Supra note 27. Chapter 6. P. 92.
137 Gelpern A. Supra note 137. P. 207.
138 Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. P. 346.
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of crises, such as currency or sovereign debt crisis, asset price bubble, stock market de-
cline. Therefore, a financial crisis can cause financial consequences for the banking system 
or other side effects139. In the strict sense, a banking crisis is perceived as a particular period 
when important segments of the banking system become insolvent or illiquid. Basically, 
this means that banks are facing serious financial difficulties including, but not limited to, 
massive withdrawal of deposits from banks, financed corporation bankruptcies, massive 
government intervention seeking to address bank solvency problems or growing number 
of financially insecure financial institutions140. Other researchers describe a banking crisis 
in terms of a certain scenario, when bank insolvency or cessation and/or suspension of 
banking activity leads to the suspension of many or even all bank operations in a given 
market and decreases capital deficiency141. The bank insolvency crisis has always been 
associated with extremely high social costs142 or payments made by default and even sov-
ereign debt crises143. Therefore, there is a close link between the financial crisis and private 
sector solutions which may lead to the rapid spread of adverse effects of the financial crisis 
in the private sector to the public sector. This ratio reveals the relationship between state 
and private sector assets and liabilities (balance sheet)144. 
The impact of bank insolvency crisis on the economy may occur through the follow-
ing: (i) direct costs to the public; (ii) real effect on the economic activity of the country; 
(iii) the impact of the country’s monetary and currency policy; (iv) dysfunction of ser-
vices of the bank as a financial intermediary; (v) banking difficulties and modifications 
of behaviour with regard to customers and other interested parties145. The following ques-
tion arises: which legal measures help mitigating this negative impact on the economy? 
In response to the latest banking crisis, public authorities had only a small choice of legal 
instruments and bank  resolution  methods at their disposal, such as: (i) a central bank 
of a certain country could start acting as a lender of last resort146 and rescue   the bank 
(or banks ) from insolvency by providing additional liquidity reserve to a certain bank, 
which, in spite of the fact that in most cases it holds eligible assets to pledge for its obliga-
139 Ibid. P. 353-389. Calomiris C. Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game. NBER, Working Paper No. 
15403, Cambridge, 2009. P. 5-6.
140 Drechel B.S.D. Supra note 39. P. 8-9.
141 Caprio G., Klingebiel D. Bank Insolvencies: Cross-Country Experience. WB, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 1620, 1996.
142 Supra note 27. P. 39. For example, some researchers estimate that the losses of bank assets arising 
from bank liquidation procedures are very significant and frequently amount to almost 30% of the 
actual bank asset value. These numbers significantly exceed ordinary bankruptcy costs of a non-credit 
institution (from 10 to 20% of asset value). Supra note 76. P. 42-44.
143 The most notable examples of the recent crisis with regard to the sovereign debt crisis are those of 
Greece and Ireland. BIS estimated and evaluated that as for June 2010 , default commitments of the 
private and public sector borrowers four key eurozone economies, namely Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain, which suffered a severe sovereign debt crisis, was USD 1.6 trillion. French and German 
financial injections (lending) for banks accounted for 61% of total lending, including 15% for public 
debt repayment. Private investor funds financed the remaining part. BIS. Quaterly Review. Interna-
tional Banking and Financial Market Developments, 2010.
144 Lastra R.M. Supra note 74. P. 346.
145 Drechel B.S.D. Supra note 39. P. 123.
146 See more. 3 chapter 1 sec. 2 subsec.
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tions, but for any reason is unable to obtain financing from the market; (ii) in the wake 
of an insured event and under deposit guarantee schemes, to make use of the existing 
government guarantees by paying compensations to depositors; (iii) to protect depositors 
and other banks (e.g. by buying or insuring bank assets, recapitalising the bank or using 
other forms of financial support) by securing financial sustainability; (iv) to apply general 
insolvency law and try to restructure and/or liquidate the bank; (v) to apply early interven-
tions tools, i.e. immediate corrective action for bank activities, and similar legal sanctions, 
preventive measures (statutory prudential regulation, bank supervision and pro-cyclical 
measures). Among other things, it is important to emphasize that, within the scope of this 
research, the banking crisis is identified with situations of systemic crisis147, whereby the 
financial difficulties faced by one or more banks may jeopardise the balanced synthesis of 
all banking activities. Such financial difficulties may manifest in different forms of bank 
insolvency: solvency (credit) crisis, liquidity crisis or market crisis.
1.2. Why Banks are Unique Legal Persons? Does Public Interest Affect  
the Functions of the Bank?
Banks perform functions148 that are extremely important for the real economy as a 
whole and that are sometimes referred in the doctrine as critical149. Legal theory distin-
guishes three main groups of special features of banking activities related to the following 
aspects: (i) banks usually hold many liquid liabilities (generally in the form of deposits), 
compensated according to the nominal value, whenever requested by the creditor; (ii) 
financial services provided by banks, which are vital for the functioning of the entire real 
economy150; (iii) specific  functions performed by some banks as legal persons, by con-
necting the monetary policy created by the state and the monetary policy and economic 
processes of the state; (iv) specific bank insolvency procedures and regulations, compared 
with typical, general insolvency procedures of business entities151. Naturally, a legitimate 
147 See more 1 chapter 6 sec. 5 subsec.
148 Critical functions are exercised to achieve the effective functioning of the financial and economic 
system. Hüpkes E. Resolving Crisis in Global Financial Institutions: The Functional Approach Re-
visited. Supra note 27. Chapter 18. P. 295-296. Regarding the concepts of critical bank functions and 
core business lines. See more EBA. Technical advice on the delegated acts on critical functions and core 
business lines. EBA/Op/2015/05.
149 Critical functions of banks in the EU legislation are defined as activities, services and operations the 
discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services 
that are essential to the real economy or the disruption financial stability due to the size, market 
share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-border activities of an institu-
tion or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations. 
Core business lines mean business lines and associated services which represent material sources of 
revenue, profit or franchise value for an institution or for a group of which an institution forms part. 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2014/59/ES. Art. 2 (35).
150 For the purposes of this dissertation, the real economy is understood as highly interrelated phenom-
ena - economic production and consumption of goods and services, developed in a certain economy. 
Additionally this term is associated with exposure to the financial markets. EBA. Supra note 148. P. 5.
151 Hüpkes E. Supra note 3. P. 3. Theissen R. Supra note 104. P. 30-33. Haan J., Oosterloo S., Schoenmaker 
D. Supra note 62. P. 204-211. Gleeson S. Supra note 113. P. 4-6.
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question arises whether banks should be treated different from entities operating in other 
sectors of economic activity? It is also important to examine this issue in view of the fact 
that special bank insolvency regulation is primarily based on the exceptional importance 
of banks for the national economy.
The doctrine is consistent on the fact that the banks are the most widespread financial 
institutions152 in the world and perform multiple functions. Banks provide vital services 
for individuals, family farms, businesses, public institutions, governments and the econ-
omy as a whole153. These services manifest in many forms, such as deposit collection and 
storage154 for commercial purposes, lending155, i.e., supplying money to the market in the 
form of loans, bank guarantees156 and other financing activities. There is no doubt that for 
depositors and borrowers banks are extremely important as financial intermediaries. For 
example, banks provide financial risk management services to their customers and help 
ensuring their financial risk, such as interest rate or currency risk157. In addition, banks 
are critical because they handle the smooth functioning of the state’s payment system158. 
Banks also provide unique services to their customers, such as foreign currency exchange, 
or trade in precious metals159, international orders and other international transactions, 
control and administer the funds and savings of both ordinary customers, businesses and 
public institutions160. It follows that banks are different from ordinary business entities 
also by reason of particular, prudential regulation, such as requirements with regard to 
their structure161, specific licensing, supervision of operation, specific financial statements, 
accurate auditing162, etc.
152 Bliss R.R., Kaufman G.G. Supra note 75. P. 3.
153 Gleeson S. Supra note 136. P. 6.
154 Deposit safekeeping does not imply that deposits are directly kept in storage. Safeguarding is a duty 
undertaken by the bank and the obligation to repay the same equivalent of cash or securities to de-
positors, persons confident that the bank will pay and return the assigned assets in full on the deposi-
tor’s demand. Deposits are mainly used to finance other bank customers’ loans.
155 Most of bank loans amount from 25 to 75% of total bank assets. Gleeson S. Supra note 136. P. 6. 
156 When a bank (the guarantor) undertakes to pay a determined sum of money to the debtor’s creditor 
on creditor’s demand.
157 Boonstra W.B. Supra note 84. P. 4.
158 It is crucial that the payment and settlement system operates smoothly, continuously and operation-
ally in each country. The payment system is a method used to carry out the payment. It can take the 
form of an insignificant cash payment and complex international electronic networks. Kancerevyčius 
G. Finance and Investments. 3 edition, Smaltija, Kaunas, 2009. P. 330.
159 Bauen M., Rouiller N. Supra note 39. P. 5.
160 Theissen R. Supra note 104. P. 30-33.
161 For example, according to the requirements of the Lithuanian Law on Banks, commercial bank shall 
have the following bodies in place: the General Meeting, the Supervisory Board (note that in addition 
to the general competence provided for in the Law on Companies, the competence of the Supervisory 
Board is also distinctive: approval of the action plan, ensuring adequate internal control, setting the 
procedures for lending, which can take place only after the approval of the bank’s supervisory board, 
etc., issues referred to in the articles of association), the Board, the Chief Executive Officer. In addition, 
a commercial bank is required to have a system of internal control and an internal audit service, perma-
nent loans, internal audit and risk management committees. Republic of Lithuania. Law on the Bank of 
Lithuania. Official Publication Valstybės žinios. 2004, No. 54-1832. (recast) 2014-08-05. Art.30-36.
162 Bauen M., Rouiller N. Supra note 39. P. 51-54.
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Conventional bank business models differ from traditional corporate entities also due 
to the nature of the assets disposed by the bank163. According to their nature, bank assets 
are based on long-term  value  (mainly banks  provide  long-term credits   to loan recipi-
ents), but funded by short-term deposits164. Liabilities of the bank, for example, towards 
depositors, are temporary and must be discharged immediately and without interruption, 
on demand. However, the majority of the bank’s capital is accumulated by collecting con-
tributions from depositors, giving rise to the unique protection of the depositors’ rights165. 
It should also be noted that banks have high standard of liquidity commitments166. Moreo-
ver, banks remain the primary source of funding (and hence securing liquidity and finan-
cial flows). To guarantee the supply of liquidity to the market, banks have certain competi-
tive advantage over other financial institutions. Banks also have developed information 
technologies, which are designed to monitor the borrowers in order to reduce information 
asymmetry between the creditor and the debtor167. In some cases bank customers attempt 
to borrow money directly from the bank as their primary source of business financing, 
or from financial markets by issuing shares and/or debt instruments and they therefore 
rely on bank intermediation and advice. Thus, supply of liquidity, customer tracking fea-
tures and specialised knowledge (human resources) allows the banks to acquire a strong 
position not only on the loan granting market, but also execute modern capital market 
transactions, such as securities underwriting, trading and derivative transactions168. Fi-
nally, banks must be able to manage the investment portfolio to avoid liquidity risk for the 
bank169. Banks provide direct and indirect credit and liquidity services to the market (as a 
source of money), which is the basis for efficient functioning of a market economy.
Another significant qualifying factor is that some banks are directly related to the en-
tire banking system and the implementation of national monetary policies (usually this 
process takes place in collaboration with the government). The recent financial crisis has 
confirmed that when faced with solvency problems, banks inevitably encounter additional 
political and legal risks. Politicians can very easily lead to unexpected, secondary, negative 
consequences associated with the financial situation of a particular bank, especially related 
163 Kaufman G.G. Too big to fail in banking: What does it mean? Journal of Financial Stability, Vol.13, 
2014. P. 217.
164 Haan J., Oosterloo S., Schoenmaker D. Supra note 62. P. 204.
165 When a bank is facing financial distress and in order to avoid direct bank liquidation (bankruptcy) 
with the help of a bank resolution tool, the bank’s assets and deposits can be swiftly transferred to 
other solid banks operating in the system. The key purpose of a DGS is to protect depositors against 
the consequences of insolvency of a credit institution. DGSs should primarily be used to repay deposi-
tors. Directive 2014/C/ 105/01of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes Adopted by the Council on 3 March 2014 (recast). Recital (14). The contract between the 
bank and the depositor has long been regarded as a debtor and creditor agreement. Foley v Hill [1848] 
II HLC, 27 1002.
166 The most common example is that of a bank deposit together with loan portfolio, i.e. certain assets 
which are often difficult to sell in the short term and which are characterised by longer term of de-
mand.
167 Haan J., Oosterloo S., Schoenmaker D. Supra note 62. P. 204.
168 Ibid.
169 Boonstra W.V.B. Supra note 84. P. 4.
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to escalating the financial situation of a particular bank170. They are often “keen” to protect 
the banks and the financial stability of the banking system, but without explicit knowledge 
or reliable information they often disinform the society, attempting to initiate urgent and 
poorly prepared, “politicised” legislative proposals or solutions.
Banks could be distinguished from other business entities for particular legal con-
sequences associated with determining bank insolvency conditions and general bank 
solvency risk management, especially with increased systemic risk171 (also known as sys-
temic crisis or contagion effect in the scientific literature and some legal acts)172. This ba-
170 The most popular example is a case in Lithuania, and the findings reached by the Lithuanian Par-
liament. The findings included a ‘hypothetical’ approach of the interim parliamentary investigation 
commission and the analysis of the draft resolution adopted by the Parliament. It was found that 
the explanatory meeting of 30 May 2012 of the interim parliamentary commission investigating the 
efficiency of supervision of commercial banks operating in Lithuania and the situation of the bank 
‘Snoras’ undergoing bankruptcy, in accordance with Article 10(1) of the Statute of the Seimas of the 
Republic of Lithuania and Article 7(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on interim parliamen-
tary commission, was regarded as not having taken place, the minutes No. LK-26 of the meeting was 
declared illegal, and the findings were not adopted. The legal force of such parliamentary commis-
sions is questionable, as they submit legally undefined findings having no legal effect. 2012, June 27th, 
Seimas Commission on Ethics and Procedures, Conclusion No. 101-I-25. 
171 Concerns about systemic contagion are equally valid for depositors, borrowers, other creditors, and 
the entire payment system. The legal doctrine describes ‘contagion’ as a social phenomenon, whereby 
as soon as one bank goes bankrupt, depositors begin to interpret its insolvency as a sign of the endur-
ing financial difficulties across the entire financial sector. Such a situation may accordingly result in an 
adverse response and  the immediate deposit withdrawal from other banks operating in the country. 
In this case, the panic regarding the distressed banks generates very high costs. This phenomenon 
can also lead to recession and cash shortage in the market, reduce lending, which could cause severe 
injury to the relevant economy, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. See more 1 chapter 
6 sec. Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 23.
172 A few relevant examples should be highlighted. First, information about the financial situation of the 
bank ‘Snoras’ and certain leaks of this information were an unexpected factor in Lithuania’s financial 
system. This prompted instant reaction of the supervisory authority. After the article in the newspa-
per ‘Lietuvos Rytas’ (entitled ‘The President ordered to destroy Lithuanian capital-based banks’), the 
liquidity situation of the bank ‘Snoras’ was developing rapidly. Until today there is no answer to the 
question who leaked the information. The General Prosecutor’s Office initiated an investigation on 
the possible leaks of privileged information about the bank ‘Snoras’ in relation to the possible abuse 
of office, after obtaining information from the Department of National Security on the results of the 
investigation requested by the Prosecutor General on 17 November 2011. Also, the investigation was 
initiated after the news publication of the daily newspaper ‘Lietuvos Rytas’ regarding the financial 
difficulties faced by the bank ‘Snoras’ financial difficulties. The second example relates to Bulgaria. In 
2014, several Bulgarian banks found themselves at the threshold of insolvency, after six people were 
arrested for disseminating ‘misleading information’ on the situation of the country’s financial insti-
tutions by technological means. The messages were distributed on the internet and mobile phones, 
stating that the Bulgarian ‘First Investment Bank’, the third largest in the country, and ‘Corpbank’ 
experience severe financial difficulties and are in default. The rumours instigated panic in Bulgaria, 
customers gathered at the bank doors to withdraw their money as soon as possible. A serious threat 
appeared to systemic risk. The government tried to calm the depositors down by announcing that 
the banks were sound. But this was insufficient. Deposit withdrawal continued, and the Bulgarian 
Government announced that the EU approved EUR 1.7 billion credit line to settle the tensions in the 
banking system. See more Supra note 170. Business news. Finance. Banko griūtis - Bulgarijoje, vertini-
mai – Lietuvoje. 2012 03 02. [interactive]. [accessed on 02-11-2014] <http://vz.lt/article/2014/8/10/
banko-griutis-bulgarijoje-vertinimai-lietuvoje>.
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sically means that insolvency problems at one bank can lead to depositors running to 
other banks, which can accordingly destabilise the country’s financial system and even 
affect banks operating in other countries. Therefore, in all cases of bank insolvency it is 
vital to maintain public confidence in the entire banking system. In the absence of trust, 
a systemic banking crisis may begin shortly. In addition, bearing in mind the fact that, 
along with the processes of globalisation and technological progress, the world has an ac-
celerated access to information and now it spreads very quickly. Information related to the 
bank’s financial problems may also spread very quickly. It can affect systemic contagion of 
the financial system, as even without checking the information, individuals may assume 
that other banks face similar financial difficulties and insolvency risks and, for example, 
may start withdrawing deposits, conclude no new business transactions, etc. 
Following the practice of traditional insolvent banks in different jurisdictions, which 
was intended to provide effective legal regulation of bank insolvency, the IMF and the 
WB study173 argues that bank insolvency may cause much more extensive negative legal 
consequences than standard cases of business entity insolvency. It can cause social ex-
penditure174, the use of public finances to restructure or rescue banks, as banks are often 
the primary public entities and other fund savings, and indeed a crucial source of credit 
for the entire economy. In addition, it can be said that the public interest also manifests 
in the need to take into account indirect costs associated with the decrease of lending in a 
given country, lower economic growth, higher unemployment and lower investments175. 
As discussed in other sections176 in more detail, bank resolution regime can be seen as a 
premise for cost and benefit optimisation. That thesis is primarily based on the fact that 
the reorganisation of a bank allows continuing its operations while maintaining the going 
concern assumption.
Banking activities, as well as other business activities, are associated with risk-taking, 
but in particular circumstances excessive risk taking inevitably affects the entire financial 
system to a significant extent, thus banking risk could be compared to the public inter-
est177. Both lawyers and economists and most lawmakers consider that financial stability 
is in the public interest. Moreover, the banking crisis can develop very quickly, and bank 
assets can soon lose their value, while depositors can start withdrawing their savings. As 
long as banks perform distinctive and exceptional economic functions in the society and 
the legal system, bank insolvency procedures remain under the umbrella of the public in-
terest to have a sound banking system and smoothly operating banks. Banking activities 
173 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. The research involved 17 jurisdictions and 6 independent experts, including, 
but not limited to, the investigation of the relevant jurisdictions. P. 75-76.
174 See the empirical study on more detailed costs incurred in the case of bank insolvency. Among other 
things, the study describes all of the largest interventions and bank resolution costs during the recent 
financial crisis. White P., Yorulmazer T. Bank Resolution concepts, Trade-offs, and Changes in practises. 
FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 2014. P. 3, 6. IMF. Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor preference, 
and Asset Encumbrance, 2013. No. WP/13/172. P. 4-7.
175 Dewatripont M., Freixas X. Bank resolution: a framework for the assesment of regulatory intervention. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2011. P. 413.
176 See more 2 chapter 3 sec.
177 Hüpkes E. Supra note 3. P. 5.
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are mostly based on trust. Therefore, the public interest178 concerned with the protection 
of banks determines that banks not only must comply with special legal regulation of 
bank insolvency179 procedures, but also special prudential regulation and supervision180. 
These rules assist in enhancing the smooth operation of the banks, and thus in assuring 
the safety of the public interest and bank solvency181. Among other things, it contributes 
to strengthening bank solvency requirements. The purpose of such regulation is to ensure 
that banks are optimally managed and that the regulatory system ensures compliance 
with the statutory requirements. The world has gradually come to an opinion that strict 
licensing of banking activities and the ensuing conditions of prudential regulation are 
only primary factors in order to protect against bank solvency problems (e.g., in ensur-
ing adequate levels of capital ratio and proper bank management). Nevertheless, after 
repeated surges of global financial crises it finally became apparent that efficient bank 
management and market forces alone cannot ensure financial stability182. For this rea-
son, it was necessary to establish qualitative criteria for bank insolvency procedures, in 
particular, in order to restructure the functioning part of the bank and to liquidate the 
inactive assets of the bank. 
Prudential regulation has a dual objective: firstly, such regulation seeks to ensure fi-
nancial security of banks and solvency of the financial system as a whole, and secondly, 
it is aimed at removing trade barriers and ensuring equal competitive conditions in the 
178 Public interest in the context of financial services consists of several elements. Consumers always ex-
pect that the financial services industry is ready to provide reliable, high-quality services at attractive 
prices. Instability is inherent in market speculation, but the real economy must be protected from the 
most serious adverse consequences and instability in the financial sector. Therefore, many countries 
seek that the financial services industry operates profitably and is competitive internationally, as this 
significantly contributes to the state treasury, i.e. the ‘purse’ of the society as a whole. Financial stabil-
ity is aspired by every modern society. Public interest can be ensured with the help of reliable and 
predictable legal regulation. Kay J. Narrow Banking: the Reform of Banking Regulation. Centre for the 
Study of Financial Innovation, 2009. P. 3.
179 Hüpkes E. Supra note 71. P. 8-9.
180 The provisions governing initial bank capital and supervisory review. Prudential regulation of banks 
includes the following key elements: (i) the particular capital ratio regulations, which ensure that 
banks comply with the minimum own funds (equity) standard according to their risk level, in order 
to cover unexpected solvency losses (such as balancing the interests of firms that repackage loans into 
securities and other traded financial instruments, and the companies that invest in these securities or 
instruments (investors)). In order to fulfill this requirement, the bank must keep a significant part of 
its assets; (ii) certain limits on ill-founded bank risk-taking in order to promote certain lending con-
centration, for example, to restrict lending to people related to the bank, liquidity mismatches and the 
net assets in foreign jurisdictions; (iii) prudential standards must ensure that the bank will be able to 
fulfill its obligations to creditors and depositors without the forced sale of assets or another destructive 
method that helps to collect funds (liquidity requirements). Prudential regulation also includes bank 
accounting standards, including, but not limited to, asset valuation criteria, loan classification, and 
foresees binding provisions (to predict loan losses) and provisions for overdue interest (or even the 
suspension of their calculation). Theissen R.P. Supra note 104. P. 27-29. Boonstra W.V.B. Supra note 
84. P. 2-3.
181 Traditionally, the aim of prudential regulation is to mitigate social costs by creating a variety of pru-
dential measures, including deposit guarantee schemes, capital adequacy requirements, asset compo-
sition rules, fit and proper requirements for the bank staff, board members, senior management.
182 Hüpkes E. Supra note 3. P. 11.
52
banking sector. However, the objective of prudential regulation and supervision is not 
to reduce the risk of bank insolvency to zero, as accepting risk forms an integral part of 
banking. In line with their chosen strategy, the banks are free to define their investment 
and lending policies that they consider to be the most appropriate. Thus, we conclude that 
prudential regulation is not designed to help avoiding insolvency of the bank183. In all 
cases, the aim of prudential regulation is to minimise risk-taking ex ante in order to reduce 
the probability of bank insolvency.
Another distinctive feature of the public interest is the interaction between bank in-
solvency and bank liquidity ratio. As mentioned above, the banks operate on the finan-
cial  market   also as liquidity providers, and thus supervisory authorities seek that the 
banks comply with the minimum safety and risk requirements. One of such requirements 
is capital adequacy. Financial institutions usually entail very high level of financial lever-
age, i.e. they finance their assets mainly from debt (liabilities) rather than from equity. The 
recent financial crisis has revealed quite clearly the importance of bank liquidity dilemma. 
Whenever a bank is confronted with solvency problems, its capital acts as a “buffer” of 
loss. This is due to the fact that when faced with distress problems, banks can still borrow 
from the central bank, which means, in essence, that central banks of many countries 
still hold the role of lenders of last resort184. Inability to achieve liquidity requirements 
could lead to potential bank insolvency even in the case where bank assets exceed its li-
abilities comparing with a whole healthy asset, i.e., the bank becomes insolvent because 
it is illiquid. Inability to carry out its obligations towards the creditors on demand often 
results in insolvency of financial flows. At the same time, a bank is insolvent also from the 
perspective of the balance sheet test, if it would be allowed to remain in operation even 
after facing liquidity problems. Thus, drawing the line between bank illiquidity and bank 
insolvency is extremely important in legal terms, and it is very difficult to identify during 
the banking crisis185.
Banks are still the primary “players” of the financial system and provide liquidity not 
only to households, businesses, but also to other financial and public institutions. Recently 
banks have expanded their business from traditional forms of lending to transactions car-
ried out in a modern capital market, thereby retaining their position in the financial sys-
tem. Greater consistency and efficiency of the central operational functions of a bank and 
financial solvency essentially means better services provided by banks in the field of fi-
nancial intermediation, which accordingly leads to a better match between the interests of 
depositors and investors with all the ensuing positive economic indicators.
183 Lawmakers realised that even very high capital requirement may be insufficient in the case of a bank-
ing crisis. Avgoulleas E. Breaking-up Mega-banks: a New Regulatory Model for the Separation of Com-
mercial Banking from Investment Banking. Financial regulation at the Crossroads: Implications for the 
Supervision, Institutional Design and Trade. Wolter Kluwer, Netherlands, 2011. P. 198.
184 Over the past two centuries, this role has been developed with the assistance of the CB. Such legal 
regulation is dedicated to ensure that banks experiencing temporary liquidity problems and the as-
sociated financial difficulties may receive financial support on a temporary basis. See more 3 chapter 1 
sec. 1 subsec.
185 See more 1 chapter 7 sec.
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1.3. Lex generalis or Lex specialis. Why General Insolvency Law 
is Unsuitable for Banks?
The importance of insolvency law has expanded into various economic sectors, includ-
ing banking. Despite the globalisation of business, national insolvency law remains an im-
portant branch of the law for the entire market economy, although international unification 
of insolvency law is still lacking both in terms of procedural and substantive insolvency 
law186. Effective insolvency procedures serve for the predictability and legal certainty of 
the outcome of such procedures. Accordingly, market participants want to acknowledge 
the outcome of their outstanding claims or pledged property in advance, whenever the 
borrower becomes insolvent. Legal rules governing bank insolvency diverge from general 
insolvency law in many respects. Some of the reasons for this are worth examining.
Perhaps the most serious economic reason is that if regulated by the general insol-
vency law, bank insolvency procedures fail to prevent the risk for the global economic 
system spreading over the counterparties of an insolvent bank187. The recent banking 
crisis revealed very clearly the intimate relationship between finance, banking stability 
and security of the real economy. Therefore, smooth and operative market exit of insol-
vent banks unable to meet the requirements of supervisory authorities is necessary for 
the efficient financial system188. Bank insolvency may lead to certain legal challenges and 
problems for the entire legal system of the country. It requires specific legal requirements 
and regulations laid down by law in order to mitigate the ensuing consequences. If com-
petent authorities had no specific legal measures at their disposal to solve the problems of 
insolvent banks, they would have to rely on general insolvency law only, and it is highly 
likely that the response and intervention in the bank would be overdue or would have a 
destabilising effect189. Intervention must based on pre-regulated rights and predictable and 
foreseeable procedure enabling the competent authorities to respond as soon as faced with 
the first signs of deteriorating financial situation of a particular bank. The recent banking 
186 The original meaning of insolvency law is to resolve the core issue of competing priorities, as in the 
context of limited resources only a part (usually a small part) of creditor claims may be satisfied. It is 
important to ensure that if the borrower is no longer able to meet their obligations, the debtor’s assets 
are used to the maximum extent to meet the financial requirements of the creditors. Peter H., Jeandin 
N., Kilborn J. The challenges of insolvency law reform in the 21st century. Shulthess, Basel. 2006. P. 11.
187 For example, if a counterparty fails to absorb fund shortages caused by the bank’s failure to fulfill its 
contractual obligations, such as foreign exchange contracts, repurchase agreements, contractual rela-
tions arising from securities trading, swaps/options, futures or forward transactions, this can result 
in non-compliance with the obligations towards other banks, and other cases of default, also threaten 
the stability of the entire financial system.
188 BCBS. Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Principle 22, 2012 [interactive]. [ac-
cessed on 12-10-2014] <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf>.
189 The current crisis has demonstrated the need for early and comprehensively quick intervention by 
the competent authorities and the need for such an intervention as long as the bank is still solvent. 
In addition, the financial crisis has revealed that when systemically important banks face the risk of 
insolvency, general insolvency procedures fail to meet the general public interest objectives because 
critical economic functions, such as collection of deposits and lending, are lost. Prior to the recent 
financial crisis, governments lacked the necessary legal measures and straight liquidation was not a 
promising option, and they were therefore forced to give large sums of public finances in order to 
rescue banks from insolvency and thus avoid significant damage to the whole economy.
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crisis has shown that bank insolvency problems need to be addressed promptly – typi-
cally over the weekend – and in a way that would allow banks to continue their essential 
operations and minimise future restructuring and/or liquidation costs of the bank. Given 
that bank insolvency problems are attached to public interest190 objectives, after analysing 
foreign legal doctrine the following reasons support the conclusion that lex generalis is 
inappropriate for dealing with bank failures191.
General reasons:
• The genėsis of inclusion of particular legal rules in legislation. In the most EU Member 
States, the lex generalis rules of general insolvency law were applicable to banks before 
the financial crisis192, whereas lex specialis existed only in more exceptional cases193. 
The inception of special legal rules in the EU legal order can be related to the legislative 
project of the Banking Union. 
• In contrast to many European lawmakers who regularly applied general insolvency in-
solvency rules to banks, already in 1857 the US Congress adopted special bank insol-
vency regulation and procedures applicable to national banks at the federal level (state 
banks fell outside this scope)194. In addition, in parallel with the federal bankruptcy 
law, the majority of the US states adopted state laws aimed at more efficient banking 
supervision and resolution of banks ins distress195. Therefore, already since the nine-
teenth century the US Bankruptcy Act was applied to banks with certain provisions 
designed for solving problems faced by banks in distress. More comprehensive and 
consistent legal rules governing bank insolvency mainly came into existence only after 
creating the deposit insurance system, when more than nine thousand banks (one-
third of the banking industry) were declared insolvent during the Great Depression196. 
In 1933 FDIC, a public authority acting as a receiver of insured insolvent national and 
state banks was granted exclusive rights with respect to bank insolvencies197. Only the 
190 For example, the Lithuanian Supreme Court has noted that the financial sector, which includes a 
significant part of the banking industry, is one of the most sensitive sectors, and its situation can 
significantly influence national economy, population and confidence of economic entities in the do-
mestic financial system and the sustainability of this system. Therefore, it is necessary to allow proper 
and timely implementation of financial system stability measures. These legal provisions show that 
the stability of the financial system is in the public interest, and strict compliance with loan terms, 
depending on the specificity of the crediting business, has an essential value. Judgment of the Lithu-
anian Supreme Court of 20 February 2012 in civil case No. 3K-3-58/2012.
191 Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. P. 34-37.
192 Garcia G.H., Lastra M.R., Nieto J.M. Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross-border banks 
in the EU: Towards an integrated approach to the reform of the EU safety net. LSE financial markets 
group paper series, 2009. P. 11-17.
193 In exceptional cases the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands were the first EU Member States that 
revised their regulation in the light of the financial crisis, by adopting special legal rules governing 
bank insolvency. Hüpkes E. Supra note 3. P. 6-7. Schillig M. Supra note 47. FSB. Thematic review on 
resolution regimes. Peer review Report. 2013.
194 Swire P.P. Supra note 9. P. 478-481.
195 Ibid. P. 479.
196 FDIC. Chapter 7. The FDIC‘s Role as Receiver. P.2. [interactive]. [accessed on 20-11-2014] <https://
www.fdic.gov/ bank/historical/reshandbook/ch7recvr.pdf >.
197 Hüpkes E. Supra note 3. P. 8.
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creation of the FDIC gave rise to special legal rules governing bank insolvency proce-
dures, whereas bank insolvency law became a topic of legal interest and a subject in 
legal science198. In addition, in 1991 the United States included a new chapter in the 
Bankruptcy Code designed for bank insolvency procedures, in particular by extend-
ing its scope to state banks, and by creating the new framework for regulating prompt 
corrective action, together with the relevant amendments of the federal deposit in-
surance legislation. Additional powers were granted to FDIC199, by separating FDIC 
legal functions in the field of deposit insurance and administration and by establishing 
new rights and obligations. Particular bank resolution measures were adopted (such 
as sale of business, asset separation, bridge bank) with the key objective to maximise 
the assets of bank creditors and to minimise any loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund. 
Eventually, on 21 July 2010 legal rules governing bank insolvency were revised once 
again and the Dodd-Frank Act200 entered into force, bringing a very significant change 
with it. The main purpose of the Act, by avoiding rescue of the distressed banks with 
taxpayers’ money, new rules were adopted for insolvent banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, with the task to solve systemic risks problems mostly created by large 
banking groups or systemically important financial institutions, which accordingly 
threatened the stability of the entire financial system201. Among other things, the said 
Act created a new orderly liquidation institution202 whose provisions had priority over 
the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable bankruptcy laws, in order to restructure 
and/or liquidate a bank.
• In 1934 Switzerland created its first federal banking law. The Federal Council came to 
the conclusion that banks required special legal regulation in view of their status as 
a “public service provider” and that the country’s economic growth depends on the 
amount of capital banks can attract for investment203. However, special legal regulation 
of bank’  bankruptcy and restructuring accelerated only in 2003 when the lawmak-
ers found considerable flaws in the existing Swiss bank insolvency law and resolution 
procedures. In 2003, the Swiss Parliament passed amendments to the banking laws204 
and designated a special Chapter 11 for legal measures (aiding to combat bank insol-
198 The main reasons for bank insolvency regulatory reforms were massive deposit withdrawal scenarios, 
depositor irrationality, excessive commissions of administrators and a tendency to delay insolvency 
procedures as long as possible. In addition, the insolvency administrator was normally appointed by 
politicians. Bank insolvency procedures lasted for an average of six years. However, in some cases they 
took as long as 21 years. Even after depositors recovered part of their claim, that part was significantly 
lower than the original claim. Creditors were able to recover only 58% of the claim in average. There-
fore, a need arose for the government to rebuild trust in the banking system. Supra note 192. P. 3-4.
199 For example, to close a bank after finding insufficient level of the bank’s assets and pending obliga-
tions, and identifying unsound and unreliable banking conduct, or potential losses that could deplete 
the bank’s capital, etc. Bliss R., Kaufman G. Supra note 75. P. 46.
200 This legislation essentially aims to balance the objectives of bankruptcy and consumer protection 
laws, by at the same time maintaining and protecting financial stability and public confidence. Dodd-
Frank Act § 1021. Codified 12 U.S.C. § 5511. July 21, 2011.
201 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 116-117.
202 Dodd-Frank. Title II, Section 201.
203 Swiss Federal Banking Commission. Supra note 42. P. 5.
204 Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Saving Banks of 8 November 1934, RS 952.0.
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vency issues) and Chapter 12 for regulating bank liquidation procedures. Special bank 
insolvency law came into force on 1 June 2004. A year later, a new piece of second-
ary legislation governing bankruptcy of banks and securities dealers was approved205 
(hereinafter-Swiss Ordinance). Ultimately, the new banking legal provisions on depos-
it guarantee schemes together with Swiss banks and securities brokerage law entered 
into force in 2006206. Nevertheless, the main legal acts on bank insolvency were revised 
in 2011 and 2012. This resulted in new bank resolution rules and regulations, review-
ing the specific requirements for SSFI, etc. Secondary bank insolvency legislation has 
also been changed accordingly only at the end of 2012, combining bankruptcy and 
resolution procedures in order to establish efficient and coherent legal regulation207.
• Specific financial arrangements associated with bank loss-absorbency. At the internation-
al level, it was decided208 that, in view of insurmountable consequences of the financial 
crisis, particular bank insolvency procedures must be financed by the banking industry 
and not with taxpayers’ money. Therefore, in the context of international reforms, in 
some cases it was necessary to finance the resolution of banks by industry funds and 
to create special financial arrangements (funds) that could assist in reducing the costs 
of failing banks imposed on taxpayers. Such financial arrangements, such as the crea-
tion of the resolution fund, contributions to the latter from the industry were outside 
the scope of general insolvency law. It is crucial to sustain predictable, steady, clear and 
potential bank distress solutions, rules and legal instruments on the market where the 
bank operates, particularly at the time of the banking crisis. The purpose is to prevent 
bank bailouts using taxpayers’ money and this common objective is most often outside 
the scope of general insolvency law. In addition, decisions regarding the future of an 
insolvent bank must not only be made swiftly, but also the consequences need to be 
predictable, by avoiding surprises. Therefore, it could be recognized that national lead-
ers and authorities unkeen to adopt crucial decisions would feel more supported and 
encouraged if they refuse to rescue banks using public finances and taxpayers’ money. 
Especially if they acknowledge the consequences of possible actions in advance and at 
the same time feel more secure with regard to the decisions that they make.
Until the recent financial crisis and regulatory reforms relating to the shifted paradigm 
of bank insolvency law, the substance and procedures of the laws and other regulations 
governing bank insolvency differed significantly209. In addition, after analysing the histori-
cal evolution of special legal rules in particular  jurisdictions relevant for the research, it 
205 Swiss Federal Banking Commission Ordinance on the Bankruptcy of Banks and Securities Dealers of 
30 June 2005 (Bank Bankruptcy Ordinance, RS 952.812.31). (recast of 1 January, 2015). Chapter 1.
206 Swiss Federal Ordinance on Banks and Savings Banks of 17 May 1972 RS 952.02. 
207 FSB. Thematic review on resolution regimes. Peer review Report. 2013. P. 45.
208 See more 1 chapter 5 sec. 1 subsec.
209 Institution of ordinary bankruptcy proceedings and bank liquidation may pose the following risks: 
(i) endangering financial stability; (ii) cancellation of critical banking functions; (iii) affect depositor 
protection to a certain extent (e.g., in the case of uninsured depositors); (iv) breach of the public inter-
est, as it is controversial whether bank resolution rather than liquidation better suits the public inter-
est. This idea is based on the fact that in the face of insolvency, a failing bank should first and foremost 
be rescued through restructuring measures, by trying to save the bank from failure as an entity able 
to continue its activities, by using private funds to the largest extent possible, e.g. bank sale or merger, 
write-off of bank’s liabilities, conversion of debt into securities.
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can be assumed that, except for the US, complete, unique legal rules for governing bank 
insolvency procedures have appeared quite late, already after the start of the international 
financial crisis. At the same time, a priori there is no reason to disapply general insolvency 
law for banks. Normally, most aspects of bank insolvency procedures, such as property as-
sessment and collection arrangements, validation of creditors’ claims, decisions related to 
controversial claims and their recognition, asset allocation procedure of an insolvent entity 
in standard bankruptcy proceedings are regulated in a similar manner as in the case of oth-
er conventional enterprises. This presumption is opposed by the arguments set out below.
Procedural reasons: 
• The need for swift decisions. The expectations of depositors, financial markets and the 
public after a particular bank faces distress are linked to a prompt solution of problems 
faced by a bank that is failing or likely to fail soon, especially in the case of insolvency 
of a systemically important bank. Interested parties expect that the competent author-
ity will adopt a decision on the bank that is failing or likely to fail within a few days or 
even over a weekend. Therefore, clarity and legal certainty are crucial factors to reas-
sure stakeholders and ensure the stability of the financial system. Faced with the need 
for adequate bank insolvency solutions, courts have difficulties in achieving a positive 
outcome based solely on general insolvency law210. As in the Lehman bankruptcy case, 
it is very likely that in the case of bank liquidation the courts will face the require-
ment to sell nearly all of the viable assets of the failing bank in the first days after 
submission of the petition211. Such a requirement is often based on the fact that the 
value of bank assets may fall drastically in a few days, if the ambiguities regarding the 
distressed bank subsist. Even the insolvency of one large bank could lead to a systemic 
crisis212. Consequently, according to the general legal rules governing insolvency, or-
dinary restructuring of a business entity under general insolvency law, e.g. the proce-
dures for acquiring debtor’s assets often take much longer. In this case, in accordance 
with general insolvency law, a bank facing financial difficulties will first be required 
to prepare a recovery plan and then seek the consent of the persons concerned and 
the creditors. In all cases, the application with regard to the sale of the debtor’s (the 
bank) valuable assets to third parties in the first few days would be delayed, depend-
ing on the individual restrictions of general insolvency law in most jurisdictions. For 
example, under German or Lithuanian general insolvency law, application for the sale 
of assets also requires the consent and approval of the creditors’ committee before the 
court starts examining insolvency procedures. Creditor resolutions may be disputed in 
court, which complicates the decision-making process. Rare exceptions exist, however. 
For example, in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case, the judge was able to approve 
and authorise the administrator performing the sale of the assets of the entity in bank-
ruptcy, based on the restrictions placed on the powers of the court within the context 
210 See more 3 chapter 1 sec. 4 subsec.
211 The sale offer in the bankruptcy proceedings of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 17 September 2008, 
(Docket No 60) was submitted only when two days have passed after the commencement of bank-
ruptcy.
212 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., dated 17 September 2008, (Docket No. 60). The SIPA Liquidation 
of Lehman Brothers Inc. James W. Giddens, Trustee [interactive]. [accessed on 10-12-2014] <http://
www.lehmantrustee.com/>.
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of the general Bankruptcy Code. The judge approved the sale of the debtor’s assets, 
despite the fact that it would predetermine any subsequent solution for bank recovery 
plan and potentially reduce the possibilities for private individuals to object the deci-
sion. The judge based his judgment with regard to the sale of property on the existence 
of “urgent and necessary circumstances of the case”213 outside the limits of general 
insolvency law. It was found that the debtor’s assets would otherwise inevitably loose 
their value and will lead to irreparable damage, if such a request was unsuccessful 
and remained unimplemented swiftly. The restrictions of asset sales or of continuous 
economic and commercial activity of the bank faced with financial difficulties in the 
case of bankruptcy lead to certain limitation of procedural rights held by the creditors, 
as their consent is no longer required. In addition, creditors often tend to lose their 
opportunity to appeal against the decision and raise objections with regard to the sale 
(veto right) within a reasonable period.
• Outstanding financial stability objectives. General insolvency law is not adequate to 
meet and reflect the importance of financial stability. The main purpose of general in-
solvency law is to fulfil creditor claims to the maximum possible extent, in view of the 
legally mandatory hierarchy of creditor claims. Therefore, the fundamental features of 
general insolvency law seem to run counter the features of the legal regime governing 
bank resolution, by prioritising creditors (for example, creditors without a collateral, 
or depositors) in order to avoid massive deposit withdrawal from banks. The aim to 
maximise the compensation of creditors’ claims is determined by macroeconomic fac-
tors214 and the necessity to maintain financial stability and to prevent the spillover 
effects of financial risks, which may occur due to lack of confidence  in  banks (the 
domino effect). General insolvency law gives no opportunity for banks to continue 
with their vital services, thus providing the legal opportunity to terminate a part of the 
bank’s operations in the event of liquidation, as according to the general insolvency 
law, all of the obligations are suspended after the application to initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings is accepted. General insolvency law procedures that existed at the time 
of the recent bank crisis were aimed at direct liquidation of the debtor, by liquidating 
the assets, therefore leading to the inability to guarantee the continuity of only certain 
parts of the debtor’s business, as this may increase creditors’ losses.
• Bank asset sales procedure. The primary objective of general insolvency procedures 
is to provide a legal „plan“ to distribute the debtor’s assets to the creditors. Then, the 
creditors or the bankruptcy administrator determines ways to distribute the assets of 
the debtor (usually on the basis of a quorum of creditors, at the creditors’ meeting or 
committee). The asset allocation procedure may take place only in a particular situ-
ation, under a pre-planned bankruptcy strategy, based on creditors’ approval. Most 
often the liquidation procedure works by submitting the draft resolution for creditors’ 
approval. Consequently, it allows only predictable bankruptcy, according to the strictly 
213 See more. United States Bankruptcy Court. Case No. 08-1420 (JMP). SIPA Liquidation Proceeding. 
Lehman Brothers Holdings. The Sale order, dated 20 September 2008. Docket No. 258. Case No. 
08-13555, Case No. 08 -01420. [interactive]. [accessed on 10-12-2014] <http://www.lehman-docket.
com/>.
214 See more Savona P., Kirton J., Oldani C. Supra note 129. P. 37-51.
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defined procedures215. Meanwhile, in the case of bank insolvency, legal bank resolution 
measures and tools play an extremely important role, which should be predictable in 
their structure and content. Only the statutory procedure governing bank asset sales 
process allows performing predefined and predictable asset sales216.
• Setting the threshold for bank failure. In all cases, in determining the insolvency of a 
certain bank, it requires actions and appropriate decisions of the supervisory author-
ity. Which is why general insolvency law seems defective and not always suitable for 
determining the triggering event of bank insolvency. Different methods, conditions, 
qualifying criteria concern determination of insolvency, and the legal consequences 
arising from the determination of insolvency. In contrast, legal regulation govern-
ing bank resolution is associated with particular insolvency procedures designed to 
solve bank solvency problems in view of the particular features of banking activity, by 
granting legal measures outside the limits of general legal rules governing company 
insolvency and by avoiding direct formal bankruptcy procedures, which may generate 
adverse effects often caused by the termination of the activities of the bank or after its 
closure217.
• Different objectives of the general and special law. The ultimate goal of special bank 
insolvency law procedures is to reduce the probability of the future banking crisis and 
to increase bank resilience to unfavorable economic conditions, at the same time tak-
ing into account the specific features of banks and their functional roles218. Meanwhile, 
the major goal of the general insolvency proceedings is the maximum satisfaction of 
creditors’ interests after liquidating the debtor’s assets. The competent authority may 
delay liquidation of the distressed bank219 by means of forced liquidation, but at the 
same time lack the specific legal measures at its disposal to reduce the losses resulting 
from the insolvency of a particular bank in the most effective way. The liquidation of a 
bank becomes practicable only if the resolution measures of an insolvent bank are un-
able to efficiently address the distress problems encountered by the bank, allow main-
taining depositor confidence in the stability and reliability of the banking system and 
otherwise protecting the public interest220. Many significant differences exist between 
general bank insolvency law and the special bank resolution regime. These differences 
will be clarified in the remaining chapters of the thesis, but at this point the most im-
portant ones should be mentioned, illustrating the examples based on the analysis of 
the US legal system. 
• First of all, general bank insolvency procedures (reorganisation and liquidation) in ac-
cordance with the US Bankruptcy Code are different from bank resolution procedures 
in view of their purposes. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are designed to max-
imise the return from debtors to creditors or revive and rehabilitate the debtor, often 
215 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 2005. P. 238-247.
216 EC. Brussels, 28.09.2008. C(2008) 5619. Merger Procedure article 7(3) Decision. Bradford&Bingley. 
Case No. COMP/M.5363. 
217 See more 1 chapter 8 sec.
218 For more information on the objectives of the legal regime governing bank resolution see Part 2, 
Chapter 3.
219 For example, concerns about systemic contagion. Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 23.
220 Čihak M., Nier E., IMF. Supra note 15. P. 42.
60
without taking the potential impact on the third parties taking part in the insolvency 
procedures. Meanwhile, bank resolution procedures allow and sometimes even encour-
age public authorities to grant some advantage to certain classes of creditors (such as 
depositors) or external factors221 (such as the impact on the economy and on the finan-
cial markets)222. In addition to that, bank resolution procedures empower governments 
to take action to reduce the adverse impact not only on creditors but also on the wider 
economy223. Second, the special bank insolvency procedures should also be assessed 
taking into account the lessons learned from the recent banking crisis. At the interna-
tional level, it was agreed that the government should not be forced to choose between 
two options that are equally unattractive: rescue of banks, even those holding the status 
of a systemically important financial institutions through public financing (bail-out), or 
initiation of disorderly liquidation. Instead, the government must have the legal tools 
to solve the financial problems of the distressed bank in a more robust way. Such a step 
serves to maintain market discipline by ensuring that not taxpayers, but shareholders 
and creditors will first suffer losses, and the management responsible for bank insol-
vency will be replaced, by mitigating the consequences on the general financial system 
of the potentially destabilising effect caused by the collapse of the bank224. Third, the 
essential difference between general insolvency law and special legal regime of bank 
resolution stems from the content of the bank insolvency process. For example, un-
der the US Bankruptcy Code, bank liquidation and reorganisation is a judicial process, 
which primarily relies on the legal interpretation rules developed in the case law, by 
interpreting and construing the rules of the Bankruptcy Code. However, bank resolu-
tion procedures are developed and administered by administrative authorities, which 
have the capacity and the rights to fulfill and issue implementing secondary legislation 
supporting the implementation of primary legislation. The court may review such deci-
sions taken by the competent authorities to the extent permitted by law. Moreover, the 
United States, where a legal precedent is treated as a source of law, case law decisions 
are mandatory for the administrative authorities225. The fourth fundamental difference 
relates to the financing of bank insolvency procedures. For example, Chapter 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code provides that bank resolution is primarily financed by using the 
debtor’s assets, by withdrawing or converting the debt, which typically consists of pri-
vate funding sources having priority over debtor’s creditor claims arising prior to the 
opening of insolvency proceedings (such as administrative costs), or a prioritised judi-
cial review226. The US Bank ruptcy Code is also constructed so as to enable the debtor 
to continue its activities and timely restructure the debtor’s obligations. Meanwhile, 
221 Systemic risk exception may be a good example. 12 U.S.C. Section 1823(c)(4)(G).
222 Cohen R., Goldstein M. The Case for an Orderly Resolution Regime for Systemically-Important Finan-
cial Institutions, PEW Financial Reform Project, 2009.
223 See more. Catharsis K.F. The real effects of bank insolvency and resolution. Journal of Financial Stabil-
ity, Vol. 16, 2015.
224 Bernanke B.S. Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks on the Squam 
Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System, 2010. P. 9.
225 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Study on the Resolution of Financial Companies 
under the Bankruptcy Code, 2011. P. 4.
226 11 U.S.C. Section 364 (a)-(d). See more 3 chapter, 3 sec.
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special bank insolvency law empowers administrators controlling the resolution pro-
cedures to grant funding for the process227. This financing gap can become extremely 
important in the case of a systemic crisis, where market confidence is weak, and the 
acquisition of funding from private sources is unlikely.
• Special legal rules serve to decrease the insolvency costs arising from bank insolvency. 
In the event of insolvency, the bank incurs charges that are much higher, compared 
to typical business entity insolvency costs228. Therefore, the state needs to produce ac-
curate and detailed legal rules designed to regulate bank insolvency procedures and 
to reduce the costs arising from the insolvency of the bank. For example, according 
to some researchers, bank asset losses in the case of forced liquidation are vital and 
amount to almost 30% of the real value of the bank assets, which considerably exceeds 
the numbers in the case of bankruptcy of a regular business entity, which is not a fi-
nancial institution (10 to 20% of property value)229. A similar conclusion can be drawn 
after analysing the case of the failed bank ‘Snoras’230. It should be noted that simply 
administrative and legal costs in directing liquidation procedures account for about 
10% of the failed bank’s total asset value231. In addition, bank bankruptcy procedures 
(liquidation) take considerable amount of time. Over time, until the assets are realised, 
their value decreases significantly. Among other things, the need for special rules and 
higher costs of insolvency proceedings is determined by very broad and specific range 
of reasons for bank insolvency. By way of illustration, several most relevant causes 
can be noted within the context of the research: unsustainable business models based 
on excessive debt and excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding, excessive 
number of employees or overly exaggerated bank structure, weak-all risk management 
system, the lack of internal or external audit services, the cases of improper reflection 
of operations, especially those of the valuation of assets, in the accounting, loans to 
persons related to the shareholder, intentional criminal acts, etc.232
• Special equity criteria and ratios. The recent banking crisis pointed resulted in many 
bank insolvency cases, in particular relating to banks with capital deficiency233. Typi-
227 12 U.S.C. Section 1823 (c), Dodd-Frank Act Section 204 (d).
228 See more Supra note 28, 138, 170.
229 Marinč M., Vlahu, R. Supra note 76. P. 42-44.
230 The activity reports of the bankruptcy administrator of bank ‘Snoras’ show that during the three-
month period only, e.g. up to 30 June 2013, the payments effected in the bank amounted to LTL 16.9 
million, including LTL 6.4 million of operating costs, LTL 9.4 million (incl. VAT) of payments to 
consultants, etc. [interactive]. [accessed on 02-01-2014]. <http://www.snoras.com/files/tinymce/files/
LT%207%204%20-%20Annual%20report%20-%20FINAL.pdf>.
231 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 42-44.
232 EC. The information report. MEMO/12/478, 2012, June 22nd, Brussels.
233 In the light of the banking crisis, available capital was lacking both in quantitative and qualitative 
terms, and unprecedented support of national authorities was therefore required. States began to im-
plement the new international bank capital standards, as agreed at the G20 level (the so-called Basel 
III requirements). It must be noted that Europe is one of the driving forces in this field, as it applies 
these rules for more than 8 thousand banks in Europe, which own 53% of the world’s assets. Ibid. See 
more Masera R. Bank Capital Standards: A Critical Review. Special Paper 215. LSE Financial Markets 
Group Paper Series. December 2012. P. 5.
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cally, bank insolvency is not an abrupt matter, as there is an ex-ante stage234 prior to 
insolvency, starting with early supervisory intervention, when formal and informal 
measures are applied235. In contrast to companies, creditors have no right to initiate 
bank insolvency procedures. Most often a bank is gradually approaching insolvency, 
first by breaching certain legally established prudential requirements, no longer meet-
ing capital requirements, which automatically requires intervention  of the relevant 
supervisory authorities236 prior to the bank becoming insolvent. For example, if bank 
shareholders fail to increase bank capital to the required standards237 (or act formally 
rather than in terms of content), in this case, in order to maintain financial stability 
and confidence, a supervisory authority may suspend the activities of the bank and 
impose a moratorium and only then engage in active search for the most appropriate 
solutions to deal with the problems of an insolvent bank (e.g., “bad loans” solution238). 
Furthermore, various rules exist for calculating the capital as well as solutions to the 
problems239 (regarding “bank capital requirement test” see more at p. 152-155).
Above discussed development of bank insolvency legal regulation allows to state that 
the general insolvency law during the recent banking crisis were not sufficient to deal with 
failing or likely to fail banks effectively. In summary, it must be assumed that general in-
solvency law has two fundamental shortcomings when applied to the banks. First, it fails 
to concentrate on the financial system and the stability of its protection, and secondly, it 
234 Bank pre-insolvency stage is intended to reduce excessive bank risk-taking. The essence of interven-
tion at this stage is that the regulatory authorities must have the powers to take specific measures in 
response to the rapid loss of market confidence, which could lead to the fact that certain banks will 
lose access to the short-term inter-bank lending market and the wholesale capital markets, which can 
appropriately increase systemic risk in the banking system. On the one hand, through the interven-
tion of regulators, market-based solutions are still real. If the market solution is not possible, such as 
borrowing from financial markets, intervention may be the first step carried out by the competent au-
thority or the central bank’s takeover of a failing bank and the transfer of bank shares and other equity, 
including contractual rights and obligations to the state-controlled bridge bank or a private buyer. 
Next steps – typically a bank is declared insolvent and is being wound up, also, official administration 
procedures start. Alexander K. Supra note 79. P. 65-66. Marinč, Vlahu. Supra note 76. P. 37.
235 Hoelscher D.S. Supra note 2. P. 97.
236 The report of the Bank of Lithuania on the bankruptcy process of the bank SNORAS AB. [interac-
tive]. [accessed on 10-02-2013] <http://www.lb.lt/seimo_posedyje_ab_banko_snoras_bankroto_pro-
ceso_apzvalga_1>. Unlimited risks, the bank’s capital fails to support the required additional capital 
levels, unrestricted interest paid to non-professional market participants and so on. Irregularities in 
breach of these criteria are accordingly related to the sanctions of the supervisory authority applied to 
the bank.
237 According to Article 41(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Banks. The authorised capital of 
the bank is created and reduced or increased in accordance with the Law of on Companies, if the Law 
on Banks does not provide otherwise.
238 Campbell A. Bank insolvency and the problem of nonperforming loans. Journal of Banking regulation, 
2007, UK. P. 25-45. With the increasing number of ‘bad loans’, the cash flows received by the lender 
from periodic credit repayment decrease, so that the credit issuer (the bank) may fall short of re-
sources and be forced to seek additional financial resources in order to properly discharge its liabilities 
(e.g. return funds to depositors); otherwise the bank itself could face the risk of insolvency.
239 Friedman J., Kraus W. Engineering the Financial Crisis. Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation. 
Capital Adequacy Regulations and the Financial Crisis: Bankers‘ and Regulators‘ Errors. University of 
Pennsylvania Press, US, 2011. P. 57-86.
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intervenes behind time240. The legal doctrine analysed by the author has revealed that the 
recent banking crisis and the enduring general insolvency law applicable to the ordinary 
course of business were not adequate to accurately regulate banking crises. This position 
is based on the fact that, in addition to the above-mentioned special role in the economy, 
general insolvency law is not suitable for not reflecting the specific functions of the bank 
and the related public interest objectives. The insolvency case of the US investment bank 
Lehman Brothers perfectly revealed that phenomenon. Moreover, some other shortcom-
ings were detected: firstly, the financial role and participation of the state in the rescue 
and/or restructuring of a failing or likely to fail bank was insufficiently regulated and, 
secondly, the legal regulation was inconsistent, or poorly developed, for example, without 
taking into account banking activities featured by administrative qualities. In the light of 
the analysis of the characteristics exposed by the relevant jurisdictions, it was necessary 
to review legal regulation governing bank insolvency. Such regulation should establish the 
legal regime for bank resolution that could provide a reliable set of legislative measures 
for public authorities to intervene quickly and early enough in the activities of a failing 
credit institution, in order to ensure the continuity of particularly important financial and 
economic functions of the bank and at the same time to minimise the economic effects of 
the collapse for the economy and the financial system. The main purpose of lex specialis 
is to ensure the distribution of losses to the shareholders and then to creditors, provided 
that creditors are not exposed to greater losses than they would have experienced if the 
bank had been wound up under standard bankruptcy procedures in accordance with the 
“least cost” or “no creditors worse-off ” principle. In the context of reforms, improvement 
or development of specific legal norms, it was important to give broad powers to compe-
tent authorities in order to ensure, for example, constant access to deposits and continue 
payment transactions, in particular cases – to sell viable parts of the bank’s assets, and to 
foresee a clear and known-to-all hierarchy of different creditor claims (loss distribution) 
in advance. Therefore, special legal rules are essentially associated with the modern bank 
resolution regime. On the one hand, the creation of special bank insolvency law is based 
on a premise that it can help avoiding destabilisation of financial markets and minimise 
the costs for taxpayers, avoid destabilisation of financial markets during the banking crisis. 
On the other hand, lex specialis can produce both positive and negative effect and pro-
vide substantial benefits or losses for the state and for the society. Increasing stability of 
the banking industry, together with effective regulation of bank insolvency problems may 
induce economic growth and at the same time result in the opposite effect – insufficient, 
ineffective legal regulation may foster the banks to increase social costs to consumers in 
other forms, e.g. they will be less willing to lend money and/or will charge higher credit 
support (administrative) costs to borrowers: both enterprises and households. Moreover, 
otherwise, it may result in a situation where new and inefficient legal regulation may at 
least partially increase the risks related to banking activity. Other sections of the disserta-
tion further investigate the success of creating a special regime for bank resolution and 
implementing international financial standards in other jurisdictions.
240 Hüpkes E. Supra note 3. P. 9.
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1.4. Interaction of Insolvent Bank (s) and Public Interest
1.4.1. Historical Origins and Background of Bank Insolvency Procedures
As already explained, since the beginning of the recent financial crisis until now, regu-
lation of bank insolvency procedures in the EU Member States but also in Switzerland and 
the US underwent turbulent periods. Numerous legal and regulatory reforms were agreed 
at the international political level241 (however, not all jurisdictions had the time to imple-
ment international financial standards to their full extent). In order to fully explore the re-
search object, the legal regime of bank resolution must be viewed also from the historical 
perspective. Firstly, this is necessary in order to produce a definite perception of why bank 
insolvency is an unavoidable economic phenomenon242, secondly, it will help identifying 
the primary cause of bank insolvency impartially, and thirdly, hence will crystallise the 
diverging interests of the parties involved in bank insolvency procedures.
First of all, it should be noted that banks go bankrupt since their inception in the 
civil society. The word “bankruptcy” is found in virtually all of the world’s languages and 
countries243 and means personal insolvency. In general terms, debtor’s insolvency reflects 
their debt repayment potential244. The word “bankruptcy” is inseparable from the history 
of the first bank failure. The origin of the word “bankruptcy” is associated with the Italian 
compound banca rotta. The phrase essentially means a ritual act of breaking a banker’s 
table. Breaking a banker’s table assumed their insolvency253. 
First banks appeared in ancient civilizations, however, they had no legal form of an 
enterprise, so at that time different temples and estates run by local managers and land-
owners performed the main financing role. However, the banks were expanding gradually 
in view of the modernisation of civil circulation and different modes of payment, which 
modified the banks themselves. Gradually, banks have acquired their legal status, and 
their activities have evolved from primary money exchange to a wider range of banking 
services, such as collecting deposits and lending money (loan issuance). These changes 
took place in the Middle Ages, at most times in Italian state-cities. Bank failures can thus 
be linked to Italy, in particular, to the Italian city of Genoa, where banking services, such 
as money exchange, shifted to extra banking services, such as deposit capture, storage, 
and lending money to other entities. This phenomenon emerged in 1200. The trend final-
241 The FSB requirements shall be fully implemented by 2016.
242 Both authoritative global organisations operating in the regulatory environment of financial services 
and interpreting bank insolvency legal relations, and the legal doctrine admits that bank insolvency 
is an inevitable phenomenon in a market economy. The BCBS has acknowledged that in a market 
economy, bank insolvency is one of the inevitable consequences of the risk-taking business. Therefore, 
swift and orderly, well-organised liquidation of a financial institution, when the latter fails to comply 
with the requirements of the supervisory authority, is a necessary and efficient financial system instru-
ment. The Committee has also noted that sometimes inadequate legal regulation of bank insolvency 
procedures leads to a deterioration of the bank’s financial difficulties and in some cases leads to nega-
tive legal consequences and increased social costs. BCBS. BIS. Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision. 2012 [interactive]. [accessed on 25-03-2014] <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf>.
243 Bankruptcy (English), bankrott (German), bancarootta (Portuguese), etc.
244 Norkus R. Nemokumas ir jo sąvokos dualizmas Lietuvos teisėje: ar reikalinga teisinio reguliavimo re-
forma? Justitia, Vilnius, 2013. Summary.
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ly prevailed in Venice at about 1300245. Therefore, in the early days of civilization deposits 
were brought in (credited) to a current bank account, which is best described by the word 
‘till’ of that time. Deposits intended for storage only were classified as depositum regulare, 
while deposits held in the current account were classified as depositum irregulare. Ac-
cording to legal nature of depositum irregulare, the depositor used to lose ownership of 
the deposited property, i.e. the input. Thus the depositor’s property was replaced with the 
bank’s commitment to pay interest for the opportunity to use the depositor’s cash. The 
banker, at the depositor’s request, had to return the deposit with equivalent assets, which 
could take the form of other assets, but necessarily of the same quality and quantity246. 
Therefore, the bank usually stored only a small part of the net cash received in the form of 
deposits and available to depositors on demand. Eventually, banks began lending to third 
parties for longer term, which presupposed that if the lending was too risky, for example, 
if the borrowers delayed their payments to creditors, the depositors were unable to re-
cover their money. As a result, since the inception of the first banks the banking business 
model has been inherently risky. Depositors did not have any exclusive rights or other 
legitimate preferences over other creditors of the bank, and they were simply treated on 
the same level with other creditors and not secured by the state from insolvency risk.
It should be emphasized that even these days, bank solvency problems are not un-
common. Bank insolvency at the time was an intractable process, and even gained the 
name of una gran furia247. A common cause of bank insolvency was that banks, among 
other things, were lending to sovereign states, which often simply failed to repay their 
loans and failed to meet their obligations (e.g., the state was involved in a military conflict 
in another country and often faced shortage of funds and then simply discontinued the 
performance of its liabilities to banks). Even in that particular period default caused a 
chain reaction in the financial system. It also led to a variety of financial default towards 
other creditors and depositors, which inevitably resulted the first bankrupt banks248. The 
events taking place at about 1345 could be given as an example. The three most impor-
tant banks of that time, who had branches throughout Western Europe went bankrupt 
because they exploited their credit resources by irresponsible lending and not weighing 
the financial risk with regard to the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Naples249. 
245 Roover R. New Interpretations of the History of Banking. Edt. J. Kirshner. Business, Banking, and 
Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, University of Chicago Press, Chi-
cago,1974. P. 201. Mueller R.C. The Venetian Money Market, Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200-
1500. Johns Hopkins University Press, London. 1997. P. 8.
246 Haebtjens M., Wessels B. Supra note 92. P. 4. For example, following a cash injection, subsequently the 
repayment of the contributed amount could be required in another equivalent, such as cheese, or vice 
versa.
247 R.C. Mueller. Supra note 245. P. 126.
248 Bankruptcy means inability to pay debts. Vaitkevičiūtė, V. International Dictionary. Lexicon, Vilnius, 
2001. Multiple versions of the relation between the words “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” could be 
found all over the world. In some places they are used as synonyms, and – in the others they are distin-
guished. Typically, insolvency is an initial stage of bankruptcy. In the Western countries, the term ‘in-
solvency’ is more common, and it is therefore used in this dissertation. Generally, the circumstances 
under which a bank may be declared insolvent, and the regulations of the supervisory authority and 
prudential regulation establishes the procedure for estimating and assessing insolvency.
249 Roover R. Supra note 245. P. 206.
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Another example of 1302 was that of bank Ammanati which went into bankruptcy. The 
latter had different borrowers and bank account holders not only in important Italian 
cities like Rome, but also in Spain, Portugal, France, England, and Germany250. The gen-
eral situation in the banking sector of that time is best illustrated by the extract from the 
letter of Venetian senator Tommaso Contarini, which was published after another bank 
collapse in 1584. He wrote: “In 1200 years of the republic we can tell that a total of 103 
banks were created in the country, of which 93 banks failed [...] and only seven of them 
successfully continued their activities.”251
In view of the above, we can conclude that banks were always challenged with in-
solvency problems. After examining the cases of bank insolvency of that period, we can 
identify that bank insolvency procedures were quite similar and were characterized by 
the following key features: (i) during bank insolvency procedures, ordinary depositors 
had to share bank assets with other creditors on the basis of pro rata principle; (2) trans-
national, i.e. cross-border bank insolvency was a common phenomenon at that time; 
(iii) bank insolvency crises were “international” in a sense. Even then cross-border cases 
of bank insolvency raised serious coordination problems. For example, it is known that 
about 1338, after the collapse of the largest bank in Venice, banks in Florence raised 
their claim and initiated proceedings with regard to the bank’s assets only after a year 
or two252; (iv) when most banks were confronted with insolvency issues, in particular, 
a bank was usually declared a moratorium as a measure to temporarily suspend the 
bank’s activities253. It should be  noted that under a moratorium the distressed bank 
could not be declared insolvent. Among other things, during the moratorium, the bank 
was prevented from opening insolvency proceedings, realising the assets and starting 
the liquidation procedure; (v) the analysis of bank restructuring procedures existing at 
that time demonstrated that any agreements between creditors had to be confirmed by 
the sovereign and/or the sovereigns; (vi) in complex and systemically significant cases 
of bank insolvency that could produce huge negative impact on the society, and also 
in extreme cases, the state assumed direct responsibility by appointing a liquidator for 
banks (by initiating straight bank liquidation), and sometimes the state was even acting 
as a lender of last resort and rescued banks from insolvency through public finances. 
For example, at the time of massive withdrawal of deposits from banks following the 
insolvency of Pisani Tiepolo in 1576, the government, in order to prevent bankruptcy of 
the bank, adjusted 65,000 ducats to it254. It is believed to be the first case of bank rescue 
and resolution in the world, through bail-out; (vii) some other significant differences 
prevailing in bank insolvency regulation are also worth mentioning. For instance, in 
Venice all insolvent persons unable to duly fulfill their obligations were excluded from 
social life and often from their political and economic life in the city. In other Italian 
districts, penalties associated with personal insolvency were more physical rather than 
substantive in nature. For example, an insolvent person (including bankers) had to hit 
250 Wessels B. International Insolvency Law. 3rd ed. Kluwer, Deventer, 2012. Para 10033.
251 Mueller R.C. Supra note 245. P. 121-122.
252 Ibid. P. 123.
253 Ibid. P. 124.
254 Ibid. P. 126.
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their own naked buttocks at least three times. The “punishment” was executed on the 
stone of “shame” placed in public, and the executed person had to spell out the words 
cedo bonis (“I am transferring my assets”) aloud.
1.4.2. Lessons to be learned from the recent banking crisis – the fundamentals 
of the changed paradigm 
The banking crises are likely to be associated with chaotic and controversial situations 
threatening the public interest. Among other things, financial difficulties faced by the bank 
(or banks) intercede with political and social problems. If a competent authority is late to 
take action in relation to the bank, interventions and supervisory actions are delayed, par-
ticularly in the absence of a proper legal framework, which may result in ambiguity and un-
certainty regarding the future financial system of the state and lead to protests and increased 
panic255. Inadequacy or inaccuracy of legal regulation may cause politicians’ ‘competition’ 
and lead to social chaos in a certain country, which may accordingly affect economic deci-
sion-making. The causes and consequences of the recent banking crisis could be mentioned 
as an illustration of that. Some scientists are of the opinion that only a catastrophic collapse 
of the market could force lawmakers and regulatory authorities overcome the difficulties of 
the financial community and to carry out comprehensive legal and regulatory reforms256. 
On 5 February 2008 an acknowledged economist Martin Wolf spoke to the Financial Times 
that “either we have learned from this financial crisis or another financial crisis will hit the 
global economy in the near future”257. This statement also applied in the scientific context. 
The financial crisis has given many lessons both to practitioners and academics which need 
to be systematized at scientific level, considering that science cannot distance itself from 
practice. Due to the large-scale experiences of the recent international crisis, this section 
concentrates on the lessons relevant for the scope of the study. Why lawmakers were forced 
to review the legal framework governing bank insolvency?
First of all, the recent banking crisis has proved that bank insolvency can result in sig-
nificant adverse consequences both for the society and individuals, and that there is a com-
mon threat both for the developed and for the emerging economies258. It became evident 
that maintaining public confidence in the banking system is one of the essential elements 
around the banking sector and stands above private interests. Once trust in the financial 
sector is lost, it can spread general panic and the contagion of global financial problems 
may spread throughout the banking system259. Furthermore, such events may cause credit 
255 Hoelscher D. Supra note 2. P. 3.
256 Coffee J.C. The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and 
Systemic Risk Perpetuated (January 9, 2012). Cornell Law Review, 2012; Columbia Law and Econom-
ics Working Paper No. 414. P. 2.
257 Wolf M. Why it is so hard to keep the financial sector caged [interactive]. [accessed on 10-12-2014] 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9987c5c4-d41f-11dc-a8c6-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3LQKpw3c8>.
258 See more Hardy C.D. Supra note 23.
259 Huertas T. Resolution and Contagion. Special Paper No. 188. LSE Financial Markets Group Paper 
Series, 2010.
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problems, payment system malfunctions and may even lead to a currency crisis and/or 
government defaults260. 
Second, fiscal costs born by the state in a situation of a banking crisis may increase 
seriously, especially in cases of inadequate and ineffective regulation of bank insolvency 
law261. That respectively means that the states is or will be forced to deal with solvency 
problems on an ad hoc basis, using ordinary deposit guarantee schemes, open-ended 
liquidity support, partial recapitalisation of the debtor, rescue through bail-out. This sig-
nificantly increase fiscal responsibility of the state, as the latter is faced with enormous 
fiscal expenditure, compared to countries with strict regulatory framework262. A strict 
regulatory framework, in particular, refers to restriction of bank’s activity in the case of 
persistant liquidity problems, by requiring the bank to significantly increase the level 
of capital, and – failing that – to remove the management, to sell the bank to a solvent 
financial institution, to provide public money or to initiate liquidation263. The banking 
crisis has shown the importance of the ability to manage an orderly liquidation also of 
the bodies other than the systemically important financial institutions, whatever form 
or legal status they may take. In the absence of specific legislative measures for bank 
resolution and special legal regime for bank restructuring, banks continue to be res-
cued by public finances on a mass scale, and this will inevitably lead to significant and 
negative moral hazard in the banking sector264. It was absolutely necessary to diversify 
legal regulation in order to balance public and private interests, by distinguishing bank 
crisis prevention, management, and bank resolution, as this distinction would help ju-
risdictions to maintain financial stability and restore the viability of banks in the wake 
of the financial crisis265.
Thirdly, it has become evident that we live in a “credit” society, and “credit” is the 
blood of modern economy. The banking sector is considered as one of the most sensitive 
sectors of the economy. We are talking about a situation that could vitally affect the coun-
try’s economy, the confidence of the population and economic operators in the country’s 
financial system, the sustainability of such systems, and the need to ensure proper and 
timely implementation of the stability of the financial system, by providing measures to 
strengthen the application of measures to increase the stability of the financial system266. 
In addition, it should be noted that, as a rule, the safety and soundness of banks need to be 
defined in the constitution of the relevant society and in the related constitutional princi-
260 Moro B. Lessons from the European economic and financial great crisis: A survey. European Journal of 
Political Economy. No. 31, 2014. P. 9-24.
261 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76.
262 Ibid. P. 72.
263 Ibid.
264 Hüpkes E. Resolving crises in global financial institutions: the functional approach revisited. (in) Supra 
note 27. Chapter 18.
265 Ibid. P. 293.
266 Republic of Lithuania. Financial Sustainability Act. Official Publication Valstybės Žinios. 2009. No. 
93-3985. Preamble. 
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ples, forming a fundamental criterion of a harmonious society267. In addition, banking can 
be treated as a public service268.
Fourth, bank solvency problems are related to sovereign debt crises269. Banking crises often 
correlate with sovereign debt crises. Financial difficulties faced by a particular bank can run 
off the movement of capital from a given market, cause potential and actual fiscal problems 
to a large group of people and create additional financial burden for the state. Such a situation 
negatively affects the pre-defined state budget270. In some cases, it may lead to the insolvency 
of the sovereign itself271. Severe banking crises can convert into public debt crises or vice ver-
sa272. On the one hand, the state is not legally responsible for the debts of companies operat-
ing within its jurisdiction, including banks, or the financial obligations of individuals both 
in international and national contexts. On the other hand, the state operates like a modern 
267 For example, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, inter alia, its Article 46(3), 
in regulating financial-economic activity for the benefit of general welfare of the people, the legislator 
needs to establish legal regulation that would ensure the safety, stability and reliability of the country’s 
financial system. See Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 24 May 2013 
on the compliance of certain provisions of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on financial collateral 
arrangements, the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on restructuring of enterprises, and the Republic of 
Lithuania Enterprise Bankruptcy Law with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. Case No. 
135/2010.
268 The first Swiss banking law of 1934 states in its explanatory memorandum that banking activities de-
veloped into public services. This provision is based on the fact that economic growth depends on the 
amount of capital available for investment purposes that banks can supply to the market. In addition, 
state monetary policy and implementing measures and the payment system is directly related to the 
public interest. Swiss Federal Banking Commission. Supra note 200. P. 5.
269 Gelpern A. Supra note 137. P. 207-288.
270 Waibel M. Bank insolvency and Sovereign Insolvency. (in) Lastra R.M. Cross-Border bank Insolven-
cy. Oxford University Press, 2011. Chapter 13. [interactive]. [accessed on 05-12-2014] SSRN <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1732786> P.2. Yadav Y. Empty creditors and sovereign debt: what now? Capital 
Markets Law journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2014. P. 10. Dubel J.H. Creditor Participation in Banking Crisis 
in the eurozone – A Corner Turned? Empirical analysis of current bank liability management and re-
structuring policies with conclusions for the European bank restructuring and resolution framework. 
Berlin, 2013.
271 For example, in October 2008 the three largest Icelandic banks collapsed within one week. These three 
banks accounted for about 90% of Iceland’s banking sector. It was the largest banking crisis in history. 
At a time when the banks became de facto insolvent, their liabilities to creditors exceeded USD 60 bil-
lion, i.e. eight times than the total GDP of the country. Iceland’s central bank failed to provide emer-
gency liquidity assistance to banks (become a ‘lender of last resort’) due to lack of financial resources 
to guarantee such an extent of foreign capital commitments. Among other things, this led to serious 
devaluation of the Icelandic currency.
272 For example, the Greek banking sector assumed large amounts of domestic government securities 
and bonds. When it became evident that the government’s finances were in destitute condition and 
government bonds depreciated significantly and became practically worthless, the government had 
to address the banking sector concerns at the time of its own financial decline. By contrast, banks 
in Spain and Ireland primarily led to the insolvency of the government itself. For example, banks in 
Spain and Ireland accumulated a large real estate portfolio. Therefore, they were the most vulnerable 
to any drop in the housing market. At the time of sharp real estate market decline the government had 
to bail out banks by using public finances and suffered enormous costs in the result. Boomerang L.M. 
The Biggest Bust. Penguin Books, London, 2011. P. 83.
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corporation – a limited civil liability entity. It should be noted that some exceptions exist, i.e. 
when the state is generally liable for the obligations towards creditors by means of its property.
First, the state is legally responsible for the provision of obligation guarantees entered 
by private sector, if the state acts as guarantor in this type of a borrowing relationship. 
Such assurances can be accommodated both according to international and national law. 
Secondly, the state often issues guarantees to the private sector to stabilise the economy in 
turbulent times273. Third, liability can arise while the deposit insurance fund performs its 
obligations under an insured event, which usually occurs after the bank becomes insolvent 
de jure. Deposits are typically secured by the deposit guarantee scheme (DGS). At the time 
of the banking crisis, the object of the DGS is to avoid abrupt withdrawal of deposits from 
other financial institutions operating in the country, therefore, rescue, reorganisation or 
liquidation of an insolvent bank (by paying money to the insured depositors) may lead to 
a situation where the state must employ public finances, due to the insufficiency of funds 
contained in the DGS to cover bank resolution or liquidation costs endured by depositors. 
In this instance, the state requires additional funding, which may appropriately entail ad-
ditional and significant fiscal costs for the state.
Fifth, the recent banking crisis has highlighted bank capital failure or the defective 
nature of capital quality criteria274. Capital ratio is one of the primary conditions for iden-
tifying bank insolvency275. Bank capital acts in the form of a safety guarantee required for 
highly vulnerable-banking activities. The higher the capital of the bank, the more it can re-
duce insolvency-related losses of the bank276. Most often banks become insolvent at a time 
when their capital does not match their business risk profile, so that accurate and timely 
management of the risks associated with bank capital levels is crucial. Low bank capital 
ratios could endanger the bank’s conduct in two primary instances. First, banks may fol-
low a strategy of excessively rapid growth, which is financed by high costs and leads to 
unpredictable and unstable bank liabilities. For example, bank asset growth exceeds the 
available capital, and the governing bodies are forced to buy more securities or to issue 
more loans in order to compensate for the increase in interest expenses caused by exces-
sive growth. Second, capital ratios decrease when bank income declines due to significant 
losses resulting from the issue of high-risk loans or excessive number of loans granted or 
securities issued277. Bank capital quality indicators were one of the key reasons leading to 
273 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 11. Several competent authorities issued collective guarantees for all li-
abilities of the bank, in order to calm the fears and disturbances in the market. The essential feature of 
a successful comprehensive guarantee is its reliability. It is politically difficult to determine whether a 
guarantee is valid and founded.
274 During the recent banking crisis, the capital held by credit institutions was insufficient both in terms 
of quantity and quality, which required unprecedented support from national authorities. The EU 
already applies new international standards for bank capital (the so-called Basel III requirements). 
Masera R. Supra note 233. 
275 See more 1 chapter 8 sec.
276 Friedman J., Kraus W. Engineering the Financial Crisis. Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation. 
University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia, US, 2011. P. 57.
277 William C. Handorf. Bank risk management, regulation and CEO compensation after the Panic of 2008. 
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a massive bank rescue with bailout278, by granting some form and degree of state support. 
For instance, if only between October 2008 and October 2011, the European Commission 
approved EUR 4.5 trillion in state aid to financial institutions279. Consequently, during the 
financial crisis, financial difficulties and problems affected not only borrowers (businesses, 
individuals, the state), lenders (banks), but also the states. Accordingly, cases of public fi-
nance-based rescue preconditioned the “too big to fail“ problem280. The doctrine is mainly 
based on the fact that some financial institutions are too big and too complex or largely 
interconnected and their insolvency can cause both national and international ‘contagion’, 
and their liquidation is therefore not possible (by initiating ordinary bankruptcy proceed-
ings). The society considers that some banks are simply ‘too big to fail’, namely ‘too big 
to terminate their activities and be liquidated, which created moral hazards281. The idea 
is based on the fact that taxpayers will nevertheless bear the ultimate burden of financial 
problems caused by bank rescue. Besides, it is likely that in all ‘too big to fail’ cases banks 
will still need full or partial public support of the state to survive without debt and to 
avoid general destabilisation of the financial system. It is believed that this problem could 
be resolved through upgrading or creating a special bank resolution regime, according to 
which bank liquidation would be undertaken only in extreme cases, by maintaining and 
securing the systemically important functions at the same time282.
Sixth, banks operating in several states on a cross-border level have mostly been rescued 
at the national level, subject to national public interests only, which often gave no optimal 
results283. Within the context of insolvent cross-border banks, legal and practical difficul-
ties related to the solution of problems caused by distress doubled due to different legal 
systems, involvement of different types of public authorities, whereas communication and 
collaboration between thos institutions was very complex and inefficient284. A need arose 
to legally establish certain principles for cooperation, such as non-discrimination of for-
278 Sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain deserve particular attention. These four 
eurozone economies suffered from the sovereign debt crisis by facing USD 1.6 trillion losses. BIS. 
Quarterly Review. International Banking and Financial Market Developments, 2010.
279 EC. Press release. New Crisis Management Measures to Avoid Future Bank Bail-Outs. 2012, June 6th.
280 See more 6 chapter 2 sec.
281 Reiser N. Supra note 94. P. 13. Howell E., Kaplow L., Shavell S.M. etc. Analytical Methods for Lawyers. 
2nd edt. Foundation Press, US, 2010. P. 48.
282 BCBC. Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group. 2010. P. 3.
283 BCBS. Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group. Basel, Switzer-
land. 2010. P. 6-9.
284 The Metliss case best illustrates the principle of mutual recognition of insolvency and acceptance and 
differences of the legal systems, which respectively leads to more serious legal obstacles problems. A 
long time ago, the national Greek Home Loan Bank issued bonds under English law. Then, the bank 
merged with another bank under the Greek government decree, which inter alia established the cre-
ation of a new National Bank of Greece, replacing the former national bank as the successor of all its 
rights and duties. However, English courts did not accept this change in the foreign law for the parties 
to the contractual relationship. The case perfectly illustrates how important it is to plan cross-border 
bank insolvencies in advance and to have clear rules for mutual cooperation and recognition of rights. 
Attinger J. B. Supra note 49. P. 5-8. See more National Bank of Greece and Athens v Metliss [1958] AC 
509.
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eign creditors, appropriate intervention measures, adequate legal safeguards for creditors, 
reliable rules for the protection of depositors’ rights, etc285. At the international level, as 
noted by the BCBS, unified bank insolvency legal regime would help resolve cross-border 
cooperation and inefficiency problems, by creating a coordinated, national legal regula-
tion for bank insolvency in all jurisdictions286. According to the Committee’s analysis, such 
compatibility would help maintaining the continuity of the critical bank functions in all 
countries where the bank operates, and would ensure financial stability287. Although cross-
border bank insolvency procedures are outside the scope of this dissertation, it should be 
noted that recently, banks were freely allowed to operate globally288, without admitting, 
however, that banks fail in the first place and that insolvency procedures are first and fore-
most initiated at the national level289. This essentially means that bank assets and liabilities, 
along with the losses resulting from the banking crisis, were distributed among the states 
and creditors concerned with the activities of a particular bank. In addition, during the 
recent banking crisis, the complexity of banking groups turned out to be ‘deadly’ for the 
supervisory authorities and for the private sector itself290.
After analysing the banking group structure, the problem of cross-border bank insol-
vency procedures is not surprising. The regulatory structure of the banking groups deter-
mined splitting of the bank group into several legal persons and this in no way reflected 
the economic functionality of such entities. The core business lines of the bank did not 
meet the legal structure. Therefore, any legal system based on a single legal entity approach 
in terms of insolvency recognition, admitting only each separate legal person as having le-
gal personality and possessing rights and obligations, was unable to reconcile the different 
285 Haan S., Vinals J. IMF. Resolution of Cross-Border Banks - A proposed Framework for Enhanced 
Coordination. Prepared by the Legal and Monetary and Capital Markets Departments, 2010. P. 4.
286 For example, in the case of insolvency of the banking group Fortis, Belgian and Dutch public authori-
ties failed to coordinate their efforts properly, to find solutions to financial difficulties faced by a cross-
border and to create a financial burden-sharing system. A more successful example was that of the 
banking group Dexia. Belgium, France, Luxembourg were able to control and coordinate their actions 
by entering into an agreement on the joint guarantee mechanism. This allowed avoiding straight bank 
liquidation at national level, and cross-border bank resolution procedure became possible. However, 
a problem arose in relation to the protection of shareholders’ rights. According to the Belgian law, the 
consent of the shareholders was necessary, which respectively blocked bank resolution. BCBS. Cross-
border Bank Resolution Group of the BCBS. Report and Recommendations, 2010. 33-37 para.
287 Ibid.
288 The main factors of globalisation of financial services: regulatory liberalisation of the financial sector 
and legal deregulations (most countries have now removed legal barriers to enable the establishment 
of a financial institution abroad), risk diversification (the ability of financial institutions to expand 
abroad allows diversifying risks, reducing dependence on the home market and pursuing new busi-
ness opportunities in a foreign market), provision of core services to business entities (as the activity 
of business entities expanded abroad, large banks followed this path to support and profit from such 
business entities and their development plans), brand value (internationally recognised brand repre-
sented at the local level in foreign markets can quickly gain market share abroad). Ibid. P. 7.
289 Hüpkes E. Supra note 148. P. 293-294.
290 In the case of Lehman Brothers collapse, it became apparent that no one could explain the elementary 
question as to the number of commitments the bank had throughout the financial sector. The bank 
had 3,000 legal entities operating in fifty countries. No one could tell the exact institution and the 
amount of money under risk (risk of losses). Attinger J. B. Supra note 49. P. 7.
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and complex aspects of the banking group. Therefore, the legal regulation of cross-border 
banking groups became one of the preconditions for the new legal regime on banking res-
olution based on the following objectives (i) that the states should improve their national 
laws so that the competent national authorities have the duty to maximise the coordina-
tion of resolution activities with their counterparties in other jurisdictions, in correspond-
ence with the interests of creditors and domestic financial stability; (ii) it is recognised 
that the state will be in a better position by coordinating their resolution actions with 
other countries, whose legal regime governing resolution will be harmonised with that of 
the other states to the maximum possible extent, by implementing international financial 
standards291. In normal economic circumstances, the differences between the form that a 
bank may take and the functions it performs (in the sense that many banks expand their 
business lines and operate in several countries across national borders and the activities 
are carried out through more than one legal entity) are not so important, but at the times 
of banking crisis their role becomes extremely significant292. During the crisis, national 
authorities paid insufficient attention to the risk management at the banking group level, 
and to the financial challenges faced by the bank as an economic unit. Instead, the authori-
ties primarily focused on individual legal entities within their jurisdictions and the legal 
protection of the bank assets and liabilities.
Last but not least, it is necessary to emphasize the management problems encountered 
by banks as corporations, especially in terms of an event prompting bank insolvency, e.g. 
by adopting excessively risky business decisions. First of all, the recent banking crisis has 
highlighted the key disparities between banks and non-financial corporate governance. It 
was influenced by the fact that, compared to conventional business entities, the internal 
structures of the bank organise more interested counterparties. It is equally important that 
banking business became mysterious and complex, and could develop  quite  rapidly293. 
Most of the bank’s creditors (debt holders) consist of depositors and subordinate debt 
holders. Despite numerous additional interests of creditors, the board was frequently rep-
resenting only a narrow view supported by shareholders. Shareholders’ interests are very 
different from those of the other creditors of the bank, since shareholders often pursue 
short-term benefits. In contrast, traditional bank lenders tend to pursue long-term and 
rarely varying objectives and interests. In addition, in most cases, faced with the recent 
banking crisis, the board of directors did not play the leading role of the key decision-
maker (e.g., it neither took enough time nor employed enough resources to implement 
its duties, there was no diverse ethnic or cultural origin, such as gender, social, cultural, 
educational background, and etc.294). Shareholders’ conflicts of interest, disagreements on 
bank profitability models appeared together with a number of troubles between auditors 
and shareholders, etc. The nature of the banking business recently became much wider, the 
services gained more complexity, and regulators were therefore unable to respond timely 
291 Supra note 188. Executive summary.
292 Lastra M.R. The role of the IMF as a global financial authority. LSE Financial Markets Group Paper 
Sries. Special Paper 192. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, Vol. 2, 2011.
293 Dewatripont M., Freixas X. The Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory Paradigms. Why is the governance of 
banks different from non-financial firms? Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 2012. P. 13.
294 EC. Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies. Green Paper. COM 
(2010) 284 final. Brussels, 2010. P. 6.
74
and adjust legal regulation to the consequences of bank development. Bank management 
was ill-founded, inter alia also due to excessive bonus and payment schemes for the ex-
ecutives (e.g., in the absence of a connection between the level of bank assets and wages), 
the unwillingness of the board to change managing bodies (e.g., even in the case of lack 
of consideration for maintaining bank solvency, by focusing exclusively on the pursuit 
of profit instead), insufficient competence fitness for function (lack of expertise) of the 
managing bodies, interdependence of the directors and the board (e.g., intellectual inde-
pendence), inadequate risk management (e.g., without specifying the level of risk that is 
acceptable to the bank, inability to perceive the risks assumed, etc.).
1.4.3. The Problem of the Banking Sector Structure – a Preventive Measure  
for the Protection of Public Interest?
The globalisation of financial services stimulated the creation of a large number of 
international banking groups and it was one of the grounds of recent banking crisis, inter 
alia threaten to public interest295. Banking groups are based on global network of bank 
branches and subsidiaries operating in several countries that employ multiple currencies 
in different time zones296. It should be noted that since 1990 banks (both commercial and 
investment banks) grew inexorably297. Accordingly, the size of banks, the number and va-
riety of transactions and the assets managed by the banks were also increasing rapidly. 
These events were worldwide and occurred in all developed market economies. Among 
other things, banks were often growing by reason of various bank mergers and acquisi-
tions and the increasingly widespread banking intermediation functions in the financial 
markets. Commercial banks united into joint bank groups, usually operating on a cross-
border level. Thus, the world was hit by a strong banking concentration trend, pointing 
to large and universal banks298. This situation eventually led to some banks or banking 
groups becoming so significant that if an individual bank faced financial problems in the 
relevant jurisdiction, it was not possible to apply direct liquidation procedures, i.e., allow 
ordinary bankruptcy procedures, and they could no longer be supported by taxpayers’ 
money (namely too big to fail). Recently, in addition to better bank insolvency regulation, 
legislators and policy-makers have focused on preventive measures of bank insolvency 
procedures (prudential requirements, additional capital requirements, supervision, ad-
vance planning of resolution, namely resolution plans, early intervention legal framework) 
and their potential positive impact on the economy. The question is whether narrowing 
banking activity could be an alternative means for mitigating the practical problems and ef-
fects caused by the operation of bank insolvency procedures, and whether it can contribute to 
the successful operation of the bank resolution regime?
295 Chorafas N.D. Supra note 8. P. 40.
296 Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. (ix).
297 Kay J. Supra note 178. P. 51.
298 Jone D.K. Critchfield T. Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry: Is the „Long, Strange Trip“ About 
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Some regulatory proposals argue and propose the necessity to reduce the volume of 
bank activity  by  restoring the US Glass-Steagal299 legislative restrictions or by applying 
taxes, or additional capital charges according to the size of the bank and its intercon-
nection with other credit institutions300. Other regulatory proposals attempt to reduce 
bank insolvency risks, in particular, by improving bank management and internal control 
structures, by managing various bank insolvency-related risks301. It is worth noting that 
preventive insolvency measures and their practical implementation through supervisory 
actions and legal processes may reduce the probability of bank insolvency risks, by en-
suring greater resilience and sustainability of banks and lessening the likelihood of bank 
insolvency. In the context of insolvency, it is relevant to distinguish the bank structure 
problem as a preventive measure and to clarify it, as this would serve to predict the fu-
ture of the science and the regulatory prospects. Such a distinction would contribute to 
the mitigation of moral hazards arising from bank insolvency procedures, distortions of 
competition, and to the reduction of flawed banking practice, which could potentially lead 
to systemic risks. Furthermore, more effective supervision of constricted banking activi-
ties would potentially facilitate market monitoring and would help better distinguish the 
sources of systemic risk. Finally, although this preventive measure remains problematic in 
the doctrine (the need to exclude specific banking activities from the banking sector and 
to delegate them to public institutions is still under a question mark), it is however seen 
as a legal instrument to manage public services or the means to create and develop public 
infrastructure, inevitably influencing private interests302.
Nowadays, universal, traditional commercial banks normally not only accept deposits, 
but also issue guarantees and trade in securities and derivatives303. The development of 
banking was quite different in the Anglo-Saxon legal system and the European continental 
legal system. In the US, combining commercial and investment banking became possible 
only after 1999304. At the time, the Glass-Steagall Act305 was repealed and replaced by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act306. Under previous regulation valid from the time of the Great 
Depression, each financial institution was under a duty and obligation to choose whether 
to engage in deposit-taking and lending only, or whether to undertake broader banking 
299 US Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat 162 (1933).
300 Lictenstein C.C. Lessons for 21st-century central bankers: differences between investment and depos-
itory banking. International Monetray and Finacial Law. The Global Crisis Oxford University Press, 
2010. P. 217-233. G30. Financial Reform: A framework for Financial Stability. Washington DC, Group 
of Thirty, 2009. Turner L. The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis. 
London, Financial Services Authority, 2009.
301 Hüpkes E. Supra note 19. P. 105. Samolyk K. The Future of Banking in America. The envolving Role 
of Commercial Banks in U.S. Credit Martkets. FDIC banking review. Vol. 16, No. 2, 2004. P. 29-65.
302 Supra note 76. P. 89.
303 Lichtenstein C.C. Lessons for 21 st- century central bankers: differences between investment and deposi-
tory banking. International Monetary and Financial Law: The Global Crisis. Edt. Giovanoli M., Devos 
D. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010. P. 228.
304 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 13 Stat 1338 (1999).
305 Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 58, 47 Stat. 56 (1932). Codified 12 U.S.C.§§ 347a-347b, 412 (1988).
306 Lawson N. Capitalism Needs a Revived Glass–Steagal. Financial Times, 15 March 2009. Barth J.R., 
Brumbaugh R.D., Wilcox J.A. The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking. 14 Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 2000. P. 191-204.
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activities, e.g. operating as a financial services agent or a broker-dealer. Therefore, for a 
long time, legislators treated investment and commercial banking as a separate business 
line307. After repealing this kind of regulation, the concentration of the US banks highly 
increased and became obvious308. The different banking structure culture among bank 
business models is best revealed by the US Supreme Court, in its judgment Investment 
Company Institute v Camp309. The primary requirement of the case was to separate securi-
ties lending activities from other banking activities and to maintain the banks as finan-
cial institutions collecting deposits, and at the same time to distinguish banking from 
securities lending business. This meant that depositors may suffer significant losses due 
to more risky investment banking business. Investors operate primarily on the basis of a 
relationship of trust in the bank and in line with the instructions and orders of the bank. 
Therefore, loss of customer confidence can cause ‘significant and severe harm to the bank 
for a transitional securities market during the period of deflation’310, which could in turn 
lead to massive withdrawal of deposits from banks and result in a significant number of 
bank insolvencies.
Some recent regulatory proposals have suggested getting back to narrow banking or 
the Glass-Steagall regulatory principles, which basically means that banks accepting de-
posits would be distinguished from banks investing in shares, financial instruments and 
complex structural financial products311. The central idea of the suggested regulation is 
that investment banking services should not be permitted for self-financing financial in-
stitutions collecting deposits from the public or other commercial banks312. On the one 
hand, ‘narrow banking’ consists of the obligation for banks to invest all private retail cus-
tomer deposits in reliable assets. On the other hand, such legal regulation would eliminate 
the inconsistency between ‘bank’ terms and different definitions and reduce the liquidity 
risk of banks engaged only in deposit collection activities, also simplify legal regulation 
(except for the cases of fraud) and remove the necessity for financial safety nets. As noted 
in the Turner Review report, any State would face difficulties in pursuing such reforms, 
while other states haven’t taken the equivalent measures to separate banking activities, 
in addition, it is unlikely that such regulation would result in the adoption of a decent 
international political agreement, due to very different historical traditions of banking in 
the individual jurisdictions313.
307 Pennacchi G. Narrow Banking. ARFE Journal. Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 4, 2012. P. 
3-15.
308 Kay J. Supra note 178.
309 Investment Company Institute v Camp, 91 S Ct 1091 (US S Ct 1971).
310 Ibid.
311 Kay J. Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation. CSFI. Erasmus Press, London, 2009. Kay 
J. Should We Have ‘Narrow Banking’? Future of Finance: the LSE Report, 2011. Speech by Mr. Erkki 
Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland and Chairman of the High-level Expert Group on the 
structure of the EU banking sector, at a conference on “The future of central banking”, Copenhagen, 
30 January 2013.
312 Grauwe D. The Banking Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Remedies. CEPS Policy Brief, No. 178, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008.
313 Financial Services Authority. The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Cri-
sis, 2009.
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It should be noted that the EU has now submitted new regulatory proposals, which are 
still in the initial stage of the legislative process. The EU legal system is willing to separate 
banking businesses and diversify them. The Liikainen report314 proposes some structural 
changes in the banking sector and the initiatives similar to the former legal regulation 
in the US. These legislative proposals aim to abolish universal banking trends in the EU 
banking sector. This means that the new regulatory framework would not allow any bank 
to offer all possible banking services, i.e. to implement universal banking functions. Bank-
ing activities would be diversified, by making it possible to identify and distinguish be-
tween high-risk criteria for the operation of banks and banking risk as such, for example, 
by putting high-risk banking activities outside the banking sector. A more detailed review 
of this reform is outside the scope of this research, in addition to the fact that the scientific 
opinions on the matter still vary greatly and are in the stage of active deliberations315. At 
the same time, current and future legislative measures cannot fully eliminate financial 
and/or banking crises and avoid bank insolvencies, as this would run counter the nature 
of banking, which is risky in itself316. However, such legal reforms could mitigate the legal 
consequences caused by the insolvency of one or more banks. In addition, some of the 
risks associated with the event triggering bank insolvency are increasing, and cybercrime 
is particularly worth mentioning317. Therefore, on the one hand, it can be assumed that 
in the future new banks (with diversified activities) and their entirely different earning 
patterns are likely to eliminate weaker, universal banks from the banking system. On the 
other hand, prohibition or restriction of banking activities associated with high risks for 
both banks and non-banks (investment firms326) may serve as a useful tool to combat 
bank insolvency problems.
In conclusion, it must be considered that the structural changes of the banking busi-
ness actively debated in the EU would not be a fait accompli. It is doubtful whether the 
‘narrowing’ approach to banking activities could be fulfilled in practice as a completely 
harmless phenomenon for the financial markets, as in this case the state itself would have 
to inevitably intervene directly in the specific activities of banks, and the primary idea of 
banking, based on customer (corporate or individual) confidence in the system would 
be distorted318. Some opinions state that such reforms would simply undermine the cur-
rent risk profile of the financial system and would be less efficient than the current fi-
nancial system319. The key arguments questioning this trend of  regulation relate to the 
314 Liikanen Group. Final report of the European Commission‘s high-level expert group on reforming the 
structure of the EU banking sector, Brussels: European Commission, 2012 [interactive]. [accessed on 15-
10-2014] <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf>
315 Symposium on Building the Financial System of 21st Century: An Agenda for the Europe and the 
United States, March 21-23, 2013. Zurich Symposium Report. P. 5.
316 Bonstra W.V.B. Supra note 84. P. 17.
317 Frizell S. J.P. Morgan Says 76 Million Households Hit By Cyber Breach. Time.Com. MasterFILE Premier, 
2014. P. 1. EBSCOhost [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-19]. James M. Fear over cyber attack on City 
after „Russians hack JP Morgan data’’. Evening Standard, 28 August, 2014, Newspaper Source. EBSCO 
host [interactive], [accessed on 19-12-2014].
318 Lictenstein C.C. Supra note 300. P. 228-233.
319 Goodhart C.A.E. The Optimal Financial Structure. Special paper 220. LSE Financial Markets Group 
Paper Series, 2013. P. 6.
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potential conflicts associated with the disorders of the banking supervision system and 
uneven bank activity management, the requirement to create different deposit insurance 
schemes for different banks, the emergence of the different role of the central bank as a 
lender of last resort, and the creation of additional administrative burden. It is doubtful 
whether the current revised and/or the newly created legal regime governing bank resolu-
tion would assist in  fighting against bank insolvencies and could be replaced by sort of 
bank self-regulation. We can also talk about other problematic aspects, such as whether 
voters, through their appropriate representation in the Parliament, would support the idea 
of such a banking structure, or whether such a narrowed banking system is safe, especially 
in the context of financial stability, or whether the depositors would be willing to actively 
monitor bank activities, or whether such banking system would be able to finance the 
existing economy320.
1.5. A New Paradigm of Bank Insolvency Procedures
As mentioned above, during the recent banking crisis many jurisdictions did not have 
sufficient and efficient legal regulation of bank insolvency, especially bank resolution tools 
that could actually deal with distressed banks and other financial institutions in financial 
difficulty321. For example, when a bank de facto becomes insolvent, the competent authori-
ties of certain jurisdictions had no right to terminate the ‘unnecessary’ bank contracts, 
extend the valuable bank contracts, sell the assets of the insolvent bank or transfer bank 
liabilities to another legal entity. That idea was principally based on the fact that the solu-
tion of problems faced by financial institutions was based on complicated and expensive 
compulsory winding up procedures or bank rescue by using public finances. Therefore, 
public authorities were confronted with the disadvantage of the alternative: either to ap-
ply very unpredictable general corporate insolvency proceedings under lex generalis, or 
to save the bank from liquidation by bail- out. Most of the jurisdictions referred to the 
general insolvency regimes, which was usually administered by the courts. Lex generalis 
was often applied too late or was simply too slow in solving the financial problems of banks 
in difficulty, thus causing massive losses and highly decreasing general confidence in the 
banking sector. Banking supervision, as well as legal regulation of banking crises and bank 
resolution was not harmonised neither at regional nor international level. Individual bank 
resolution procedures and their regulation in different countries highly varied and bank 
resolution measures were lacking322. For example, supervisory authorities did not apply 
consolidated supervision for banks operating globally, treated banking groups as a single 
economic entity, the powers of competent authorities were non-harmonised and limited, 
and very different conditions existed with regard to determining bank insolvency or legal 
measures for bank resolution, etc. In addition, the competent authorities did not have the 
legal framework that would require ex ante preparation of recovery plans for potentially 
insolvent banks and/or exit strategies. It is important to mention that before the recent 
320 Theissen R. Supra note 104. P. 41.
321 BCBS. Supra note 15. P. 41.
322 Hüpkes E. Supra note 71. Blair W. Standards and the rule of law after the global financial crisis. (in) 
Ferran E., Moloney N., Hill G. The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. P. 2.
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banking crisis, the legal sources for harmonisation of international bank insolvency pro-
cedures and soft law measures were lacking. It can be assumed that the vacuum of legal 
regulation of international financial standards inter alia resulted in the insufficient regula-
tion of bank insolvency procedures in individual jurisdictions. Various international regu-
lation initiatives were emerging in order to stabilise and strengthen the international fi-
nancial system, and thus reform the regulation of bank insolvency law, in order to achieve 
the due balance of public and private interests. In this section, we will assess the processes 
of harmonisation and unification of legal relations surrounding bank insolvency in the 
international and (regional) EU context.
1.5.1. Current Trends and Developments of Bank Insolvency Procedures.  
An International Perspective
First of all, it is important to note that new international financial standards are based 
on ‘soft’ law323, i.e. determined by international organisations and inter-governmental re-
lations. It is assumed that the choice of such regulatory direction generates several con-
cerns. First, various major international standard-setting organisations and institutions   
lack legislative powers, thus the recommendations adopted by them do not in theirselves 
possesses and have legal power. In order for a recommendation to become legally bind-
ing, the rules must be incorporated into national legislation and the relevant administrative 
practice of national legislators in the relevant jurisdictions. Second, international financial 
standards (IFS) related to bank insolvency procedures are not now based on international 
treaties, and thus, at least theoretically, their implementation is linked to ‘voluntary’ im-
plementation of standards initiated by national authorities. At the same time, this does 
not diminish the fact that IFS in the sphere of bank insolvency procedures have largely 
contributed and do contribute to the elimination of gaps in the legal regulation within the 
context of bank insolvency, as IFS reflect a certain legal and political consensus among 
different countries of the world, in line with the will of the largest global financial cent-
ers-states. Besides, IFS were adopted in the presence of national supervisory authorities 
or experts from different jurisdictions, and only after the meetings (usually recorded by 
minutes) the jurisdictions were encouraged to implement this non-binding legislation at 
national level324. It is also assumed that in an extremely dynamic industry of financial 
323 In the context of bank insolvency, soft law is characterised by the fact that it avoids such terms as 
rules or legal regulation (it often uses the terms standards or code of conduct instead ) and execution 
(instead of implementation), convention (instead of international agreement) and so on. Soft law is a 
category of legal rules created by legal doctrine. The main reason for using soft law is – that it facili-
tates taking into consideration the complex legal framework, along with the broader social and politi-
cal context. Both binding and non-binding rules can amount to soft law. Giovanoli M. Supra note 85. 
P. 34. Terpan F. Soft Law in the European Union - The changing Nature of the EU Law. European Law 
Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, UK, 2015. P. 68-96.
324 Occasionally, scientists believe and claim that international financial standards are not that non-
binding. This judgment is based on the fact that IFS reflect the agreements that came into being after 
intense negotiations and afterwards were adopted at national level, in consequence of the expressed 
consent and will). In some cases, the IFS recommend compliance, and sometimes even important 
sanctions are agreed for non-compliance. On the other hand, because of unclear regulation of the 
IFS a number of legal problems may arise in practice (i) legitimacy (no clear legal basis), uncertain 
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services, ‘soft’ law is more operational, more flexible and more efficient than positive law. 
The market itself supports bank insolvency regulation through IFS325. It should be empha-
sized that the Member States of the IFS-setting bodies aim to achieve these standards at 
the national level, often before their implementation is agreed by the heads of the state. 
For instance, the FSB members committed to maintain financial stability by all means 
implement IFS  and conduct periodic reviews of implementation of those standards in 
national law. Finally, there is a growing trend with regard to the meaning of international 
financial standards for the states in the relevant context of economic and trade relations, 
particularly, having the United Nations standards and the recommendations prepared by 
the World Trade Organization in mind326.
Though various non-periodic discussions on the issues of improving and problem-
solving of bank insolvency procedures were maintained since the early 1990s, nonetheless, 
their results were very limited in scope, often limited to an abstract diagnosis of problem-
atic issues and not their solutions327. Given the large-scale financial crisis of 2007-2009, it 
has become clear that it is necessary to strengthen the legal regime governing resolution 
of credit institutions and to improve banking supervision328. There was a strong need to 
restore public confidence in the financial system, in particular, by improving the protec-
tion of depositors and consumers, and thus to facilitate the European and global economic 
recovery. Since 2007, the beginning of the global financial crisis, up to now many regula-
tory reforms have been seeking to improve the legal regulation of bank insolvency or to 
make it more effective. Various initiatives triggering regulatory reforms were assumed by 
different international organisations: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, also vari-
ous cross-border bank resolution group initiatives appeared, etc. Furthermore, significant 
works were undertaken under the initiative of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
legitimacy of standard-setting bodies and decision-making by setting standards for procedural rules, 
transparency of the consultation and the related rulemaking process, final approval of the created 
international standards; (ii) the degree of discretion and flexibility of implementation of each coun-
try; (iii) general public law principles, such as proportionality and subsidiarity; (iv) procedural safe-
guards, such as the likelihood of revision of the standards, the right to defense and personal remedies. 
Bismuth R. Financial Sector Regulation and Financial Services Liberalization at the Crossroads: The 
Relevance of International Standards in WTO Law. Journal of World Trade 44/2. 2010.
325 Bernanke B. What should economists and policymakers learn from the financial crisis? Department of 
Economics & STICERD public discussion in association with the Bank of England [interactive]. [ac-
cessed on 11-10-2014] <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130325a.htm>.
326 Ramanna K., Sletten E. Why do Countries Adopt International Financial Reporting Standards? Harvard 
Business School Accounting & Management Unit, Working Paper No. 09-102, 2009. Brummer C. 
How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t). Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 99, 2011; 
Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-15.
327 In 1992, the BCBS formed a working group that published a report entitled ‘The Insolvency Liq-
uidation of a Multinational Bank’. The Financial Stability Forum mandated the BCBS to draw up 
guidelines dealing with insolvent bank issues. In 2002, the report ‘Supervisory Guidance on Dealing 
with Weak Banks’ was published. BIS. The Insolvency Liquidation of Multinational Bank. 1992 [inter-
active]. [accessed on 13-10-2014]. <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs10c.pdf>. BIS. BCBS. Supervisory 
Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks. Report of the Task Force on Dealing with Weak Banks. 2002 
[interactive]. [accessed on 13-10-2014] <http://www.bis. org/publ/bcbs88.pdf>.
328 See more Blair W. Supra note 322. P. 96-102.
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national Trade Law (hereinafter – UNCITRAL). The awareness that international harmo-
nisation of bank insolvency procedures by way of international treaties is not possible in 
the short - term, first of all, it was necessary to adopt certain soft law standards or regula-
tory guidelines and to find a common approach to the existing practical problems of bank 
insolvency procedures329. 
International regulatory forces would not exist without the G-20330 leaders’ meetings – 
forums that were formed at the beginning of the financial crisis. Subsequently, the meetings 
were held both in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, in October 2009 in London, in Novem-
ber 2010 in Seoul and in November 2011 in Cannes. The meetings of G20 resulted in the 
decisions to support consistent efforts to improve legal regulation governing bank insol-
vency, by developing and formulating international agreements and the common legal base 
with regard to problem-solving of distressed banks (particularly cross-border ones), and by 
determining the main characteristics in the form of ‘soft law’ guidelines, that would even-
tually become part of the bank resolution legal regime in all jurisdictions331. The question 
then arises as to how such initiatives evolved and what they were intended for. While at the 
international level, the focus was placed on systemic financial risks caused by the insolven-
cies of systemically important financial institutions332, the discussions also largely involved 
ordinary bank insolvency procedures. The primary objective of international legal regula-
tion was that the competent authorities would no longer be required to choose between 
the two unacceptable alternatives: disorderly liquidation of the bank and bank bail-outs by 
public finances333. Within the scope of the research334, the present section will concentrate 
on the trends of changing international regulation taking place since the inception of the 
financial crisis and will aim to reflect the shifting paradigms.
At the initial stage, it was envisaged that as early as in June 2012 the G-20 will begin to 
assess country progress with regard to the implementation of those IFS provisions in their 
jurisdictions. It should also be noted that at the international level, a number of authorita-
329 At the summit, the G-20 leaders adopted the declaration on financial markets and the world economy 
in April 2009. The G20 leaders urged ‘in the light of the recent developments in the resolution of 
financial institutions to review financial institutions resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws, in par-
ticular for the orderly winding up of large and complex structure of cross-border credit institutions’.
330 The G20 is an informal political leadership group, consisting of 19 countries and the EU, with a mis-
sion to strengthen, reform, review the functioning of the international financial architecture, espe-
cially in the regulatory guidelines, based on the IFS agreed at international level. See more Giovanoli 
M. Supra note 85. P. 14-17. [interactive] [accessed on 13-10-2014] <www.g20.org/about_G20>.
331 Hüpkes E. „Living Wills“ – An International Perspective. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Direc-
tive. Europe’s Solution for “too big to fail”? (in) Edt. Dombret A., Kenadjian P. Institute for Law and 
Financial Series. Vol. 13, 2013. Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin, Germany. P. 73.
332 For example, at the Seoul summit of heads of state , the G20 leaders adopted a political programme 
of the FSB aimed at reducing the moral hazard arising from the insolvency of systemically important 
financial institutions. FSB recommendations and timelines [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-11-15] 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard. org/publications/r_101111a.pdf>.
333 Hüpkes E. Supra note 71. P. 3.
334 In this study, the author does not intend to provide detailed scientific analysis of all legal reforms 
carried out since the beginning of the financial crisis and the change of international financial archi-
tecture. Only particular legal aspects of the changes are considered, by giving some remarks directly 
related to the subject-matter and the main question of the research. This section focuses on the discus-
sion of the key standards in the context of the international bank resolution legal regime.
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tive international organisations have also taken the initiative to identify the critical legal 
issues arising from the recurring cases of bank insolvency, and to formulate the principles 
of bank insolvency law, which can be applied to solve the relevant problems. Since then, 
the G30335 group together with INSOL International336 regularly prepare and publish pro-
gress reports on the regulation of bank insolvency procedures. The report touches topical 
issues related to the problems that may arise in cross-border bank insolvency cases in the 
financial sector, making it clear that jurisdictions still lack effective legal regulation337.
After the real estate and mortgage lending crisis, which began in 2007, but gathered 
pace only in September 2008 after declaring insolvency of the Lehman Brothers invest-
ment bank, the G20 348 and other leaders recognised that efficient bank insolvency legal 
regulation was a necessary precondition in order to protect financial stability and limit 
moral hazard338. State leaders urged to review special laws governing bank resolution and 
liquidation and were  supported by all key organisations setting international financial 
standards.
1.5.1.1. Financial Stability Board Initiatives and Key Attributes of Effective Bank 
Resolution Regimes
In October 2009 the Financial Stability Board339 (FSB) replaced the Financial Stability 
Forum340 and announced a set of rules on the key preferred features of bank insolvency 
335 G30 is a group established back in 1978. This is an international non-profit organisation, consisting of 
high-level public and private sector representatives, as well as academics. The organisation’s primary 
goal is to promote the solution of international economic and financial problems, analyse and address 
the issues and decisions having international repercussions, taken both by private and international 
sectors. The organisation works in conjunction with market practitioners and national policy-makers. 
Group members meet in plenary session twice a year to discuss pre-selected, relevant economic, fi-
nancial and policy development issues. The group has a broader audience in seminars and sympo-
siums. For example, it periodically organises international banking seminars. The debate culminates 
with the release and publication of a special report. See more [interactive] [accessed on 13-10-2014] 
<www.group30.org/about>
336 A world-scale authoritative international association that brings together the restructuring, insol-
vency and bankruptcy professionals. In a sense, it is a federation of both accountants and lawyers 
operating in the field of insolvency and of national associations. Currently, the network consists of 44 
member associations with more than 9,800 professional members. See more [interactive] [accessed on 
13-10-2014] <www.insol.org>.
337 UN Commission on International Trade Law. Working Group V (Insolvency law). Insolvency of 
Large and Complex Financial Institutions. Note by the Secretariat, 2012. P. 3.
338 IMF. Resolution of Cross-Border Banks, 2011. P. 5.
339 The Financial Stability Charter, which established the FSB, announces that the Financial Stability 
Board is to be created to coordinate at the international level of national financial authorities and in-
ternational organisations, to develop and promote efficient financial services legal regulation and fol-
low implementation, and maintenance and other financial sector policies. In cooperation with other 
international financial institutions, the FSB seeks to resolve the central issues prevailing in the finan-
cial systems and to ensure global financial stability. Financial Stability Board Charter. 1 Art. [inter-
active]. [accessed on 10-11-2014] <http://www.financialstabilityboard. org/publications/r_090925d.
pdf>.
340 The Financial Stability Forum was established back in 1999 by G7 states coordinating the actions of 
various international organisations’ activities in the field of finance. After the summits held in Wash-
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procedures341, to be followed in addressing the problems of insolvent banks, cross-border 
cooperation in the case of bank insolvency and banking crisis management. The most 
important aspect of those principles was the requirement that national authorities for-
mulate the principles in short-term in order to develop mutual cooperation and exchange 
of information. Since then, the FSB regularly publishes evaluation results, the thematic 
overview, last dated April 2013, assessing the implementation of FSB recommendations by 
different jurisdictions and transposition of international financial standards into national 
law342. The aim of the periodic report is to evaluate progress and legislation gaps.
In November 2011 the leaders of the largest countries endorsed one of the most im-
portant  international act – the Financial Stability Board (FSB) document entitled “Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regime for Financial Institutions”343. The document 
has developed into a new international financial standard for legal regulation of bank 
insolvency procedures. It set out the fundamental legal principles and twelve attributes, 
which the FSB considers to be necessary for efficient bank resolution. These features are 
applicable in particular to all financial institutions and their conversion regimes, espe-
cially those financial institutions which may be systemically important and which perform 
critical functions at the international level, but at the same time, to conventional banks344. 
According to that document, the concept of financial institutions includes: banks, insur-
ance companies, investment and securities firms and financial market infrastructures (all 
types of financial intermediaries). The document also regulated resolution procedures of 
financial groups, conglomerates and holding companies. It is assumed that only after the 
implementation of these features in the national legal systems of individual countries, the 
authorities would be able to restructure credit institutions, so that the risk of loss is not 
transferred on taxpayers by reason of the aid granted to secure smooth operation of the 
ington and London in November 2008 and April 2009, the forum was transformed into the Financial 
Stability Board. The reform provided greater clarity and consistency for the international financial 
architecture and the IFS. However, scientists are frequently making reservations about the effective-
ness of the FSB because the legal status of this organisation is not in line with international law. While 
a formal charter establishing the FSB was adopted, the FSB is an institution which does not have legal 
personality under international law (in the absence of an international agreement and its ratification 
by the relevant national parliaments) or by private law (because it is not seen as a counterparty, lack-
ing the will of a legal person and with no founding documents or registration). Therefore, until this 
uncertain situation with regard to legal personality exists, the FSB is treated as an international organ-
isation established entirely on organisational grounds. Researchers state that the FSB cannot legally 
operate in full scope in relations with third parties, such as open bank accounts, enter into contracts, 
including labor contracts, moreover, it no claim for default can be brought against this organisation in 
court, and etc. Giovanoli M. Supra note 85. P. 19.
341 Financial Stability Forum. Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management. 2 April 
2009.
342 FSB. Thematic review on resolution regimes. Peer review Report. 2013 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-
11-2014]. <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130411a.pdf>.
343 Key Attributes. Supra note 90 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-11-2014]. <http://www.financialstability-
board.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf.>.
344 Effective ways to address financial difficulties faced by banks require States to have in place bank 
resolution legal regimes with comprehensively regulated resolution powers of competent authorities, 
in order to resolve the financial problems of any financial institution (regardless of its type, size, com-
plexity, systematic effect). FSB. Supra note 90. Key Attributes 4. Annex IV.
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bank, and that the key economic features of these bodies are maintained. These guidelines 
provide specific legal characteristics and principles for the allocation of losses to share-
holders, unsecured and otherwise exposed creditors, while maintaining vital economic 
and financial banking functions.
After a systematic analysis of the FSB regulatory guidelines, we can conclude that sol-
vency problems of financial institutions can be resolved in efficient and reliable manner 
only if (i) taxpayers’ money is not used; (ii) the competent authorities have the necessary 
legal measures and practical skills to apply them so that the critical functions of the bank 
are preserved; (iii) the resolution of the bank is deemed to be reliable and efficient if the 
application of adjustment path does not result in unacceptable negative and broad con-
sequences for the financial system and the real economy345. The Guidelines provide for 
the following primary functions of the states: (i) to amend national bank insolvency laws 
based on the characteristics and key attributes of resolution regimes governing financial 
institutions, set out in the abovementioned document; (ii) the requirements for the ju-
risdictions to ensure the consolidation of unified bank insolvency problem-solving tech-
niques in national legislation, as well as bank recovery and resolution planning ex-ante, 
especially taking into account international, systemically important financial institutions; 
(iii) requirements for banks, making it clear as to when it should be established that banks 
are systemically important at the international level, which respectively implies that banks 
need to secure an additional possibility of recoupment in case of financial difficulties, and 
must increase ordinary tier-one equity capital from 1% to 2.5% according to the risk-based 
common equity; (iv) the requirements related to the wider and more effective supervision 
of financial institutions for all SSFI346. Bank insolvency procedures should be harmonised 
so that they meet these requirements and ensure compliance. While most of those rules 
have already been implemented in various legislative projects in different jurisdictions, 
but selective disclosure of the key FSB aspects347 is still relevant, in so far as it concerns the 
research object.
The scope of the bank resolution regime. It should be noted that the scope of FSB 
attributes also includes financial institutions other than banks. Although not all interna-
tional regulatory initiatives consistently treat categories of financial institutions, which 
should be subject to a special legal regime of resolution, in general we can state that the 
FSB does not distinguish or categorise financial institutions – the features concern all fi-
nancial institutions, by including other financial institutions, i.e., investment companies. 
The basic principles of the FSB attributes apply to all types of financial institutions in order 
to improve their distress problems – both faced by banks, investment firms and insurance 
companies and other financial institutions348. This approach leaves certain discretion for 
the states to implement the attributes in their national law. In the US, according to Part 
II of the Dodd-Frank Act, it applies to both systemically important banks and non-bank-
ing financial institutions, i.e., investment firms349. Under the EU Banking Recovery and 
345 Ibid. Annex II.
346 Ibid. Preamble. 
347 See more Hüpkes E. Supra note 331. P. 73-80.
348 FSB Progress Report, 2013. P. 5.
349 Dodd-Frank. 201 Section.
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Resolution Directive and the scope of the SRM regulation the directive applies not only 
to credit institutions but also to investment firms350. In Switzerland, the scope of special 
bank resolution regime includes licensed banks (the concept of banks includes private 
banks and savings banks351), securities dealers (investment firms) and authorities distrib-
uting central mortgage bonds352. The FSB’ based its position with regard to such scope on 
the fact that in any case effective legal regime for the resolution of investment companies 
and securities companies would require explicit rules of bank resolution regime, requir-
ing separation and identification of customer assets located also outside banks, so that 
resolution authorities are able to transfer customer assets to successfully operating third 
countries or make use of the bridge bank353. Scientists have diverging opinions on this is-
sue. The central idea prevailing in the doctrine is that clear rules should be set with regard 
to the separation of assets of financial institutions and they should be applied not only to 
securities companies, but also to any financial institution managing customer assets, and 
that they are particularly relevant in cases where the property is held in different jurisdic-
tions354. The FSB and the BCBS did not engage into a wider discussion on the subject, but 
expressed their wish to clearly and unequivocally treat financial institutions and invest-
ment companies as those to ‘which authority subject to the rules and in accordance with 
the law’355. It is thought considered that this requirement of the FSB for the separation of 
assets should be applied not only to investment and securities distributors, but also to any 
financial institution holding customer’s property, and this is especially true in the case 
when the property is located in different jurisdictions.
Administration of the bank resolution regime. The legal regime of bank resolution 
needs to be administered by a competent administrative authority or several authorities 
that have the expertise, the resources, the operational capacity and are independent to ef-
fectively apply the resolution measures356. 
Extensive powers of resolution authorities. Broad powers are envisaged for resolu-
tion authorities. Such powers, inter alia, include rules to achieve bank sale or transfer of 
shares from a failing financial institution by legal means, e.g. by fully or partially trans-
ferring assets and liabilities to a third party, acting directly or through a bridge financial 
institution, without the obligation to obtain the consent of shareholders or interested par-
ties for such a transaction. The authorities must also have all the required rights to convert 
bank debt instruments into capital, in order to recapitalise the bank funded by creditors, 
using any of the following ways: (i) recapitalisation of a legal person that is no longer 
economically viable and lost  going concern assumption or (ii) capitalisation of the newly 
established legal entity or temporary financial authority to which the critical functions and 
assets of the financial institution in difficulty were transferred, seeking to close the non-
350 BRRD. Art. 1.
351 Swiss Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks. Status as of 1 January 2009. 1 Art.
352 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 2.
353 FSB. Progress Report, 2012. P. 10.
354 Haentjens M., Wessels B. A Conference Book. Supra note 92. P. 15.
355 FSB. Supra note 353. P. 10-12. BCBS Report, 2010. P. 32. National authorities are advised to specify 
how customers’ cash and securities are separated by in case of financial institution insolvency.
356 FSB. Supra note 90. Key Attributes 2.
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viable part of the legal entity (the remaining part of the business would then be wound up, 
and the company eventually closed).
Application of the bail-in tool. Banks in distress require additional funding. The FSB 
has analysed and observed that in most jurisdictions, according to the existing financial 
arrangements with regard to the loss resulting from bank insolvency, although financial 
aid is granted to a failing bank from private funds, in order to eliminate the financial short-
fall, this funding is not sufficient in all instances, that is why public finance capital injec-
tions, even though temporary, remain in demand357. The FSB states and provides rules to 
calculate bank debt, i.e. by excluding equity capital, uninsured depositors and safeguarded 
investor funds under DGS from the debt write-off measure. The FSB stated that the resolu-
tion authorities must have the power to impose the bank bail-in measure, which means 
that the application of this legal instrument enables writing off unsecured and uninsured 
creditor claims and their respective conversion into bank capital358. Such legal regulation 
is consistent with the BCBS recommendations359. Although this mechanism is not yet fully 
established in all jurisdictions, the FSB noted and found, among other things, that most 
jurisdictions are soon planning to implement the requirements of the FSB, whereas the 
leading jurisdictions in the banking sector (such as the United States, Switzerland, and the 
EU) have already implemented this mechanism360. For example, the EU Banking Recovery 
and Resolution Directive entitle all Member States to write off all bonds, convert them into 
shares and reduce them to zero361. This legal mechanism forms one of the key aspects of 
the Directive. Once this mechanism is implemented to its full extent, it should be consid-
ered as one of the measures that will have a significant impact on higher borrowing costs 
for all banks, as bond holders will assume higher risk potential and more risky financial 
requirements, and accordingly will require higher interest rates on bonds. To ensure a 
smooth transitional period in the EU legal system, the Directive requires transposition 
and implementation of the bail-in tool in the national jurisdictions of the Member States 
no earlier than in 2016362. It should also be noted that the EU legislators of the bank resolu-
tion legal regime were long unable to reach compromise, especially with regard to the hi-
erarchy of creditors, sequence of claims, especially with regard to the seniority of securities 
holders and uninsured depositors, with intensive discussions taking place as to whether 
equity holders should always be fully written-off before satisfying depositors’ claims.
Legal certainty and the right to terminate a contract363. The FSB admits the im-
portance of legal certainty and continuity of financial performance of contracts at the 
time of bank resolution, including netting and continuity of collateral agreements, if the 
financial situation of the financial institution is in line with the conditions governing 
357 FSB Progress Report, 2013. P. 6. FSB. Key Attributes 6.
358 Ibid. 
359 BCBS Report 2010. P. 23.
360 FCB Progress Report, 2013. P. 5.
361 BRRD. Art. 37-51.
362 Ibid. Art. 131.
363 The right to terminate a contract, termination or other close-out, set off, netting arrangements rights 
in financial contracts held by counterparties of a bank, that may be triggered on the occurrence of an 
event or circumstances set out in the financial contract, such as an insolvency event or the entry into 
resolution of the bank. 
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bank resolution regime or the competent authority implements any conversion rights 
and powers. The essence of this principle is to create legal regulation that would not 
lead to the possibility of such an effect, which would empower any interested financial 
counterparty to speed up the procedures at the time of resolution, by means of early 
termination of contracts with the bank. Significant obligations must be placed on the 
counterparties, making them fulfill their duties to the bank when it becomes insolvent. 
Thereby, in order to guarantee that when transferring assets and liabilities to the private 
purchaser or bridge bank, the resolution authorities have sufficient time to identify the 
contracts to be transferred, it might be appropriate to impose proportionate restrictions 
on the counterparties’ rights to complete, advance or otherwise terminate the financial 
contracts pending transfer. Such restrictions are necessary for the public authorities to 
obtain a real understanding of a failing bank balance, net of possible changes in the value 
and scale of bank assets, resulting from the intense exercise of termination rights. In 
order to ensure the minimum effect on the contractual rights of the parties to the trans-
action, termination rights should be restricted only with regard to the crisis prevention 
measure or crisis management measure. Whereas the right to terminate a contract by 
reason of other defaults, including the non-payment or failure to supply of the guarantee 
payment should remain in force. It should be emphasized that the resolution authorities 
may temporarily suspend the rights arising from the financial contracts of the bank. The 
aim is to avoid termination of high-value financial contracts and effects resulting in prop-
erty sale at low price, giving priority to contract extension. For example, an agreement for 
transferring contracts to a healthy financial market participant or a temporary financial 
institution in a way that would not disrupt payments or discharge of obligations under a 
contract364. The recent bank insolvency cases demonstrated that termination of contrac-
tual relationships and the ensuing legal consequences may have pro-cyclical effects: when 
bank recovery and restructuring measures are officially applied, this may accordingly 
influence the contractual rights of the bank with regard to other counterparties and ter-
mination of contracts, and could only further weaken the solvency situation of the bank 
and cause market instability. As a result, the FCB fundamental principles recommended 
a temporary solution – contract termination, netting agreements365, set-off agreements366 
in the case of bank conversion may be performed only if deemed appropriate in regard 
of the restructuring conditions or if the reorganisation authority has already launched its 
restructuring powers or initiated the first restructuring steps. This idea is based on the 
principle of contractual independence, because the parties are vested with independent 
obligations, under which the contract must be continued. Account must be taken of the 
‘financial contract integrity’ in a way that termination of contracts and possible set-off 
364 FSB. Key Attributes 4.
365 ‘Netting arrangement’ means an arrangement under which a number of claims or obligations can be 
converted into a single net claim, including close-out netting arrangements under which, on the oc-
currence of an enforcement event (however or wherever defined) the obligations of the parties are 
accelerated so as to become immediately due or are terminated, and in either case are converted into or 
replaced by a single net claim, including ‘close-out netting provisions’ and ‘netting’. BRRD. Art. 2 (98).
366 Set-off arrangement’ means an arrangement under which two or more claims or obligations owed 
between the institution under resolution and a counterparty can be set off against each other; Ibid. 
Art. 2 (99).
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(especially of mortgage transactions, such as RAPO transactions) are permitted only if 
such termination is apparent from the failure of the parties to fulfill their obligation un-
der the contract, and not because of the exercise of some restructuring powers367. Among 
other things, it is noted that when the contracts transferred to another legal entity, they 
must be assigned in full368. Subsequently, the BCBS recommendations further proposed 
that national authorities secured the powers to perform (or force to continue) finan-
cial contracts by transferring them to a third party that is a solvent financial institution. 
Such an approach would be more acceptable than early termination of contracts with 
the parties for netting purposes369. In 2013 the FSB progress report found that the law in 
the majority of jurisdictions still lacked effective solutions or legal safeguards that could 
minimise the negative impact on the rights of the parties370.
Hierarchy of creditors’ claims. The fifth attribute identifies a clear need for legal cer-
tainty of bank insolvency procedures and regulatory predictability, especially in imple-
menting comprehensively regulated legal bank resolution tools and in determining that 
conversion powers should be exercised in strict compliance with the statutory require-
ments for hierarchic filing of creditor claims. The proposal suggested granting some flex-
ibility to the competent authorities by departing from general insolvency law, which is 
based on the principle of equality (pari passu) of the same class of creditors, whenever 
there is a need to prevent the spread of systemic risk of financial institutions or to maxim-
ise the benefit for all the creditors as a whole, considering that at the time of resolution all 
creditors of the bank meet their requirements at least to the same level as that in the case 
of liquidation (least cost or creditors worse off). It was also found that the judicial review 
possibility of creditors, particularly with regard to the size of the financial requirements, 
and the related judicial appeal mechanisms can in no way restrict or terminate the imple-
mentation of the legal resolution tools. The use of legal conversion measures must give 
creditors the right to compensate the damage by paying a compensation, if the claim is 
legally justified371.
Funding mechanisms for private bank restructuring. This attribute requires juris-
dictions to create privately funded financing arrangements, preferably by collecting fees 
from the industry, which could provide temporary financing and facilitate the resolution 
of financial institutions372.
Aspects of cross-border bank resolution. This attribute estimated legal regulation 
that should facilitate the resolution of a financial institution operating on a cross-border 
basis. It is recognised that cross-border financial institutions remain controlled on the 
basis of national law and administered by national authorities. Therefore, it is necessary to 
provide statutory powers for competent authorities and, where possible, to take action in 
order to reach a global resolution solution for groups of financial institutions, in collabo-
ration with the resolution authorities in foreign jurisdictions. Jurisdictions must provide 
367 BCBS Report, 2010. P. 23.
368 FCB. Key Attributes 4, 3 and Annex IV. BCBS Report, 2010. Recommendation No. 9.
369 BCBS Report, 2010. P. 40.
370 Ibid. P. 6.
371 FSB. Key Attributes 5.
372 FSB. Key Attributes 6.
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transparent and expeditious procedures in their national laws in order to influence the 
resolution tools applied by foreign competent authorities373. The FSB encouraged the con-
clusion of specific institutional cooperation agreements between the country of the parent 
financial institution and the country of the subsidiary financial institution, to be used in 
the preparatory stage of the banking crisis, or for its management, in particular when the 
crisis affects internationally significant financial institutions374.
Cooperation in the case of cross-border bank group insolvency. In the event of in-
solvency of cross-border banking groups, bank resolution strategies need to be split into 
two main parts: a single model and a multiple model. According to the first scenario, 
bank resolution tools are solely directed against the parent company or holding compa-
nies of the group (the holding) that are directly related to the banking group. In this case, 
the companies (subsidiaries) will manage to stay on a going concern basis. In the sec-
ond case, according to the multiple strategy the entire group of banks fails in a given 
area and within its boundaries. Then reorganisation measures are applied by two or more 
resolution institutions. For example, a single entity  approach was apparently preferred 
in a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of England and the US 
FDIC375. The EU directive was based on a coordinating and multiple approach376. Specific 
rules must be applied to international, systemically significant financial institutions. The 
FCB recommended creating a cross-border crisis management group to supervise GSIFI 
activities. This group could consist of supervisory authorities, central banks, resolution 
authorities, the ministries of finance and other public authorities responsible for the op-
eration of guarantee schemes of financial authorities’ group both in the subsidiary and in 
the parent state377. The FSB also recommends concluding specific cooperation agreements 
with institutions operating across borders, between the most related financial institutions 
of the banking group. For example, the EU Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive 
created resolution colleges378 where a general restructuring and supervisory authority was 
to take the lead, in this case – in the case of the EU – the European resolution college, the 
European Banking Authority379. One of the most important aspects of cross-border co-
operation is information sharing. The competent authorities were recommended to reach 
an agreement on mutual co-operation agreements. The FSB found that, in any case, the 
jurisdiction must have explicit rules for confidential information sharing with foreign ju-
risdictions for bank resolution purposes380.
373 FSB. Key Attributes 7.
374 FSB. Key Attributes 9.
375 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Bank of England. Resolving Globally Active, Systemically 
Important, Financial Institutions. 10 December, 2010. P. 6-9.
376 BRRD. Art. 80-83.
377 FSB. Key Attributes 8, 9.
378 On a banking group level, resolution authorities must set up resolution colleges for the fulfillment of 
the tasks and, where necessary, ensure cooperation and coordination with third country resolution 
authorities. The resolution colleges constitute a system in which a group-wide resolution authority, 
other authorities and, where appropriate, the competent authorities and the consolidating supervisor 
perform statutory duties. BRRD. Art. 87.
379 Ibid.
380 FSB. Progress report. P. 6.
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Recovery and resolution plans and assessment of solvency problems. The FSB en-
courages to organise ex-ante assessment of bank viability, at least of the financial institu-
tions that are internationally regarded as systemically important381. Sustainability assess-
ment shall consist of continuing and reappearing insolvency planning processes, designed 
to identify and resolve potential restrictions of substantive law. The FSB attributes require 
that all parent and subsidiary credit institutions of global systemically important finan-
cial institutions and the competent resolution authorities comply with bank crisis man-
agement principles by providing pre-banking crisis preparation and planning382. Such an 
evaluation should be led by the competent authority of the parent country, in coordina-
tion with the competent authority of the subsidiary credit institution383. According to the 
key principles of cross-border cooperation on crisis management, published in October 
2009, financial institutions were obliged to adhere to the ‘emergency’ plans, sometimes 
called ‘contingency insolvency cases to encourage the planning’. These bank recovery and 
resolution plans should be regularly reviewed in order to ensure that they remain realistic, 
justified and competent. The FSB provides that emergency plans should consist of poten-
tial financing plans for banks under intense practicable and adverse banking market sce-
narios. It should be noted that already in 2011 the FSB recommended that all international 
systemically important financial institutions needed to develop and maintain ‘recovery 
and resolution plans’, by providing a list of the ‘essential elements’ ex ante384. The BCBS 
issued the same recommendation385.
Bank recovery and resolution plans include early planning phase of the financial in-
stitution’s insolvency, where at the time of radical changes in the banking system the bank 
would be able to stay off insolvency or prevent liquidation, by maintaining the viability 
of bank activities. For example, under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, 
financial institutions should take the initiative to prepare these recovery and resolution 
plans in accordance with the rules enshrined in the Directive386. Resolution authorities 
should assist in preparing resolution plans. Such plans should provide a specific resolution 
action plan (‘insolvency roadmap’) in order to avoid insolvency procedures for banks and 
find solutions at a point of insolvency when the institution can no longer be considered 
as perspective and financially viable387. In its last progress report, the FSB announced that 
most jurisdictions lacked the rights and powers to require banks to make changes in their 
management structure in order to improve their problem solution388.
Applicable law. Most of the above-mentioned attributes associated with insolvency 
law of financial institutions leave broad discretion to the states and their resolution au-
thorities to establish optimal legal regulation. However, in line with the FSB features, it is 
admitted that the competent authorities are required to ensure at least minimum trans-
381 FSB. Key Attributes 10.
382 FSB. Key Attributes 8.
383 FSB. Key Attributes 10.
384 FSB. Key Attributes 11. Annex III.
385 BCBS Report, 2010. Recommendations No. 6.
386 BRRD. Art. 10.
387 BRRD. Art. 5-13.
388 FSB. Progress Report, 2013. P. 6.
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position of the resolution attributes listed in the document into their national law. The 
rules must be consistent with the constitutionally protected fundamental remedies in the 
respective countries. It is important to note that in its guidelines the FSB prioritises ex post 
compensations for potential losses suffered by financial institutions and related to resolu-
tion actions, rather than the option of ex-ante loss compensation, as they believe that such 
regulation may unduly restrict the process of implementing the resolution measures. This 
raises an important question whether the implementation of the bank resolution tools at 
national level will not result in the conflict of various competing public and private inter-
ests and whether it will secure fundamental human rights and allow avoiding their viola-
tion, e.g. by securing the inviolability of property rights. These aspects will be explored in 
subsequent sections in more detail. 
In summary, it can be said that the FSB provided legal justification for model legal 
regulation of bank resolution procedures, by also publishing resolution progress reports, 
evaluating the success of jurisdictions in implementing the recommendations and the 
incorporation of international provisions into national law. On the one hand, it can be 
considered that the FSB key attributes will serve as a tool to solve the problems that ex-
isted prior the recent banking crisis, e.g. the ‘too big that fail’, allow minimising taxpayers’ 
money when rescuing distressed banks, and avoiding public support during conversion. 
Financial institutions will not suffer higher funding costs, market discipline will not be un-
dermined, fair competition between financial institutions of different sizes will be ensured 
and public finances will not be adversely affected389. On the other hand, some aspects 
deserve criticism. FSB is not a typical international organisation or authorised supervi-
sory authority. It is an informal structure without institutional powers based on public 
law and it cannot legally impose the implementation of the standards adopted by the FSB, 
for example, by applying sanctions. In any case, since April 2009 the countries involved 
in the activities of the FSB officially and voluntarily committed themselves to implement 
these international financial standards in the field of financial stability390. However, it is 
difficult to scientifically understand and explain such an organisational structure as that 
of the FSB. On the one hand, the organisation represents the interests of its members, act-
ing on the basis of emergency international administrative law. Other scientists are of an 
opinion that the FSB represents the network of transnational governments391. In essence, 
in the absence of any international agreement governing bank insolvency procedures, the 
FSB remains a primary, authoritative creator of legal bank insolvency procedures at the 
international level, which is engaged in monitoring, but also provides advice on regulatory 
development and implementation of regulatory policies392.
389 FSB. Report of the Financial Stability Board to the G-20 Progress and next steps towards ending 
“Too-Big-To-Fail”. 2013 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-12-2014] <http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_130902.pdf>.
390 FSB. Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards. 2010 [interaktyvus]. 
[žiūrėta 2014-09-26] <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf>.
391 Giovanoli M. Supra note 85. P. 20. Kingsbury B., Krich N., Stewart R.B. The emergence of a global 
administrative law. University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 17. New York, 
2005. Kingsbury B. The Concept of Law in Global Administrative Law. IILJ Working paper 2009/1. 
Global Administrative Law Series, NYU School of Law, Public law Research Paper No. 09-29.
392 FSB Charter. 2 str. (1) (a) (b).
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1.5.1.2. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the International Bank of Set-
tlements is the oldest and certainly the most notable international organisation393 setting 
global international standards for the regulation of financial services. Since the beginning 
of the recent financial crisis, BCBS was actively preparing reports and legal regulatory 
guidelines on bank insolvency procedures, including the development of bank resolution 
regime. BCBS activity was mostly focused on cross-border banking regulation. The Com-
mittee recalled that prudential requirements were not enough to avoid banking crises. 
In other words, in order to protect financial institutions from public aid dependency 
and the financing of the Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort, a credible bank 
resolution legal regime must be created394. The first BCBS report and recommendations 
regarding regulatory improvement of bank insolvency was published in March 2010. The 
report was based on the case studies of Fortis, Dexia, Kaupthing and Lehman Brothers 
banks. After examining these bank insolvencies, ten recommendations were submitted, 
suggesting ways to improve the effectiveness of the resolution powers of competent na-
tional authorities. It was concluded that banking group insolvency situations have been 
resolved at national level so far, according to the so-called principle of territoriality. The 
Committee noted that according to such legal regulation the problems of the banking 
group resolution could be treated as a whole, including branches of foreign financial 
institutions, according to the so-called principle of universality. BCBS also suggested the 
method combining both of the abovementioned principles. The principle of territoriality 
has been recognised as the most feasible one, to be followed in any case at the time of 
the banking crisis. Legislative changes in the national law were also suggested, so that the 
two principles complement each other. The BCBS concluded in its findings that national 
authorities must contain legal bank resolution measures that could ensure proper conver-
sion of all kinds of financial institutions, contributing to (i) the minimisation of systemic 
risk; (ii) adequate protection of consumer rights; (iii) mitigation of moral hazards; (iv) 
market efficiency and better productivity.
BCBS recommendations were signed and approved in June 2010 at the G20 Toronto 
summit, and the respective states undertook to implement them in their national law. In 
393 The BCBS was established in 1974 by the ten largest countries engaged in the field of financial services 
and governors of the central banks. It is the Committee for banking regulation and supervision, deal-
ing with practical issues in the field. The idea emerged after experiencing serious turbulence on the 
international currency and banking market. The first committee meeting was held again in February 
1975. Since then meetings have been organised regularly, three to four times a year. The Committee 
strongly increased the legal number of members in March 2009– and June 2009. All the relevant ju-
risdictions are members of the Committee. Normally the Committee meets in BIS, Basel, Switzerland, 
where the permanent secretariat is located. The Committee provides a forum for regular cooperation 
among its Member States in matters of banking supervision. The committee pursues its objectives 
by implementing three primary goals: (i) exchanging information on national supervisory arrange-
ments; (ii) improving the effectiveness of international banking business supervisory techniques; (iii) 
establishing minimum standards for banking supervision in the areas of demand. Compendium of 
documents produced by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. 1999. Bank for International 
Settlements, Basel, Switzerland. P. 1. Koch B. E. Supra note 13. P. 40-42. Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Resolution policies and frameworks - progress so far. 2011. P. 1.
394 BCBS. Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border bank Resolution Group, 2010. P. 3.
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June 2011 the BCBS published a progress report reviewing the implementation of legal 
arrangements governing bank restructuring in different jurisdictions395. It was noted that 
many jurisdictions have already adopted new legislation or made the necessary legislative 
amendments in order to improve their bank resolution regimes in line with the BCBS 
recommendations. 
BCBS has arrived to the conclusion that the recent regulatory reforms revealed that 
countries have already established special legal rules governing bank insolvency to regu-
late critical banking insolvency procedures, created a distinct legal regime for bank reso-
lution and special resolution tools, which are to be considered as operating in the public 
interest: aimed at financial stability and legal protection of retail depositors. The report 
mentions difficulties in determining bank insolvency and diverging conditions for such 
dertermination in different jurisdictions as one of the fundamental problems. Further-
more, in some jurisdictions, certain resolution tools still require court approval, which is 
contrary to the IFS396. The competent authorities in many countries still lack legal author-
ity to solve bank insolvency problems, and even though the law regulates resolution tools, 
there is a lack of specific fundamental rights protection and legal safeguards for the af-
fected shareholders and creditors, including the right to terminate the unnecessary agree-
ments, extend the necessary agreements, sell bank assets and transfer the obligations. In 
such a situation, bank resolution could be costly and challenging. The Committee identi-
fied lack of legal powers for the competent authorities as one of the most significant gaps 
to restructure systemically important financial institutions and successfully complete the 
resolution of other ordinary financial institutions. Another important aspect relates to 
the fact that the competent authorities in most countries lack legal authority to allow 
temporary suspension of early contract termination provisions of the financial contracts 
and their implementation. This is crucial in order to transfer such contracts to the solvent 
financial institution, a bridge bank or another public entity. The report also discusses 
problems arising from trans-national banking groups.
BCBS recommendations undertaken to implement by the G20 states in their nation-
al law are an extremely important guidance document for regulating international bank 
insolvency procedures. Progress reports reveal that the increasing number of countries 
have already implemented a particular bank resolution regime and created special legal 
norms. At the same time, this does not mean that the jurisdictions were able to fully 
address the recommendations. Reforms are still ongoing, and there is much work to 
do to ensure the financial stability of large financial institutions and to encourage the 
conservation of the relevant functions carried out by financial institutions (stabilisation 
and continuity of authority). As the FSB, the BCBS is a legal person with undefined le-
gal status. In any case, BIS has its own infrastructure and staff397. BCBS is a member of 
the FSB, and in any case is accountable to the FSB despite the reporting agreements or 
independence398.
395 BCBS. Supra note 15.
396 Ibid. P. 2.
397 However, BCBS for the timebeing haven’t published any documents on its internal structure and 
functioning.
398 See more Giovanoli M. Supra note 85. P. 29.
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1.5.1.3. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is not only an international monetary au-
thority par excellence, but also a center of the international financial system399. It is an 
international organisation whose operation is guaranteed by the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment400, seeking to promote financial stability and world monetary order. In addition, it 
should be noted that the IMF mandate has been expanded recently and now the IMF is 
clearly aimed, inter alia, international financial stability401 objectives. It must also be noted 
that the IMF is the only institution that is totally legitimate according to international law, 
with detailed functions (supervision, conditional financial assistance, technical support), 
adequate financial resources and personnel, and plays a significant international role in 
the international financial system402. The IMF has published major reports related to legal 
regulation of bank insolvency.
In April 2009 together with the World Bank403 the IMF published one of the most 
prominent studies of that time, entitled ‘An Overview of the Legal, Institutional and Regu-
latory Framework for Bank Insolvency’404. The study was launched in 2004, but it was 
officially confirmed after the start of the international financial crisis, and at that time it 
was unable to influence the legal and institutional regulation of bank insolvency. The study 
was focused on the overview of traditional deposit-taking bank insolvency procedures in 
different jurisdictions, by comparing national legal regulation. The study reviewed mul-
tiple jurisdictions, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks in the context of bank 
insolvency procedures. Finally, it provided recommendations for effective regulation of 
bank insolvency procedures in national law in order to prevent problems caused by bank 
insolvency procedures and the related difficulties. The primary objective of the guidelines 
was to resolve the difficulties arising from bank insolvency and financial stability issues. 
The study consists of two parts. The first part discusses the legal regulation that the state 
must adopt in order to be able to implement and coordinate international bank insolvency 
procedures and initiatives and to ensure financial stability. The second part examines the 
interaction between bank insolvency procedures and their features at the time of systemic 
crisis. After analysing different legal systems from a comparative perspective, the study 
proposes the concept of bank insolvency procedures, their composition, and provides the 
interpretation of the objectives pursued by such procedures. The study is useful also in 
the sense that it clearly distinguishes bank restructuring and bank liquidation institutes, 
399 Lastra M.R. The role of the IMF as global financial authority. European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Vol. 2, 2011. LSE Financial Markets Group Paper Series. Special paper No. 192. P. 1-2.
400 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Washington DC. 2011 [interactive]. [ac-
cessed on 15-11-2014] <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf>.
401 Ibid. Art. 1, Art. 4.
402 Lastra M.R. Supra note 399. P. 4.
403 WB works with other TFS-setting bodies and their members, i.e. individual countries to strengthen 
legal, institutional and regulatory supervision in the financial sector. WB supports financial sector 
development, progress and stability through various aid and lending instruments, bilateral technical 
assistance and other instruments, such as the joint IMF/WB Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
and the TFS initiative. IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 3.
404 Ibid.
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provides a detailed analysis of the pre-insolvency stage of the bank, and examines formal 
administrative procedures and operational principles.
In September 2009 the European Department of the IMF published a working docu-
ment to review the need for a particular legal regime of bank restructuring in the EU405. 
It contains valuable comments with regard to the regulatory design of bank insolvency 
and the fundamental legal principles, by discussing the main lessons learnt from the 
financial crisis, and a number of cross-border bank insolvency issues. In addition, the 
document states that the international financial crisis has clearly demonstrated the legal 
consequences of the vacuum in the banking resolution regime and the defectiveness of the 
legal regulation governing bank insolvency procedures. Among other things, this docu-
ment suggests ways for effective legal regulation of bank restructuring and the legislative 
instruments to be available during the banking crisis and the optimal tools to manage 
the banking crisis. The document focuses more on the analysis of the EU financial sector, 
while touching other regulatory jurisdictions from theoretical and practical perspective.
In June 2010 the IMF published a report entitled ‘Cross-border bank resolution - pro-
posed legal regulation that could enhance coordination of the competent authorities’406. 
The report emphasized the importance of harmonisation of the global bank resolution 
regime. In the report, countries that have already implemented the proposed legal regu-
lation are treated as ‘ensuring a harmonised legal regulation’. It should be noted that the 
cooperating authorities may share the financing burden of an insolvent bank and agree on 
joint restructuring actions with cross-border implications. 
Unlike the G20, the IMF is not a selective organisation in the form of a member club 
of the world’s most influential countries. It is a full-fledged international organisation en-
gaged in comprehensive financial regulatory functions and implementing international 
monetary policy at the institutional level and with general membership. For this reason, 
the IMF better represents the interests of countries, compared to the G7 or the G20 frame-
work, but has limited quotas in the decision-making mechanism407. The IMF is not only 
involved in the preparation of the international financial architecture and standards, as a 
member of the FSB, but also assumes responsibility in relation to the overall monitoring 
and maintenance of the international financial system. Moreover, it is linked to the review 
of implementation of international financial standards in individual countries in the con-
text of bank insolvency procedures. 
1.5.1.4. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
The central mission of UNCITRAL is to provide certain regulatory models (recom-
mendations) and model laws to national legislatures, members of UNCITRAL408. Such 
405 IMF. Supra note 15.
406 Haan S., Vinals J., IMF. Supra note 285.
407 Compared with the relevant UN rule of ‘one country-one vote’ (with the right of veto at the UN Se-
curity Council), the financial capacity of participants is based on the weighting of votes for adopting 
decisions related to financial matters. The Member States participating in the IMF pay fees based on 
their economic criteria. See more. IMF. Governance. Country representation [interactive]. [accessed 
on 12-11-2014] <www.imf.org/about>.
408 Currently, the organisation consists of 60 Member States elected for a 6-year period and representing 
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legislative models409 can potentially eliminate regulatory gaps in national legislation and 
commit the courts to take into account these recommendations and to apply ‘soft law’ (a 
source of law) in areas falling within the scope of UNCITRAL principles410. In 2004, the 
Commission released the first and second legal principles of the ‘Legislative Guidelines 
for Insolvency Law’411. These guidelines discussed national insolvency procedures and the 
fundamental problems of their application. The principles set out in the Guidelines apply 
only to ordinary business entities (financial institutions are outside their scope). Part 3 
of the amendments to the same guidelines, published in 2010, discusses the treatment of 
corporate groups in case of insolvency both nationally and internationally412. It should be 
noted that these amendments have expanded the scope and incorporated financial insti-
tutions. The central feature of this model law is the principle that the courts of one juris-
diction ‘recognise’ the insolvency proceedings of another jurisdiction. On the one hand, 
some of these principles are not suitable for banks (mainly those operating on transna-
tional level), but on the other hand, some of these principles are very much related to the 
financial institution insolvency procedures: (i) they clearly distinguish core and secondary 
insolvency procedures with regard to the the debtor according to the place of operation of 
the legal entity; (ii) they govern the principles of cooperation between the competent au-
thorities, calling for direct communication and information exchange on overlapping in-
solvency procedures; (iii) they provide for certain discretionary legal protection, whereby 
model law prohibits discrimination against foreign creditors; (iv) they recommend sign-
ing cooperation protocols between the competent authorities, and cooperation is ensured 
through negotiated protocols concluded between competent authorities with regard to 
certain cases. Protocols often take the form of formal contracts negotiated on the basis of 
representation of experts representing the parties concerned with insolvency proceedings. 
In addition, such protocols are approved by relevant courts.
It should be emphasized that the legal principles of UNCITRAL413 are the result of 
the research-intensive work of the most prominent scientists representing different legal 
systems of the world. These principles codify and present the most flexible decisions that 
five regional groups. One of the working groups is Insolvency Law working group. For more detailed 
information see Clift J. UNCITRAL. Senior legal officer of UNCITRAL. Insolvency Law. INSOL In-
ternational presentation.
409 The aim of model law is not to harmonise national insolvency law. The main problems addressed by 
model law related to the recognition of foreign insolvency procedures, the coordination of insolvency 
procedures by reason of insolvency of the debtor, protection of foreign creditors’ rights, rights and ob-
ligations of international insolvency representatives, such as insolvency administrators, cooperation 
between public authorities in different countries. Model law is not based on an international treaty 
and creates no binding international obligations. Its activities are largely dependent on the function-
ing at the local level.
410 Koch B.E. Supra note 13. P. 37.
411 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. Unit-
ed Nations, New York, 2004. 1, 2 d.
412 Wessels B. International Insolvency Law. 3rd edition. Kluwe. Deventer, 2012. 10425 para [interactive]. 
[accessed on 10-12-2014] <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Judicial-Perspective-
2013-e.pdf>.
413 UNIDROIT. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Unidroit Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts. 2010. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Rome.
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are most suited for international commercial trade. The problems discussed in this report 
are rather dedicated to ordinary companies, with banks and other financial institutions 
falling within the scope of the Guidelines only in particular cases. However, by their le-
gal nature, UNCITRAL principles are very similar to those identified by the BCBS in its 
review of cross-border banking group insolvency. It is equally important that the BCBS 
recommends to use the UNCITRAL guidelines for banking groups facing insolvency414. It 
should also be noted that currently UNCITRAL working groups are actively working on 
the United Nations Convention on insolvency, particularly concerned with regulation of 
cross-border group insolvency. The ongoing debate now concerns the best ways to reflect 
the FSB bank resolution attributes in the Convention, especially in the case of insolvency 
of systemically important cross-border banking groups415.
1.5.2. Major Regulatory Reforms and Developments in the EU.  
The Banking Union Perspective
Recently the EU legislative bodies have reached an agreement on the Banking Un-
ion416. The legislation reflects a definite trend to unify bank insolvency procedures and 
their application in Europe417. It was the largest legislative EU project since the creation 
of the euro418. This means not only that the Banking Union legislation must ultimately re-
place national bank insolvency law and legal rules and unify them. This is both an attempt 
to strengthen and empower the competent authorities of the EU Member States, by grant-
ing them minimum powers in the case of the banking crisis, to recapitalise or restructure 
banks, creditor claims, in order to avoid direct bank liquidation and mitigate the effects 
caused by bank insolvency on the financial system. For example, it provides more legal 
measures to first restructure and only then liquidate banks: separation of the bank assets, 
bank (or bank business) sale, partial debt write-off or conversion of debt into securities, 
bridge bank. It should be noted that eventually the new EU legal framework governing 
414 BCBS report, 2010. P. 26.
415 Baer G. IS Subcommittee update. UNCITRAL Working Groups approves insolvency convention 
study. Insolvency and Restructuring International. Vol. 8., No. 1, 2014.
416 The development of the Banking Union, in particular, was aimed at creating an integrated EU fi-
nancial framework to ensure financial stability and to reduce the costs incurred in the event of bank 
failure. The Banking Union is based on a comprehensive and detailed set of rules for financial services. 
It should be emphasized that at the time of Lithuanian Presidency, tremendous progress was achieved 
in the development of the Banking Union in the EU (negotiations with the EP on bank recovery and 
resolution and deposit insurance framework directives were completed, and the Council reached an 
agreement on a Single Bank Resolution Mechanism Regulation).
417 Before the Banking Union, bank resolution and/or liquidation procedures in the EU were not har-
monised. The essence and procedures of the Member State laws and regulations governing bank in-
solvency vary widely. BRRD. Recital (4).
418 Barnier M. The EU and US: leading partners in financial reform. Speech at the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, Washington DC, June 13, 2014. [interactive]. [accessed on 10-12-2014] 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-465_en.htm>. Constâncio V. Banking Union: 
meaning and implications for the future of banking. Speech by Vice-President of the ECB, at Banking 
Union Conference organised by the Master in Banking and Financial Regulation, Navarra University, 
Madrid, 24 April 2014.
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bank insolvency will be fully transposed into the national legal systems of the EU Member 
States and that the regulations are directly applicable, which fundamentally changes the 
pre-existing bank insolvency legislation. Thus, the Banking Union works as a new tool for 
managing the banking crisis in the EU.
How legislative idea of the Banking Union was born? The recent international finan-
cial crisis has provoked reforms in the European Union’s financial sector in the field of 
legal regulation and bank supervision, and the Banking Union project was to become the 
key tool for managing the banking crisis. In 2007-2009, at the peak of the financial crisis, 
most of the EU Member States were lacking an adequate legal regime for bank restructur-
ing that could successfully ensure orderly restructuring and/or liquidation of a financial 
institution that is failing or likely to fail(including banks). Before the financial crisis, the 
EU Member States dealt with the problem of insolvent banks using general insolvency law. 
At the beginning of 2008, as soon as significant number of large banks, including, but not 
limited to such large and systemically important banks as Fortis, Dexia and Royal Bank of 
Scotland, were failing or likely to fail, the absence of effective bank resolution and recovery 
regulations in the EU Member States became evident. In the result of such a situation, au-
thorities launched random efforts (such as freezing, seizing and confiscating the assets of 
the bank under their jurisdiction in order to settle with creditors and pay compensations 
to depositors) to strengthen banks, which in some cases resulted in sovereign debt cri-
ses. Furthermore, when certain banks faced with financial difficulties, national authorities 
mostly relied on desperate ad hoc measures, e.g. by providing government guarantees and 
applying additional capital injections to failing financial institutions419. In the center of the 
deepest global economic recession since the World War II, the financial crisis has demon-
strated obvious regulatory gaps and the fact that the EU lacked a precise and predictable 
legal framework governing proper reorganisation or liquidation of a credit institution fac-
ing financial difficulties without threatening financial stability420. The EU’s financial crisis 
has become a serious challenge for national and European institutions and their ability to 
manage the problems of bank insolvency procedures. At the same time, the European Un-
ion’s financial markets became strongly integrated, so that collapses in one Member State 
could shortly be felt in other Member States421. Already since 2007, the beginning of the fi-
nancial crisis, acknowledged world’s economists and lawyers launched a discussion on the 
necessity to initiate legal regulation reforms in the EU. Until the time when legislators and 
the relevant EU institutions placed legal bank regulation on top of the agenda. However, 
in practice, the academic community remains concerned with the following questions: 
What is the object of the Banking Union? What is it for? Funded by who? Controlled by who? 
What is its legal basis?
419 According to the IMF estimates, the financial crisis related losses incurred by European banks be-
tween 2007 and 2010 amounted to nearly EUR 1 trillion, or 8%. EU GDP. In addition, it should be 
noted that during the period from October 2008 to October 2011 the European Commission ap-
proved EUR 4.5 trillion (37% of EU GDP) of state aid measures to financial institutions. Alexander K. 
Enhancing European Bank Resolution and Recovery. ERA Forum, Vol. 14, No. 1. Academy of European 
Law. 2013. P. 459.
420 BRRD. Recital (5), (56).
421 SRM. Recital (1).
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In October 2010 the European Commission published a Communication422 setting 
out the particular plans to improve the EU’s financial sector crisis management system. 
According to the envisaged system, public authorities would have standard and efficient 
tools and powers to prevent the banking crisis, to preserve financial stability and minimise 
the risks of bank insolvency procedures, especially taxpayers’ loss. In June 2010 the EP, 
acting on his own initiative, adopted report-recommendations for cross-border banking 
crisis management. The EP stressed the need to develop an EU-wide system for distressed 
bank management and recommended to achieve greater integration and consistency, ad-
dressing issues related to cross-border financial institutions insolvencies which are subject 
to the conversion requirements and procedures. In December 2010 the Council of the 
European Union (ECOFIN423) adopted its conclusions424 calling for the creation of the 
EU system, among other things, designed to prevent, manage, and resolve banking crises. 
The conclusions underlined that the system should be applied to improve banks of all 
sizes, promote cross-border cooperation and be based on three pillars of bank insolvency 
procedures (preparatory and preventative measures, early intervention and restructuring 
and resolution tools and powers with regard to credit institutions). The aim of these meas-
ures should be to preserve financial stability by protecting public and market confidence; 
giving priority to prevention and preparation for bank insolvency; provide credible bank 
resolution tools; enable fast and decisive  bank resolution action; reduce the tendency to 
act less responsibly and minimise the total cost of public funds, to ensure fair burden-
sharing among financial institutions, stakeholders; contribute to a smooth resolution of 
cross-border financial groups; to ensure legal certainty of bank insolvency procedures and 
to reduce the distortions of competition in default situations.
National governments of the EU Member States realised that in certain cases banks 
and other systemic financial institutions can not be permitted to fail, i.e., be liquidated 
by ordinary bankruptcy procedure. In the event of a large bank failure, those functions 
could not be terminated without causing significant systemic damage. The actions that 
governments were bound to undertake with regard to banks in a tense situation – capital 
injections, backup of illiquid assets, issued guarantees on assets and discharge of liabilities 
and liquidity support – succeeded in stabilising the financial system to a certain extent. 
422 EC. An EU framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector. COM (2010), 579. Brussels, 
2010. The communication provides guidance followed by the EC on the basis of the work done to date 
on crisis management and legal regulation of bank resolution. The communication notes that the EC 
will continue its preparatory work along these lines, so that in spring 2011 it would submit legislative 
proposals. The proposal was accompanied by an impact assessment and was the last step of the EC in 
implementing the principal international regulatory reforms agreed at the G20 level. Public consulta-
tion on technical details of the legislative framework under consideration was launched in December 
2010. In addition, Section 6 of the Communication discusses further work related to bank insolvency 
law reform and cross-border banking groups.
423 The European Economic and Financial Affairs Council is responsible for the EU’s policies in the 
following key areas: the economy, politics, tax issues and financial services regulation. Its areas of 
expertise include legal and practical matters, such as: the EU’s single currency, problems of the euro, 
coordination of action at the international level between the G20, the IMF and the WB. Also other 
financial services regulatory issues related to international regulation. The ECOFIN Council is com-
posed of all the EU Member States’ economic and finance ministers. [interactive]. [accessed on 10-12-
2014] <www.consilium.europa.eu/council/council-configurations>.
424 CoE. ECOFIN, 2010. Findings No.17006/1/10.
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Nevertheless, such action aimed at supporting failing credit institutions and creditors re-
quired enormous public financial costs. The EU governments committed to provide public 
funds amounting to around 30% of the EU’s GDP, while state aid amounted to 13%425. 
Such intervention by governments significantly affected the level playing field in the EU 
internal banking market. Therefore, the EC demanded that, where applicable, the costs re-
lated to credit institution’s insolvency be shared and measures be taken to limit such com-
petitive distortions in accordance with the relevant provisions of the EU Treaty. A need 
arose not only to improve deregulation, which would reduce the chance that the financial 
difficulties faced by some banks become critical, but also the need for reliable, predictable, 
well-defined regulation of bank insolvency procedures. Only then market discipline asso-
ciated with bank failures and threats would be restored, the moral hazard reduced, implicit 
protection against bank failures achieved, which was usual practice in the banking sector 
during the financial crisis.
Finally, in September 2012 the EC launched the Banking Union idea. The first stage 
legislative proposals were focused on the creation of the eurozone banking supervision 
mechanism. Three documents were included in the project: (1) Regulation on the specifi-
cation of the supervisory functions to the ECB; (2) Replacement of the Regulation on the 
establishment of the European Banking Authority (EBA); (3) Communication from the 
EC to the EP and the Council on the guidelines of the Banking Union, providing an action 
plan for the remaining elements of the Banking Union, i.e. a unified system of bank resolu-
tion and a single DGS. The purpose of the proposal with regard to the Banking Union was 
firstly that the Banking Union, in particular, was to strengthen banking sector stability and 
confidence in the euro. In the long term, it was expected that the Banking Union could 
contribute to the strengthening of the economic and monetary union. Secondly, under the 
proposal for a unified banking supervisory mechanism (hereinafter - SSM), entrusting the 
euro area banking supervision to the ECB, was based on the need to promote the internal 
market in financial services, which essentially formed the basis for the EU’s economic re-
covery. The EC considers that if banking supervisory expertise remaining at national level 
limits the effectiveness of supervision, then, in the context of the single market, it does not 
allow for the direct application of bank recapitalisation using the funds of the European 
Stability Mechanism426, and the ECB was therefore proposed as the one to perform core 
banking supervisory functions. In addition, in view of the new role of the ECB, revision 
of the Regulation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) was suggested. The EC was 
seeking to preserve the role and tasks of the EBA (namely to develop uniform rules on 
financial services – single rulebooks for financial services –, ensure convergence of super-
visory practices and cooperation between national supervisory authorities).
After the transition to the unified eurozone banking supervisory mechanism, the 
next stage was supposed to address overall protection of depositors’ rights and integrated 
banking crisis management tasks. A single bank crisis management system should en-
sure priority for banking resolution by using private funds of the banking industry, in 
order to save taxpayer money. The system is aimed at the EU-wide harmonisation of bank 
425 According to the information supplied by the European Commission’s services and the Member 
States via the Economic and Financial Committee until December 2009.
426 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation 
mechanism.
101
resolution tools and procedures. Each EU Member State shall establish a bank resolu-
tion authority and bank resolution funds consisting of contributions from banks. In this 
case, the EC believes that in the context of the Banking Union bank resolution could be 
more efficient as an integrated tool, especially in the case when bank resolution includes 
cross-border banks. Banking Union comprises the following elements: the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism427, Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive428, the Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes Directive429, the Single Resolution Mechanism430 and is based on common EU 
banking regulatory package – single rulebook, which essentially consists of supervision of 
bank capital requirements (the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRDIV/
CRR431)). The Banking Union legislation replaced and unified the non-harmonised EU le-
gal framework. The following part of the dissertation provides only a concentrated review 
of the key elements of the Banking Union, in so far as this is useful for the purposes of the 
research. Some other elements and institutes of the Banking Union will be presented in 
other parts of the dissertation. 
A Single Rulebook for Financial Services 
The recent banking crisis has highlighted the differences of transposition of the for-
mer Capital Requirements Directive432 into national law, in particular in the area of pru-
dential regulation, which posed a threat to the EU internal market. For this reason, the 
European Commission proposed a single rule book as one of the regulatory elements of 
the unified financial system for the purpose of application of unified banking prudential 
requirements in the EU433. New rules were created to enable credit institutions and invest-
ment firms to pursue their activities, determine their supervisory system and prudential 
banking regulation, in order to strengthen the solvency and credibility of credit institu-
tions, e.g. by enhancing capital requirements based on Basel III framework. The applicable 
427 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. Regula-
tion (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework 
for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and 
national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regula-
tion) (ECB/2014/17).
428 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014.
429 Directive 2014/C/ 105/01of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes Adopted by the Council on 3 March 2014 (recast).
430 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 estab-
lishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
431 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.
432 Directives 2006/48/EB and 2006/49/EB.
433 If prudential requirements are imposed in the form of a regulation, direct application of these re-
quirements would be ensured. This would guarantee a level playing field, by avoiding differences in 
national requirements, which could result in the result of the transposition of the Directive.
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prudential requirements relate only to the operation of banking and financial services 
and are designed to ensure financial stability of market operators, and high-level protec-
tion of depositors and investors. The new legal regulation, inter alia, aims to strengthen 
management of credit institutions. In order to limit excess risk-taking of credit institutions 
(for example, operational efficiency of managing bodies in the field of risk oversight, by 
ensuring that the supervisory authorities strictly monitor and evaluate risk management). 
A Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The SSM will form the supervisory system of the ECB and national supervisory au-
thorities. ECB will be in charge for the effective functioning of the entire SSM. In coopera-
tion with national supervisory authorities, the ECB will directly supervise large and sys-
temically important banks in the participating Member States (at least three major banks 
in each Member State of the eurozone, while other banks will be supervised by national 
authorities). Smaller banks will be directly managed by national supervisory authorities, 
in accordance with the ECB guidelines and recommendations. Non-eurozone Member 
States will be able to choose whether to participate in the SSM or not434. In such case they 
would have to notify their intentions to the other Member States, the EC, the ECB and the 
EBA, and to amend their legislation respectively, to make it clear that national supervisory 
authorities will follow the ECB instructions. Other key elements of the Regulation are 
further reviewed when analysing the role of supervisory authorities in different jurisdic-
tions435.
Deposits Guarantee Schemes Directive
Another important regulatory proposal in the context of the Banking Union was the 
amendment of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) Directive. The essential elements of 
the DGS proposal were to harmonise and simplify the scope of the Directive; to maintain a 
harmonised depositor compensation amount (EUR 100,000); to reduce the deposit payout 
term to 7 working days; to establish a harmonised DGS funding mechanism (obligatory 
ex-ante contributions, with ex post additional contributions of credit institutions, in case 
of insufficiency of the former, and finally, in the case of shortage of funds, alternative fi-
nancing arrangements should be set up); to introduce risk-based contributions of credit 
institutions to the DGS, etc.
The goal of the DGS is to maintain depositor confidence and financial stability at the 
time of economic turbulence, by ensuring rapid payout to depositors in case of credit 
institution failure. The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that the application of the 
pre-existing fragmented DGS, depositors cannot benefit of equal conditions for guaran-
tees in the EU, some systems lack sufficient funding, and for this reason the Member State 
and ultimately the taxpayers must bear the burden of a failed credit institution. The aim is 
to ensure that the deposit insurance fund holds enough resources and, where necessary, 
434 See more 3 chapter 1 sec. 2 subsec.
435 See more 3 chapter 1 sec. 2 subsec.
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depositors swiftly receive the insurance premium. DGS are intended to improve the pro-
tection of depositors’ rights. 
Other important aspects of the new regulatory framework. The new version of the Di-
rective aims to harmonise and simplify all DGS in the EU, i.e. to establish a precise defini-
tion of a deposit, by clearly excluding financial instruments of a capital nature from the 
scope of insurance (deposit certificates, bonds, structured financial products, collective 
investment entities, pension fund deposits) and deposits of public authorities with regard 
to the transactions subject to a judgment in criminal proceedings on money laundering, 
and deposits of other financial institutions436. The new regulatory framework contains a 
provision preventing the EU Member States from discretionary application of exceptions, 
save for deposits held in personalised pension schemes of small and medium-sized enter-
prises and occupational pension schemes and deposits of local authorities with an annual 
budget of no more than EUR 500 000 for deposits437. Another particular feature is that 
the pre-existing level of deposit coverage in the amount of EUR 100 000 has been main-
tained, but the Member States are allowed to guarantee higher deposits in certain social 
circumstances (such as marriage, divorce, retirement, dismissal, redundancy, disability, 
death, deposits resulting from private residential real estate transactions, deposits based 
on insurance benefits or compensations for the damage caused by crime or case of wrong-
ful conviction438). The new DGS provisions reduce the 20 working days payout period for 
depositors (with the possibility of extension for another 10 days in exceptional circum-
stances). The DGS ensures that the depositors receive their money within seven working 
days. The repayment term shall run from the date when the respective administrative or 
judicial authority decides on the insolvency of the bank439. At the same time, a transitional 
period is set until 31 December 2023, by fixing the following repayment terms: (i) up 
to 20 working days until 31 December 2018, (ii) up to 15 working days from 1 January 
2019 to 31 December 2020, (iii) up to 10 working days from 1 January 2021 and until 31 
December 2023440. Moreover, during the transitional period, if the DGS is unable to repay 
the required amount within 7 working days, by ensuring that depositors have access to the 
respective insured deposit amount to cover their subsistence costs within 5 working days 
after making the request441.
DGS financing. As practice has shown, the ex-ante financing (when banks pay regular 
contributions in advance) is insufficient, and the funding ex-post (when banks pay contri-
butions only if the activity of another bank is impaired) could adversely impact the liquid-
ity of credit institutions and jeopardise stability in case of economic tension. Therefore, the 
Directive establishes a provision that by 2021 all DGS of EU Member States must achieve 
436 DGS. Art 5 (1).
437 Ibid. Art. 5 (2).
438 Ibid. Art 6 (2).
439 In the DGS Directive, bank insolvency relates with a moment in time when a judicial authority, taking 
the reasons into account, adopts a decision suspending the rights of depositors to raise claims against 
the credit institution, or if an administrative authority finds that, in their opinion, for reasons directly 
related to the credit institution’s financial circumstances, the respective credit institution is unable to 
repay the deposit at that time and or to do so in the nearest future. Ibid. Art. 2 (1), (h) (i), (ii).
440 Ibid. Art 8 (2).
441 DGS. Art. 8 (4).
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a targeted level of funding, starting from a particular bank covered deposits amount. The 
Member States shall ensure that no later than 10 years after the Directive enters into force, 
the available DGS financial resources would reach at least 0.8% of covered deposits target 
level in the Member States442. To ensure DGS funding, the following multi-tier method is 
proposed: ex-ante funding reserve, and if insufficient, credit institutions will have to pay 
ex-post contributions; while alternative financing arrangements are suggested as a meas-
ure of last resort. More risky credit institution would have to pay higher premiums (risk-
based contributions).
Use of DGS funds. In principle, the funds are used to repay depositor losses, but Mem-
ber States may also decide to use DGS to finance the prevention of credit institution col-
lapse, early intervention and bank resolution measures, including transfer of deposits to 
another reliably functioning financial institution. In determining regular contributions in 
all cases account should be taken of the business cycle phase and the possible effect of pro-
cyclical contributions on the framework of annual contributions.
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive459 (BRRD) establishes a single package of 
legislative measures for bank resolution that Member States may apply when a bank is fail-
ing or likely to fail. The aim of the new regulatory framework is to ensure that bank resolu-
tion will be financed by banks, and taxpayers’ money will not be used for that purpose. The 
financing of resolution measures is primarily based on private sources: capital, Additional 
Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital, subordinated debt, etc. If these measures prove sufficient and 
separation of the bank would be required, then common resolution funds would be used. 
National resolutions funds are established for this purpose, and financed by contributions 
paid by banks. Resolution funds would be constituted from the ex-ante (or additional ex-
post) bank contributions, the amount of which is expected to reach at least 1% target level 
of covered deposits over 10 years. 
It also foreseen that banks will be obliged to draw up recovery and resolution plans 
ex ante to ensure that in case of a deteriorating situation and the application of resolution 
tools the systemic effects will be minimised. The new bank resolution regime (as opposed 
to ordinary bankruptcy procedure) provides for orderly liquidation of the bank, in par-
ticular by means of bank resolution tools and then passing to liquidation. In the case of or-
derly liquidation, the original bank would be preserved on the basis of the going concern 
assumption or could be transferred to the bridge bank, which would enable the authorities 
to transfer some or all of the failing bank’s assets (including deposits or mortgage) to the 
temporary bank and to liquidate the distressed assets. 
The BRRD establishes a new prevention, early intervention, bank resolution tools: for 
instance, the power to appoint a temporary administrator in order to replace the govern-
ing body and senior management or to work with them on a temporary basis; the require-
ment that the managing body of a credit institution examines the situation, determines 
the measures to address the identified problems and to draw up an action programme to 
442 DGS. Art. 10 (2).
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overcome the problems, and to adopt the implementation schedule; the requirement to 
remove or replace one or more of the managing bodies or senior management members, 
if it is established that the person concerned is unable to meet their obligations; the re-
quirement to change the business strategy; the requirement to replace the existing legal or 
operational structure of the bank and to obtain all the information, etc.443.
The Directive provides for new bank resolution tools: asset separation, sale of the bank; 
bridge bank, bail-in tool (write-off and partial conversion of capital and creditor liabilities 
to share capital). Where the losses cannot be passed to other creditors, the resolution fi-
nancing arrangement may make a contribution to the bank under resolution subject to a 
number of strict conditions including the requirement that losses totalling not less than 
8 % of total liabilities including own funds have already been absorbed, and the funding 
provided by the resolution fund is limited to the lower of 5 % of total liabilities including 
own funds or the means available to the resolution fund and the amount that can be raised 
through ex-post contributions within three years The exceptions of eligible liabilities of 
the bank could be applied only in the following cases: Option 1 (general rule). 8% of the 
liabilities of the bank in resolution (including own funds) have already been written off 
or converted. Option 2 (clause). At least 20% of the risk-weighted assets have already been 
written off. To apply the clause, it is necessary that the amount accumulated in the fund 
would reach at least 3% of the covered deposits. The discretionary exemption may not 
exceed 5% of the total liabilities of the bank in resolution. The resolution fund and other 
creditors (if their situation is not affected more negatively than it would be in case of 
bankruptcy) contribute to the application of exemptions. If the bank resolution fund lacks 
sufficient funds and after writing off all other liabilities (other than the liabilities to insured 
depositors) alternative funding sources are possible (such as the State, the European Sta-
bility Mechanism). The discretionary exemption applies only in exceptional cases, i.e. if 
this is required for financial stability. 
Single Resolution Mechanism 
In July 2013 the European Commission submitted a proposal to a European Parlia-
ment and the Council for a regulation establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure 
for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of 
a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund (hereinafter – SRM and the 
Fund)462. The goal of the SRM– is to create a single bank resolution mechanism with 
centralised decision-making and control in the field of bank resolution, by establishing 
a single resolution board, to ensure a clear, uniform and consistent approach throughout 
the EU internal market.
Relationship between the proposal and other banking union initiatives. The SRM pro-
posal forms an integral part of the Banking Union and is closely linked to the SSM and 
BRRD. The SRM requires a common and effectively functioning banking resolution sys-
tem operating on the same level as the SSM. According to the SSM, from January 2014 
the ECB performs banking supervision of the eurozone Member States. In case of insol-
443 BRRD. Art. 27 (1).
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vency  of cross-border banks, the ECB should resolve them in cooperation with many 
national authorities, which could obstruct solving bank insolvency problems and reduce 
efficiency. Another element of the Banking Union – the BRRD – is designed to regulate 
bank resolution at the national level. The SRM is also based on the conversion principles 
and instruments of the BRRD.
The legal basis of the SRM is Article 114 of the Treaty on the European Union, con-
cerned with the creation and functioning of the internal market. According to that article, 
legislation shall be adopted under ordinary legislative procedure. The SRM Regulation will 
be directly binding on all Member States and applied to the banks of the Member States 
participating in the SSM and supervised by the SSM (currently – all eurozone banks). The 
banks of all Member States participating in the SSM will be involved in the SRM (in the 
European Union, this will comprise about 6,000 banks). The Member States not partici-
pating in the SSM retain the ability to join the SSM or SRM.
Single Resolution Board. A new EU agency – the Single Resolution Board  –  (the 
Board)  is established for resolution of eurozone banks, by granting it legal personality. 
The main tasks of the Board is to prepare banking resolution projects, ensure their uni-
form application throughtou the banks supervised by the SSM, monitoring of bank resolu-
tion schemes and their  implementation at the national level, administration of the Single 
Resolution Fund (–the Fund), preparation of resolution plans and tools. The Board, acting 
together with the national authorities, will coordinate the preparation and implementa-
tion of bank resolution plans, but national authorities will not be able to veto or refuse to 
execute the decisions of the Board. The Board will provide guidance on the bank resolu-
tion scheme, and its decisions will be adopted in executive and plenary sessions.
Single Resolution Fund444. Any losses or other costs associated with the legal measures 
for bank resolution and their application, in particular, will be allocated and covered from 
shareholder and creditor funds and only as a measure of last resort, where necessary, by 
using financial industry funds. A single resolution fund is to be established for financing 
resolution. Banks will contribute to the fund and the fund size will amount to at least 1% of 
the total covered bank deposits of the Member States participating in the SRM (according 
to preliminary estimates, about EUR 55 billion could be accumulated over 10 years). Ex-
ante contributions to the Fund will be determined by deducting equity funds and covered 
deposits from all bank liabilities (banks with larger comparative deposit share in the bank 
balance sheet will pay lower contributions to the Fund, but higher premiums will be paid 
to the Deposit Guarantee Fund. The Member States and the EU budget will not contribute. 
The SRB will administer the Fund. The fund will replace the national resolution funds of 
the SSM participating Member States. In the event of shortage of funds, additional ex post 
contributions may be imposed on banks. The fund will be able to borrow or lend funds 
to other non-participating national funds (lending is not obligatory). The use of the Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism (ESM)445 funds is not directly foreseen in the SRM proposal. 
444 See more Ambrasas T. Financial Arrangements under the Single Resolution Mechanism. Several Prob-
lematic Aspects. Justitia, No. 79. Vilnius, 2014. P. 24-27.
445 The ESM was created by an inter-governmental agreement of the euro zone Member States, with the 
purpose to provide financial assistance to euro-zone countries facing financing problems threatening 
the financial stability of the entire euro zone.
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National funds are to be gradually integrated into the general resolution fund. After com-
pleting this integration, banks would start making contributions directly to the Fund.
Use of the SRF. It is established that the Fund cannot be directly used to absorb losses. 
The Fund will be subject to the EU state aid rules, and can be used for bank resolution only 
after the shareholders and other unsecured creditors of the converted bank have already 
absorbed the losses to 8%, based on all liabilities of the converted bank. The Fund may 
be used for the following purposes: providing guarantees for the assets or liabilities of 
the converted bank, for issuing loans to the bank in resolution, for property redemption, 
capitalisation of a bridge bank, for paying compensations to shareholders and creditors if, 
following asset transfer, shareholders and creditors receive less than they would in the case 
of normal bankruptcy procedures. Such application may be extended if the bank is sold446.
Entry into force of the SRM. The SRM has been in operation since 1 January 2015, ex-
cept for the application of the bail-in instrument, which is foreseen for 2016.
In summarising the preceding part of the research section, it should be noted that 
in 2008 many international organisations had not yet achieved any concrete regulatory 
results and the regulatory community long lacked international, comprehensive, coherent 
bank insolvency regulatory standards. In June 2010 the G20 summit in Toronto commit-
ted to design and implement the legal systems whereby public authorities were vested with 
the powers and tools to restructure or resolve all types of crisis-stricken credit institutions, 
and the burden ultimately not being transferred on the taxpayer. The G20 leaders urged 
‘to review the legislation governing resolution of financial institutions and insolvency laws 
in the light of the recent developments for the orderly winding up of a large and complex 
structure of cross-border credit institutions’447. In November 2011, the FSB document en-
titled ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ was ap-
proved448. This document arranges fundamental international principles and features of 
the IFS that are essential for the effectiveness of the credit institutions’ resolution regime. 
It is assumed that after implementing these elements, public authorities will be able to 
methodically replenish credit institutions so that the risk of loss resulting from failure of 
distressed banks would not be transferred on taxpayers, by preserving the particularly sig-
nificant economic functions of these credit institutions. The key attributes of financial in-
stitutions provide for a sufficiently comprehensive idea of the legal framework governing 
bank insolvency procedures. Some jurisdictions have already followed the recommenda-
tions by incorporating them into their national law, while others are still in the legislative 
process. International organisations are responsible for the progress of jurisdictions in 
implementing international financial standards. Although the reforms of the international 
financial architecture and adoption of standards took place mainly on the basis of ‘soft law’, 
all the major economies of the world undertook direct commitments to implement these 
IFS. Significant challenges are based on differences between national legal regimes and 
legal traditions, which is another reason for a comparative analysis of this study. For ex-
446 Ambrasas T. Supra note 444. P. 24-27.
447 The declaration of G-20 leaders adopted at the summit on financial markets and the world economy 
in April 2009.
448 FSB. Supra note 90.
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ample, different treatment of creditor hierarchy may force national conversion authorities 
to seek compromise in cooperation with each other, if in one country ‘local’ creditors and 
treated exceptionally and their rights are protected to a lesser extent than in other national 
legal regimes governing conversion. Furthermore, legal barriers with regard to informa-
tion sharing can lead to restrictions, e.g. by affecting overall resolution planning ex-ante 
(bank recovery plans), and disrupting the efficient cooperation of banks during the crisis. 
1.6. Conceptual Framework of Bank Insolvency Procedures
1.6.1. The Theoretical Basis for Bank Insolvency Procedures
Like corporates, in order to gain profit, banks assume certain risks associated with 
their business activities. It is entirely reasonable that in the course of their conduct, banks 
may face financial difficulties or become insolvent. In some cases, bank managing bodies 
can restore its profitability and sustainability on their own initiative. In extreme cases, they 
are guided and instructed by the competent supervisory authorities subjecting them to 
risk-reducing steps. In other instances the managing bodies of the bank are financially in-
capable to reinstate the successful operation of the bank or are simply unwilling to try and 
solve the financial problems of the distressed bank449. When a bank is faced with financial 
difficulties, the supervisory authority is under a duty to initiate the solution of solvency 
problems faced by banks in accordance with the existing bank insolvency regulation450 in 
the relevant country, seeking to find an optimal bank resolution strategy.
Bank insolvency procedures are a complex economic, social and legal phenomenon, 
characterised by complexity, i.e. very close connection between substantive and procedur-
al legal rules of various branches of law. Bank insolvency procedures include inter alia the 
removal of the bank managing bodies and/or introduction of sanctions against them, the 
suspension of the rights of shareholders and the direct bank takeovers by official authori-
ties or any other officially empowered entity (e.g., a temporary administrator)451. Bank 
insolvency procedures should be viewed as all kinds of official actions with a legal basis, a 
conduct directed against an ailing bank, if the latter meets the statutory requirements and 
the specific insolvency ‘threshold’. When the bank’s financial situation meets the statutory 
requirements for bank insolvency, the bank is subjected to insolvency proceedings452. 
According to the jurisprudence, bank insolvency procedures are divided into the fol-
lowing stages of the banking crisis: prevention, early intervention, resolution and liquida-
tion453.
449 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 14.
450 Ibid.
451 Ibid. P. 15.
452 Lastra R.M., Schiffman H.N. Supra note 74. P. 85.
453 Fonteyne W., Bossu W. Cortavarria-Checkley L. etc. Crisis Management and Resolution for a Eu-
ropean Banking System. Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System. IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/10/70. IMF. European Department, Legal Department, and Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, 2010.
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After the recent banking crisis, it has been internationally agreed that, depending on 
the event or events that triggered bank insolvency and special characteristics of the event, 
the following bank insolvency crisis management hypotheses are distinguished, by strictly 
implementing one of the bank insolvency procedures:
(a) Bank recovery procedure. This procedure consists of specific legal instruments 
aimed at restoring the bank’s financial sustainability and vitality, to determine whether 
the bank is or may be experiencing severe financial difficulties in the near future, but has 
not yet reached the stage that already requires regulator’s intervention454. Bank recovery 
procedure reflects in the bank recovery plan, which are regarded as a particular preventive 
control measure, and the banks have a duty to prepare them at the time when a bank is still 
financially healthy. They also act as a precautionary measure, because bank recovery and 
resolution plans must be updated periodically455, even if the bank is financially healthy. In 
addition, bank recovery is associated with compliance with certain preventive criteria. The 
criteria may be both qualitative and quantitative. Thus, bank recovery procedure is imple-
mented before insolvency stage and will not be further analysed within the scope of this 
study. In the legal doctrine, this procedure is considered as a primary and precautionary 
bank insolvency resolution measure.
(b) Bank resolution procedure. A broader analysis of the procedure is provided in the 
second part of the thesis. It is worth noting that, if the bank recovery procedure fails to 
achieve the expected results, the competent authorities apply formal sanctions, take legal 
action against the bank facing financial difficulties and implement bank resolution tools. 
The supervisory authority can apply resolution measures only when the bank meets the 
resolution threshold456. In the international context, according to the BCBS, the term 
‘bank resolution’ is conceived as ‘any action commenced by the national supervisory au-
thority together with or without private sector involvement, and that mainly aims to preserve 
financial stability and/or to solve the serious financial problems that cause danger to the 
viability of the bank credit facility, and in the absence of such a bank resolution regime, the 
financial institution would not be able to stay longer viable (it should be compulsorily wound 
up due to bankruptcy procedure) and there is no reasonable prospect that it would happen 
in the future’457. 
(c) Bank liquidation procedure. Finally, if after applying certain bank resolution 
measures the financial institution remains financially non-viable and unsustainable, 
a classic bank liquidation procedure remains the only solution for the bank in distress. 
Basically, it is a normal bankruptcy procedure applicable to other business entities 
under the common insolvency law regime. According to this scenario, the regulator 
would be forced to close and liquidate the failing financial institution, based on the 
relevant insolvency (bankruptcy) law in force in a particular country and in accordance 
454 Henry P., Pnevmonidis I. Triggering events for recovery and resolution plans: towards better financial 
crisis management. SZW 2013 S. 536, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, 2013. P. 4.
455 Under the BRRD Directive, banks must update their recovery and resolution plans at least once a 
year: (a) after changes in the legal or organisational structure, operational or financial position; (b) 
where this may significantly impair recovery plans or when it is necessary to change the recovery plan.
456 See more 2 chapter 4 sec.
457 BCBS. Supra note 15. P. 7. See more 2 chapter 1sec. 2 subsec.
110
with the rules and provisions of that law. Regular insolvency laws remain directed at 
the liquidation of an insolvent business entity and maximisation of creditors’ claims, 
whereas bank resolution rules are more focused on the preservation of the individual 
bank’s assets and functions, such as maintaining the depositors and the critical banking 
functions. 
1.6.2. Classification of Bank Insolvency Procedures in the EU, US and 
Switzerland 
Bank insolvency procedures are classified differently, according to the national law of 
the relevant jurisdiction. However, identification of a particular type of bank insolvency 
procedure and their efficiency is an important step in the context of the bank resolution 
strategy. As soon as the particular insolvency procedure is settled for the bank, it grants 
public authorities the power to act promptly as soon as an individual bank faces finan-
cial difficulties458 and allows moving away from the ordinary corporate governance rules, 
which are often associated with the requirements to obtain shareholder consent. When 
the public authorities are exercising their powers, the actions related to insolvency proce-
dures may, for example, affect state capital injections into the bank facing solvency issues 
or result in the requirement against the bank to collect additional capital from external 
sources, or transfer bank property to another investor without the consent of shareholders, 
which accordingly may affect the economic rights of shareholders and creditors. In case of 
an opposite scenario a public authority decides that it will not intervene in the bank and 
adopts a decision to liquidate the bank directly. In this case, traditionally a bankruptcy 
administrator is appointed, who takes control over the bank’s assets and business opera-
tions of the bank seized, and the bank is finally wound up. Declaring and identification of 
a certain type of insolvency procedure means, inter alia, that the shareholder control rights 
are terminated and that shareholders and creditors require the residual assets of the bank 
to the extent of their financial claim. 
Why is it important to distinguish types of bank insolvency procedures and to clas-
sify them? In particular, at first sight, the definition of types of bank insolvency a priori 
seems uncomplicated, but each has certain degree of complexity and are often confused 
with each other in practice. Second, depending on the criteria and conditions triggering 
bank insolvency, potential bank insolvency crisis has different stages. Third, this helps 
distinguishing more clearly a financially unsound bank from a successfully operating 
bank. Fourth, after identifying the actual financial situation of the distressed bank, a 
further solution that is most suitable for the interests of all the parties concerned may be 
458 Bank insolvency triggering provisions and criteria are analysed in more detail in sec. 8 subsec. 1. It 
should be noted that for the purposes of the thesis, the term ‘financial difficulties’ is understood as a 
situation in which the bank is experiencing financial difficulties, but continues its normal activities, 
and at the same faces financing or capital deficiency, however, the relevant authorities or court has not 
yet declared its insolvency. The financial difficulties period ends by bankruptcy of a bank or its return 
to normal legally eligible capital and financial indicators. The legal regime of bank resolution could 
be distinguished only after determining the type of bank insolvency procedures, as one of the public 
authorities’ intervention measures to restore normal bank business conditions or liquidate the bank 
and thus restore normal business conditions for all other banks operating in the country.
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chosen. In addition, in practice, the competent authorities are often faced with an am-
biguous and uncertain situation where it is not entirely clear how to correctly determine 
the financial viability of the bank and prospects. For example, when banks operate in 
different jurisdictions, a competent authority may face a variety of different terms and 
differences that can inadequately or insufficiently describe the degree of viability of the 
bank, bank resolution regime or provide for forced liquidation conditions of the bank. 
The terminology may be widely understood and interpreted, e.g.: failing or likely to fail, 
insolvency event, in danger of default459 or default risk460. Therefore, the precise classifica-
tion of bank insolvency procedures would definitely contribute to minimising this prob-
lem. Another important aspect is that the society and practitioners sometimes still con-
fuse bank insolvency and bankruptcy and these terms are often used as synonyms. Bank 
bankruptcy often means identification of insolvency by legal procedures, performed by 
a court or a competent supervisory authority461. This is an extreme solution to bank 
solvency problems or possibly the last stage of bank resolution462. In general, in banking 
terms, insolvency has a slightly different meaning than in the case of typical business 
entities: the conditions and procedures for identifying insolvency, persons concerned and 
involved in the procedure are different. 
The legal doctrine, in particular, distinguishes banking crisis stages and/or strategies, 
which are broadly classified into: preparation and prevention, early intervention, bank 
resolution, bank liquidation463. In the broad sense, before the latest banking crisis, the IMF 
and the WB codified the types of bank insolvency procedures in different jurisdictions. The 
conclusion was that, in case of potential bank insolvency risk, and if a particular bank satis-
fies the conditions that trigger bank insolvency, the competent authority may adopt the fol-
lowing decision on the bank’s future: (i) prompt corrective or protective measures, in the US 
459 UK Banking Act. Section 7 (2).
460 Dodd-Frank. Title II, Section 203 (b) (1).
461 Ambrasas T. Bank Liquidation As Interference of Public and Private Interests. Jurisprudencija, Vilnius, 
2014. P. 6-11.
462 Ibid.
463 In order to enhance preparation and prevention, first of all, during the recent banking crisis, the states 
began strengthening their banking supervision system. The goal is to collect better information on 
the bank risks in the financial sector and better control them. Another objective relates to contin-
gency planning due to the scale of banking risks and the use of legal conversion tools ex ante, and the 
mandate for protection against far too complex banking operations to ensure their potential problem 
solution. Early intervention means early corrective actions designed to correct and solve insolvency 
problems in the early insolvency stage. These procedures can help banks return to normal business 
operations, while avoiding resolution and/or liquidation. Bank resolution means mainly administra-
tive, non-judicial procedures and legal instruments for bank restructuring, or management of the in-
terrupted activity of a failing bank, while preserving the insured depositors and other services that are 
vital for maintaining financial stability, e.g. the smooth operation of payment systems. In bank resolu-
tion, legal bank resolution tools are employed. Liquidation means ordinary bankruptcy procedure. 
EC. Staff Working Document. Impact Assesment. Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council. Brussels, 6.6.2012. SWD 1666 final, 2012. P. 8. Dewatripont M., Freixas X. Bank 
resolution: a framework for the assesment of regulatory intervention. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2011. P. 413-415.
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and Swiss legal systems464, or early intervention measures in the EU465. This bank insolvency 
stage is characterised by developing financial difficulties of the bank, no official bank insol-
vency has been declared yet, and the supervisory authority undertakes intervention actions 
in accordance with the statutory provisions of prudential regulation to reduce the risk of 
insolvency of the bank to the maximum extent, as long as the conditions for insolvency 
‘threshold’466 are not met; (i) official administration procedures (during these procedures, the 
competent public authority, whether a banking supervisory authority or a court-appointed 
administrator, or a temporary administrator appointed by the supervisory authority bank, 
takes over the direct control of the bank from its managing bodies, in order to protect the 
bank’s assets, assess the actual financial situation in the bank and then perform all the nec-
464 In Switzerland, FINMA can impose the following early intervention measures: restrict the activities 
of managing bodies, appoint a temporary administrator, revoke the powers of managing bodies or 
remove them from the daily management of the bank, remove both internal and external auditors, 
restrict some of the bank’s business activities, prohibit the bank to make and receive payments or take 
over the bank’s securities trading, close the bank, adopt a resolution on the suspension of liabilities 
or delay the discharge of obligations to a certain date, with the exception of guaranteed collateralised 
debt and mortgage-backed bonds. In the US, early intervention measures are associated with the 
use of prompt corrective FDIC measures, where appropriate, in order to resolve the problems of an 
insured financial institution facing financial difficulties. Depending on whether the bank is well-cap-
italised, adequately capitalised, or critically undercapitalised, the supervisory authority can apply the 
following primary sanctions: (i) limit the allocation of capital; (ii) limiting the costs of the managing 
bodies; (iii) apply a moratorium to insufficiently capitalised institutions; (iv) require a capital restora-
tion plan; (iv) restrict guarantee obligations; (vi) restrict transactions with bank affiliates; (v) limit 
interest rates; (vi) limit the bank’s asset growth; (vii) improve the work of the managing bodies, such 
as the appointment of a new director; (viii) require the sale of assets, etc. Swiss Banking law. Art. 26. 
FDIA. 38 Section. Codified 12 U.S.C. 1831o.
465 In the EU, if a bank infringes or is likely to infringe prudential requirements, and in the event of a 
rapidly deteriorating financial condition, including deteriorating liquidity situation, increasing level 
of leverage and the number of non-performing loans or concentration of exposures, as valued on the 
basis of a set of indicators, the competent authority has a right to apply the following measures: (a) 
require the managing body of the bank to implement one or more of the arrangements or measures 
set out in the recovery plan or to update such a recovery plan; (b) require the managing body of the 
bank to examine the situation, identify measures to overcome any problems identified and draw up 
an action programme to address those problems and a timetable for its implementation; (c) require 
the managing body of the bank to convene a shareholders’ meeting of the bank, or if the managing 
body fails to comply with this requirement, convene the shareholders’ meeting directly, and in both 
cases set the agenda and require certain decisions to be considered for adoption by the shareholders; 
(d) require the removal or replacement of one or more members of the managing body or senior man-
agement, if those persons are found unfit to perform their duties pursuant to Article 13 of Directive 
2013/36/EU or Article 9 of Directive 2014/65/EU; (e) require the managing body of the bank to draw 
up a plan for negotiation on debt restructuring with some or all of its creditors according to the re-
covery plan, where applicable; (f) require changes to the bank’s business strategy; (g) require changes 
to the legal or operational structures of the bank; (h) obtain, including through on-site inspections 
and provide to the resolution authority all the information necessary in order to update the resolu-
tion plan and prepare for the possible resolution of the institution and for valuation of the assets and 
liabilities of the bank; (i) if the competent authority considers that the replacement of senior manage-
ment or a managing body is deemed to be an insufficient measure to remedy the situation, Member 
States shall ensure that competent authorities may appoint one or more temporary administrators of 
the bank. BRRD. 27, 28, 29 str. Directive 2013/36/ES Art. 13, Directive 2014/65/ES Art 9.
466 Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. P. 64. 
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essary reorganisation operations of the bank or initiate involuntary liquidation procedures 
for the bank); (iii) resolution and/or liquidation of the bank, if the facts can establish that 
the bank is or may be excessively indebted, i.e insolvent, also whether it fails to meet capital 
ratio requirements, or faces severe liquidity problems after the expiry of the deadline set by 
the supervisory authority for the correction of such financial difficulties. 
In the EU legal system the following bank insolvency procedures could be distin-
guished: preparation and prevention, early intervention and resolution and/or liquidation 
procedures. Although the two first procedures are outside the limits of this study, as they 
are treated as ex ante preventive insolvency measures, after a significant shift in paradigms, 
it is worth noting that the powers of the competent authorities are characterised by three 
main elements: (i) preparatory steps and plans, to minimise the possible insolvency risk 
(preparation and prevention); (ii) the mandate to respond to the emerging financial dif-
ficulties of the bank at an early stage, in order to stop the deterioration of the bank to avoid 
insolvency (early intervention); (iii) if bank insolvency poses a threat to the public interest, 
definite legal measures to reorganise the bank, while preserving the critical functions and 
limiting taxpayer losses as far as possible (bank resolution); (iv) ordinary insolvency pro-
ceedings, winding-up procedure in accordance with the national legal systems of the EU 
Member States. Bank liquidation is associated with the realisation of the bank’s assets467. 
Bank liquidation procedures in the EU legal system are defined collective insolvency pro-
ceedings initiated and supervised by administrative or judicial authorities of a Member 
State for disposing the assets under the supervision of those authorities, including cases 
where such procedures are terminated by a compromise agreement or another similar 
measure468. All of the above-mentioned legal instruments all together establish a banking 
recovery and resolution framework. Since it is impossible to determine in advance the 
exact risk posed by an individual bank for financial stability, the authorities exercise these 
powers with regard to any bank, despite its size and business volume, whereas preparation 
of banking recovery and resolution plans ex-ante is regarded as a management tool and is 
not associated with bank insolvency procedures469. It should be noted that early interven-
tion provisions470 and the temporary administrator institute also fall within the scope of 
official bank administration procedures471. It should also be highlighted that the EU legal 
system distinguishes bank reorganisation procedures. These measures are directed at pre-
serving or recovering the financial situation of credit institutions or investment firms472 
and they could affect pre-existing rights of third parties, including measures involving 
the possibility to suspend payments, enforcement measures or reduction of claims; such 
measures include application of resolution measures and the use of resolution powers pro-
vided in Directive 2014/59/EU. Finally, the main type of bank insolvency procedures is 
bank resolution473. 
467 BRRD. Art. 2 (54).
468 Directive 2001/24/EB. Art. 2.
469 Directive 2013/36/ES. Art. 74.
470 BRRD. Art. 27.
471 BRRD. Art. 29. 
472 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013. Art. 4 (1) (2).
473 See more 2 chapter, 1 sec.
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Bank insolvency procedures in Switzerland, characterised by the absence of special 
insolvency law, are initiated on the basis of the general corporate insolvency law regime474. 
In addition to formal insolvency procedures for banks (early intervention and preventive 
measures) applied before the insolvency stage475, bank restructuring476, and bank bank-
ruptcy procedures477 are distinguished. It is important to note that preventive measures 
can be employed both independently and collectively, during restructuring or liquida-
tion (bankruptcy proceedings) of the bank478. Legal rules governing bank insolvency 
procedures are applicable to both banks and securities dealers and non-bank financial 
institutions499. Bank restructuring procedure is initiated if FINMA discovers that (i) the 
financial situation of the bank is such that creditors will attain a better position after bank 
restructuring than at the time of bankruptcy; (ii) the bank restructuring plan is economi-
cally realistic479. If  a bank faces financial difficulties,  the restructuring procedure is not 
automatic. This right is conferred immediately after FINMA adopts a formal ruling on 
the initiation of the bank restructuring procedure after the restructuring plan has already 
been approved480. FINMA approves the restructuring plan after: (i) careful consideration 
of the financial situation and assets of the bank; (ii) if it can be reasonably assumed that in 
the case of restructuring creditors would be in a better position than in the case of bank-
ruptcy; (iii) in the restructuring plan, the interests of creditors are prioritised over share-
holders’ interests; (iv) the legislative and economic relations between the bank’s assets, 
liabilities, contractual relations are adequately included and addressed in the restructuring 
plan502; (v) the restructuring plan requires no approval from the board of the bank and 
the restructuring plan must enable the shareholders to reduce the share capital or to create 
new capital, by converting bank debt into capital481. Bank liquidation procedure is inevi-
table, if bank restructuring is not viable. In this case, FINMA revokes the banking license, 
passes a resolution on winding up and makes it public and appoints one or more liquida-
tors, who also report to FINMA. It should also be noted that a separate bank resolution 
regime applies internationally for systemically important banks. An additional regulatory 
system is now under way, by creating a favorable legal environment for the successful 
restructuring of the banks at the time of the crisis. The main purpose of this particular – 
regulation is to ensure the continuity of banking services, or regular, orderly liquidation of 
systemically important functions, to protect from the adverse effects on the international 
and national financial systems and economies concerned and to avoid the use of state aid 
for their insolvency as far as possible482. The reforms are not yet implemented to their 
474 Swiss banking law. Art. 34. Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act of 11 April 1889 (July 1st, 
2014) Art. 197-220.
475 Swiss Banking law. Art. 26.
476 Swiss Banking law. Art. 28-32.
477 Ibid. Art. 33-37.
478 Ibid. Art. 25 (2).
479 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 40.
480 Ibid. Art. 41.
481 Ibid. Art. 31.
482 FINMA. Position paper on Resolution of G-SIBs. Resolution of global systemically important banks. 
2013 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-11-2014] <http://www.finma.ch/e/finma/publikationen/Docu-
ments/pos-sanierung-abwicklung-20130807-e.pdf>.
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full extent. FINMA is still working on this regulatory puzzle to improve the efficient and 
timely restructuring of these particular entities and their timely conversion planning and 
identification of restructuring conditions during the banking crisis.
There are three bank insolvency procedures in the US, in the form of legal tools to deal 
with distressed banks. A financial institution may be reorganised under the bankruptcy 
code (in this case, the bank usually remains in operation), liquidated under the bank-
ruptcy code or its financial difficulties are solved in accordance with the special legal rules 
governing bank insolvency (resolution)483. In general, all of the three options are treated as 
bank resolution measures or, in other words, bank insolvency procedures. According to a 
general rule, both the concept of bank reorganisation and bank liquidation are regulated 
by and associated with the United States Bankruptcy Code, Chapters 11 and 7. After the 
establishment of the special bank resolution regime in the Dodd-Frank Act, a special Or-
dinary Liquidation Authority was established. That Authority was designed for banks that 
may have systemic implications, by applying special rules. The Bankruptcy Code and the 
related provisions remain the primary legal source dealing with bank difficulties and serve 
as a reference for traditional commercial banks484. Bank insolvency procedures are carried 
out on the federal level under the supervision of the federal bankruptcy court485. In the 
context of bank insolvency procedures in the strict sense of the word, resolution is equated 
to a specific bank resolution regime, historically employed for processing insolvency cases 
of special financial institutions only, namely deposit-taking financial institutions. Bank re-
organisation is subject to the provisions governing corporate reorganisation and primary 
law provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11486. That Chapter provides that the 
debtor can negotiate with the creditors (sometimes even before submitting a petition for 
insolvency proceedings) to reach consensus and to materialise the reorganisation plan 
that would allow the restructuring of the debtor’s obligations so that the company would 
be able to implement them. The negotiations are taking place in parallel with the judicial 
procedure, and the federal bankruptcy judge manages the case. When the reorganisation 
plan is approved, the company, often after obtaining the approval of the managing bod-
ies, undertakes the operations set under the reorganisation plan. In this case, the debtor 
can often delay the bankruptcy procedures and continue business operations487. Another 
procedure is bank liquidation. These procedures are subject to corporate liquidations pro-
visions contained in Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code as sources of primary law. That 
Chapter provides that the debtor’s assets should be liquidated under the appointment of 
the liquidation trustee, appointed exclusively with the approval of the US court or credi-
483 Liquidation in the US legal system means that the bank’s assets will be sold, and the received funds will 
be distributed to creditors according to the hierarchy of creditor claims. Reorganisation means that 
the bank’s assets are inviolable, but commitments are rearranged by eliminating or reducing junior, 
subordinated claims, while converting priority claims into subordinated claims, and extending some 
of the subordinated claims. The US Bankruptcy Code. 11. U.S.C. § 1126 (2006). Chapter 11.
484 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2010).
485 Lubben S. J. Financial Institutions and Bankruptcy. Seattle University Law Review, Forthcoming; Se-
ton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 1726944, 2010. P. 1264.
486 Ibid. Section 1101-74.
487 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Study on the Resolution of Financial Companies 
under the Bankruptcy Code, 2011. P. 3.
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tors’ majority voting488, while liquidation procedures are conducted according to the hier-
archy of creditor claims. 
In the US, the liquidation process as an ordinary bankruptcy procedure is court-based. 
A federal bankruptcy judge administers the insolvency procedure. The debtor has a right 
to choose whether to initiate reorganisation or liquidation proceedings. These procedures 
and various legislative provisions governing the former have some exceptions. The rules of 
the Bankruptcy Code do not apply to particular financial institutions that do not meet the 
requirements for insolvency and the conditions for initiating bankruptcy proceedings. For 
example, insured deposit-taking financial institution489 or branches of foreign banks490 fail 
to meet such requirements. Another exclusive example concerns financial brokers-dealers 
falling outside the scope of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing liquidation 
and reorganisation491.
Another classic bank insolvency procedure in the US is bank resolution. If the bank is 
ensured by the DGS, then FDIC takes over the administration of the bank that is facing se-
vere financial problems. FDIC also acts as a receivership, according to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act492. Typically, in such case the bank is closed by the appropriate competent 
administrative authority (supervisory authority, currency control authority, the US Office 
of Thrift Supervision) and the FDIC is appointed as a receiver of the closed financial insti-
tution493. The purpose of such bank resolution regime is to set out the Federal Deposit In-
surance legislation in detail and seek to resolve the financial difficulties of the bank based 
on the ‘least cost’ principle with respect to the FDIC494. The FDIC, as a receiver of the 
insolvent bank, after taking over control of the bank has a number of options to address 
the bank’s financial problems (see more in the chapter on bank resolution tools). However, 
the purchase and assumption transaction is the most common bank resolution method, 
by partially or fully transferring bank assets or liabilities, deposits and loans to another 
financial institution495. By such transactions, the customers of the failing financial institu-
488 11 U.S.C. Section 701-2.
489 11 U.S.C. Section109 (b) (2).
490 11 U.S.C. Section 109 (b) (3) (B). International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. Section 3102.
491 11 U.S.C. Section109 (d).
492 If a financial institution is failing, the role of the FDIC, as the receiver, is similar to that of a bank-
ruptcy administrator. The bankruptcy administrator may wind up an insolvent bank or transfer all or 
part of its assets to the assuming bank. The main function of the FDIC is to maximise the failing bank 
assets and satisfaction of creditor claims in accordance with the least cost principle to FDIC. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 1811.
493 See more. Who Is the FDIC? [interactive]. [accessed on 05-12-2014] <https://www.fdic.gov/about/
learn/symbol/ index.html>. 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(c).
494 12 U.S.C. Section 1823(c) (4) (A) (ii). Under certain circumstances, a resolution method diverging 
from ‘the least cost’ principle is possible only in view of a ‘systemic risk’ exception. This exception 
applies only when both the Management Board and the FDIC Board of Directors obtain no less than 
two-thirds of the votes of their members and the State Secretariat of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the President, determines that non-compliance with the ‘least cost’ principle can cause serious nega-
tive consequences for economic conditions or financial stability and the actions or assistance by way 
of derogation from ‘the least cost’ principle would allow avoiding or mitigating such negative effects. 
12 U.S.C. Section 1832 (c) (4) (G). 
495 FDIC. Supra note 493.
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tion automatically become customers of the acquiring financial institution. Meanwhile, 
the remaining creditors are entitled to raise claims against the FDIC with regard to the 
commitments unrelated to deposits, but they have no other rights to take action against 
the administrator. Bank resolution procedure is not court-based, as it is administrative in 
nature, but some aspects can be appealed against and be subjected to judicial review496. 
Finally, a new bank resolution system is found in the US legal system, based on the exclu-
sive authority of the Ordinary Liquidation Authority (OLA). This Authority implements 
its functions in the field of resolution with regard to systemically important financial in-
stitutions (large structures, complex)497. According to this regulation model, the scope of 
the regime involves non-banking financial institutions if their financial difficulties may 
potentially cause systemic risk to the entire national economy. The operating principles 
are broadly similar to the FDIC resolution procedures dedicated to deposit-taking finan-
cial institutions. The key distinctive feature is that such a reorganisation procedure helps 
avoiding bankruptcy procedures (direct liquidation). OLA is launching its functions only 
in the case the Treasury Secretariat, acting on the basis of the recommendations of the 
supervisory authority board and the FDCI guidance, determines (after consulting the 
President of the United States) that the insolvency of financial institutions will have seri-
ous negative repercussions for financial stability of the US and that the initiation of such 
action with help mitigating the adverse effect with regard to a particular bank498. When 
it is not possible to identify the circumstances mentioned above, general insolvency law 
and the FDIC bank resolution regime shall be applied (according to the special FDICA 
provisions)499.
All of the above bank resolution methods in general may be identified as bank insol-
vency procedures. The role of bank insolvency procedure is twofold. First of all, they have 
their economic objective, i.e. resolution of banking activity as a business entity or reorgan-
isation of the bank or a part of it, by transferring bank assets and right of claim to another 
entity, or forced bank liquidation procedure, which is subject to both general insolvency 
law and special insolvency legislation exclusively concerned with the legal relations of the 
insolvent bank. Second, bank insolvency procedures may lead to either business continu-
ity of the bank as a legal person or liquidation of a bank as a corporate entity and the end 
of the company. Bank insolvency procedures may be conducted separately, but can also 
be used in an integrated way, combining them into a single bank insolvency procedure.
1.6.3. General Objectives of Bank Insolvency Procedures
By reason of the unique features of banks, financial difficulties should also be ad-
dressed with a different approach than corporate insolvency problems. Another reason 
is that corporate insolvency law and procedure is concerned with different aims and pur-
poses, compared to general insolvency law. Corporate insolvency laws and procedures aim 
to achieve two main objectives: (i) fair and predictable procedures and equal treatment 
496 12 U.S.C. Section 1821 (c) (7).
497 Dodd-Frank Act. Title II.
498 Dodd-Frank. 203 Section.
499 Dodd-Frank. 204 (a) Section.
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of creditors in accordance with creditor hierarchy and addressing coordination problems 
in order to avoid creditors ‘racing’ for the assets of the debtor500; (ii) maximisation of the 
debtor’s assets in order to satisfy the interests of creditors501. 
After the global shift of the paradigm of bank insolvency procedures it has become 
apparent that the general objectives of public interest pursued by bank insolvency proce-
dures have become more important than the objectives pursued by general insolvency law. 
For example, one of the main objectives of bank insolvency procedures is the least costs 
to deposit insurance institutions502. However, general insolvency law remains imperative 
in the context of bank resolution rules and applies in cases where special bank resolution 
regime and the related rules do not apply503. This section reviews the general objectives of 
bank insolvency procedures, Section 2 of Chapter 3 analyses the specific targets of the bank 
resolution regime according to the positive law of the relevant jurisdictions. 
After analysing foreign sources of literature and legal doctrine, it can be stated that 
when a certain bank faces financial difficulties, in addition to a variety of private interests, 
the competent authorities must reflect and ensure the fundamental public interests: (i) 
stability of the financial system; (ii) protection of insured depositors’ rights; (iii) continu-
ity of the critical banking functions and business lines; (iv) reduction of moral hazard to 
the minimal level; (v) restriction of competition distortions. Furthermore, some additional 
objectives of bank insolvency procedures can be identified in the scientific literature and 
studies conducted by international organisations504: (vi) smooth functioning of payment 
and settlement systems; (vii) preservation of financial intermediation and lending func-
tions; (viii) operational efficiency; ix) the minimisation of ‘too big to fail’ problem. All of 
these objectives are correlated, but it must be assumed, however, that the primary ob-
jective of the bank insolvency procedures is financial stability and the remaining ob-
jectives– are of secondary nature. In economic terms, the objectives of bank insolvency 
procedures relate to the bank activities as a whole, or maintaining the continuity of the 
viable part of the bank, by putting the bank into resolution, transferring the bank’s assets 
and creditors’ claim rights. In legal terms, the objective of bank insolvency procedures is 
the elimination of the legal person from civil circulation, while executing bank resolution 
procedures and/or involuntary bank liquidation procedures505. Thus, the objectives of 
bank insolvency procedures may trigger two insolvency scenarios for the bank: business 
continuity of the bank as a legal entity or liquidation of a bank as a legal entity and the 
500 The expanded list of general insolvency law objectives is provided in Marinč. M., Vlahu R. Supra note 
76. Bankruptcy Procedures and Their Ex-Post Efficiency. P. 15.
501 The main principles of bank insolvency procedures and their application can be compared with the 
corresponding principles of corporate insolvency law. See more. UNCITRAL. Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law. Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems. WB, Washington 
D.C., 2001. Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures-Key Issues, Legal Department, IMF, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1999.
502 Bliss R., Kaufman G. Supra note 75. P. 47.
503 For example, in line with the EU legal system, before applying a particular bank resolution tool, the 
competent authorities should assess prospective positions of shareholders and creditors’ rights and 
assess whether direct bank liquidation is more feasible under normal insolvency scenario.
504 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 16. 
505 Ibid. P. 15.
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end of the company. Bank insolvency procedures can operate independently, but can be 
applied comprehensively. 
Stability of the financial system. There is no universally accepted definition of finan-
cial stability. In general, it should be understood as the stability of the financial system. 
The changes themselves and the stability of the financial system can be defined through 
the combination of various elements. Garry Schinasi gives one of the most accurate defini-
tions. He identifies three primary segments of the financial stability system: (1) financial 
intermediaries, such as banks, insurance companies, common investment funds, pension 
funds, hedge funds, which collect savings from consumers and make them available to in-
vestors; (2) financial markets, such as stock exchange and bond markets, where consumers 
and investors operate directly or through the relevant stakeholders; (3) financial system 
infrastructure, which in essence is effective institutional and legal regulation (including 
payment and settlement systems, accounting standards, competent supervisory authori-
ties through which intermediaries and markets operate)506. From the totality of those ele-
ments, we can identify financial stability.
The main purpose of bank insolvency law is to provide safeguards for the stability of 
the financial system and for the prevention of the adverse impact of ‘contagion’. Most of 
the bank’s liabilities often form part of a large group of depositors, most of them are indi-
viduals who fail to take and manage financial risk or reduce it correctly. Even if a deposit 
guarantee system can assist in protecting the depositors, by indirectly transferring costs 
on the insured entity to the state budget or on the banking industry, but eventually, the 
financial difficulties of the bank may result in payment system disorders, bank default on 
contracts and the disruption of the related services or, in extreme cases, even the suspen-
sion of services. Therefore, this may cause a domino effect, which manifests itself in the 
form of transfer to the counterparties of the financial losses suffered by the bank. Public 
confidence in the banking system may also be lost and a serious threat to financial stability 
could be provoked. Even the insolvency of a single bank may trigger a systemic banking 
crisis, destructing the remaining part of the sound banking system and threatening the 
functions of banks as financial intermediaries across the financial system507. Thus, before 
preparing a resolution strategy for a particular bank, the competent authorities need to 
aim for the prevention of such adverse effects by all means and make every effort to main-
tain the financial stability in the country.
Avoiding provision of public financial support for banks from taxpayers’ money is 
equally important, since, as agreed at the international level, losses resulting from bank 
insolvency must first and foremost be distributed to creditors. It is important to avoid 
additional, unnecessary losses to creditors508 and to avoid systemic risks to financial sta-
506 Shinasi G. FinancialStability - Theory and Practises. IMF, Washington DC, US, 2006. P. 80.
507 Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. P. 29-32.
508 Particularly important to the owners of bank bonds (as it would be very impractical to identify in-
dividual bond holders on the threshold of conversion, applying the discretion of the case by case 
approach, and for regulators it is essential to ensure that the bank holds no bonds of other banks, 
except for small amounts), for ranking of creditors and for securing the priority of depositors’ rights 
(preparation for bank bail-in with private funds, especially at the time of the Cyprus banking crisis, 
highlighted the fact that lenders lack clarity regarding different creditors’ hierarchy and satisfaction 
of creditor claims in financially distressed banks, and the type of losses the banks will suffer in case of 
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bility509. A situation when insolvency problems faced by a distressed bank spread over the 
other participants of the banking system is described by the doctrine as a financial ‘conta-
gion’. The adverse effects or the ‘contagion’ are the central features and the primary cause of 
systemic risk510. Scientific literature identifies two categories of financial contagion: direct 
and indirect. Direct contagion is when ‘contagion’ spreads from one bank facing financial 
difficulties to several other financial institutions, by reason of their real mutual commit-
ments. Different lines of credit, guarantees, trade operations are the most frequently en-
countered forms of mutual obligations are. The failure of one bank could trigger a chain 
reaction and force other banks write off their assets. Eventually, bank insolvency may lead 
to drastically decreasing economy of the state. Moreover, it can give rise to the increase 
of public financial debt and decline in the prices of various assets, especially if banks hold 
a similar portfolio of assets. This statement is explained by an obvious fact that the pay-
ment and settlement system and the interbank market provides additional interconnec-
tions between banks. For example, problems arising in the case of payment orders or from 
participation in wholesale financing may lead to significant losses to other market par-
ticipants and adversely affect the liquidity of the banking system. Reputational or indirect 
contagion occurs when consumers suddenly change their views on the insolvency and risk 
profile of the bank. After assessing the ‘competitor’, i.e. another player in the market with 
similar performance characteristics, creditors may come to both accurate and incorrect 
conclusions with regard to the closure of a particular bank. This phenomenon can prompt 
other creditors with the rights of claim to another bank to withdraw their cash from banks 
as quickly as possible. Therefore, it is assumed that the financial ‘contagion’ theory, inter 
alia, is based on psychological elements and can severely damage public interest and the 
solvency of other banks operating in the country, especially if they are very similar in their 
structure and business models, or could result in radical adverse developments and risks 
in the financial market.
Protection of depositor rights. Most of the bank’s liabilities depend on different groups 
of depositors. Moreover, most of them are natural persons. When a bank becomes insol-
vent, losing their deposits would cause a disproportionate financial burden. In contrast to 
large companies or institutional investors, retail depositors lack the capacity to analyse and 
verify how banks control their money. They do not have access to often limited sources 
of information and lack resources to assess the financial situation of the bank. Therefore, 
the doctrine considers that depositors cannot adequately determine the level of risk they 
assume when depositing their contributions to a certain bank534. For these reasons, the 
states has realised that it is vital to establish a deposit insurance system535. These deposit 
insurance schemes protect retail depositors by paying compensations up to a particular 
insolvency, which was particularly important in the case of uninsured depositors. See more. Creditor 
Participation in Banking Crisis in the Eurozone- A Corner Turned? Empirical analysis of current bank 
liability management and restructuring policies with conclusions for the European bank restructuring 
and resolution framework. Study commissioned by the Greens/ European Free Alliance in European 
Parliament, Berlin, 2013. P. 22.
509 Tucker P. Bank of England. Supra note 92. P. 9.
510 Smaga. P. The Concept of Systemic Risk. Systemic Risk Center. The London School of Economics and 
Political Science. Special Paper No. 5, 2014. P. 10-13.
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insured amount, if the bank is liquidated. The effective protection of depositors’ rights and 
guarantees could be attributed to the general objectives of bank insolvency procedures. 
Continuity of the critical functions performed by the bank. The main purpose is to 
avoid direct bank liquidation and its removal from civil circulation. This objective can be 
achieved, as discussed below in more detail, by making the bank in distress to continue 
all or parts of its critical business until its resolution and subsequent liquidation under 
ordinary insolvency proceedings. Different from companies, a bank cannot operate on 
a lost going concern assumption because financial transactions represent a crucial part 
of the bank’s business. Therefore, the competent authorities must undertake all the legal 
means to support and strengthen the fundamental functions of a failing bank, e.g. deposit-
taking operations, lending. Preserving the primary functions of the bank also serves the 
interests of its creditors, preventing significant asset impairment, which may accordingly 
affect rapid bankruptcy and the respective closure of the bank. It is assumed that this goal 
not only assists in protecting the systemically important bank functions, but also secures 
the bank’s assets and maintains the added value of the failing bank. 
Moral hazard reduction. Another significant goal is to maintain viable parts of a fail-
ing bank while liquidate and close non-viable business operations. If bank insolvency pro-
cedures are governed in an effective manner, inter alia, they have a punitive impact in the 
context of standard bank insolvency procedures. Moreover, in the absence of explicit, clear 
and precise regulation of the bank insolvency procedure it can affect the banking industry. 
For example, other banks operating on a given market will be more cautious about the 
related possible bank insolvency risks, which could in turn contribute to a more efficient 
market discipline511. 
Minimising distortions of competition. A failing bank may cause both negative and 
positive impact and consequences for its competitors, and even for the efficiency of the 
entire banking sector512. On the one hand, banks may be given a particular advantage, in 
comparison with their competitors, and especially in view of the interconnection with the 
other banks and impact on the real economy. For example, a failing bank may influence 
collateral default and interbank loan default. If a failing bank will be stabilised through 
debt write-off measures and temporary liquidity support from the public sector instead 
of direct liquidation, competitors may assess their claims and the bank assets at less than 
their market value, especially if they no longer see the operational potential of the bank. 
On the other hand, if bank insolvency procedures are applied by using public finances, 
it can lead to inefficient and undue allocation of resources. Therefore, such an approach 
may prove ineffective in the case when banks receive disproportionate financial support, 
compared to other competing banks, which accordingly confers competitive advantage 
against competitors. 
Minimising the ‘too big to fail’ problem (see also Chapter 1, Section 7, subsection 2). 
The recent financial crisis raised many discussions on how to deal with banks and how 
to treat them, by reason of their special status, i.e. the importance for the entire finan-
cial system. These financial institutions are defined as ‘systemically important financial 
511 Aghion P., Bolton P., Dewatripont M. Contagious bank failures in a free banking system. European 
Economic Review, Vol. 44, Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost, 2000. P. 713-718.
512 Effect of State intervention on the competition in the banking system is very controversial, compared 
to other sectors of the economy.
122
institutions’, and thus as ‘too big to fail’, ‘too complex to fail’ or ‘too interconnected to fail’. 
This regulatory phenomenon is usually associated with political will, which prevents large 
banks of utmost economic significance from collapsing, although the bank is de facto in-
solvent or has serious financial problems538. It is assumed that the liquidation of a large and 
complex bank would trigger many difficulties in terms of operational coordination and 
procedural efficiency, mainly occurring when the bank operates on a cross border basis. 
Operational efficiency. The physical assets of the bank can depreciate or disappear very 
quickly, and this is primarily reflected in large, complex institutions engaged in cross-
border activities. It is therefore particularly important to take over effective control of the 
bank in a operative manner, in order to protect the bank assets and to preserve the bank 
business as far as possible. For this reason, the supervisory authority must timely and cor-
rectly determine the cases of violation of bank (in) solvency criteria. 
Bank insolvency procedures in all jurisdictions must be based on sound, reliable and 
stable legal regulation of banking supervision, which, inter alia, should ensure the imple-
mentation of these basic principles. 
1.7. Key Operational Risks of the Bank and Correlation to  
Financial Difficulties
Banking activity regulation is primarily concerned with quantitative banking risks al-
lowed by the law, in combination with certain restrictions provided in the law513. High risk 
is an integral part of banking, but the effective management of bank insolvency risks is an 
essential element of successful strategic planning of the bank. Therefore, the inability or 
unwillingness of the bank directors to adequately identify, understand, control and limit 
the risks are regarded as one of the cornerstones of the recent banking crisis514. Prudential 
regulations of banking are conceived as any procedures, processes and systems, transac-
tions and instructions, and designed to protect a bank from unexpected losses and dam-
ages, including additional losses resulting from bank insolvency by the time that such an 
event occurs515. Of course, most banks diversify their risks and lending by using a variety 
of strategies and with a view to reducing the risks and bank liabilities, e.g. by allocating 
lending to different business entities. Understanding of risks makes their reduction easier 
and their control more effective. For instance, in certain jurisdictions the law recommends 
the banks to form internal, individual committees that would monitor insolvency risks ex-
ante and control them appropriately516. 
After examining the legal doctrine, the following key insolvency risks of financial in-
stitutions that may influence the bank’s insolvency procedures may be identified: (i) opera-
tional risks ; (ii) liquidity risk; (iii) credit risk (iv) legal risk (risks arising from various in-
513 Gleeson S. Supra note 113. (vii).
514 EC. Green Paper. Corporate Governance in financial institutions and renumeration policies. Brussels, 
COM(2010) 284 final, 2010. P. 6. Bishof E. Fitness and Propriety of Bank Directors in the Light of the 
Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009. European Union Private Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 6, 2013. P. 321-
328.
515 Bauen M., Rouiller N. Supra note 39. P. 54.
516 For example, in Switzerland bank boards are advised to establish special risk management commit-
tees, in addition to other standard bank committees, such as audit, compensation committees, etc.
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fringement cases, non-compliance with laws or norms, rules, regulations, the established 
good practice, or where banks simply complied with their rights and obligations.); (v) 
systemic risk; While this is not an exhaustive list517, as the banking sector is dynamic and 
is going very fast due to the changes in information technologies and speed of this trend, 
especially because of the specific risks associated with electronic banking and electronic 
payment systems and new banking products, etc. 
Operational risk. This risk can be defined in different ways, but in all cases it results 
from potential bank losses that can occur due to significant deficiencies in the operat-
ing system of a certain bank, its credibility and integrity. Operational risk is significant, 
because it needs to be covered by the bank’s own funds. BCBS defines operational risk as 
the risk under which a bank may suffer losses due to inadequate or inappropriate inter-
nal bank processes, people and systems or external events and related risks involved518. 
This definition does not include such risks as strategic risks related to business decision-
making519. One of the main tasks pursued by banking is smooth provision of payment 
services, which accordingly requires high degree of reliability. Each year, payment systems 
of the banking sector perform an enormous number of transactions, with great amount of 
money520. Consequently, the number and percentage of operating errors must be negligi-
ble, as otherwise this will immediately adversely affect thousands of private and public in-
terests. Thus, payment services are always associated with operational risk, which basically 
means that there is a risk that certain transactions may be omitted in due time or wrongly 
performed in violation of the legal requirements, for example, by reason of human (staff) 
or technical failures. In addition, operational risk is closely related to the banking system 
security risk and reputational risk elements, as banks, for example, may experience a range 
of attacks on both their external and internal systems or bank products521. In addition 
to external attacks, it is equally important that banks face potential employee fraud risk: 
employees can secretly gain access to sensitive customer data, access information on cus-
tomer accounts and absorb these data. In addition, when employees falsify data, e.g., for 
committing falsified data, the bank is also exposed to operational risks, which is explained 
by the fact that the bank is often responsible for cases of personnel tampering, when there 
is no customer fault. 
517 Traditionally, bank insolvency risks can be identified in view of the banking laws of a certain country. 
For example, Section 9 (2) of the Swiss Banking Act provides for the following core bank insolvency 
risks: credit risk, counterparty or bad loan risk, market risk, interest rate risk, payment system risk, 
legal and operational risks, liquidity risk, reputational risk. BCBS. Core Principles of Effective Bank-
ing Supervision, 2012. P. 5. 
518 BCBS. Review of the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk, 2014 [interactive]. 
[accessed on 11-10-2014] <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs292.pdf>. BCBS. Consultative Document 
Operational risk - Revisions to the simpler approaches, 2014 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-10-11]. 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs291.pdf>. 
519 Gleeson S. Supra note 113. P. 12.
520 IMF. International Financial Statistics. Balance of Payments, 2013 [interactive]. [accessed on 11-10-
2014]. <http:// data.imf.org/?sk=7A51304B-6426-40C0-83DD-CA473CA1FD52>.
521 Security breaches, although resulting from fraud or violation of the law, can lead to bank defaults and 
as a consequence the bank can suffer direct losses. For instance, illegal internet hacker attack against 
a bank’s computer system, when hackers access and select the data relating to confidential customer 
information, in the absence of sufficient and adequate control. Ibid. P. 5.
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Credit risk. It is associated with various lending operations or non-performing 
loans522. This risk arises due to unforeseen circumstances which may occur due to the fact 
that the borrower (for instance, default on the part of borrowers or on bonds, guarantees, 
financial instruments) is no longer able to timely discharge their obligations523. Typically, 
this risk is limited by certain criteria, such as credit limit, the borrower’s loan qualification 
by creating reserves, etc.524. Therefore, banks should carefully assess and make sure in all 
cases whether their customers can and will be able to comply with debt commitments they 
have undertaken. This is not only in the interest of banks, but also in their customers’ in-
terest. In essence, in legal terms credit risk is associated with the duty of care, when banks 
are required to draw customers’ attention to the risks associated with banking products 
and services. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the risk of non-performing loans only 
cannot be fully avoided, as market conditions may change to the customers’ detriment 
and result their insolvency, or customers with housing loans may simply lose their job and 
become unable to duly fulfill their obligations towards the creditor. Typically, banks try 
to reduce this risk by pledging customer assets, obtaining various customer guarantees, 
credits from other sources to finance derivative instruments, etc. 
Reputational risk. It is associated with significant and negative public opinion on the 
activities of a certain bank, which may all together determine that the bank or its custom-
ers will suffer loss. Reputational risk consists of a number of actions that can lead to con-
tinuous adverse effects on the public image of any bank, its transactions or activities, such 
as its ability to build and maintain relationships with customers. Reputational risk may 
arise if bank actions cause massive loss of confidence, which most often manifests itself 
through the bank’s ability to perform their critical functions and continue operations. This 
risk may be associated with actions taken by the bank in response to third parties acting 
against the bank. Increased reputational risk is often the result of increased bank opera-
tional risks. Reputational risk may arise if the bank’s systems or products do not work as 
expected, or this phenomenon causes negative, spillover effects in the public. Both exter-
nal and internal cases of violation of bank protection requirements and attacks against the 
bank may affect the degree of public confidence in individual banks. Reputational risk also 
appears when bank customers are not adequately informed about and familiarised with 
services supplied by certain bank products and the conditions of their use. Errors, unlaw-
ful actions, service violations or violations of the bank’s internal rules, third-party fraud may 
also cause reputational risk to the bank (e.g., breaking into the bank’s computer systems 
or website can change the opinion of the financial market and the information related to 
the false information about bank products or its financial data can spread very quickly). 
Reputational risk may affect the banking system as a whole, and can also give rise to sys-
temic risk. 
Liquidity risk. One of the most significant banking risks, which may lead to bank 
failure and can be treated as one of the cornerstones triggering bank insolvency525. The 
522 Kauko K.External deficits and non-performing loans in the recent financial crisis. Economics Letters, 
Vol.115, No.2, Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost, 2012. P. 196-199. 
523 Gleeson S. Supra note 109. P. 8.
524 Aysun U. Bankruptcy resolution capacity and economic fluctuations. Journal of Macroeconomics Vol. 
40, 2014. US. P. 387-399.
525 See more 1 chapter 7 sec. 1 subsec.
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risk results from a defaulting bank, whereby it is unable to obtain the necessary financ-
ing in the market and to meet its obligations at maturity date526. Such a situation is often 
caused by the bank’s liabilities becoming lower than the bank’s assets (mainly the loans 
granted). Liquidity risk is the direct consequence of financial intermediation services and 
the related banking functions. At the same time, banks are trying to satisfy completely 
different interests of their customers, e.g. mortgage borrowers, real estate owners require 
legal certainty with regard to long-term mortgages, while in practice banks are willing to 
set a payment time limit of at least 30 years. Other bank customers reserve the possibility 
to withdraw their savings (e.g., deposits) from the bank on demand, that is why the with-
drawal rate of deposits or other savings on demand is very high. In other words, banks 
finance an excessively large number of illiquid assets in the long run, mostly in the form 
of loans, while liabilities are of a shorter term. Such a situation can accordingly result in 
various solvency problems for the banks after loosing confidence in the market. There-
fore, banks are required to form liquidity reserves in their balance sheet accounts, which 
are usually held at central banks or in the market in the form of readily released traded 
securities. This allows the bank to convert its assets into cash in a quick and secure man-
ner. In addition, banks may convert less liquid assets into additional financial resources 
held in the secondary market or by encumbering the assets to the central bank. Neverthe-
less, bank liquidity reserves are usually lower than bank liabilities payable on demand. 
Accordingly, if withdrawals exceed its liquidity reserves, a bank must be in a position to 
immediately raise its capital in the financial markets or, if this is not possible, to ask the 
central bank for support. In normal economic circumstances, the central bank is required 
to act as a lender of last resort527. It should also be emphasized that banks face market and 
price risks by reason of the marketable (easily liquidated in the market) securities held by 
them, such as bonds and ordinary shares (equity). Foreign currency transactions can lead 
to currency risks and impaired bank asset value. Banks arte also exposed to interest rate 
risks. This is because a disproportion of assets and liabilities of the bank exists in its bal-
ance sheet not only because of the liquidity schedule, but also because of the nature of the 
changing interest rate schedule. For example, the interest rate may vary considerably for 
savings deposits (it changes frequently), whereas in case of housing loans the interest rate 
is usually locked for a long number of years. 
Systemic risk. In global economic conditions characterized by a very well-developed 
capital movement, relations between banks play an important role. As mentioned above, 
because of their critical functions, banks are subject to a special prudential regulation. 
However, market participants distinguish more risky banks having a special status among 
ordinary banks. Such banks play a particular role because of their size (their transactions, 
activities, significance of responsibilities in different sectors of the economy), functions (in 
identifying whether bank products and services associated with systemically important 
banking services and products, or at least with particular categories of consumers, such 
as family, small and medium enterprises, government agencies and other banks), indis-
pensability of products and services (determining the principal customers, counterparties, 
creditors and debtors, their number, and the ability to cope with the collapse of one bank, 
526 Gleeson S. Supra note 113. P. 11.
527 Bonstra W.V.B. Supra note 84. P. 4.
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by substituting the insolvent bank with another counterparty within reasonable time)528. 
In the legal doctrine, banks performing systemically important functions are described 
as systemically important banks. Until the recent banking crisis, legal regulation of sys-
temically important banks was unclear. Essentially, it was difficult to define ex-ante, which 
bank can cause systemic risk, this question therefore deserves deeper scientific analysis. 
Systemic risk is primarily characterised by the fact that financial difficulties in one sys-
temically important bank can cause massive financial instability throughout the financial 
system529. In addition, systemic risk reflects the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine. However, financial 
difficulties faced by a certain bank have systemic effects in two cases: (i) if the bank itself 
is so large that its insolvency would lead to disruption of the market and of the economy as a 
whole; (ii) situations when risk of contagion appears530. 
The BCBS has defined the concept of systemic risk, by describing it in quantitative 
criteria: bank size, interconnectedness, substitutability (or infrastructure of the financial 
institution for the services that the latter supplies), international banking business in sev-
eral jurisdictions and complexity of the banks531. The Committee has defined systemic risk 
as the one when insolvency of one financial market participant could lead to the default of 
other market participants, disruptions of financial services, causing a chain reaction that 
leads to wider financial difficulties and domino effect532. In the event of that risk, financial 
difficulties experienced by one bank (financial institution) spread over a large number of 
other banks (financial institutions) or over the entire financial system533. By definition, 
systemic risk is unpredictable534. 
Scientific literature suggests several different definitions of systemic risk. First, sys-
temic risk is described as the risk or likelihood, manifesting in the eventual malfunctions 
of the entire system, in the form of an offsetting phenomenon with regard to the disor-
ders experienced by certain parts or individual elements of the financial system. Other 
researchers view systemic risk as the entirety of adequate macro-prudential535 and mi-
528 Djijkman. M., WB. A Framework for Assessing Systemic Risk. Policy Research Working Paper 5282, 
2010. P. 7-8. IMF. Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Monetary and Economics Department, 
Bank for International Settlements and the Secretariat of the Financial Stability Board. Guidance to 
Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Consider-
ations, 2009. P. 5-9.
529 Aglietta M., Scialom L. A systemic approach to financial regulation A European perspective. Economie 
internationale, No. 123, 2010. P. 32.
530 Hadjiemmanuil C. Supra note 79. P. 18.
531 These criteria are consistent and in compliance with the criteria identified in the reports of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the Basel International Payments Bank, and the Financial Stability Board. 
BCBS (2011). Global systemically important banks: Assesment Methodology and the additional loss 
absorbency Requirement. Consultative Document, Rules text, cover note, November. BIS, FSB, IMF. 
Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks. Progress Report to G20, 2011.
532 Ibid. P. 274.
533 Smaga. P. Supra note 509. P. 2-7.
534 Maino R. Tackling the „Too Big To Fail“ conundrum: Integrating market and regulation. LSE Financial 
Markets Group Paper Series. Special Paper No. 207, 2012. P. 2.
535 Such risk, which occurs suddenly, an unforeseen event that damages the financial system to the extent 
that economic activity in the wider economy is experiencing negative consequences.
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cro-prudential536 supervisory tools. They state that systemic risk is transferred by means 
of certain mechanisms, and thus in order to identify systemic risks, the channels of the 
systemic crisis need to be established first. Systemic crisis is determined by the identifica-
tion of bank insolvency by causa proxima, but also the mechanisms for transferring this 
knowledge both at national and international level. It should be noted that the new tech-
nologies have significantly increased the speed of information development with regard to 
the events related to the financial difficulties of the bank, because many financial activities 
and services are now supplied by automated computer systems. The increasing emergence 
of capital worldwide has triggered more active stock market trading, as well as financial 
futures markets and other financial markets537. The doctrine distinguishes four systemic 
risk components: (i) predominance of interbank systemic risk; (ii) systemic risk of pay-
ment systems; (iii) systemic risk of information transmission; (iv) psychological risk538. 
Systemic risk means a conjunction of bank default risk associated with bank liquidity, 
when the banking crisis that has started in a particular market or sector, or jurisdiction 
may spread to other markets, sectors and jurisdictions, and finally develop into a complex 
international financial crisis539. Some authors argue that any risk (interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange risk, credit risk, etc.) can transform into systemic risk, as it negatively affects and 
expands beyond the bank (financial institutions) , influences and/or affects other banks 
(financial institutions), often causing a ‘destructive’ domino effect in the money and set-
tlement system570. The latest technologies have increased the speed of communication, 
by disseminating information on the relevant events relating to the activities of one or 
another bank, e.g. many financial activities are now carried out through automated com-
puter systems540.
The EU legislation defines systemic risk or systemic crisis as ‘a disruption in the finan-
cial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal mar-
ket and the real economy. All types of financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure 
may be potentially systemically important to some degree;‘541. Systemic risk (crisis) gets 
the sense that it affects many credit institutions to obtain financing. So at the beginning 
of such a crisis there is a need to take steps to ensure that all credit institutions, which 
are otherwise solvent, have equivalent access to finance, in order to avoid problems with 
consequences for the whole economy. These measures include support for central banks to 
increase liquidity in the Member States and the guarantees for securities issued by solvent 
536 The probability that growing losses will increase or will be affected by a certain event, resulting from 
financial difficulties of several financial institutions.
537 The financial market is a market in which people issue and trade in securities. Securities are fungible, 
negotiable instruments that reflect certain financial value and are generally categorised as debt and 
property (capital) securities. In the financial markets, monetary funds come from trade surplus of 
those who buy the securities, to those who lack funds and who distribute new securities or sell exist-
ing securities. The financial market can be considered as a certain set of agreements that allows market 
trading. The breakdown of central financial markets is as follows: money market, bond market, capital 
market, derivatives market. Haan D.J., Oosterlo S., Schoenmaker D. Supra note 62. P. 65-104.
538 See more Schwarcz L.S. Systemick Risk. The Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 97, No. 1, 2008. P. 193-249.
539 Giovanoli M. Supra note 85. P. 6.
540 Ibid.
541 Directive 2014/59/EU. Art. 2 (30).
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credit institutions542. In a systemic risk situation, systemic damage can occur, for example, 
it can affect Member State confidence, financial services in the internal market and cred-
ibility. Therefore, avoiding such systemic risk and the respective stability of financial mar-
kets is one of the key conditions for the creation and operation of the internal market543. 
In the US legal system systemic risk is understood as an exceptional banking situa-
tion. This risk may lead to serious adverse consequences for the economic conditions or 
financial stability. In this case, the legal regulation allows derogation from the ‘least cost’ 
principle, if this helps reducing or avoiding systemic adverse consequences544. The follow-
ing criteria should be taken into account when identifying systemic risk: the size of the fi-
nancial institution and the financial conditions; sources of capital; operations in progress, 
especially those that may considerably impact financial stability, markets; if other financial 
institutions exist on the market that can provide services similar to those supplied by the 
failing entity; whether insolvency solutions of certain financial institutions will cause any 
negative consequences for the entire international market; whether the financial difficul-
ties faced by a financial institution and their resolution (i.e. the insolvency procedure to 
be selected) will not have potential consequences; the effect of the reicever’s appointment 
on consumers and the financial system, financial markets, banks and other financial in-
stitutions; whether solvency solutions of financial institutions will not result in significant 
negative liquidity problems for other banks or financial institutions545. After identifying at 
least one of those criteria or a set of them systemic risk can be determined. 
In the Swiss legal system, systemic risk is assessed in view of the size of the bank, links 
to the entire financial system and the economy, and the substitutability of the functions 
and services in short term. The following criteria are also relevant: market share of system-
ically important functions, the amount of insured deposits, especially the one exceeding 
the covered part, the ratio of the total assets of the bank and the annual Swiss GDP, bank 
risk profile, determined on the basis of its business model, balance sheet structure, asset 
quality, liquidity and leverage criteria546. 
1.7.1. Regulation of Systemically Important Banks. What’s New? 
Scientists and lawmakers still disagree and are inconsistent in addressing the extent to 
which systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) should be governed. Both sides 
agree on one point, namely that by reason of their size and/or complexity, insolvency of 
systemically important financial institutions causes much more severe consequences than 
the failure of a small financial institution547. It follows that SSIF insolvency procedures 
should be subject to different legal regulation. In addition, the latest banking crisis has 
highlighted that the insolvency belonging to a banking group can rapidly affect the sol-
542 BRRD. Recital (2).
543 Ibid. (3).
544 12 U.S.C. Section 1832(c) (4) (G). John B. Taylor, “Systemic Risk in Theory and in Practice,” in Ending 
Government Bailouts AsWe Know Them, 2010. P. 46.
545 Dodd-Frank. 203 (c) (2) chapter.
546 Swiss Banking law. Art. 8.
547 Lastra R.M. Supra note 74. P. 270.
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vency of the entire group or even cause systemic effects.548 The collapse of SIFI was one 
of the most important aspects of the recent financial crisis. SIFI insolvencies have caused 
massive losses for creditors and pushed the entire global economy down. Governmen-
tal intervention into distressed banks took two main forms: (i) governments used fiscal 
capital injections, state aid or financial stabilisation (sustainability) measures to save the 
banks, which was not standard practice in normal economic circumstances549; (ii) some 
governments publicly committed theirselves to prevent systemically important financial 
institutions from failing, i.e. to terminate their activities, by withdrawing their licenses and 
adopting an official decision on insolvency, and eventually to liquidate them for bankrupt-
cy and to eliminate the bank as a legal person from civil circulation. In this section, we will 
reveal the understanding of SIFI in the doctrine and positive law of different jurisdictions 
and at the end we will review some practical examples.  
Firs of all, the systemic importance of financial institutions arises due to the financial 
services and financial functions performed by these financial institutions for the general 
economy550. At the same time, SIFI supplies many other functions and services that are 
systemically irrelevant or may be replaced immediately and easily. There is no universally 
accepted legal definition of SIFI; this question therefore deserves an extensive scientific 
judgment. In a general sense, SIFI means any financial institution, when due to the par-
ticular importance of this institution, it is likely that public authorities will rescue the 
failing financial institution from insolvency and intervention will therefore become abso-
lutely necessary, in order to save the financial institution’s activities and to avoid significant 
negative and systemic exposure (risk) for the entire financial system, which is usually the 
case if an ordinary bankruptcy procedure is applied551. The word ‘systemic’ should be un-
derstood as systemic effect not only for the financial sector, but also for the real economy, 
and ultimately for the sovereign functioning of a country or even several countries. This 
definition lacks precision, but it has its advantages. Primarily because a common decision 
on bank insolvency problems and the future of the bank may be adjusted to the fact, on an 
ad hoc basis, after considering each situation individually. Supervisors or other competent 
authorities shall assess each situation individually, by determining what is a financial insti-
tution having a systemic effect, and which institutions fall outside this concept, and then 
choose the insolvency solution accordingly (depending on the evaluation of the bank’s 
assets at the time of intervention, inspection results, etc.). Second, this definition implies 
that insolvency problems of SIFI can be solved without taxpayer support (for example, us-
ing the financial assistance of the central bank as a lender of last resort), with no additional 
548 BRRD. Recital (14).
549 The main reason that induced government intervention was that systemic risk is not the risk that the 
bank itself can estimate, thus in the case of improper evaluation of the bank’s financial situation, this 
could cause the collapse of the entire market or the banking system. In addition, if the prudential 
requirements require banks to manage their own operational risks and to follow the developments on 
the market, it does not necessarily mean that a bank will consider and assess all the risks, particularly 
those with potential to cause wider adverse consequences for the entire financial system. IMF, BIS, 
FSB. Guidance to Asses the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: 
Initial Considerations-Background Paper, October 2009.
550 FINMA. Adressing „Too Big To Fail“. The Swiss SIFI Policy. Bern, 2011. P. 5.
551 Attinger J.B. Supra note 49. P. 8.
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legal regulation allowing better control of the financial institution. Third, some scientists 
believe that governments in all cases have more economic reasons to save the SIFI rather 
than directly liquidate it552. In the narrow sense, a more detailed analysis reveals that SIFI 
is an institution whose collapse could cause systemic risk, characterised by the risk of 
contagion, and therefore affect the failure of other credit institutions553. The likelihood 
of outspread or contagion may occur in the literal sense (arising from the fact that the 
collapse of one financial institution can lead to the losses of another financial institution 
linked to each other because of creditor relations). Exhaustion of capital automatically 
leads to losses, which may result in wider liquidity or bank capital failure. Indirectly, the 
risk of spreading is a situation whereby the insolvency of one bank may trigger a chain 
reaction554. Even if a particular financial institution causes no significant direct domino ef-
fect on other financial institutions, the collapse of the bank could encourage other market 
participants to re-estimate solvency risks of certain classes of financial institutions, espe-
cially in cases where this is related to any implicit or explicit bank guarantees555.
In the EU legal framework, systemically important banks are those exercising systemic 
and critical functions. Critical functions are defined in terms of activities, services and 
operations, the termination of which is likely to disrupt the provision of services that are 
critically important for the real economy, or the financial stability of one or more Member 
States by reason of the size of the financial institution or group, the market share con-
trolled by it, external or internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-border activities, 
in particular, having regard to the substitutability and extent of such activities, services or 
operations or their importance for the economy of the EU or of the respective Member 
State, also the importance556 of cross-border activity, and the interconnectedness of the 
credit institution or group and the financial system557. In addition, it must be noted that 
the EBA has published key guidelines on this issue, by specifying the SIFI criteria. At 
national level, SSFI shall defined within regard to the following criteria: size (all bank 
552 Ibid.
553 See more 1 chapter 6 sec. 1 subsec.
554 Whether a financial institution can be considered as systemically important, is generally determined 
by public authorities in the early intervention period. For example, in determining whether other 
financial institutions bear significant financial obligations in the distressed financial institution. When 
that fact is established, it implies that the collapse of the bank experiencing financial difficulties can 
lead to significant loss for other financial institutions’ capital and liquidity, and thus the chain reac-
tion of contagion. A good example was the insolvency case of the Bearn Stearns investment bank. 
In March 2008 The Federal Reserve decided to bail-out the bank by using public finances and to 
prevent the bankruptcy of the investment firm. Public authorities determined that the bank was too 
connected to fail and that the collapse would unavoidably lead to negative consequences for other 
banks. For this reason, the Federal Reserve gave a USD 30 billion loan (without the right of recourse) 
with illiquid security, ‘bad’ bank assets and securities. In the event of this extraordinary support, after 
granting state aid, JP Morgan Chase decided and agreed to buy Bearn Stearns.
555 The best illustration of this is the single money market funds. Prior to that, the prevailing myth was 
that single money market funds were equivalent to the size of deposits.
556 Means activities, services and operations provided to third parties and should not be determined from 
a merely internal perspective oriented at the business and organisation of the bank. EBA. Technical 
advice on the delegated acts on ccritical functions and core business lines. EBA/Op/2015/05. 2015. P. 6.
557 Directive 2013/36/EU. Art. 131, Art. 132 (3).
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assets), including the substitutability of the financial institution558, and the financial sys-
tem infrastructure (the value of local payment transactions, private sector deposits in the 
EU, loans to the private sector in the EU), complexity and trans-national activities (im-
plied value of derivative instruments, inter-jurisdictional obligations, inter-jurisdictional 
creditor claims), interconnection (interbank liabilities, interbank assets, outstanding debt 
securities)559. Thus, the content and information of the BRRD directive and its annexes 
places minimum requirements which, inter alia, apply to the banks of systemic impor-
tance, e.g. competent authorities are allowed to apply different or highly reduced require-
ments for particular credit institutions with regard to recovery and resolution plans560 and 
supervisory information, as well as in determining that updates –shall take place at least 
once a year. In addition, one of the main objectives of the Directive in applying an efficient 
conversion regime is to minimise the resolution costs of the failing credit institution for 
taxpayers and to ensure that credit institutions of systemic importance could be restruc-
tured without jeopardising financial stability. For example, this can be achieved using the 
bail-in measure, by securing that the shareholders and creditors of the failing institution 
suffer appropriate losses and cover the legally defined share of the costs triggered by its 
collapse. In all cases, when a bank faces solvency problems, the aim is to preserve systemi-
cally important functions of the respective credit institution as far as possible561.
In the Swiss legal system, a systemically important financial institution is defined as 
a bank, financial group and financial conglomerates dominated by banks, whose failure 
would cause significant damage to the Swiss economy and the Swiss financial system562. 
This definition requires that the bank conducts systemically important functions. A func-
tion is systemically important if it is necessary for the Swiss economy and is indispensa-
ble in the short term563. Such systemically important functions are payment transactions, 
deposit-taking business, securing access of business operators to liquid financing sources, 
lending business related to lending to entities, non-financial institutions, local housing 
loans564. The bank, as a company, is considered systemically important if it performs ser-
558 Associated with the ability to change the specific functions under similar conditions to a similar ex-
tent, with the same quality, at a reasonable cost. Compared to other market participants, within a 
reasonable period, thus avoiding disruption of the functions that are essential to the real economy and 
the financial markets. EBA. Supra note 555. P. 5.
559 EBA. Guidelines on the criteria to determine the conditions of application of Article 131(3) of Direc-
tive 2013/36/EU (CRD) in relation to the assessment of other systemically important institutions 
(O-SIIs). EBA/CP/2014/19, 2014. P. 4.
560 A resolution and recovery plan is prepared, if the operations of a credit institution form a significant 
share of that Member State’s financial system, where at least one of the following conditions is met: 
(a) the total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion, or (b) the ratio of its total assets over the GDP 
of the participating Member State of establishment exceeds 20%, unless the total value of its assets is 
below EUR 5 billion. BRRD. Art. 4(10).
561 BRRD. Recital (14), (67).
562 Swiss Banking law. Art. 7 (1). The definition is in compliance with IFS. IMF, BIS, FSB. Guidance to 
access the Systemic Importance of financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial consid-
erations, Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 2009 [interactive] [ac-
cessed on 05-04-2014]. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf> P. 5, 8.
563 Ibid. Art. 8, para 1.
564 Ibid. FINMA. Supra note 549. P. 6.
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vices that are relevant for the entire Swiss economy and that cannot be replaced by other 
market participants within a reasonable period. The same definition includes the following 
criteria: (i) systemically important lines of business, such as: deposits, loans, clearing, mar-
ket share; (ii) the value of existing deposits not covered by the deposit guarantee scheme; 
(iii) the ratio between the bank’s balance sheet and the GDP; (iii) bank risk profile565. In 
order to minimise the ‘too big to fail’ scenario, Switzerland newly created supplementary 
legal regulation to manage SIFI capital ratios and liquidity more effectively, to improve the 
internal management of the organisation, and the obligation to have a separate risk diver-
sification system in place566. For example, legal instruments to enhance capital and liquid-
ity facilitate the supervisory authority in conducting the resolution of the bank, whenever 
the latter faces financial difficulties, encourage bank managing bodies to reduce systemic 
risk and to limit the impact bank insolvency. Liquidity risk is mitigated by applying stress 
tests, using exceptional liquidity requirements for large banks, etc. 
In the US legal system, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protec-
tion Act has given extensive powers to the FDIC in order to mitigate the insolvency risks 
of systemically important financial institutions, endangering the financial stability of the 
US, by crossing the boundaries of general insolvency law, where necessary. Possibility to 
mitigate and resolve SIFI risks is a significant exception to the FDIC mission567. It should 
be noted that the Dodd-Frank Act provides no definition of the SSIFI concept. The term 
‘systemically important financial institution’ in the Dodd-Frank Act is used solely in two 
sections: 216 and 217. The systematic interpretation of those provisions must take into 
account the US Bankruptcy Code regulating insolvency of financial institutions. Like the 
FDIC, that term is most often used in the academic community or by experts, in particu-
lar in view of the fact that they are companies belonging to banking groups and holding 
more than USD 50 billion of consolidated bank assets or the entire non-bank financial 
institution, as established by the Federal Reserve Financial Stability in accordance with the 
relevant prudential standards provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act568. The answer to the 
question whether a financial institution is systemically important according to insolvency 
law, depends on a number of criteria: the size of financial institutions, financial leverage, 
nature of conducting transactions, relations with other financial institutions (especially, 
interconnectedness with other financial institutions operating in the same financial mar-
ket). It should also be considered whether other financial institution will be able to provide 
the services of the same type and level as those provided by the financial institution now 
in distress. In addition, the following criteria must be consistent with the Dodd-Frank 
legislative requirements of Chapter I, which determines duty of regulators to consider and 
assess when a financial institution is to be considered as ‘systemically important’, accord-
ing to the prudential regulatory requirements569. As mentioned above, the SSFI is subject 
to a new resolution regime based on the activity of the exceptional ‘Ordinary Liquidation 
565 Ibid.
566 Ibid. P. 6-19.
567 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Office of Inspector General. The FDIC’s Progress in Implement-
ing Systemic Resolution Authorities under the Dodd-Frank Act. Report No. AUD-14-001, 2013. P. 4.
568 Ibid. P. 36. 
569 Dodd-Frank. 113 chapter.
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Authority’ and the unique implementation of resolution functions with regard to systemi-
cally important financial institutions570. 
Finally, whilst banks conduct their activities on an international level, it is important to 
determine whether SSFI can be regarded as an internationally and systemically important 
financial institutiton571 (hereinafter - G-SSFI). The G-SSFI has three distinctive features. 
The first one is interconnectedness of financial institutions with another financial insti-
tution coming within the same banking group or falling outside the group framework. 
After determining such a relationship, it could be argued that this increases the risk of 
contagion and the negative impact of bank insolvency on the economy. Such interconnec-
tions reduce the potential of an individual and prevents them from instituting ordinary 
bankruptcy proceedings, notwithstanding combined connections with other companies 
of the banking group. After identifying such interconnections, it could be stated that this 
increases the risk of ‘contagion’ and the negative impact of bank solvency problems for the 
economy, accordingly specific regulation is needed. Such a interconnected links reduce 
the possibilities of starting ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, regardless of component in-
terfaces with other banks in the group. Therefore, there is a need to coordinate the failure 
impact on the other market participants’ interest. In the doctrine, this phenomenon has 
been described as ‘too interconnected to fail’. Another criterion is substitutability. Even 
a relatively small financial institution may prove vitally important for the functioning of 
the entire system, if it is unique, by providing underlying services that cannot be easily 
replaced by other market participants. The complexity of business models or the supply 
of the respective financial products is another important criterion. If these products are 
specific and can lead to financial difficulties of other market participants, by assessing the 
impact and possible outcomes of crisis situations, e.g. that the products of that bank have 
both psychological and practical consequences. This situation can easily cause a panic 
reaction in a given market, massive withdrawal of deposits, when the counterparties, the 
financial institutions having financial difficulties are unable to assess the risks arising from 
the emergency situation. In addition, some side effects could be distinguished: more ex-
tensive balance sheet, and higher financial leverage indicators. The liabilities of such banks 
often amount to extremely liquid financial products. Finally, such banks are conglomer-
ates with strong links between component companies, internationally accessible banks 
(staff), etc572. Since G-SSFI failure causes a significant threat to public finances and ulti-
mately the public interest, the problem of moral hazard is intense573. For this reason, these 
banks are not covered by standard bank insolvency law. All of these concerns aggravate the 
resolution procedure for such financial institutions and require special legal regulation for 
the proper management of systemically important banks in the time of crisis.
The particular problems of G-SIFI were raised to the international level to develop 
and apply comprehensive and conclusive solutions by combining the efforts of the gov-
ernments. Legal instruments for solving the main problems are identified in the following 
570 Dodd-Frank. Title II .
571 FSB. Progress in the Implementation of the G20. Recommendations. P. 2.
572 Sommer H.J. Special Issue: Large and Complex Banks. Economic Policy Review. Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. Vol.20, No.2, 2014. P. 3.
573 Attinger J.B. Supra note 49. P. 8-10.
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internationals documents: FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regime for Finan-
cial Institutions; BCBS Global Systemically Important Banks: Assesment Methodology 
and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement; FSB, Progress Report on Intensity and 
Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision. A wider analysis of resolution of these types of credit 
institutions and of the related problems is out of the study range. However, it should be 
noted that the lawmakers have addressed many of those problems through modern bank 
resolution regime, agreeing to the fact that international bank insolvency is a much more 
complex process than conventional businesses574. It should be noted that principally, in-
ternational regulatory guidelines recommended that national resolution authorities en-
gaged in an ex ante resolution impact assessment, in preparing recovery and resolution 
plans for G-SSFI, by creating inter - institutional, cross-border cooperation agreements. 
The FSB also recommended requiring more extensive and better loss absorption capacity 
and the relevant rules for the protection of capital. For instance, increasing requirements 
from 1 to 2.5% according to the risk-weighted assets of the total capital. It was also de-
cided that these institutions will be more intensively and strictly controlled by supervi-
sory authorities, by providing that the powers of resolution authorities will be exercised 
in a manner that allows derogation from the general principle of equality (pari passu) of 
creditors, treating the same classes of creditors in different ways, undertaking to apply 
the no creditor worse off than liquidation principle, with the right to compensation for 
shareholders, through the bail-in legal instrument, thereby increasing capital and liquid-
ity requirements of such institutions. It is assumed that these measures make it easier for 
the supervisory authority to restructure the bank facing financial difficulties, encourages 
the managing bodies of the bank to reduce systemic risks until the time when the bank 
is still in operation, etc.).
1.7.2. Why Banks Are not Allowed to Institute Ordinary Bankruptcy 
Proceedings? Doctrinal Reflections on the ‘Too big to fail’ 
The concept and legal regulation of SSFI correlates with the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine. The 
solution of problems faced by large and complex insolvent banks turned into a significant 
legal problem575. The main reason for this was that because of their large, systemically im-
portant banks, based on unconditional implicit government guarantees576, took excessive 
risks, which together with the lack of bank insolvency regulation led to the international 
574 Sommer H.J. Supra note 571. P. 14.
575 Kaufman G.G. Supra note 159. Abstract.
576 If the bank is experiencing serious financial difficulties, the Central Bank is often expected to assume 
the role of the ‘lender of last resort’, which traditionally performs the functions of the lender of last 
resort and emergency liquidity supply functions. It is expected from the lender of last resort, usually 
acting with the approval and active participation of the government, that the bank will be rescued 
with public finances. Legal acts often fail to regulate the price role of the lender of last resort. It is as-
sumed that such discretion is intentional, as the bank will not be able to calculate government support 
ex ante. Such an approach implies that the CB reserves the right to intervene in order to protect the 
stability of the financial system, but in general terms and without any abstract guarantees. It should be 
noted that the circumstances began to evolve together with the new bank insolvency paradigm. The 
CB carries out stress tests, and large banks have a duty to prepare recovery and resolution plans ex 
ante, etc. See more 3 chapter, 1 sec., 2 sub-sec.
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financial crisis in 2008-2009577. Many large banks took excessive risks and applied aggressive 
financial leverage system. In addition, banks were too much influenced by various specula-
tions in the financial markets. Such a situation has led to the accumulation of barely manage-
able bank risks in bank accounting. Finally, the solutions to bank solvency problems were 
guaranteed with taxpayers’ money, or, in other words, with the money of the state where the 
bank was located. If the bank operated in a number of countries (a branch, a subsidiary), 
the bank’s risk-taking activities were partly guaranteed by several governments. This ‘eas-
ily’ obtained financial support mainly reflected the macroeconomic and financial stability 
objectives of the governments578. Such governmentally-secured unconditional guarantees to 
banks resulted in the ‘too important to fail’ doctrine, preventing the initiation of bankruptcy 
proceedings and liquidation for banks on account of highly probable negative consequences 
for the economy. These large and complex banks were simply too big to be closed down and 
subjected to normal bankruptcy procedures. A legitimate question then arises, whether cer-
tain financial institutions must be treated exclusively and legislators may treat them in an ex-
ceptional manner, preventing the ‘failure’, i.e. winding up of systemically important and most 
complex institutions? Due to the limited scope of this study, we will only reveal the principal 
aspects of this doctrine necessary for the subsequent analysis of the bank resolution regime. 
Reasons supporting the genesis of the ‘too big that fail’ doctrine could be highlighted. 
First of all, as discussed above, costs of bank insolvency de jure exceed the average costs 
incurred by other corporate bodies in case of insolvency579. Second, the state, taking into 
account the particular circumstances of the financial system, may prevent banks from 
launching direct liquidation procedures in some instances580, as the bank’s collapse could 
577 The doctrine has evolved due to lack of legal regulation of banking activities: (i) lending powers and 
eligible bank investment expanded; (ii) access to debt and equity-based financing evolved, especially 
in economic upturn periods; (iii) the asset market prices noticeably escalated; (iv) market participants 
started massive selling of fixed assets; (v) when property prices were falling throughout the market, 
the number of bank default cases increased as well, which undermined the confidence of depositors 
and creditors in banks, and the risk of a systemic crisis emerged; (vii) the TBTF doctrine was devel-
oped in order to avoid a systemic crisis. Moosa A. The Myth of Too Big to Fail. Palgrave Macmillan, 
Great Britain, 2010. P. 22.
578 One of the main reasons is the trend to manage banking risks and increase the impact on their lever-
age, giving unconditional public financial support guarantees. Such guarantees are supplied by the 
government to the bank, regarded as too important for creditors to be liquidated. Such banks were 
able to obtain much cheaper funding in the market and, therefore, grow faster than the other financial 
institutions. They had fewer incentives than other financial institutions to protect against banking 
risks. Banks and creditors of the respective banks were aware that if they were sufficiently important 
to the economy or the rest of the financial system and if they encountered financial difficulties, the 
government was to protect them with a guarantee.
579 K. Alexander. Supra note 79. P. 64-65.
580 One of the reasons is the interconnectedness between banks. Once a bank is not allowed to fail, the mar-
ket creates expectations, inter alia, related to political risk. When financial difficulties are faced by a bank 
operating on the same market, the state is automatically facing high pressure to prevent the bank from 
becoming insolvent. Such situation is also associated with time scheduling criteria, as the benefits related 
to bank liquidation procedures (thus sweeping the entire banking system) become apparent only in the 
future, and the costs (financial destabilisation and voter excitement) are inevitable in the current mo-
ment. Therefore, first of all, bank failure or likelihood of failure should be anticipated as soon as possible. 
This is important since even the well-planned actions for addressing bank insolvency problems will face 
adverse reaction both in the market and among depositors. Furthermore, the implementation of the 
136
lead to negative consequences for the entire functioning of the real economy581. Third, in 
the absence of a bank resolution regime that would effectively regulate bank resolution, 
the competent authorities are obliged to undertake intervention measures582 with regard 
to the bank on an ad hoc basis. In this case, it is very likely that taxpayers will face the 
burden, and additional, significant financial risks will arise. Therefore, the ‘too big that 
fail’ problem was one of the main reasons that encouraged the appearance of the resolu-
tion regime for failing or likely to fail banks, and thus this is the ultimate solution to this 
problem583. Finally, it should be highlighted that until the recent banking crisis the ad 
hoc intervention of competent authorities could sometimes stabilise the situation of the 
distressed bank and the banking system in the short term, but in the long term, such inter-
vention costs could become very costly. The reasons for this are rather plain. It is difficult 
to imagine a state that fails to respond to the banking crisis (insolvency of one or several 
banks) that threatens the entire national economy threatens, as this phenomenon, other-
wise known as moral hazard584, can lead to negative consequences not only for the banking 
industry, but also for future generations, after a significant increase in national fiscal costs.
The concept of ‘too big to fail’ is not new and has been extensively analysed by 
foreign researchers585. However, the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine remains a rather ambigu-
bank resolution plan and of the respective resolution tools is a complex process, with many positive at-
tributes. One of them is that, in case of bank resolution, and not straight liquidation, bank creditors are 
more confident about the safety and security of their investments and the level of risk attributable to the 
bank’s conduct. In addition, in theory it is possible that the market can manage to prepare for such bank 
transformation and creditor and bank resolution will not require taxpayers’ money. It became evident 
after establishing a new legal regime for bank resolution. At the same time, bank resolution through 
public finances can spread the ‘contagion effect’ among creditors and especially large depositors. Finally, 
only bank rescue will not solve the systemic crisis. When the country’s payment and settlement system 
as the basic infrastructure of the modern economy is under threat, the government is indirectly obliged 
to act and take action to rescue the bank. Not because it is desirable, but in view of the fact that other 
alternatives would prove much worse. Barth. A, Schnabel. I. Why banks are not too big to fail – evidence 
from the CDS market. Economic Policy, Vol. 28, No.74, 2013. P. 335-369.
581 BIS. 2012. 82nd Annual Report. 1 April 2011- 31 March 2012, Basel, Switzerland, June 24. P. 75-76.
582 For example, in the EU, especially in the eurozone, direct government intervention by applying finan-
cial sustainability measures, providing guarantees or asset relief measures or bank recapitalisation was 
adopted in accordance with the state aid rules. State aid generated considerable costs. From 2008 to 
2012, 75% of all the state aid (about EUR 4 trillion) in the EU was allocated to the eurozone countries. 
Valiante D. Supra note 5. P. 9-12.
583 Tucker P. Supra note 92. P. 2.
584 Since ordinary bankruptcy procedures are considered as too expensive by competent authorities, 
bankruptcy (direct liquidation of the bank) is regarded as posing a threat to the financial system. 
However, in the absence of other bank resolution options, public working capital (equity) injection is 
the only option, even though it causes enormous moral hazard and reduces market discipline. Empiri-
cal studies confirm that the banks that expect to obtain public support hold lower amounts and sub-
stantial equity capital on their balance sheet, compared with the total assets of medium-sized banks. 
Public support expectations reduce market discipline. In accordance with Basel III requirements, this 
situation may force banks to seek for better counter-cyclical capital buffers. Nier E. Cihak M. Supra 
note 15. Public Support and Moral Hazard. P. 7-9. FSB. Recommendations and Time Lines. Reducing 
the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions, 2010.
585 Elijah B., Jagtiani J. How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically 
Important? Springer Science, Business Media, LLC, 2011. Strahan, P.E. Too big to fail: causes, conse-
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ous legal concept not defined in law586. This legal phenomenon is easier to identify 
ex post than ex ante587. It is essential to distinguish the components of this doctrine 
principally because special bank resolution regime is one of the solutions to this prob-
lem and also in order to see whether this theory can reduce the losses caused by bank 
insolvency to the related stakeholders588. The essence of the TBTF is to avoid massive 
deposit withdrawals from banks without destabilising the economy. By reason of such 
financial institutions (determined ex ante), the TBTF banks will experience greater 
benefit than their competitors, whose debts are unsecured ex ante and who are there-
fore encouraged to engage in additional risk taking. It seems that Barth R.J. offered 
the most accurate definition of the TBTF. According to him, the TBTF is a situation, 
which at different times, in different jurisdictions and in different economic conditions 
protects both insured and uninsured depositors, bank guarantees, insured risky assets, 
depreciation of collateral, providing liquidity to the bank for exclusively long periods, 
by using public capital injections and thereby benefiting the shareholders of the bank, 
as otherwise the bank would collapse589.
In the banking sector, the ‘too big to fail’ ‘doctrine has some equivalents, such as: ‘too 
big to liquidate’, ‘too big to be closed’, ‘too complex to fail’, ‘too interconnected to fail’. Each 
of the terms used reciprocally reflects different causes for bank insolvency and bank reso-
lution. The fundamental objectives of the doctrine are the following: (i) reducing the likeli-
hood of bank insolvency (bankruptcy procedure); (ii) accommodating the state and the 
quences, and policy responses. Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 5, 2013. P. 43-61. Acharya 
V.V., Beck T. Evanof D.D. etc. Too big to Fail or Just Too Big? (in) the Social Value of the Financial 
Sector. World Scientific Studies in International Economics, 2013. P. 377-400; Brento M. Too big to 
fail-too big to manage. LSE Financial Markets Group Paper Series. Special Paper No. 191, 2010.
586 Kaufman G.G. Supra note 159. P. 214-223.
587 Seelig S. Too big to fail: a taxonomic analysis. (in) Edt. Gup B. Too Big To Fail: Policies and Practisies. 
Praeger Publishers. P. 219-230.
588 In order to better understand the TBTF problem and the related risks, one needs to analyse the risks 
assumed by private creditors lending to a financial institution. They face two main risks of losses: (i) 
the possibility that the bank experiencing financial difficulties will require intervention of the compe-
tent authorities or even government intervention; (ii) potential losses caused by interference. Losses 
may depend on the risk profile of bank assets, bank leverage and liquidity, in other words, a classic 
credit analysis. Bank recovery and/or resolution also results in certain risks to private creditors. If it 
is acknowledged that the competent authorities will always intervene and protect creditor from direct 
liquidation (bankruptcy) of a financial institution, then the creditors’ losses arising from government 
intervention will amount to zero. In this case, creditors will experience zero risk. If the competent 
authority fails to protect creditors from bank insolvency and will decide not to apply bail-out, then it 
is likely that creditors will suffer losses due to bank insolvency, and the risk and losses to creditors will 
reach such level as required by the insolvency procedure. Market expectations with regard to possible 
resolution of the bank are much higher than in the case of bank rescue with public finances, which 
often occurs very swiftly. Therefore, if the government decides to bail-out a bank, the market would 
panic because of the expectation that it had already created. In this context, intervention is under-
stood as actions undertaken by the supervisory authority: (i) intended to rescue the financial institu-
tion (e.g., through the injection of new capital) in order to keep it functioning; (ii) concerned with the 
adoption of a decision on the resolution of the financial institution (e.g., by transferring deposits or 
creating a bridge bank).
589 Barth R.J. Just how big is the too-big-to-fail problem? Journal of Banking Regulation Vol. 13, No. 4. 
Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 2012. P. 266.
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competent authorities with legal measures to effectively address the insolvency of systemi-
cally important financial institutions, without using taxpayer support590.
The central aspect of the doctrine is that in certain situations, from a practical view-
point, competent authorities may be determined to ensure higher protection for all or 
some depositors or different groups of bank creditors, compared to the others, which is to 
mitigate the worst case scenario. Such a decision at least partially depends on the economic 
damage to be incurred, including advanced risk, the effect for other banks operating in the 
same environment, considering the lost value of creditor claims held by certain depositors 
and other creditors in the case of bank insolvency. Therefore, the ‘too big to fail’ regime 
must first identify the entire banking sector and the potential effects for the latter, and then 
quantify indirect social harm. Another step is identifying the bank’s counterparties, taking 
into account the categories of creditors potentially exposed to significant losses. Finally, 
following the cost and benefit analysis, the competent authorities will decide whether to 
grant public support for the most vulnerable groups of bank creditors (private interests) 
in order to protect public interest, including the entire banking sector and the economy591.
During the recent financial crisis, a substantially similar approach was followed in ad-
dressing bank insolvency issues both in the case of collapse of significant financial institu-
tions, which automatically used to spread fear in the market due to financial ‘contagion’592, 
and in the event of failure of traditionally-sized banks. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
‘too big to fail’ doctrine is associated with the above-mentioned systemic risk. On the 
other hand, this doctrine refers to the fact that the bank is too big to be wound up with 
all the ensuing negative consequences593. In addition, if a systemically important financial 
institution faces insolvency problems, it is likely to cause an adverse domino effect, when a 
number of other financial institutions could collapse, causing extreme damage to the real 
economy as a whole. Due to such potential consequences, the state cannot and will not 
allow a financial institution to fail. On the contrary, the state will be forced to bail-out the 
distressed bank through public finances, performing additional capital injections or giv-
ing loans and guarantees from public finances594. Eventually, several legal problems were 
identified in relation to the doctrine. First, in the absence of an effective bank resolution 
regime, the financial difficulties encountered by a financial institution could most often 
be addressed only by means of negotiations, indirect pressure and by concluding private 
contracts, the formal acts of public law being unnecessary595. Second, conceivably the most 
590 Tucker P. Supra note 92. P. 2.
591 Kaufman G.G. Supra note 159. P. 12.
592 See more 1 chapter 5 sec. 3 sub-sec.
593 Rolef W. Too Big to fail as a Game of Chicken with the State: What Insolvency Law theory Has to Say 
About TBTF and Vica Versa. European Business Organization Law Review. Vol., 14. No.2, 2013. P. 
202.
594 Ibid.
595 When highly complex, large financial institutions were confronted with financial difficulties, their fate 
was regularly determined not by stringent application of legal or regulatory insolvency rules, which 
accordingly could result in the revocation of the relevant bank license or liquidation procedure, but by 
hasty acquisitions and mergers, different restructuring and refinancing schemes, often initiated by the 
ministry of finance or the Central Bank of a certain country. In most cases, this kind of intervention 
by public authorities involved private sector competitors of a failing financial institution. Hadjiem-
manil C. Supra note 79. P. 5.
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visible problem is that application of public finances to maintain a private financial institu-
tion in turn weakens the fiscal position of the state596. Another indirect issue is concerned 
with moral hazards and market distortions caused by implicit state guarantee.
Other sections of the dissertation will explore the successes and failures of the bank 
resolution regime in solving these problems in more detail. It is important to note that 
before the new paradigm of bank insolvency law, it is difficult to find examples of large, 
systemically important bank failures at the expense other than consumers’ (taxpayers’) 
costs. On the contrary, many examples show that banks were rescued with the assistance 
of the state or the society, i.e. taxpayers’ money. This presumption is explained by the fact 
that due to its particular size, the bank may simply be too big to undergo ordinary bank-
ruptcy and be involved in immediate liquidation procedures. In essence, this means that in 
the event of collapse too many depositors would encounter inevitable losses and the bank 
is too big for the deposit insurance fund to be able to make cash payments to depositors 
without delay under deposit guarantee schemes, while the state would assume all the nega-
tive consequences of the failing bank. In addition, in certain situations several financially 
interconnected banks may also approach the insolvency threshold. Such a phenomenon 
can lead to even larger-scale banking crises in the market. The objective of the TBTF is the 
maximum protection of the insolvent bank’s creditors (including its shareholders) against 
the losses they would incur if bank insolvency problems were addressed through bank-
ruptcy. In this case, the shareholders of the bank retain control over the bank manage-
ment597 and the protection is funded by a third party. In the case of an intervention, bank 
capital is still positive, and therefore the bank is not declared insolvent de jure and thus 
depositors and other creditors remain adequately protected against potential losses.
1.7.3. Case Study
1.7.3.1. The Swiss Approach
Two Swiss banks (namely UBS and Credit Suisse) are considered as systemically im-
portant for financial stability at the international level598. Both banks are treated as Glob-
ally Systemically Important Financial Institutions. After the recent financial crisis, a de-
cision was made to produce new legislative measures that would facilitate inter alia the 
reliability and resilience of these systemically important banks during banking crises and 
ensure financial stability.
The Swiss Government and the Swiss National Bank were required to deal with the 
distress problems of the UBS bank. The bank had the ‘too big to fail’ status. In 2007 UBS 
was the world leader in asset management services, one of the largest investment banks in 
the US, also a leader in retail and wholesale trading, and the largest commercial bank in 
Switzerland. Although it was hard to believe, but after the US Government failed to rescue 
the systematically significant investment bank Lehman Brothers by public finances and it 
was forced to initiate bankruptcy, on 15 September 2008 the Swiss Federal Banking Com-
596 Dewatripont M., Freixas X. Supra note 463.
597 Kaufman G.G. Supra note 163. P. 2.
598 FINMA. Supra note 550. P. 5.
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mission, in close consultation with the Swiss National Bank, called the two largest Swiss 
banks – UBS and Credit Suisse – to take immediate steps to increase their capital base. 
The requirement was based on the necessity to ease the financial markets and to maintain 
the financial strength of those banks and to prevent their de jure insolvency. Credit Suisse 
started reducing its commitments prior to market developments in the US, and managed 
to additionally collect CHF 10.4 billion capital from private investors and maintain the 
Basel Tier 1599 level 633 capital requirement, which was around 10%. UBS failed to achieve 
the same, which is why on 16 October 2008 the Federal Banking Commission announced 
a bank rescue600 and recovery plan, consisting of two main parts. First, the government 
provides CHF 6 billion Tier-1 share capital for UBS601 (recapitalisation), and the central 
bank buys illiquid assets of the bank worth up to USD 60 billion. The main legal problem 
faced by the Central Bank was that the government was not directly vested with a legal 
obligation to issue guarantees to each systemically important bank. Despite debt relief and 
write-off measures, both banks remained adequately capitalised even according to Swiss 
standards, which always required higher capital reserves than international standards.
Another real risk was related to almost complete loss of liquidity in most markets 
and increased difficulties in financing the related operations. Ultra-tight interbank money 
markets, depositor concerns and short-term lender anxiety threatened with bank closure, 
i.e., by initiating its ordinary bankruptcy procedure with an unacceptable level of risk. The 
liquidity reserves of the UBS bank were exhausted very soon. On 30 September 2008 UBS 
wrote off bad debts worth USD 48.2 billion of assets, which made the bank even more 
vulnerable. Among other things, the management methods of the bank’s governing bodies 
were also highly questionable.
Another important problem was related to short-term financing. Public guarantees 
and additional distribution of bonds was not considered as an acceptable bank restruc-
turing option. To maintain competitive neutrality, identical rescue/recovery packages 
were offered to both UBS and Credit Suisse. Both banks were seeking to avoid state aid 
and attempted, in particular, to appeal to private investors. Credit Suisse successfully 
lifted its capital level by CHF 10.4 billion in cooperation with several other large institu-
tional investors. UBS was unable to attract additional capital. As a result, the Swiss Cen-
tral Bank carried out innovative intervention by recapitalising the bank, while acting as 
a lender of last resort. The Central Bank has developed and funded a ‘stabilisation fund’ 
of USD 60 billion602. The operating conditions of the Fund and the founding contract 
stated that the fund was permitted to buy back up to 60 billion of illiquid UBS assets, 
consisting mainly of: residential and commercial mortgage loans, commercial (housing) 
599 Tier 1 bank capital consists of ordinary shares and non-distributed profits of the bank, minus adapt-
able arrangements, such as the impairment of the carrying amount of goodwill impairment, i.e., rec-
ognized as expenses. The equity capital of a corporation is a classic concept. It consists of preferred 
shares and other financial instruments that meet the regulatory criteria. The last objective of tier 1 
capital is to ensure that it will cover losses until the bank is solvent. 
600 Since Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the bank resolution definitions are different from the EU 
and US, and the term ‘recovery’ is used instead of ‘rescue’.
601 Drechel B.S.D. Supra note 39. P. 99-100.
602 Panetta F., Faeh T., Grande G. etc. BIS. An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes. BIS 
Papers No. 48, 2009. P. 22.
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mortgage-backed securities, securitised student loans and other asset-backed financial 
instruments, single-type securities, etc. USB assets were redeemed on 30 September 2008 
at book value, which decreased after UBS wrote off part of its debt, based on the value 
determined by independent experts. Each cash transfer to the stabilisation fund was to 
be financed with additional 10% UB capital contribution. The remaining 90% were ob-
tained from the Swiss National Bank in the form of loan secured by UBS assets. The loan 
was issued for a period of 8 to 12 years using the same financing conditions as for other 
UBS mortgage-based loans. The loan was granted with variable monthly interest based 
on LIBOR, which was accordingly related to national currency plus 250 basis points603. 
As a limited liability entity, the stabilisation fund had no shareholder equity. According 
to the operating conditions of the fund, an entity with unlimited civil liability was to be 
established under Cayman Islands law. UBS contributed 10% of additional capital for 
each property transfer to the fund, in accordance with the benefits formula, i.e. a forward 
repurchase transaction.
After the Swiss National Bank fully financed the loan, the repurchase transaction al-
lowed UBS to repurchase the stabilisation fund for USD 1 billion, by granting the right to 
50% capital gain. In other words, UBS assumed the first 10% of losses resulting from the 
fund. The founding contract of the Fund stated that if the fund eventually earned profit, 
UBS was entitled to half of it, which amounted to more than USD 1 billion. In addition, 
the National Bank supplied a state guarantee by means fo UBS shares for a total of CHF 
100 million. An interesting aspect of the recovery procedure of this bank is related to 
the decision-making mechanism according to the Swiss legal system. Neither the Fed-
eral Constitution, nor the federal law give the government an explicit right to participate 
directly or indirectly in providing capital to banks. Such decisions require a resolution 
adopted and approved by the Parliament by means of an ordinary legislative proposal. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Assembly (Parliament) meets only four times a year, as it is not 
a professional parliament. Moreover, in any case, the bank rescue plan could not be dis-
cussed in public. Expedition and finality of the recapitalisation transaction were the essen-
tial factors guaranteed by the Swiss Constitution, and the government therefore adopted a 
decree that was legally based on emergency powers. The decree was based on Article 184 
of the Swiss Constitution entitled ‘Foreign Relations’, which allows the government to act 
whenever “the need to ensure national interests’ arises. The decree was also concerned 
with Article 185 of the Swiss Constitution relating to the provisions governing ‘internal 
and external national security’ and authorising the government to adopt resolution if ‘the 
state is in imminent danger or a threat to public policy or internal and external protec-
tion arises’604. Another unusual aspect of the bank rescue was the fact that, unlike other 
jurisdictions, the state did not make direct purchase of the bank’s shares, but was acting 
through mandatory convertible notes transaction, which is mainly linked to and based on 
capital instruments that can never be redeemed before maturity using cash, although they 
 
603 To finance the loan, the Swiss National Bank intentionally applied the first currency swap method at 
first, in cooperation with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In February 2009 the issue of short-
term Swiss National Bank treasury bills denominated in the US dollars and with a maturity of less 
than one year started.
604 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 (Status as of 18 May 2014).
142
relate to the legal nature of the bank’s shares in some respects605. Finally, it should be noted 
that after the fund had bought illiquid UBS assets worth USD 38.7 billion, at the end of 
the financial crisis, the stabilisation fund managed to successfully liquidate a significant 
part of the bank’s assets on the open market. The government was interested in reselling 
its UBS market share. The initial public offer of convertible securities ended on 9 June 
2009. Since UBS was in the process of distributing new shares, the government agreed to 
further allocation of the publicly available assets and no longer waited. On 19 August 2009, 
based on the stabilisation fund contract, the securities were converted into UBS shares. 
Then the shares were sold to institutional investors for CHF 5.4 billion, by accelerating 
the accumulated profit by means of private placement. Then UBS redeemed shares at their 
nominal price and compensated the existing inequality, which amounted to 1.8 billion. 
This respectively led to USD 1.2 billion gains for the public sector606. 
1.7.3.2 The US Approach
Lehman Brothers
It was an internationally operating non-bank financial company, which consisted of 
2985 legal entities operating worldwide. From the middle of 2007 to the middle of 2008 
Lehman Brothers faced severe financial difficulties. The financial difficulties were deter-
mined by large asset positions in the mortgage loan market and other lower securitised 
loan and housing loan segments607. On 15 September 2008 the competent US authorities 
adopted resolutions and ordered the mother (parent) holding company Lehman Brothers 
to file an application for bankruptcy proceedings against the bank under Chapter 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code. Secondly, Lehman had debts of around USD 613 billion and assets 
worth USD 639 billion. It was the largest bankruptcy in the US history. First of all, the 
insolvency of Lehman Brothers revealed negative impact on financial leverage-based608, 
mainly short-term financing. Lehman Brothers had considerable assets in real estate prod-
ucts, most of the transactions were financed by leveraged financial funds, especially in 
tripartite repo markets. Another problem was that the bank’s share price was overrated by 
credit rating agencies647. According to the initial scenario to address the bank’s solvency 
problems, it should have been bought by the Korean national Development Bank, and later 
purchased by Barclays and Bank of America. However, the transactions did not take place. 
Before applying for insolvency proceedings, the bank group was divided and sold to differ-
ent legal entities. The main problem in deciding on the insolvency strategy was that Leh-
man Brothers, like other investment banks, fell outside the scope of legal regulation gov-
erning commercial banks. This situation highlighted the importance of having an effective 
bank resolution regime that would also apply to large financial institutions operating in 
605 See more Thevenoz L. The Rescue of UBS by the Swiss Confederation. (in) Giovanoli, M., Devos, 
D. International Monetary and Financial Law – The Global Crisis. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010. P. 378-391.
606 Ibid.
607 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Supra note 28. Report. P. 324-344.
608 In 2007, the financial leverage was 1 to 31. This made the bank very vulnerable even in the case of 
small decreases in the mortgage market.
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several countries. Another problem was related to the need of an emergency fund, which 
would provide liquidity to banks. In addition, the bank was supervised by the securities 
commission, which later prevented proper cooperation of different national supervisory 
authorities, especially when conducting insolvency procedures in accordance with differ-
ent national rules. For example, Lehman Brothers holding group applied for bankruptcy 
of the UK branch in the US and PricewaterhouseCoopers was appointed as its bankrupt-
cy administrator, whereas judicial reorganisation procedures were initiated against the 
Japanese branch. It became apparent that the harmonization of insolvency laws would 
help promptly restoring public confidence and reducing the adverse side effects. Another 
special feature of these insolvency proceedings was that the banking group successfully 
avoided financial brokerage exemptions when applying for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy 
Code excluded financial brokers (investment firms) from the scope of Chapter 11, subject-
ing them to the provisions of Chapter 7. However, Lehman Brothers was able to convince 
the court that the holding company should be subject to the provisions of Chapter 11, and 
financial brokerage branches must be promptly sold to Barclays with all their operations. 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers had a prompt adverse effect on creditor expecta-
tions in the financial market. This was based on a previous example in the market, when 
the government decided to rescue Bear Stearns investment bank in March 2008. In ad-
dition, in September 2008 the government initiated strengthening of the capital (recap-
italisation) of the Fannie Mae bank. In the case of Lehman Brothers, the investors and 
creditors had a natural interest to protect themselves from systemically important bank 
failure at any cost. This created an expectation and they started demanding government 
protection for creditors. The market situation was even further confused by the publicly 
financed restructuring of the Washington Mutual bank on 25 September 2008. At that 
time, new issues arose as to whether banks should be rescued with public finances due to 
their systemic importance. The Government nevertheless decided to solve the financial 
problems of this extremely large bank (with more than USD 300 billion of assets and close 
to USD 200 billion of deposits, 2,200 branches in fifteen different states), in accordance 
with the principle of least cost and least expensive bank resolution method609, as defined 
and regulated by the US Deposit Insurance Agency’s insurance legislation and other bank 
insolvency regulation. This adjusted method of bank resolution caused massive losses to 
unsecured senior creditors649. Finally, JP Morgan bought the insured deposits of Wash-
ington Mutual Bank and a part of assets and liabilities of the insured bank branches at a 
public auction conducted by the FDIC. The auction bidder paid a contribution of USD 1.9 
billion. After diversifying the bank into good and bad bank, the bad part was left with the 
parent holding company’s assets and liabilities, such as unprotected depositors (uninsured 
bank branches operating at loss, including uninsured deposits) whose claims exceeded 
the amount of USD 100 000. At that time this was quite an unexpected choice of the bank 
insolvency strategy, because potential losses caused concern to market participants, espe-
cially senior creditors, and forced investors to be involved and well analyse the situation of 
609 The US legal system establishes two approaches of the ‘least costs’ principle. The FDIC is always 
obliged to choose a bank resolution strategy that would minimise the costs falling for the FDIC to the 
maximum possible level. Any deviation from this principle requires the consent of the fiscal authori-
ties.
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the market before investing and depositing financial instruments and funds to distressed 
banks.
In the financial market, the case of insolvency of Lehman Brothers triggered massive 
overestimation of government actions undertaken for rescuing distressed banks. It be-
came evident that the state could not be able or willing to address solvency problems of a 
distressed bank in all cases, particularly in the case of the largest, systemically important 
banks. It was clear that the existing legal regulation was insufficient to effectively deal with 
insolvency problems of large, systemically important banks. As a result, the market expe-
rienced a number of adverse effects. Banks lost their liquidity in the market, while stock 
prices on the last weeks of September 2008 dropped significantly. The financial panic and 
the ensuing risk of financial ‘contagion’ forced consumers to reduce their borrowing costs 
and led to the fact that companies, in order to avoid bankruptcy, significantly reduced 
their investments, stocks and staffing. In addition, different countries were exposed to the 
debt deflation cycle and the real economy shrinked sharply651. One of the key moments 
to resolve the existing situation was related to the review of the legal regime governing 
banking restructuring. Among other things, there was a severe need to create regulatory 
methods that could effectively deal with, inter alia, SIFI and G-SIFI problems. Preven-
tive regulation of SIFI activities was equally important to eliminate or minimise the risks 
posed by such banks. 
1.7.3.3. The EU Approach
Northern Rock
The exclusive feature of this bank was that it grew very quickly. For instance, in 1997, 
the bank’s assets amounted to GBP 15.8 billion, while at the end of 2006 they amounted 
to GBP 101 billion. The bank was mainly focusing on the issue of traditional mortgage 
loans. Another unique feature of the bank consisted in its liabilities and their structure. 
The bank used the extreme financing model through asset securitisation, i.e. by issuing 
asset-covered bonds to finance lending, including lending for all wholesale markets. This 
resulted in the dependence on the wholesale market, which was an exclusive feature of 
Northern Rock, compared to other banks operating in the UK. While the number of 
retail depositors was increasing in parallel, it should be emphasized that this increase 
was not as fast as that of wholesale funding used for long-term borrower activities. Asset 
securitisation essentially meant that large quantities of mortgage-backed securities could 
be refinanced each year. Therefore, the bank was marked by an extreme funding model 
and significant broad financing gaps (the difference between loans and depositors)610. 
In order to finance the loans it has granted, the bank was dependent on the capital mar-
kets. The scheme worked perfectly in calm economic environment. However, when the 
world faced the subprime crisis leading to stagnation in the credit market, the bank faced 
liquidity problems, especially in collecting cash to refinance its business based on short-
term funding. In September 2007 the bank received liquidity support from the Central 
610 Hyun S.S. Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the Global Financial Crisis. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2009. P. 101-119.
145
Bank of England611. Despite this Central Bank guarantee, the bank’s customers, espe-
cially depositors, gathered outside the branches claiming for their deposits and savings612. 
These actions were determined by two major factors. First, the depositors realised that if 
the withdrawal of deposits will continue, the bank will ultimately lose its going concern 
capability. Second, the society began to escalate the issues that were previously omitted 
or simply lacked information, namely that depositors were not fully secured by the state. 
Although the state publicly announced that it will guarantee all the deposits held in the 
Northern Rock bank at times of instability in the financial markets, it still did not pro-
duce the desired effect. The government had to deal with the banking crisis. Northern 
Rock was characterised by two specific features: (i) the bank was big enough for the so-
ciety to pay attention to its failure, but not that large for its closure to be able to harm the 
real economy; (ii) the bank did not engage in significant international trade, it was not 
transnational and therefore was not facing distress problems to be addressed by several 
governments or several competent authorities only at the national level. On 22 February 
2008 the bank was nationalised and the state took over the ownership of the bank613. The 
bank was nationalised after two unsuccessful attempts to acquire the bank by the private 
sector buyer and after the bank did not manage to repay the loan granted by the Central 
Bank614. The UK bank insolvency legislation also underwent certain changes. In October 
2009 the European Commission approved a restructuring plan for the bank, by separat-
ing the bank’s assets into good and bad assets. The good bank assets consisted of retail 
depositors and low-risk housing loans, which were to be sold out. Other housing loans 
and related assets were assigned to the bad part of the bank’s assets, which were national-
ised and subjected to liquidation615. 
Some aspects of this solution to bank insolvency problems are noteworthy. First of 
all, it should be noted that the supervisory authority has been particularly open to the 
general public, since in its report assessing the prudential requirements and activities 
of the bank, it provided a detailed description and particularities of the financial situ-
ation of the bank616. In essence, the report noted that insufficient functioning of each 
organisational-structural level of the bank as an organization and defective management 
of the bank in general revealed the critical state of management and suggested future 
institutional regulatory reforms that will allow mitigating the consequences arising from 
bank insolvency. The Central Bank was heavily criticised. Some scientists argued that the 
Central Bank was excessively concerned with the moral hazard rise and failed to evalu-
ate them properly. In addition, the bank’s assets were not as good as originally claimed. 
Another problem was related to bank insolvency strategic planning. Finally, the Treasury 
611 The CB stated that Northern Rock was solvent (had a good quality loan book), but exceeded the 
capital limits required by the supervisory authority. Bank of England News Release. Liquidity Support 
Facility for Northern Rock plc. 14 September 2007.
612 Ibid. P. 59-73.
613 Ibid. P. 117
614 Moosa A. Supra note 577. P. 44.
615 Walters B. The Fall Of Northern Rock: An Insider’s Story Of Britain’s Biggest Banking Disaster, Peters-
field: Harriman House, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost, 2008. P. 91-101.
616 The FSA‘s internal audit review of its supervision of Northern Rock and the FSA management re-
sponse. Published by FSA, London, 2008.
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played its nonchalant role as the custodian of public finances, expecting that economic 
growth will continue617. 
Several bank resolution options have been discussed. According to the first option, it 
was considered that the bank manage to refinance itself in the markets or in conjunction 
with the support from the Bank of England, whereas according to the second option bank 
liquidation procedures would be initiated or the bank would be recovered by finding a 
private buyer. However, due to the poor reputation and size of the bank, finding a buyer 
was an uneasy task. Firstly, the emergence of the bank’s financial problems turned to be a 
particular shock to the markets, as no similar cases that could have verified the effectiveness 
of the existing bank insolvency regulation were encountered earlier. Secondly, the political 
risk was relatively high due to recent change of the Prime Ministers, which is why the im-
mediate closure of the bank was unlikely to benefit the government’s reputation, especially 
bearing in mind that at that time the unemployment rate was very high and exceeded the 
national average. Thirdly, spin-off economic reasons determined the Central Bank’s refus-
al to provide financial assistance to the bank, for example, some technical aspects of the 
banking money market operations, interbank relations (money market operations at that 
time allowed banks choosing and setting their level of cash reserves based on the estimated 
amount of cash required at the end of the month. In the case of a poor forecast, banks were 
able to earn profits from interest or borrow more on the basis of a flat-rate interest)618. An-
other major problem was that after the bank was allowed to start liquidation procedures, 
in the absence of any special legal regulation that could effectively govern bank resolution 
at that time, its bankruptcy procedure would have been held in accordance with corporate 
bankruptcy law. On the one hand, the bank’s transactions, assets and liabilities would have 
been suspended, the court would have appointed a liquidator, who would be forced to pre-
vent rapid sale (without creditors’ approval), which automatically means sale at lower prices 
and property depreciation in the future. On the other hand, it was found that in modern 
banking ordinary bankruptcy procedure is problematic, because many ongoing but un-
finalised bank transactions could have been left open for months or even years, thus com-
promising the real overall bank assets. For example, if a bank fails, rap transactions (funded 
through initial stock sale and their subsequent repurchase at a slightly higher price) and 
their performance is suspended and postponed for an unlimited period of time. Repo 
transactions with the existing mortgage are left to administer through insolvency proceed-
ings, namely the creditors’ meetings. It is likely that another problem was lack of readiness 
on the part of the Central Bank and absence of ex ante planning with regard to bank resolu-
tion and/or recovery. Planning should be based on two principles: (i) regular planning of 
supervisory authorities, i.e. the concrete steps to be taken in the event of difficulties faced 
by a large bank, especially given that the banking structure and products are very different, 
and should be reflected in the ex ante bank rescue plan, with regular information updates, 
such as accurate evaluation whether the bank’s assets should be sold in parts or as a whole, 
617 Labrosse R.J., Caminal-Olivares R., Singh D. Financial Crisis Management and Bank Resolution. Edit. 
Informa, London. 2009. Chapter „ Towards A Coherent Crisis Resolution Mandate? Was the North-
ern Rock Episode a Crisis? P. 64. Wodd M. Shattered on the Rock? British Financial Stability from 
1866 to 2007. Journal of Banking Regulation and Treasury Select Committee. House of Commons. 
The Run on the Rock. HC 56-I, London, 2009.
618 Ibid. What Went Wrong? P. 125-137.
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taking the individual characteristics into account. Such planning would have three main 
advantages: reduce the distortions of competition arising from the ability of large banks to 
set specific barriers for new players entering the market; encourage the responsibility of the 
managing bodies; mitigate the ‘too big to fail’ problem619. In addition, Northern Rock insol-
vency proceedings have highlighted the fact that liquidity shortages can very quickly turn 
into a lack of capital, if the sale of bank assets is urged at prices related to market difficul-
ties. It follows that banks must hold more assets that can be swiftly converted into cash620. 
For example, government securities are beneficial in cases when a bank finds it difficult to 
obtain liquidity from the financial markets, while the market is in panic. Therefore, it has 
become clear that capital requirements must be reviewed and possibly adjusted to take ac-
count of the possible extreme market conditions. Another aspect to be considered is that 
the bonuses paid to the managing bodies or directors should be limited by legal regulation 
that would allow the governing bodies to obtain bonuses or other incentives for the success-
ful outcome and implementation of the transaction and not for signing the latter621. Senior 
management is also advised to provide for an obligation to hold bank shares, which would 
encourage protection, in particular in cases when shares cannot be sold before a specific 
deadline, in the year after leaving the bank622. In summary, it has become apparent that we 
need legal regulation that would allow the de facto insolvent bank to be taken over from 
shareholders and managing bodies, while the bank is still legally solvent and continues its 
operations. In this case, the bank could be sold in parts or as a whole to a buyer, who will be 
able to restore the financial condition of the bank. 
Fortis
Fortis was a Belgian-Dutch banking group. When the bank faced financial difficulties, 
it first tried to increase its capital by issuing additional shares on the market for EUR 24.2 
billion. However, the takeover offer proved to be in the wrong time, i.e., it was placed bare-
ly two months after the beginning of the global credit crisis in the US subprime market, 
which respectively caused high tension throughout the financial sector. As a result, after 
one year, in June 2008, the bank announced a new share issue and cut dividend payment to 
shareholders. These measures were taken to strengthen bank capital positions, which were 
severely damaged in writing off debts related to the US mortgage market. However, despite 
these efforts, the Fortis share prices fell sharply and reached their lowest level in 15 years. 
This has led to investor concerns about the liquidity level of the bank. In addition, many 
businesses and individuals withdrew their deposits, interbank loan market collapsed, and 
the Belgian government had to intervene and give additional capital to the bank in order 
to stabilise it. Joint intervention together with the Dutch and Luxembourg governments 
helped Belgium to save the bank from bankruptcy by means of public finances. A capital 
injection of EUR 11.2 billion was granted, which was used as the financial sustainability 
measure. Actions between governments were coordinated rather smoothly, but this did 
619 Ibid. P. 70-71.
620 Hyun S.S. Supra note 610. P. 117-119.
621 Smits R. Supra note 81. P. 69-70.
622 Fonteyne W., Bossu W. Supra note 453. P. 55-86. Bruni. F., Congdon T. The Failure of Northern Rock: 
A Multi-dimensional Case Study. Vienna, SUERF, 2009.
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not calm the markets and caused serious debates between the Belgian and Dutch supervi-
sory authorities in deciding on the primary coordinator of resolution actions. The Bank’s 
headquarters were in Belgium, but the Netherlands held the largest share of bank assets 
and its main business lines. Finally, the Belgian government decided to sell the entire 
banking group to the Dutch Government and the French bank BNP Paribas. The decision 
came under the pressure from the markets, and the stock price fell further, which forced 
the governments to provide immediate additional credit to Fortis. The bank’s insolvency 
process was complicated by the fact that the Belgian and Dutch governments saw it differ-
ently. Belgium had the most interest in preserving the group as a functioning unit, while 
the Netherlands was mostly concerned with certain legal units of Fortis located in the 
Netherlands, which could in turn complicate the insolvency process of the bank. However, 
the buyer agreed to acquire 75% of the banking group, including 100% of the Fortis insur-
ance group in Belgium. Nevertheless, Fortis shareholders objected to that transaction be-
tween the Belgian government and BNP Paribas. Brussels Court of Appeal suspended the 
execution of the transaction and ordered Fortis to obtain shareholders’ approval. Another 
factor that made the judgment difficult was the adoption of a resolution and the perfor-
mance of the transaction under Dutch law. After lengthy negotiations, Fortis shareholders 
finally agreed on the deal, under which BNP Paribas acquired 75% of Fortis Bank from the 
Belgian government, including 25% of Belgium’s Fortis Insurance. 
This bank insolvency case revealed that the competent authorities in Belgium and the 
Netherlands did not have sufficient powers to respond to the bank’s financial difficulties in 
a timely and efficient manner. The competent regulatory authorities could not ignore and 
block shareholders’ rights, even in urgent emergency situations, when banks needed to be 
stabilised quickly. Implementation of the restructuring was not possible without the court 
decision. Finally, the Belgian financial resources also proved inadequate in the banking 
crisis, highlighting better need for cooperation between supervisors, –and the absence of 
harmonisation of bank insolvency law in the EU. 
In summary, it should be noted that before the recent financial crisis, ‘too big to fail’ 
doctrine was generally understood and related to the size of the bank and prevention of 
bank liquidation. Thus, various experts testifying that the traditional bankruptcy law is not 
enough for large financial institutions failures and referring to Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
case. The main problem is that the judiciary system in Lehman’s insolvency trial was too 
restrictive in a sense of procedural rights and lacked of accurate knowledge, court hear-
ings were very complicated, since the very complex problems of financial structure were 
considered. The case clearly demonstrated that if the government decides to bail-out the 
ailing bank by using financial public support, it’s unavoidable that the “moral hazard.” issue 
arise. Moral hazard destroys rational evaluation of the banking risks, distorts competition 
and creates a fiscal burden on the government and, ultimately, taxpayers cover these costs. 
1.8. Reflection on the Triggering Events and Criteria for Initiating  
Bank Insolvency Procedures
In a market economy, the social function of insolvency is to ‘remove’ ineffective and 
inefficient entities from circulation, to minimise losses of stakeholders and to balance the 
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competing interests623. As already discussed and proved above, banks are very specific 
business entities and their business activities are inherently risky. A legitimate question 
arises, whether the circumstances and conditions for determining bank insolvency are 
specific as well? Which aspects of bank activity should be taken into consideration while 
determining bank insolvency? Under what threshold it can be allowed or even required 
to take legal actions against the failing or likely to fail bank? There is no universal ap-
proach in the legal doctrine with regard to the bank insolvency criteria and conditions to 
be regulated and how. In accordance with international standards, the laws of the relevant 
jurisdictions have already given priority to bank rehabilitation and resolution, in particu-
lar aiming for the objectives pursued by resolution of insolvent banks, and bankruptcy 
proceedings are instituted only in cases where there is no doubt that bank resolution (by 
restructuring) is more consistent with the public interest and less severely affects the real 
economy. In addition, liquidation of a bank may jeopardise financial stability, interrupt 
the critical functions, and harm the protection of depositors’ rights679. According to the 
second scenario, bankruptcy proceedings are initiated against the bank along with bank 
resolution tools. This section analyses general conditions for determining bank insolvency 
one of the bank insolvency procedures described above. 
The bank may become insolvent at short notice, because, among other things, this 
relates to maintaining creditors’ and particularly depositors’ confidence. For example, 
mass withdrawal of deposits over the weekend in the twenty-first-century may affect the 
bank’s ability to meet its obligations624. The determination of bank insolvency event and 
conditions is a collective work of both economists and lawyers. This section will focus on 
and examine the methods for determining bank insolvency and reveal the main qualify-
ing criteria for bank insolvency. Bank insolvency triggers are relevant in all aspects, as 
it inevitably affects the subsequent bank insolvency procedure as a whole. In addition, 
from the very inception of the bank insolvency procedure, once officially published, it can 
cause systemic effects (systemic risk). Structuring the conditions for determining bank 
insolvency in the doctrine from a comparative viewpoint could encourage countries to 
create a more predictable legal environment and more efficient banks crisis management 
measures. In addition, consistent and detailed rules would assist in ensuring a true level 
playing field for banks, in harmonising competition rules between different jurisdictions 
and contribute to the sustainable coordination of the banking crisis management actions, 
particularly in cross-border bank insolvency cases, and would ensure greater transpar-
ency and legal certainty. The main goal of this section is not to find the ‘golden solution’, 
but to highlight the existing particularities of different legal systems, and classify the most 
important bank insolvency criteria found in the doctrine. It is also assumed that clearer 
classification of triggering criteria can contribute to greater legal certainty in the context 
of protection of shareholder, creditor, investor and depositor rights (stability of financial 
markets). 
The identification of bank insolvency conditions places critical role on the legal acts 
adopted by legislators. After determining isolated statutory conditions for bank insolvency 
623 United Nations Commission on International Trade. Legislative Guide On Insolvency Law. New York, 
United Nations, 2005. P. 9.
624 Fonteyne W., Bossu W. Supra note 453. P. 10.
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or their entirety, we can identify bank insolvency and/or failing or likely to fail68 status of 
the bank, and start a particular bank insolvency procedure. The scientific literature also 
describes bank insolvency determination as the triggering event. In the countries with a 
developed system of DGS, bank insolvency is defined as a situation where the state is 
bound to pay compensations to depositors in accordance with the procedures defined 
in the laws (e.g., intervention, insolvency administrator’s appointment, or bank license 
withdrawal)625. FSB has proposed an important legal definition of bank insolvency de-
termination, highlighting that determination of bank insolvency involves ‘qualitative and 
quantitative criteria to identify the insured event or fact used for determining when such situ-
ations arise which require the highest state-level managers or supervisory authority interven-
tion. Such bank insolvency rules are created for determining designed to help prevent delays 
in solving the banking recovery, reorganization or liquidation situations’626. It is important 
to note that the rules and indicators for determining bank insolvency are dissociated from 
the early warning interventions in the bank627. Early intervention often takes place when 
the supervisory authority needs to check the financial activity of the bank leading to sus-
picion or violation of the law. In addition, early intervention criteria, in particular, legally 
defined as ex ante criteria and only determined in view of the approaching negative and 
adverse financial circumstances that can substantially affect bank (in)solvency. The earlier 
the investigation of the bank’s financial problems and decision-making, the lower bank 
resolution costs and the more successful bank resolution itself, compared to the situations 
where solutions are postponed to a moment in time when the bank has already become 
de facto insolvent628. 
Pursuant to the new paradigm of bank insolvency law, the triggering conditions and 
criteria for determining bank insolvency designed to solve bank insolvency problems can 
in principle lead to three solutions for addressing the financial problems faced by the bank 
and three hypotheses for managing banking crises: either bank recovery or bank resolution 
or forced liquidation of the bank629. Thus, the events triggering bank insolvency should all 
together be understood as a backup preventive bank insolvency crisis management measure, 
comprising a range of possible scenarios for managing the banking crisis and ensuring timely 
bank resolution and implementation of recovery plans in conjunction with a set of other legal 
instruments. This legislative package is diverse and in some cases overlaps, depending on 
the legal regulation prevailing in a particular jurisdiction. 
One of the key features distinguishing the banks from the normal business and cru-
cial in assessing whether a bank is insolvent is bank liquidity. It is commonly known that 
banks act as liquidity suppliers in a given financial market. For example, banks in a par-
ticular country provide liquidity (by providing access to liquidity, readily available cash 
and capital) to creditors by collecting and distributing bank deposits demanded by the 
market, and by issuing loans to various borrowers from the accumulated deposits and 
625 Parker D.C., IMF. Supra note 86. P. 3.
626 FSB. Recovery and Resolution Planning: Making the Key Attributes Requirements Operational, Basel, 
2012. P. 3. Ibid. P. 6.
627 Ibid. P. 6.
628 Marinč M., Vasja R. A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Bankruptcy Regimes. Journal of Financial 
Stability, No. 13, 2014. P. 139.
629 Peter H., Pnevmonidis I. Supra note 454. P. 4.
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equity capital. In addition, banks are the primary financial market players, resulting in 
borrowers’ obligations to the bank itself. Therefore, the determination of bank insolvency 
situation primarily requires the assessment of the liquidity position of the bank and the 
evaluation of supply of liquidity to the market, in order to determine the scale of solvency 
problems faced by the bank. This entertains several reasons. Banks have a duty to review 
and take account of deposits held by them not only in the form of obligations, but also 
in the form of bank assets creating added value688. Furthermore, the start of bank in-
solvency proceedings cannot automatically ‘suspend’ the bank’s liabilities to depositors, 
in case of no liquidity problems and if the liquidity supply function is maintained. It is 
equally important that the banks, through a series of lending relationships, are closely re-
lated to each other. Therefore, even temporary suspension of the bank’s liabilities can lead 
to a systemic risk situation, where liquidity problems faced by one bank trigger financial 
problems also for other banks operating in the market. For those reasons, the states and 
competent authorities provide guarantees for deposits, operating through deposit or bank 
guarantee schemes in the face of financial problems, giving priority to bank resolution, e.g. 
by selling bank deposits at their accounting (book) value. Thus, in banking activities, the 
illiquidity (lack of liquidity funds means liquid assets deficiency) and insolvency (inability 
to adequately and timely meet one’s financial obligations) ratio is not always clear and that 
limit is particularly difficult to determine, as in economic terms a bank facing financial 
difficulties is not always legally insolvent. This position in jurisprudence is firstly based 
on the fact that, to determine a particular case of bank insolvency, this primarily requires 
a decision by the competent supervisory authority and/or a court, establishing the insol-
vency of a specific bank689. The bank is recognized insolvent if the competent authority 
has taken a decision to suspend the activities of the bank and terminate all of its opera-
tions. The restructuring actions of the bank can otherwise be often carried out by making 
a formal ruling on bank insolvency or, in other words, prior to the insolvency of the bank 
under its balance sheet. Capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are a particular pre-
condition for allowing the competent authorities to take action against the bank, which 
is technically not yet insolvent according to the balance sheet test (e.g., its property still 
exceeds its liabilities). As noted by the IMF and the WB, the legislator should specify the 
legal regulation related to bank insolvency procedures, especially by legally determining 
the actual conditions specifically required and allowing crossing the threshold, qualified as 
the start of bank insolvency procedures and enabling the start of a certain bank insolvency 
procedure. Insolvency conditions can be determined when public authorities take over the 
control of the bank, whenever banks face financial difficulties, and formal administrative 
procedures are initiated630. It is thought that this concept is controversial, as it suggests 
opening of bank insolvency procedures when the institution is still technically solvent (ac-
cording to the balance sheet test). This could lead to national constitutional problems, in 
particular with regard to the protection of shareholders’ property rights and expropriation 
issues. Illiquidity and insolvency ratio is crucial also in view of bank and asset valuation 
problems, and by reason of the contagion effect that could spread over other banks facing 
financial difficulties, although still solvent.
630 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 5.
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Another essential difference from general insolvency law relates to the fact that banks 
are actively linked with coordination problems, e.g. when depositors start massively with-
drawing their deposits from the bank. According to general company insolvency law, 
whereby one of the interested parties (creditors) initiates bankruptcy proceedings for the 
company, the coordination problem is addressed by suspending the debtor’s contractual 
relations and liabilities (obligations), until the time when the decision is taken on whether 
to institute or not to institute insolvency proceedings for the company. In opposition to 
corporate insolvency law, in the case of bank insolvency procedures liabilities may be au-
tomatically suspended only in view of significant potential bank insolvency-related costs; 
otherwise it could destroy one of the major functions of the bank as the specific legal 
person, i.e. liquidity, and the bank may lose its going concern assumption. If the legal 
system lacks efficient and predictable bank insolvency procedures, this can be very costly 
for taxpayers. In particular, keeping in mind the fact that ad hoc solutions may not be swift 
and robust and require appropriate political support. Secondly, the competent authorities 
also need time to prepare, evaluate and adjust to the changes in the bank’s financial situa-
tion. Therefore, at the time of massive withdrawal of deposits from banks631, supervisory 
authorities play their crucial role in terms of accurate and timely intervention. Delayed 
intervention may cause enormous future costs.
The EU, the US and Swiss legislation governing bank insolvency procedures not nec-
essarily regulate and distinguishes the same methods and criteria for determining bank 
insolvency. Some jurisdictions are more focused on the traditional concepts of ‘overind-
ebtedness’ found in general insolvency law, while other jurisdictions give priority to in-
dependent or discretionary bank insolvency evaluation methods, i.e. leave the matter of 
determination of bank insolvency conditions to the discretion of the competent authori-
ties632. Such insolvency determination approach, based on the assessment of individual 
circumstances, relies on the complex identification of the financial situation of the bank. 
After a systematic analysis of both doctrine and legal regulation in the relevant jurisdic-
tions, three methods and the related criteria for determining bank insolvency could be 
established for determining whether a bank is failing or likely to fail: (i) quantitative crite-
ria; (ii) qualitative criteria; (iii) discretionary criteria. There is no consensus in the interna-
tional insolvency law on this matter, thus more detailed analysis and interpretation of the 
legal rules of a particular country plays a significant role.
1.8.1. Quantitative Criteria 
Bank balance sheet or ’overindebtedness’ test. This method for checking the bank’s 
insolvency threshold assesses whether the bank’s balance sheet net asset value is neto, i.e. 
631 The balance sheet situation of the bank is not that relevant, if the bank faces massive withdrawal of 
deposits. If depositors begin to withdraw their funds, it is very likely that the bank can only obtain low 
prices for fire-sale of its property, thus even a large part of the capital may disappear overnight. The 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. Supra note 28. Mr. 324th.
632 For example, some jurisdictions, while determining insolvency conditions of the bank, are more fo-
cused on the regulation of qualitative pre-insolvency criteria, by applying them together with the 
discretionary criteria set by the competent authorities. Meanwhile, some other jurisdictions use quan-
titative prudential criteria. BCBS. Supra note 15. P. 13-14.
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whether the value of bank’s liabilities exceeds (or not) the value of its assets. In theory, 
this may not bring forth any adverse legal consequences, unless the bank’s payments have 
become due and it no longer fulfills its obligations633. In practice this may result in an 
ambiguous situation, whereby the bank may be solvent in terms of its cash flows, but in-
solvent on its balance sheet. The balance sheet or excessive indebtedness detection method 
has always been and is among the two classic ways for assessing bank insolvency634. This 
test verifies the particular financial situation of a bank, whereby the bank’s liabilities ex-
ceed its assets, and for this reason its capital is inadequate or even exhausted, and the 
bank is therefore insolvent635. The test is open to criticism, because the balance test used 
as the only method for determining bank insolvency must be considered inefficient. This 
method can prove inaccurate and misleading for inadequately conveying the correct fi-
nancial situation of the bank. This is because banks are using different international ac-
counting standards and various techniques for the valuation of assets, which leads to dif-
ferent interpretations of the property value and the distortion of the respective facts and 
results, legal uncertainty and a very likely probability of litigation. In addition, it should be 
noted that such evaluation of financial situation is based on information that could not be 
easily evaluated by the supervisory authority, since such an approach would presuppose 
retrospective assessment. In addition, the regulator’s intervention normally occurs at an 
advanced stage of insolvency and restrains the resolution of solvency problems and the 
effectiveness of the related actions. The valuation of bank assets and its financial capacity 
shall be assessed retrospectively, rather than based on the actual situation existing at the 
time of intervention. Different jurisdictions interpret that aspect in various directions. For 
example, in Switzerland the balance test is inevitable, and one of the mandatory elements 
for determining bank insolvency636. The EU Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive 
treats this test as an optional method in the form of an overall insolvency test, among 
other things, establishing possible conditions for resolution, in the case of overall non-
viability of the banking group, and if there are no possible alternative solutions from the 
private sector or supervisory action and the protection of public interest637. Non-viability 
and likely insolvency of the bank should be examined by applying additional criteria that 
better reflect a realistic picture of the bank’s balance sheet and facilitate better analysis638. 
In the US, this test is similarly used as a binding method for determining bank insolvency. 
The financial institution is considered failing or likely to fail if bank assets are either is or is 
likely to be less than its liabilities to creditors or other interested parties639.
Cash flow or liquidity test. The level of liabilities of the bank’s contractors and inter-
connectedness of banks and financial markets, as well as bank liquidity crisis are the pri-
mary and perhaps the most essential reasons and sources of the banking crisis, especially 
633 Supra note 329. P. 20.
634 Ibid. P. 21.
635 UNCITRAL. Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. United Nations, New York, 2005. P. 46.
636 Swiss Banking law. Art. 25 (1). 
637 BRRD. Art. 27 (1), Art. 32 (4).
638 BRRD. Art. 27 (2) (b).
639 Dodd Frank, 203(c) (4) chapter. FDIC Act. 11, (5) (A) chapter. Codified 12 U.S.C. 5383.
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for international banks with extremely complex corporate structures640. However, no mat-
ter how ironic, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, at the time of assessing financial viability 
and financial sustainability of banks, liquidity factors were often ignored or simply disre-
garded. Since then, regulators of bank conduct started paying more attention to bank li-
quidity and its effect for determining bank insolvency. At present, it is recognized that this 
is an important element for determining the conditions and criteria of bank insolvency, 
reflecting the true financial situation of the bank. It could be argued that the regulatory 
approach to this matter evolved gradually and materialised in the implementation process 
of the Basel III package requirements, thereby improving the legal regulation641. The cash 
flows test means an insolvency test applied to assess the (in)ability of the bank to repay 
the debts at the date of maturity or on creditors’ demand. In such circumstances, insol-
vency law permits the competent authorities to initiate insolvency proceedings against the 
debtor (the bank). Therefore, this test allows verifying the bank’s insolvency, in determin-
ing whether the debtor is and will be able to carry out the commitments to creditors in the 
future, when the payment term has expired, but the liabilities are not significantly overdue, 
and the creditor has therefore brought a claim against the debtor according to the applica-
ble national legal procedures. Accordingly, the cash flows test describes situations where 
a bank fails to meet its obligations when they fall due642. This bank insolvency evaluation 
method is more efficient, given that it is more likely that the bank’s business may become 
unviable in the face of liquidity problems, and not as a result of insufficient capital643. It is 
assumed that the financial flow test is an important criterion, which may be used in the 
early stage of bank insolvency, as a warning for potential bank liquidity problems. This 
method is still based on the expected financial performance scenarios and future projec-
tions of the bank, rather than the analysis of facts explaining what may happen in the light 
of certain factors644. In any case, this method should be regarded as a desirable test for 
determining bank insolvency. The position of international organisations setting interna-
tional financial standards is that this insolvency test method should apply in all cases to 
the bank suffering financial difficulties, even in ordinary economic circumstances, when 
the bank operates smoothly, and not only at the time of systemic financial crisis or after 
640 See more 1 chapter 4 sec. 2 sub-sec.
641 The BCBS formulated and developed two minimum standards that were to finance bank liquidity. 
The first bank liquidity coverage ratio or liquidity buffer aims to ensure that the bank complies with 
adequate, high-quality liquid asset level. Maintaining this capital standard, bank capital can be easily 
converted into cash in order to ensure appropriate bank liquidity indicators. These parameters are 
guaranteed within 30 calendar days, after significant decrease in liquidity tensions and financial dif-
ficulty scenarios for financial markets. The second standard relates to the net stable funding ratio. It is 
part of the types and amounts of capital and finance commitments to ensure the stability and funding 
for one year under the most adverse market conditions. BCBS. Basel III: International Framework for 
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring, Basel, 2010. P. 3.
642 UNCITRAL. Supra note 337. P. 45-46.
643 Peter H. Bankruptcy and Reorganisation Trigger Criteria: From a Retrospective (Balance Sheet) to a 
Prospective (Cash flow) Test. (in) Peter H., Jeandin N., Kilborn J. etc. The Challenges of Insolvency 
Law Reform in the 21 st Century, Schulthess, Zurich/Basel/Geneva. 2006. P. 35.
644 Jury T. Cash flow analysis and forecasting: the definitive guide to understanding and using published 
cash flow data, Wiley United Kingdom 2012. P. 257.
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the bank has faced serious financial difficulties645. In accordance with the current Swiss 
banking law, the liquidity test applies even before the FINMA decides to implement com-
pulsory bank liquidation procedures646. Under the EU legal system, the liquidity test is also 
used in order to correctly understand and figure out the rapidly deteriorating financial 
condition of the bank, including its liquidity position, the increasing leverage ratio and 
the number of non-performing loans or concentration of exposure, including own funds 
requirements. The bank’s compliance with capital and liquidity requirements is verified. 
This method can be used either individually or collectively with the balance sheet test647. In 
the US, in order to determine whether a bank is failing or likely to fail in the nearest future, 
the fact whether a financial institution is or will be unable to fulfill its obligations (exclud-
ing bona fide disputes) in normal bank business times must be taken into account648.
Bank capital requirements test. In addition to the typical, standard tests of insol-
vency discussed above, bank insolvency is also determined by verifying the bank’s capital 
adequacy ratios and their compliance with legislation. It should be noted that after the 
financial crisis of 2008, stricter capital rules entered into force for banks based on the Basel 
III rules. Banks are required to operate more and better quality capital649. Capital performs 
645 WB. Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditors‘ Rights Systems, 2001. P. 30.
646 Swiss Banking law. Art. 25 (1).
647 BRRD. Art 27 (1).
648 Dodd Frank. 203(c) (4) Section. FDIC 11, (5) (F) chapter. Codified 12 U.S.C. §5383.
649 A more detailed implementation of the Basel III package is illustrated by means of amendments of the 
EU legal framework. The primary objective of the legislative proposal package is to strengthen capital 
requirements for banks (capital quality and size), other underlying prudential guidelines and thus to 
reduce the pro-cyclical nature of the financial system, strengthen financial stability and improve the 
competitiveness of the EU banking. In addition, harmonise the requirements to the maximum pos-
sible extent, under the EU-wide uniform prudential requirements, implement the Basel Committee 
agreements (Basel III) agreed at the G-20 level. The implementation of the new requirements began 
on 1 January 2013 and should be completed by 2019. The Capital Requirements Directive and the 
Regulation came into force on 1 January 2013. The Regulation establishes new requirements for bank 
capital: Common Equity Tier 1 shall amount to 4.5% of risk-weighted exposure amounts collected; 
total Tier 1 capital shall constitute 6% of risk-weighted exposure amounts collected; the capital ad-
equacy ratio should amount to 8% of total risk-weighted exposure amounts. Besides, it sets out the 
requirements for better quality equity. The EU Member States are allowed to determine more rigorous 
capital requirements for financial stability purposes. The following macro-prudential instruments are 
set: (1) Capital Reserve, Capital Conservation Buffer, which would amount of 2.5% of risk-weighted 
exposure amounts of property values. Banks will have to continuously meet the capital reserve re-
quirement. (2) The counter-cyclical capital buffer in the range of 0% to 2.5% of risk-weighted expo-
sure amounts of property values. Member States will be free to set a countercyclical capital buffer size 
of a particular institution or group of institutions so as to reduce the risk of pro-cyclicality and protect 
the banking sector and the economy from the lending boom. Given the experience of the financial 
crisis, new requirements for bank liquidity are introduced from 2015, which will consist of a liquidity 
coverage ratio, according to which the authorities will need to have high-quality liquid asset reserve 
that would cover the liquidity outflow loss within 30 days. In order to properly address the institu-
tional financing problems caused by the discrepancies between the duration of assets and liabilities, 
the net stable funding ratio will be set from 2018, according to which institutions exposed to solvency 
or profitability decrease will have to follow proper financing structure for one year and have stable 
funding sources. The exact size and composition of the indicators will be determined after the obser-
vation and review period. BCBS. Basel III: a Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems, Basel, 2010. P. 12. Dübel H.J. The Capital Structure of Banks and Practice of 
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a protective function and acts in the form of a buffer. In addition, capital is extremely 
important for banks because of the unique nature of its commercial assets,, when bank 
liabilities are deducted to determine the changes in the bank’s net asset value. It should 
be born in mind that the bank assets mostly consist of loans (mortgage, business loans) 
and other credits (e.g., credit cards), thus the value of this asset is rather unpredictable. 
At the international level, a common presumption has been agreed, according to which 
better-capitalised financial institutions are automatically better protected against both the 
collapse of financial markets and the particular bank insolvency cases 713. Eventually, a 
common practice has evolved to determine bank insolvency also based on the level of 
bank capital indicators. In the countries where bank insolvency procedures are governed 
by special law, in addition to the methods described above, another bank insolvency meth-
od applies, and is referred to as the regulatory threshold test. The essence of this formal 
analysis is that a bank may be declared insolvent if the supervisory authority finds that the 
bank no longer meets the statutory minimum capital requirements. In this situation, it is 
important to determine whether, under ordinary circumstances of the market, the bank 
can fulfill its obligations and make payments on the first creditors’ demand. As a general 
rule, the bank needs to manage its financial resources in a manner that would allow main-
taining the capital ‘limit’ legally required in all cases of particularly adverse situations. In 
addition, while maintaining adequate capital ratios, the bank ensures appropriate bank 
liquidity and better protects the interests of all creditors. On the one hand, this means that 
the bank is still solvent, but facing financial difficulties. In such a scenario, the bank may 
overcome temporary insolvency problems by borrowing on the market (unless the market 
has already confronted with adverse reactions on the financial situation of the bank, in 
which case the rescue actions and intervention of the surveillance authorities would be 
overdue). On the other hand, based on the equity method, in all cases, the insolvency 
of the bank needs to be determined by a competent supervisory authority. This basically 
means that the law needs to provide the right for the supervisory authority to initiate early 
intervention and perform the related interventions in order to reduce or avoid additional 
losses to creditors and the bank deposit insurance agency. It should be noted that, in con-
trast to general insolvency law, the bank could face a financial situation where, although 
encountered with significant financial losses, it still continues the performance of its ob-
ligations to creditors, since the bank still holds working capital and receives cash from 
current obligations, such as bank loan payment, new deposits, and similar. Therefore, it 
must be considered that supervisor’s intervention must be timely and ensure avoiding 
greater losses in the future. This method of bank insolvency determination is based on 
the complex insolvency determination method: assessment of capital and bank business 
risk, i.e. formal breaches of banking laws. First of all, in view of the legal requirements, 
the legal basis for supervisory intervention is determined, if any. Then bank insolvency 
is determined on the basis of the financial reports addressed to the financial supervisory 
authority, other documents obtained from the bank or other parties and/or by means of 
bank inspection, where necessary. 
Bank Restructuring. No. 2013/04. CFS Working Paper.. Berlin, 2013. This study presents an empirical 
analysis of capital and liability management in eight cases of bank restructurings and resolutions from 
eight different European countries.
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For example, in the US legal system, the FDIC has deeply rooted traditions for applying 
quantitative equity parameters to manage banking crises. In this jurisdiction, capital ad-
equacy ratio of the bank remains the most relevant and critical financial viability criterion, 
with certain rigorous restrictions applied gradually to: undercapitalised, significantly not 
capitalised, critically not capitalised banks and financial institutions650. The bank is under-
capitalized, thefore, insolvent when has no reasonable prospect of becoming adequately 
capitalized, fails to become adequately capitalized when required to do so, fails to submit a 
capital restoration plan acceptable to that agency within the time, materially fails to imple-
ment a capital restoration plan submitted and accepted651. Before FDIC requires to change 
the capital positions in accordance with restoration plan.652. One of the direct legal actions 
and a way to mitigate bank insolvency issues relates to various convertible capital instru-
ments. These tools principally focus on bank recapitalisation rather than liquidity needs653 
and are directly related to the determination of bank insolvency, as they condition the 
convertibility of bank debt into capital and capital is immediately used to protect specific 
capital adequacy requirements654. As already mentioned above, Switzerland is dominated 
by high concentration of banks and systemically important banks. Therefore, the most re-
cent bank insolvency legislation amendments introduced changes to improve and encour-
age bank recovery and transformation planning processes, by adding additional capital 
reserves for systemically important banks, the violation of which results in automatic re-
habilitation and restructuring procedures for the bank: (a) the capital conservation buffer, 
which corresponds with bank recovery objectives and would apply in writing off debts and 
converting them into capital immediately upon bank’s capital required by the regulator 
dropping to less than 7% of the total risk-weighted assets of the bank655; (b) capital gain, 
which can be used immediately for the purposes of bank restructuring and lead to the 
conversion of debt into capital when the bank capital set by the regulator falls below 5% of 
the total risk-weighted assets of the bank656. The EU legal framework provides that, before 
the bank’s insolvency period, its capital may need to be raised urgently, when the credit 
institution does not or cannot comply with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 
and Directive 2013/36/EU and it is likely that the financial situation will be restored after 
such capital increase, by avoiding a situation where it would be subject to the conditions 
governing initiation of resolution657. Bank insolvency losses in the EU legal framework 
should, in particular, be covered by regulatory capital measures and losses should be dis-
tributed to shareholders by eliminating or transferring shares, or significantly reducing 
the earnings per share. If such measures are insufficient, the subordinated debt should be 
650 FDIA. 11, (5) (K) chapter. Dewatripont M., Freixas X. Bank Resolution: Lessons from the Crisis. (in) 
Supra note 292. P. 118.
651 FDIA. 38 (b), 11 (5) (K).
652 FDIA. 38 (f)(2)(A), 38 (e)(2)(D), 38 (e)(2), 11 (5)(K). 
653 Pazarbacioglu C., Jainping Z., Leslé V. etc. Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Fea-
tures, IMF Staff Discussion, Note 25/01/2011. P. 8.
654 See more 2 chapter 5 sec. 4 sub-sec.
655 Swiss Federal Ordinance of 1 June 2012 on Capital Adequacy and Risk Diversification for Banks and 
Securities Dealers. Art. 129.
656 Ibid. Art. 130.
657 BRRD. Recital (124).
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converted or written off. Privileged liabilities should be converted or written off, if all the 
subordinated classes have already been converted or fully written down658. The minimum 
amount allocated to cover losses or to carry out recapitalisation, amounting to at least 8% 
of the total commitments, including own funds or, where applicable, 20% of risk-weighted 
assets, is calculated on the basis of property assessments. Earlier losses already covered by 
the shareholders, thus reducing their own funds before such an assessment, should not be 
included in such percentages659. Besides, the EU Members States must ensure that if the is-
suing credit institution is no longer viable, the loss would be completely covered by means 
of Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments660. Therefore, the competent authorities 
should write off all of those instruments or convert them to Common Equity Tier 1 capital 
instruments from the moment when a credit institution becomes no longer viable, and 
before any adjustment measures are taken. The precise moment when a credit institution 
is no longer viable occurs when the relevant authority determines that the bank satisfies 
the conditions for the conversion, or when the authority decides that the bank would no 
longer be viable if those capital instruments were not written down or converted661. 
Therefore, the existing financial market is dominated by an apparent trend of hybrid 
(mixed) options of convertible debt, based, in particular, on capital adequacy ratio. The 
capital adequacy ratio test is considered to be a ‘technical insolvency’ test, but an objective 
one, as it requires the intervention of the competent supervisory authorities in bank control 
at an early stage of insolvency, before performing the balance sheet or financial flow tests.
1.8.2. Qualitative Criteria
Unlike the quantitative criteria for determining bank insolvency triggers, the qualita-
tive insolvency criteria are not directly related to the particular bank capital or liquidity 
indicators. On the basis of qualitative criteria, financial performance indicators of a bank 
are the most important indicators, but some discretion of their application remains. When 
viability prospects of a bank are determined under qualitative criteria by a supervisory 
or other competent authority, it has some room for manoeuvre. As noted by the FSB, the 
qualitative criteria for determining bank insolvency consist, in particular, of the following 
criteria: the top-level management experience and losses it caused to the bank, adverse 
court rulings against the bank, significant sudden reputational risks and damage to the 
bank or claims arising out of the early discharge of obligations by the contracting par-
ties662. For example, based on MIFID II663 and CRD IV664 directives, a number of specific 
658 BRRD. Recital (77).
659 BRRD. Recital (75).
660 Additional Tier 1 instruments – capital instruments in line with the conditions set out in Article 52(1) 
of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; Tier 2 instruments – capital instruments or subordinated loans, 
satisfying the requirements of Article 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
661 BRRD. Recital (81).
662 Financial Stability Board, Recovery and Resolution Planning: Making the Key Attributes Require-
ments Operational, Basel, 2012. P. 5.
663 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU.
664 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013. 
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qualitative requirements for the managing bodies, directors and their competence and 
suitability can be highlighted. The main criteria pertain to good reputation and the duty 
of care, to act reasonably and reliably. Under the EBA guidelines665 and implementing 
technical standards account must be taken of their unlawful behavior (both criminal, civil 
and administrative violations), pending investigations launched against the bank, non-
transparent, non-cooperating behavior in addressing the current issues of the bank with 
the competent authorities and even declined memberships or registrations. In addition, 
various other criteria related to competencies (knowledge, skills, expertise), the operating 
structure, and the business model are applied666.
For example, in the US, FDIC may employ various highly qualitative bank insolvency 
criteria for determining bank insolvency in order to duly define the necessity (if any) for 
the competent authority to carry out intervention or to determine the fact of bank in-
solvency. The variety of criteria differs depending on the level of breach of legal require-
ments, considering whether such events and formal violations of the law may give rise 
to an insured event, the existence of unsafe and harmful conditions for continuing the 
bank’s business, concealment of financial documents, accounting records of the bank, and 
any irregularities with regard to bank property and anti-money laundering prevention 
requirements667. Such qualitative damage should not necessarily be considered as a whole, 
as a single qualitative criterion and the respective violation is enough for the FDIC to 
initiate bank intervention and start one of the insolvency procedures. The factors that are 
required by the FDIC Board of Directors in connection with any determination of insol-
vency a) The financial history and condition of the bank; b) The adequacy of the bank’s 
capital structure; c) The future earnings prospects of the bank.; d) The general character 
and fitness of the management of the depository institution; e) The risk presented by such 
bank to the Deposit Insurance Fund; f) The convenience and needs of the community 
to be served by such bank; g) Whether the depository institution’s corporate powers are 
consistent with the purposes of FDIA668.
Swiss banking law was designed to primarily facilitate bank recovery and restructuring 
process planning. For example, systemically important banks must ex ante comply with 
the qualitative conditions for bank insolvency associated with risk diversification; their 
activities must comply with the principles of sustainable corporate governance, by also 
providing certain safeguards to protect financial services669. The general rule is that if the 
bank fails to demonstrate its ability to achieve qualitative requirements under the threat of 
insolvency, then FINMA will intervene against the bank’s will and will apply appropriate 
sanctions to improve the solution of bank solvency problems670.
665 EBA. Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key 
function holders. EBS/GL/2012/06, 2012. EBA. Consultation Paper on draft Guidelines for assessing 
the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders of a credit institution. 
EBA/CP/2013/03, 2012.
666 See more Bishof E. Supra note 513. P. 321-328.
667 FDIA. 11(5) (C), (E), (H), (J), (M).
668 FDIA. 6 Section. Codified 12 U.S.C. 1816.
669 Swiss Banking law. Art. 9 (2).
670 Ibid. Art. 10 (2).
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1.8.3. Discretionary Criteria
Qualitative and/or discretionary criteria are set at the discretion of competent authori-
ties and are sometimes called ‘soft’ bank insolvency criteria. They are less focused on the 
rules and are more dependent on individual decisions, personal judgments and reasona-
bleness. If the actual financial situation of the bank is in line with these criteria, the com-
petent authorities refuse automatic intervention in the bank in the case of statutory viola-
tions (capital, liquidity, or any other related business activity parameters). On the contrary, 
these criteria provide the competent authority with extensive powers to assess where and 
what legal measures must be applied and used to address the financial difficulties faced by 
the bank. It is assumed that such discretionary criteria are the most appropriate and op-
timal method of determining bank insolvency. In particular, all modern bank insolvency 
regimes have introduced at least some of the discretionary criteria and certain powers 
for resolution authorities in the legislation governing bank insolvency triggering event, 
namely the precise moment for public authorities to intervene671.
On the basis of the EU Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (Member States 
should harmonise national law in accordance with the Directive), a bank is failing or likely 
to fail (according to the EU law, the concepts of failing or likely to fail are used synonymous-
ly) if the competent authority establishes one or more circumstances set in the Directive. 
Firstly, it must be determined whether the bank infringes or, based on objective elements to 
support such a determination, or is likely to infringe the requirements for maintaining the 
authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the com-
petent authority, including but not limited to the bank incurring or likely to incur losses 
that will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds672. Secondly, the bank’s assets 
are negative or there are objective elements to support a determination that the bank will, 
in the near future, be unable to repay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due673. Thirdly, 
it is determined that the bank will need emergency public financial support, except for the 
situations when emergency public financial support is supplied to avoid serious economic 
disruption in the country or to remove such a disruption and preserve financial stability, 
in any of the following forms: (i) state guarantee to support liquidity measures supplied by 
central banks in accordance with the conditions of Central Banks; (ii) State guarantee to 
newly issued obligations; (iii) injection of own funds or purchase of capital at prices and 
conditions conferring no advantage for the institution674. Guarantees and equivalent meas-
ures are applied to solvent banks only, and solely if finally approved under the EU state 
aid system. The fact that urgent support of the central bank is required to raise liquidity 
should not per se be sufficient to demonstrate that the entity is unable or could be unable in 
the near future to pay its obligations when they fall due675. In addition, it should be noted 
that the assessment of whether a bank is failing or likely to fail, when there is no ground 
to believe that any alternative private sector or supervisory action taken within a reason-
671 Henke Ch., Kaal W. Contingent Capital in EU Bank Restructuring. Northwestern Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Business Vol. 32, 2012. P. 252.
672 BRRD. Art. 32 (4). (a).
673 BRRD. Art. 32 (4) (b).
674 BRRD. Art. 32 (4) (c).
675 SRM. Recital (57).
161
able period could prevent the collapse, is performed by the ECB and the Single Resolution 
Board676. A systematic analysis the EU legal system leads to a conclusion that the assess-
ment of bank insolvency triggers and their adequacy, in particular the preparation of bank 
recovery and resolution plans, and at the same time the determination of financial condi-
tion of the bank must take into account additional, secondary considerations: the nature of 
the bank’s business, shareholder structure, legal form, risk model, size and legal status, as 
well as the interconnectedness with other financial institutions or the financial system in 
general, its scope of activities and complexity, whether it is the member of an institutional 
protection scheme or other cooperative mutual solidarity scheme, and whether it provides 
investment services or is engaged in investment activities and whether its collapse and sub-
sequent liquidation by means of ordinary bankruptcy proceedings could have significant 
adverse consequences for the financial markets, other institutions, financing conditions or 
the economy as a whole677. In the EU, the bank is considered to be failing or likely to fail, 
where: (i) private sector solutions and supervisory actions are unlikely to protect the bank 
from insolvency within a reasonable period of time, and when ordinary insolvency rules 
and procedures may pose threat to the public interest678; (ii) the competent authority or 
(under certain conditions) the resolution authority has determined that the bank is fail-
ing or likely to fail; (iii) with respect to time and other relevant circumstances, there is no 
reason to expect that by any alternative private sector solutions or supervisory action ap-
plied to the bank, including early intervention measures and write-off or conversion of ap-
propriate capital measures, bank failure would be avoided within a reasonable timeframe; 
(iii) resolution and/or liquidation action is necessary for the sake of the public interest679. 
However, the determination that a bank is failing or likely to fail remains the discretionary 
assessment of the relevant authorities and does not prevent the relevant authorities from 
taking into account other considerations signaling bank is failing or likely to fail.
Discretionary bank insolvency criteria were further developed in the US, by the Dodd-
Frank Act. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act provided for much more extensive legal regu-
lation of bank insolvency triggering events, supporting the interpretation of a potential 
bank default risk as potential insolvency risk, while associating insolvency conditions with 
the necessary protection of the financial stability of the United States680. Despite the fact 
that the proposed criteria allow the use of wider institutional discretion in determining 
the appropriate time for intervention681, the bank insolvency criteria must be assessed as 
a whole, before institutional intervention occurs. In the US legal system, a bank is failing 
or likely to fail is described by means of ‘in default or in danger of default’ doctrine. The 
676 SRM. Recital (26).
677 BRRD. Recital (14).
678 EBA. Consultation Paper. Draft Guidelines on the interpretation of the different circumstances when 
an institution shall be considered as failing or likely to fail under Article 32 (6) of Directive 2014/59/
EU. EBA/CP/2014/22. P. 6.
679 BRRD. Art. 32 (1).
680 Authorities may intervene in the following cases: (a) the financial institution is in danger of default; 
(b) bank failure would have serious negative consequences for the entire US financial stability; (c) no 
viable private sector means is available in order to avoid and prevent default; (d) no resolution actions 
would serve to prevent or mitigate such adverse effects; Dodd-Frank. Title II, 203 (b) (1) - (7) Unit.
681 Ibid. 203 (c) (4) chapter.
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bank is considered as failing or likely to fail if the following conditions are present: (a) the 
insolvency proceedings have been commenced or are likely to be initiated soon, in view of 
the financial position of the bank, as provided for and regulated in the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code; (b) the bank has suffered or is likely to suffer losses in the near future that 
will require all or a significant part of the bank’s capital and there is no reasonable prospect 
of avoiding capital loss; (c) the bank’s assets are or are likely to be lower than its liabilities 
to creditors and other persons or (d) the bank is incapable or is unlikely to be capable to 
fulfill its obligations (except for bona fide disputes) in the ordinary course of business682. In 
essence, the requirements are very similar to general conditions for initiating involuntary 
insolvency procedures in general bankruptcy law. In addition, these provisions of the Act 
require that the US Treasury must determine whether insolvency proceedings may be 
commenced under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, governing the enforcement of 
insolvency (bankruptcy) procedures. The primary criterion is that the company has suf-
fered or is likely to suffer losses that will minimise its assets, and the company’s activities 
will no longer be protected from such losses, the assets are less than liabilities to creditors, 
or the company is unable, or is likely to be unable to fulfill its obligation under normal 
business conditions683. Another very important insolvency criterion is that before starting 
the administrative actions, the Secretariat of the Treasury has to come to the conclusion 
that there is no other alternative financial solution to the problems, and that this would 
cause serious adverse consequences for the entire US financial stability. The Secretariat 
also has to determine that there are no other viable alternatives from the private sector 
to assist protection against bank defaults. Additional criterion to be taken into account in 
determining bank insolvency is that the Secretariat must assess the competing interests of 
the state, creditors, stakeholders, shareholders and ensure their proper balance. The Sec-
retariat only needs to determine whether the effect on the financial interests and creditor 
claims is ‘appropriate’, given the potential risks and threat to the US financial stability684. 
Among other things, in deciding on a particular bank’s insolvency, we need to assess how 
the collapse of the bank will ‘potentially increase the excess risk to creditors, parties and 
shareholders’685. Another important criterion relates to significant barriers and restrictions 
caused by general insolvency procedures. Before the Secretariat of the Treasury adopts its 
decision, it is necessary to obtain a recommendation both from the Federal Reserve Board 
and the FDIC. Two-thirds of the votes by the Federal Reserve Board members individually 
and two-thirds of the votes by the FDIC Board of Directors are required, and the FDIC 
must issue a recommendation on the start of the proposed bank insolvency procedures. 
This provision is open to criticism, because even three approvals are required to support 
the insolvency event. Two of the three permits depend on the will of public institutions, 
therefore, it must be assumed that determination of the grounds for bank insolvency also 
depends on the political will and their daily political pressures. Besides, considering bank 
insolvency, relevant provisions of US Bankruptcy Code should be taken into account686.
682 Dodd-Frank. 203 (b).
683 Ibid. 203 (b) (4).
684 Ibid. 203 (b) (4).
685 Ibid. 203 (b) (5).
686 US Bankruptcy Code. Title 11. Chapter 1. Sec. 101. (32).
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The new Swiss capital adequacy ordinance act was subjected to certain amendments. It 
established certain bank non-viability ‘thresholds’ guaranteeing both broad discretionary 
powers of intervention on the part of FINMA for assessing creditworthiness of the bank687. 
The conditions of bank insolvency in the Swiss legal system are governed by the Banking 
Law, which should be read systemically, in conjunction with the ordinance of the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority on the insolvency of banks and securities dealers. 
It can be concluded that there is no divide between the concepts of bank failing and likely 
to fail. When a bank is failing or likely to fail, the competent authority may intervene in 
the bank, where the actual situation meets the following conditions of bank insolvency: (i) 
insufficient level of capital and capital adequacy ratios, after FINMA gives time to correct 
these indicators; (ii) reasonable grounds to believe that the bank is overindebted; (iii) se-
vere liquidity problems688. If one or all of the following conditions are met, the supervisory 
authority may adopt a resolution on the use of individual protection measures689 alone 
or altogether, by starting bank restructuring690 or liquidation procedures691. According to 
the Banking Law, a bank is considered overindebted after it has been determined that the 
bank’s asset evaluation raises doubts about the bank’s viability, particularly in discharging 
creditors’ commitments. No formal evidence of overindebtedness is required. If special 
circumstances showing current or impending debt come into light, they are sufficient692. 
Finally, the bank experiencing serious liquidity problems is no longer considered to be 
able to fulfill its obligations. Bank liquidity ratios must be adequate to cover the bank’s 
liabilities that are already due or will become due in the near future, and the bank is no 
longer able to obtain more liquid cash in the market. In addition, by imposing prompt 
corrective actions, the competent authority may initiate bank restructuring, by adopting 
the appropriate resolution693. In adopting this resolution, FINMA shall also approve the 
restructuring plan, by, inter alia, identifying the insolvency triggering conditions. 
This chapter analysed the fundamental criteria for bank insolvency in different juris-
dictions. Attention should be paid to the fact that the preparation of technical, secondary 
acts is still in progress, the list of such criteria is expanding, by developing their more de-
tailed regulation. By optionally applying the micro - comparative method, we will examine 
the EU legal system in more detail. 
1.8.4. Peculiarities of Bank Insolvency Triggering Events and Criteria  
in the EU Legal System
On 22 September 2014 the EBA published a document (in the form of regulatory 
guidelines), which discusses different criteria leading to a situation when a bank is failing 
687 Swiss Federal Ordinance of 1 June 2012 on Capital Adequacy and Risk Diversification for Banks and 
Securities Dealers. Art. 29.
688 Swiss Banking law. Art. 25 (1).
689 Ibid. Art. 26.
690 Ibid. Art. 28-32.
691 Ibid. Art. 25 (2) d., Art. 33-37.
692 Swiss Federal Banking Commission decree published in SFBC, No. 48/2006, 2005. P. 271.
693 Swiss Banking law. Art. 41 (1).
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or likely to fail694. While in the EU legal framework determination of a bank’s failure or 
likelihood of failure depends on the discretion of the related competent authority in as-
sessing the insolvency status of the individual bank, the guidance nevertheless provides 
important technical criteria and requirements that must be relied on for assessing bank 
insolvency. The important aspect revealed is that even after identifying certain objective 
criteria bank insolvency procedures are not automatic. The discretionary determination 
of bank insolvency is followed. In each case, the competent authorities must decide on 
the basis of detailed facts and criteria (assessment of quantitative and qualitative criteria), 
taking into account all relevant circumstances and information of the particular bank695. 
In determining insolvency of a particular bank, the competent authorities primarily rely 
on the supervisor’s inspection results and the evaluation of assets and other insolvency in-
dicators696, corrective actions applied by the supervisory authorities or early intervention 
measures applied to a particular bank. In addition, the competent authorities shall take 
into account bank recovery options, depending on the bank assessment results and in ac-
cordance with the obligations laid down in Article 36 of Directive 2014/59/EU. The com-
petent authorities have the power enshrined in their national law to determine whether a 
bank is failing or is likely to fail, after consulting the appropriate authorities with regard 
to the determination of insolvency. They also need to perform autonomous insolvency 
assessment based on objective factors and criteria, primarily set out in those guidelines697. 
In view of the results obtained at the time of supervisory review and evaluation process698, 
and the duty placed under the Directive that conventional procedures and methodology, 
including assessment of the organisation and risk treatment, shall be governed by the 
EBA guidelines, the competent authority shall determine the requirements and evaluate 
whether the bank still meets the performance requirements for banks so that they are able 
to implement and continue their activities. 
There following general criteria are applied for determining bank insolvency: capital 
adequacy, liquidity, requirements providing the basis for operation (license) or its extension 
(including the agreements of managing bodies, and administrative and operational capac-
ity of the banks). The competent authority shall justify its decision with regard to the bank 
insolvency or imminent insolvency on the basis of the results of the supervisory review 
and, where possible, consider the following additional sources of information: (a) results 
arising from the application of surveillance measures and early intervention measures, if 
applied; (b) results arising from the bank’s assets and liabilities699; (c) reports received from 
the bank, where the bank considers and treats itself as failing or likely to fail700. The capital 
position is seen as bad when the bank violates the statutory requirements for own funds, 
and disposes of the assets whose value is less than its liabilities701. In assessing the bank’s 
694 EBA. Consultation Paper. Supra note 678.
695 Ibid. P. 4.
696 Directive 2013/36/EU. Art. 97, 107.
697 Dodd-Frank. Section 3, Title II.
698 Directive 2013/36/ES. Supra note 107. Art. 97., Art. 107.
699 Directive 2014/59/EU. Art. 36.
700 EBA. Consultation Paper. Supra note 678. P. 14-15.
701 Directive 2013/36/EU. Art. 104 (1) (a). 
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assets and liabilities, the competent authority, inter alia, takes into account the risks and 
indicators arising from the supervisory inspection, activation (perspective) of the bank’s 
recovery plan, asset quality requirements set by national laws or the SSM, showing impor-
tant signals that the bank assets have declined702. 
In determining the fact of bank insolvency, the competent authority may use an extra 
set of insolvency criteria: (a) the threat to the recovery of the bank’s viability, given the sig-
nificant increase in the financing costs to the level unbearable for the bank; very likely or 
important reduction in bank balance sheet; (b) decrease in the net fair value of the bank’s 
assets, liabilities, contingent liabilities and reserves; (c) significant adverse changes in the 
macroeconomic environment, which may affect the financial situation of the bank and its 
viability, including the related changes in the interest market, real estate prices and value 
changes or economic growth. These changes have a potentially important adverse effect on 
the business model, the results of bank revenue, its future viability and long-term growth; 
(d) indicators reflecting financial market confidence, i.e. that the bank’s solvency require-
ments were severely damaged and caused adverse effects for market interests or the finan-
cial situation and viability of the bank can be upset or put at risk, including, but not limited 
to, reduced bank accounting value or sudden drop in economic activity (leverage change); 
(e) significant and long-term (not temporary) deterioration of the bank’s financial situa-
tion or violation of prudential requirements, by assessing the relevant market indicators, 
including, where possible, capital-based indicators (e. g. share price) or indicators based 
on debt (e.g. credit default swap or subordinated debt differences). These parameters shall 
indicate that the bank may suffer losses that could potentially jeopardise its solvency and 
operational continuity703. 
Liquidity situation in the bank. It is presumed that the competent authority is aware of 
the risks inherent in banking activities and sustainable bank performance indicators to be 
measured and the related information to be collected through supervisory intervention. 
Activation of the bank recovery plan and the subsequent collapse, by implementing the 
selected bank recovery options serves as one of the liquidation criteria. For example, in 
cases where the implementation of the bank recovery plan by the competent authority 
was used as an early intervention instrument in accordance with Article 27(1) of Direc-
tive 2014/59/EU. Another criterion related to bank liquidity concerns significant adverse 
developments, affecting bank liquidity developments and funding profile in one way or 
another. Failure to comply with minimum liquidity requirements under EU Regulation 
No. 575/2013 (Art. 105) can be a key factor in determining bank insolvency. This can 
concern any national minimum liquidity requirements for banks. Among other things, 
it is important to determine whether liquidity problems are not temporary in nature, and 
the negative change of bank liquidity protection (stocks) and liquidity counterbalancing 
capacity704 is essential. In assessing the liquidity position of the bank, the following factors 
could be taken into account: (a) reliable liquidity inflows, including under various lines of 
credit and liquidity, i.e. any prospective contractual receipts and payments; (b) the ability 
702 Directive 2013/36/ EU Art. 104-105. Directive 2014/59/EU Art. 27 (1) (a). Directive 2014/59/EU. Art 36.
703 EBA. Supra note 678. P. 16-17.
704 Liquidity leverage counter weight capacity means the amount of cash that the bank can obtain for 
liquidity needs. The liquidity reserve is defined as the counterbalancing capacity of short-term stress 
situation scenario.
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to renew funding; the ability to access long-term financing sources; (c) the state of emer-
gency severely reducing or even suppressing liquidity, liquidity (loan-funded) line from 
partners or other counterparties; (d) increased non-temporary financing costs to an un-
stable level, particularly caused by increased costs (such as loan yields and differences) for 
unprotected assets and limitations of refinancing options; (e) significant negative develop-
ment of current and future obligations of the bank. The assessment of the bank’s obligations 
must take into account: (i) the expected bank liabilities (liquidity) flows, including claims 
by bank counterparties for the right to demand redemption of shares or obligations and 
other emerging factors which could lead to potential massive deposit withdrawal from 
banks; (ii) expected collateral requirements and lack of adequate collateral; (iii) any other 
foreseeable liabilities, including those arising from guaranteed credit lines or other liquid-
ity lines (loans); (iv) the situation of bank payments, the changes in the existing clearing 
and settlement systems, or any other indicators implying that the bank is experiencing 
difficulties in meeting the commitments or in making payments in the clearing or settle-
ment systems; (iv) the progress that is likely to adversely affect the bank’s reputation and 
importantly reduce the bank’s credit rating set by one or several rating agencies, if this can 
influence important bank revenue, restrict funding options or activation of contractual 
conditions based on external ratings. 
The essential requirements for banking authorisation. A competent authority may re-
voke the bank’s license, inter alia, when the bank: (i) no longer meets the prudential re-
quirements set out in the third, fourth or sixth parts of EU Regulation No. 575/2013 or 
under the provisions of Articles 104 (1) and 105 of Directive 2013/36/EU; (ii) there is no 
evidence that the bank will continue to carry out its obligations to creditors, and will no 
longer protect the property entrusted by creditors, or (iii) will violate one of the require-
ments laid down in points a to p of Article 67 (1) of Directive 2013/36/EU705. The resolu-
tion authority shall consider, inter alia, the existence and the level of importance of the 
shortcomings identified by the bank’s managing bodies, for example, board arrangements, 
and whether operational capacity of the bank will materially affect the economic credibil-
ity of the bank and its ability to provide banking/investment services. 
Bank management system. Bank insolvency evaluation criteria serve to determine 
whether a bank experiences serious financial problems and defects in its governance sys-
tem, which can in many cases together with other objective elements be related to capital 
and liquidity ratios and lead to license revocation. The following criteria can be distin-
guished: (a) significant, inaccurate reports and financial statements addressed to the su-
pervisory authorities, in particular decisions on the refusal of qualified external audits; 
(b) unduly protracted negotiations within the bank’s internal managing bodies, which ac-
cordingly leads to the inability to timely make fundamental decisions; (c) the differences 
and non-compliance with the primary bank management procedures and systems, which 
may altogether lead to serious violations of prudential requirements. For instance, differ-
ences in assets. In essence, these are cases of violation of substantial law, regulated by the 
primary bank governance arrangements, which could cause severe negative impact on the 
bank and lead to the reasons for revoking the banking license. Some examples are worth 
mentioning: (a) inadequate strategic planning, low risk and acceptable risk level; (b) lack 
705 Directive 2013/36/EU. Art. 18.
167
of risk control by the managing bodies, material weaknesses leading to the inability of 
the bank to identify, manage and report on existing bank risks experienced at the mo-
ment or in the near future; (c) ignoring significant weaknesses, disparities, irregularities 
and problems not reported to senior management in a proper and timely fashion; (d) 
inadequate internal control system and mechanisms; (e) significant reputational losses 
(“fit and proper” criteria) arising from the fact that the competence and eligibility of the 
persons appointed fails to comply with the legislative requirements; (f) operational risk 
of individual bank employees performing important functions in the bank, and signifi-
cant reputation damage resulting from such risk (lack of transparency in business and 
operations or incomplete/inaccurate/incorrect information disclosure to the competent 
authorities; (g) major litigation or disputes risk, especially with regard to the actions of the 
appointed and employed persons in performing the key functions of the bank; (h) major 
non-compliance with renumeration706. 
Operational capacity to provide services. These are certain objective elements that may 
adversely affect the operational capability (both financial and administrative) and func-
tioning of the bank to provide banking and investment services, even without violating 
own funds and liquidity requirements. These are legally undefined circumstances and 
events that cannot be removed at the right time and in an efficient manner, but that must 
be taken into consideration when assessing bank insolvency. The following negative indi-
cators can be distinguished: (i) the bank is unable to continue to implement its obligations 
to creditors successfully and, in particular, it can no longer ensure the protection of assets 
entrusted by depositors; (ii) the bank is unable to make or receive payments and, therefore, 
cannot properly pursue banking activities; (iii) by reason of operational risks, the bank 
loses market and depositor confidence, which leads to a situation in which the bank is no 
longer able to carry out its business and activities successfully (for example, the reluctance 
of other banks or third parties concerned to conclude a transaction providing capital to 
the bank and if the existing bank counterparties seek to terminate their contracts, includ-
ing massive withdrawal of deposits)707.
As bank financing and liquidity is highly dependent on market confidence, it must be 
assumed that the determination of bank insolvency guided only by quantitative criteria is 
not possible. If the required quantitative criteria are poorly developed in legislation, there 
is a risk that a viable and healthy bank(s) may be inaccurately placed under the bank insol-
vency procedure or fall within the scope of special bank resolution regime. This raises the 
question of the degree of discretionary criteria to be adduced to the competent authorities. 
The wider the discretion given to public institutions, the higher the risk of excessive con-
trol by the regulatory authorities. However, it must be considered that certain flexibility is 
necessary for the public authorities in order to appropriately respond to a broad range of 
banking crisis scenarios. From a practical perspective, it is impossible to determine and 
legally define in advance the precise criteria and circumstances under which the bank 
will need to start insolvency proceedings. In any case, the criteria discussed above are an 
appropriate sign to the shareholders and the bank to assess the effects of the deteriorated 
706 EBA. Supra note 678. P. 21.
707 Ibid.
168
financial position of the bank and to provide the bank with last chance to recover the situ-
ation before the intervention of public authorities.
1.9. Concluding Remarks 
It is undeniably easier to define a banking crisis rather than to identify and assess its 
extent ex ante. Banks, described in the doctrine as inherently risky business entities and 
naturally unstable financial institutions, in particular, in view of their specific liquidity 
provisions (and other insolvency risk-related differences, as compared to the ordinary 
course of business entities), which, although add a particular added value to bank cus-
tomers, nevertheless fail to protect against bank runs. Excessively frequent cases of de-
posit withdrawals can encourage the banks to promptly liquidate its assets, by incurring 
significant asset sales costs (such as execution costs for bailiffs or auction costs), which 
could affect the bank’s ability to successfully discharge the remaining obligations to its 
depositors. Such cases of massive deposit withdrawal can induce public concern with 
regard to the financial solvency of the bank and lead to panic and moral hazards in the 
market. In all cases, banking crisis is indissociable from one or more bank insolvency 
cases and the ensuing government intervention for solving the problems faced by the 
distressed bank, as they relate to the public interest. While the debate on the narrow-
ing of banking activities as a preventive measure for bank insolvency is still ongoing, it 
must be considered that the reduction of banking activities in the future might poten-
tially help minimising the risks related to banking activities (it is necessary to make a 
detailed economic cost-benefit analysis before choosing a particular regulatory model) 
and would produce a preventive effect, but would not assist to fully avoid bank insolven-
cies. At the same time, the need to find regulatory solutions for banking concentration 
problems was endorsed by the G30, by suggesting that large, systemically significant 
financial institutions should be restricted in their activities that can lead to potentially 
very significant risks or serious conflicts of interest708. Although banking activities are 
particularly affected by the public interest, but bank insolvency is an inevitable conse-
quence of the economic cycle. In order to mitigate the economic consequences of bank 
failures as much as possible, general insolvency law is not enough. Therefore, in view of 
the effects of the recent banking crisis, the aim for more effective resolution of bank in-
solvency problems according to international financial standards the paradigm of bank 
insolvency law has shifted. Special laws came into being. This led to a particular bank 
resolution regime and changes and/or significant modifications of the types of bank 
insolvency procedures. The central role in the general conception of bank insolvency 
law is placed on clear identification and determination of bank insolvency triggers and 
the qualitative, quantitative, and discretionary criteria. This is particularly important, 
first of all, due to the fact that, as demonstrated in practice, the ad hoc solutions are 
unsuitable (ineffective, related to political risk, etc.), as in the situations of bank run 
predictable, precise, timely intervention by the competent authorities in the activities of 
the bank plays a crucial role.
708 Group of Thirty. Financial Reform A Framework for Financial Stability. 2009.
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II. REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION  
OF BANK RESOLUTION
Until the latest banking crisis, bank resolution or restructuring709 had been normally 
interpreted as the process of resolution of a failing or likely to fail bank, bank liquida-
tion, sale of bank business, or various forms of recapitalisation, including ad hoc public 
financing. A number of bank asset recovery and resolution procedures, such as equity 
recapitalisation or government financial stabilisation tools, were considered to be a bank 
resolution710. Bank resolution strategies were divided into two key solutions: i) private sec-
tor assisted solutions711; ii) public sector assisted solutions712.
In the first case, bank shareholders should have the responsibility to transform a bank 
facing financial difficulties by means of recapitalisation, i.e., by attracting additional capi-
tal in order to prevent its liquidation. If shareholders were unable to recapitalise a failing 
or likely to fail bank to a legal limit but they were fit and proper, the bank was still deemed 
viable and so a going concern. Such an undercapitalised and likely to fail bank, though, 
not meeting the criteria of insolvency laid down in the law, was allowed to remain in the 
system under more strict conditions of conduct or subject to any other prudent regula-
tion. For example, the bank’s recapitalisation could be phased and involve tighter monitor-
ing and supervision of its activities and impose special additional requirements, prudent 
regulation measures such as suspension of dividend distributions until the required level 
of capital was restored. If the major shareholders, however, failed to recapitalise the bank 
adequately, the next usual step was to seek the assistance of other minority shareholders or 
additional support in financial markets. Eventually, if the above mentioned measures did 
not work, the financial difficulties of a bank would be addressed through the classic meth-
ods of bank resolution: a bank might be put into was liquidation, its assets and liabilities 
709 Regarding the terminology, it should be highlighted that the legal doctrine found uses, for example, 
both the bank restructuring and bank resolution terms and concepts. Occasionally, it is referred that 
these terms are used in parallel. For example, see. Hoelscher D.S. Supra note 2. However, the author of 
the dissertation operates the concept of bank resolution, arguing that this theory is more modern in 
the doctrine, prevailing after the change of bank insolvency law paradigm, moreover, it is enshrined 
in the EU legal framework, and in the Banking Union legislation. On the other hand at the same time, 
it should be noted that the content of these terms according to their content is virtually identical. 
Resolution concept anchored in the The related legislation in the EU and the US related legislation, 
use the term ‘resolution’, meanwhile in Switzerland the term ‘restructuring’ term is used.
710 Hoelscher D.S. Supra note 2. P. 12.
711 When a bank facing financial difficulties approaches a point requiring formal intervention by public 
authorities, the supervisory authority first takes prompt corrective actions in order to strengthen the 
bank’s activities. Such actions could amount to any restructuring efforts, such as planning sale of busi-
ness. These efforts are generally described as ‘private sector solutions’ and do not necessarily cause 
extra costs to the insured. However, governments might incur costs, e.g. while writing-off assets or 
reducing tax-related liabilities of the bank. (in) Supra note 27. Financial Crises management and Bank 
resolutions. Protecting creditors of Insolvent Banks: How should the rights of different types of credi-
tors be best managed? Chapter 13. P. 220.
712 Ibid.
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might be sold (if permitted by law), the bank might be sold in part or in full (franchise), or 
the bank might be nationalised713. 
In the second case, failure of the private sector solutions and further distress of a bank 
would not necessarily result in the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings or bank liquida-
tion. For example, financial and operational circumstances might force a bank to seek pub-
lic support and take appropriate decisions on state aid714. Public sector assistance would 
be based on a variety of financial sustainability measures, the most popular of which were 
joint recapitalisation schemes715 (recapitalisation of both shareholders and the state), bank 
resolution through purchase-and-assumption transactions, or other method of sale where 
public funds are used to back transferred liabilities or guarantee asset values, or bank na-
tionalisation (with a view to future re-privatisation)716. 
The recent banking crisis has demonstrated a lack of insolvency laws, limitations in 
national legal regulations, and that international bank resolution procedures were neither 
harmonised nor unified, and there was no single conceptual approach to a bank resolution 
regime717. Bank resolution results, accordingly, were not appropriate enough. As discussed 
above, G20 states adopted new international financial standards for bank resolutions718. 
Such international standards assisted in reforming national bank resolution regimes by 
pursuing a practical and consistent approach toward legal regulation. Analysis of the doc-
trine shows that, before the new paradigm of bank resolution regime, the following major 
factors limited the effectiveness of bank resolution procedures: 
1. The law did not grant sufficient powers to competent authorities to write off debt 
instruments of bank shareholders and convert them into capital. Thus, a need 
emerged to form legal tools to enable bank supervisory authorities to reduce 
shareholders’ equity, by converting debt to capital, in order to facilitate the bank 
resolution process and maintain the bank as a going concern. In addition, bank 
management bodies and shareholders facing financial difficulties often retained 
legal rights719. Public authorities had to use the powers granted by shareholders 
and management bodies of the bank in resolution proceedings to sell the bank’s 
assets and property under the right circumstances.
2. The law restricted the powers of competent resolution authorities to effectively 
restructure a failing or likely to fail bank. Many supervisory authorities faced re-
713 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 42-43.
714 The aim of public financial assistance aims – is to reduce and limit the insolvent bank’s costs to the real 
economy, if in a particular jurisdiction finds itself at the threshold of a bank or many banks or a bank 
performing systemically important functions find themselves at the threshold of insolvency or bank 
is engaged in systemically important functions.
715 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. Criteria and Incentives in the Recapitalization Scheme. P. 69-70.
716 The restructuring measures were generally selected on ad hoc basis, and bank resolution, in particular, 
resulted from the choice of certain restructuring strategies selected in accordance with bank’s finan-
cial performance assessment procedure.
717 FSB. Thematic review on resolution regimes, 2013.
718 Key Attributes. Supra note 90.
719 In some cases, shareholders maintained broad control rights even after the declaration of the bank’s 
insolvency, while taking part in the ordinary bankruptcy proceedings with a significant part of their 
claims.
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strictions on the sale or transfer of assets of a failing bank or part thereof. For ex-
ample, the law required the approval of shareholders (the requirement associated 
with corporate law provisions). Under such regulation, the public authorities 
were not able to prevent a negative impact on the economy or take cost-reducing 
bank resolution actions720. 
3. The legislation granted quite a weak mandate to supervisory, deposit insur-
ance, and other resolution authorities involved in the bank resolution process. 
Therefore, over time, there emerged the need to review the legal regulation of 
the public authorities and to set a clear organizational framework, organizational 
arrangements, structure, and decision-making mechanisms, which, respectively, 
allowed the authorities to be adequately funded and to have competent manage-
ment bodies, such as a board consisting of reputable professionals.
4. The law did not always prescribe adequate and comprehensively regulated bank 
resolution tools721, which would empower early and prompt actions to be taken by 
public authorities within a weekend during a banking crisis, while the bank was still 
solvent722. The bank resolution regulation was fundamentally inadequate, i.e. legally 
defective723. Thus, legislation that regulated legal relations in bank insolvency had to 
be supplemented with clear and detailed legal measures for bank resolution. 
5. With some exceptions724, judges’ knowledge of banking matters proved insuf-
ficient. Judges had only limited knowledge of the banking sector, which, in some 
cases, impeded the resolution of banks under a general insolvency law.
6. It was obvious that a bank resolution carried significant political risk in almost all 
cases (the promptness and quality of decision-making partly depended on politi-
cal will) 725.
7. A lack of legal protection for creditors, depositors and shareholders in bank 
resolution procedures was highlighted. For effective application of bank resolu-
tion tools, resolution authorities must be legally enabled to suspend creditors’ or 
720 For example, a comparison was made for bank resolution and bankruptcy costs were compared in the 
case of bank Lehman Brothers insolvency. The FDIC came into the conclusion that at the special bank 
resolution regime, if the special laws scope would be covered by investment firms came within the 
scope of operation of special laws, this type of solution for a distressed bank’s solutions would cause 
losses by the extent of extending to 3 cents for 1 dollar, while in the case of bankruptcy cases, the 
loss would be amount to 79 cents to for $ USD 1. FDIC. Press Release describing the Lechman OLA 
report. FDIC. The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Vol. 5, No. 2, 2011. Fleming M., Sarkar A. The Failure Resolution of Lechman Brothers. Fed. Res.Bank, 
NY, Economic Policy Review, Vol. 20, 2014.
721 BCBS. Supra note 15.
722 Hüpkes E. Resolving Crises in Global Financial Institutions: The Functional Approach Revisited. 
Shortcomings of Existing Resolution Regimes. (in) Supra note 27. Chapter 18. P. 294.
723 Therefore, many legal and practical issues and additional risks arose in practice due to potential 
breaches of creditor or shareholder rights by applying bank resolution tools.
724 US Bankruptcy Court. Case No. 08-13555. Opinion on Motions Seeking Modification of the Sale Or-
der Pursuant to Rule 60 (B), The Trust EE‘S Motion For Relief Under The SIPA Sale Order, Barclays‘ 
Cro SS-Motion to Enforce the Sale Orders and Adjudication of Related Adversary Proceedings, 2011. 
See more The Sale Motion of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Docket No. 60. P. 4.
725 Hoelscher D.S. Supra note 2. P. 14-15.
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counterparties’ rights to run enforcement activities; in addition, contracts with a 
failing bank must be completed, accelerated, or otherwise terminated. The com-
petent authorities need time to identify and evaluate the contracts to be handed 
over to a solvent third party without the risk of any change in value or scope of 
financial contracts upon exercise of the contract cancellation rights by the coun-
terparties. 
8. In pursuance of financial stability, restrictions for termination of creditor con-
tracts or the right to terminate the contract was not properly taken into account. 
Counterparties’ legal safeguards were underestimated as well. A need arose to 
protect the right of shareholders and creditors to a part of a claim not lower than 
that which they would receive in a case of ordinary insolvency procedures. More-
over, a judicial review of the decisions on bank resolution was not sufficiently 
regulated in cases of restricted legal proceedings. 
9. Some banks were systemically important to the national economy and there were 
issues in applying general insolvency laws to them. Up until the financial crisis of 
2007, creditors, regulators and investors underestimated serious problems in the 
financial stability of large, multinational banks, as well as the consequences that 
might arise from insufficiently regulated bank insolvency procedures726. During 
that era highly complex international financial systems were created consisting of 
a variety of credit institutions operating in different financial markets. Insolvency 
hit systemically large financial institutions such as Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, Fortis, etc. Another major problem lay within the scope of 
the application of bank insolvency procedures that did not cover a vast variety 
of banks: investment firms, government-supported mortgage lenders, and other 
significant entities, e.g., hedge funds or specialized private equity firms727. There 
were prevailing presumptions in the market that some banks were too big to be 
subject to liquidations procedures, as economic hazard would automatically be 
caused. For example, there was no regulation to establish, which banking op-
erations were considered critical to the stability of the overall financial system, 
and no resolution mechanism available to safeguard debtors or creditors against 
financial difficulties but also to protect public finances when addressing bank 
solvency concerns728.
10. Physical assets of a distressed bank are often valued too highly, and the bank 
continues to operate as a going concern, even though facing financial difficulties. 
A need arose to provide additional rights to parties concerned. Currently, for 
example, both private and public entities may reach a compromise through the 
comprehensive regulation of bank resolution tools that might foster or, at least, 
maintain a bank’s value and the going concern presumption729. 
726 Kkkoris I. Failing Firm Defence in Failing Markets. (in) Supra note 27, 2009. P. 258.
727 Knight D.M. Mitigating Moral Hazard in Dealing With Problem Financial Institutions: Too Big To 
Fail? Too Complex To Fail? Too interconnected to Fail? Banking Law Symposium. (in) Supra note 27. 
Chapter 16.
728 Rolef W. Supra note 593. P. 207. Hüpkes E. Supra note 737. P. 296-301.
729 Kkkoris I. Supra note 726.The Case For Bank Mergers. P. 260-261.
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2.1. Concept of the Bank Resolution Regime 
Different experiences of the banking crisis in a number of countries has proven that 
general insolvency legislation is not always appropriate for effective resolution of a failing 
bank, as it fails to acknowledge the necessity to avoid compromising financial stability, 
and to continue to provide essential services and protect depositors730. Bank bankruptcy 
proceedings are time-consuming731, while their reorganisation requires complicated nego-
tiations and arrangements with creditors, with the duration, costs, and outcomes causing 
losses to both debtors and creditors. Following the implementation of international finan-
cial standards and the agreement reached by the G20 leaders, member states were obliged 
to incorporate special legal regimes for bank resolution into their national law.
Clarification of which legislative measures and what, in general, should be considered 
as “bank resolution” requires a more comprehensive analysis. The use of this term in bank-
ing and in the overall jurisprudence is not consistent. The terms of bank restructuring 
and/or resolution had been used in legal doctrine prior to the financial crisis, however, it is 
worth noting that an attempt was made to define and standardize bank resolution process 
after the last financial crisis in order to comply with international financial standards. In 
addition, national positive law was substantially modified.
Bank resolution is defined in jurisprudence as the application of bank resolution tools. 
Certain bank resolution tools are provided to competent authorities by law. They are 
aimed at bank restructuring and/or at triggering a normal liquidation of a failing or likely 
to fail bank. These objectives of bank resolution can only be achieved where the regime 
allows for early, quick, and broad actions to be taken by a resolution authority as soon as a 
bank appears to be in financial risk732.
The bank resolution definition is considered to have been first used by several experts 
who acted in the legal framework of bank insolvency– Eva Hüpkes733, Tobias Asser734 and 
David S. Hoelscher735. They were among the pioneering experts who used the term of bank 
730 See more 1 chapter 4 sec. 2 sub-sec.
731 For example, the Swiss bank Spar und Leihkasee Thun bankruptcy case was very chaotic and liquida-
tion proceedings lasted for 14 years. Supra note 42. P. 6.
732 Bliss R, Kaufman G., Supra note 75. P. 3.
733 Bank resolution is implemented in two fundamental ways: (i) through bank reorganisation proce-
dure; (ii) through bank liquidation procedure (liquidation of assets). In her later publications, the 
author uses the term of bank resolution to describe all forms of public actions, including or excluding 
the involvement of the private sector, seeking to address solvency problems of the distressed financial 
institution threatening its viability. Hüpkes E., Devos D. Cross-border Bank Resolution: A reform 
agenda. (in) Giovanoli M., Devos D. International monetary and financial law, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010, P. 36. Hüpkes E. Supra note 71. P. 83.
734 Asser T.M.C. Legal Aspects of Regulatory Treatment of Banks in Distress. Washington DC, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2001. Chapter XI. P. 141. Bank resolution procedures are utilized to transform 
the bank having financial difficulties and solve the bank’s financial difficulties. Therefore, in general, 
the bank resolution procedures can be performed only when the bank starts the formal administra-
tion procedures or insolvency proceedings.
735 The author uses both concepts of bank restructuring and bank resolution. Bank resolution is de-
scribed as a bank resolution tool, which, according to the relevant national legal regulation, available 
for resolving the financial problems of particular banks. They are all alternative legal bank resolution 
measures that are likely to be less dangerous to the economy, including the sale of the bank or transfer 
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resolution to describe the legislative techniques that could be applied to the resolution, 
disposal and/or liquidation of banks in the context of bank insolvency procedures, regard-
less of their legal basis (general insolvency law or special insolvency or administrative 
provisions)736. Later, the understanding of bank resolution was developed more widely by 
other reputable scholars, such as R.M. Lastra, R.Bliss and G.Kaufman737. Further, inter-
national regulators of financial systems have unified the bank resolution concept: i) FSB 
thematic review on resolution regimes and subsequent peer review reports define bank 
resolution as “any action taken by a public authority in respect of a [bank] that meets the 
conditions for entry into resolution, including in particular the exercise of a resolution 
power with or without private sector involvement, with the aim of achieving one or more 
of the statutory objectives of resolution. Resolution may include the application of proce-
dures under insolvency law ...in conjunction with the exercise of resolution powers”738; ii) 
IMF describes the bank resolution as “the bank’s financial situation...diagnosed in the con-
text of official administration [intervention, seeking] to restructure the [failing or likely to 
fail] bank’s business with a view to securing its continuation...as rapidly as possible, in a 
manner that minimizes disruptions to the financial system and limits costs to depositors, 
other creditors, and taxpayers.739” 
Bank resolution in its narrow definition can be described as special bank insolvency 
procedures and/or legal regime of bank restructuring designed solely to regulate and deal 
with bank distress in order to ensure the continuity of essential functions of a bank, to 
preserve financial stability, and to restore the viability of all or part of that bank740. In 
light of peculiarities of the banking activities, the bank resolution regime offers tools to 
address financial difficulties of banks outside the general bankruptcy laws, to suspend 
direct formal bankruptcy procedures against the insolvent bank, but first of all, to prevent 
potential adverse effects or additional risks that may arise immediately after closing the 
bank’s activities, revocation of banking license, declaration of bank insolvency, and com-
mencement of liquidation procedures.
In an economic sense, bank resolution is a situation where an operating part of a busi-
ness entity facing financial difficulties or all activities (business) of it are subject to re-
structuring on a going concern basis, and/or, if the continuation of the bank’s activities is 
of bank assets, rights and liabilities. The author defines bank resolution as a long-term process, often 
requiring to create new laws concerning the establishment or revision of old, and as certain restruc-
turing strategies for development, such as liquidation of the bank, the bank’s business sales or bank 
recapitalization, restructuring or in order to recover the bank’s assets, activities and procedures. The 
restructuring strategy in the broad sense is divided into private and public sector solutions. Hoelscher 
D.S. Supra note 2. Introduction. P. 12-13.
736 Insolvency problems can also be addressed by using early intervention measures. They serve to pre-
serve the value of the bank’s assets, to protect depositors and to limit moral hazards. Kkkoris I. Supra 
note 726. P. 259.
737 Scientists explains the definition of bank resolution in a very broad sense. Bliss R., Kaufman G. Supra 
note 75. P. 3.
738 FSB. Thematic review on resolution regimes. Peer review Report. Principle No. 3, 2013. P. 6.
739 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 35.
740 Schillig M. Supra note 47. P. 67. Among other things, the concept of bank resolution well-established 
in the publications of international organizations, explaining the bank’s insolvency legal relations.
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impossible, the failing bank gradually and duly terminates it‘s operation in a normal way 
by liquidating its business in whole or in part741.
From a legal perspective, bank resolution may result in either the bank continuation as 
a legal entity or the dissolution of it‘s legal personality742. Therefore, bank resolution is in 
essence associated with any kind of intervention by a public authority to a bank’s activities. 
Official competent authorities conduct intervention in order to mitigate financial trouble 
suffered by a bank and potential negative consequences of its failure, to enhance or restore 
the bank’s viability, not to avoid the bank’s collapse in negative consequences in full, but, 
at least, to minimise their impact.
In the broad sense, bank resolution covers all legal banking crisis management tools 
to preserve a positive financial stability and, where necessary, to encourage an ordinary 
procedure for liquidating all or part of the financial institution743. Similarly, bank resolu-
tion denotes the set of legal arrangements establishing insolvency and quasi-insolvency 
procedures for restructuring and/or liquidation of a bank facing financial difficulties744. 
In case of financial system crises, bank resolution is associated with ad hoc state inter-
vention solutions outside the legal framework of bank resolution, in order to support 
the banking sector, through extreme state-level stabilisation measures. “Resolution” 
could also be understood as the use of certain intervention tools in the doctrine, known 
as government stabilisation tools. Such governmental actions encompass every conceiv-
able response of authorities when facing the bank’s actual or imminent failure745. Thus, 
in a broad sense, bank resolution is a diverse set of administrative and legal measures to 
deal with the failing corporate governance system of a bank. That is - formal bank insol-
vency proceedings aimed at restructuring or liquidating banks, which have crossed the 
relevant legal bank resolution threshold and meet bank resolution objectives. Moreover, 
bank resolution is understood as private sector arrangements, decisions or transactions 
that the competent authorities initiate, such as sale of business or asset separation trans-
actions leading to the transfer of the failed bank’s operations, in whole or in part, to a 
viable financial institution, and serves continuation on a going-concern basis746. In other 
words, it is a large variety of legal measures to prevent ordinary insolvency proceed-
ings747.
How is bank resolution regulated and construed in the legislative systems of the rel-
evant jurisdictions? Within the EU legal framework, bank resolution is understood as the 
application of a resolution tool (business sale, asset separation, bridge bank, bail-in) in 
order to achieve one or more of the resolution objectives748. In Switzerland, bank resolu-
741 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 15.
742 Ibid.
743 Hadjiemmanil C. Supra note 79. P. 12.
744 Ibid. P. 12-13.
745 Dewatripont M., Freixas X. Bank Resolution: Lessons from the Crisis. (in) Supra note 292. P. 106. 
Bank resolution is linked to the restoration of normal business conditions.
746 Dewatripont M., Freixas X. Bank resolution: a framework for the assesment of regulatory intervention. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2011. P. 415-420.
747 Hadjiemmanil C. Supra note 79. P. 12.
748 BRRD. Art. 2 (1) (1).
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tion is associated with a statutory concept of bank restructuring749. The Swiss Banking Act 
describes bank restructuring as one of the main bank insolvency procedures750. Bank re-
structuring is explicitly interpreted as the application of a bank restructuring plan, serving 
as an optimal protection of creditors’ and shareholders’ interests against insolvency. The 
prospect of restructuring the bank or continuing individual banking services is justified if, 
at the time of the decision, there is sufficient evidence that creditors are likely to fare better 
from the restructuring than from the bankruptcy751. The US legal framework widely applies 
a bank resolution concept. Bank resolution is associated with private measures of bank 
restructuring, which allows for bank viability through the management of financial trou-
ble in both large and complex financial institutions and ordinary banks as well as through 
avoiding adverse effects and costs to taxpayers752. Under this research, a bank’s resolution 
is interpreted in accordance with the EU regulatory framework. Bank resolution applies to 
any type of bank – both those that are “too big to fail” and other banks.
In summary, it should be concluded that the bank resolution in its broad sense means 
the whole of bank restructuring efforts. The term is correlated with the bank insolvency 
jurisdiction, which defines bank resolution in more detail. Bank resolution is also directly 
linked to bank resolution objectives753. In the narrow meaning, it is bank restructuring 
intended to ensure the continuity of essential functions of a bank, to preserve financial 
stability, and to restore the viability of all or part of that bank. Bank resolution should 
be understood as restructuring of activities of a separate bank, which faces financial dif-
ficulties. A bank is restructured by means of a certain bank resolution tool. Scientific 
literature usually interprets bank resolution as all bank resolution methods that assure 
the speedy availability of funds for depositors and other creditors754. The general rule is 
that, if there is no threat to financial stability or taxpayers in the opinion of the supervi-
sory authorities, a bank (or its individual parts) may fail in the normal way, therefore, a 
bank’s resolution is an alternative to ordinary bankruptcy proceedings. The goal of bank 
resolution is to remove an insolvent bank from the financial system whilst ensuring that 
investors’ and public confidence in the banking sector is maintained, to minimize nega-
tive consequences for taxpayers and the public, to restructure a bank facing financial 
trouble, and to duly control legal and economic risks. Given the fact that the failure of 
the banking system would prejudice interests of virtually all members of society, as well 
as their rights of ownership, the stability and reliability of the banking system should be 
considered to be of public interest to be defended by the State in carrying out its constitu-
tional functions (e.g., p. 1 of Art. 23, p. 3, 4 of Art. 46 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Lithuania). 
749 FINMA. New Banking Insolvency Ordinance. A key element in the effective restructuring and orderly 
market exit of banks, 2012 [interactive]. P. 2. [accessed on 2014-12-05] <http://www.finma.ch/e/regu-
lierung/anhoerungen/Documents/fb-biv-finma-e.pdf>. Swiss banking law. Art. 28.
750 Swiss Banking law. Art. 28-33.
751 Swiss Ordinance. 3 Section, Art. 40.
752 Dodd Frank. Title II. Section 203. FDIA Section 10(b)(3).
753 See more 2 chapter, 3 sec.
754 Hoelscher D.S. Supra note 2. Preface.
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2.2. Significance of the Bank Resolution Regime 
The bank resolution regime procedure is a central element in effective bank insolvency 
regulation755. Without calling into question the significance of the bank resolution regime 
for the bank’s functions, the analysis of why the bank resolution regime is so important to 
public interest is required.
First and foremost, the bank resolution regime is an alternative to ordinary bankrupt-
cy proceedings and the means for dealing with failing or likely to fail banks, the liquida-
tion which of would impact the public interest (threaten financial stability, the critical 
functions of a bank, and and/or the safety of deposits, clients’ assets, and public funds), to 
restructure and /or liquidate banks756. The doctrine is consistently applied to the position 
that the bank resolution regime ensures a failing bank is able to exit the market without 
causing disruption to the financial system, it is consistent with the public interest since it 
avoids adverse effects on financial stability, ensures the continuity of critical functions of a 
bank, and protects covered depositors757. The bank resolution regime is also important for 
dissolving the legal personality of weak banks, whilst banks in financial trouble, continue 
to perform a critical function for the wider economy, and survive in the market. Given 
the cyclical nature of the economy and that banks’ financial trouble is an inevitable part 
of a market economy, the bank resolution regime is the key to efficient running of the 
economy.
Second, a carefully designed legal framework for bank resolution is a central element 
for mitigating financial difficulties of not only a failing bank, but also other credit institu-
tions, in particular, during a banking crisis. Until the recent banking crisis, the bank reso-
lution regime was inadequate, and brought with it a whole set of negative consequences 
which resulted in huge cost to taxpayer758. Effective bank resolution tools are, therefore, 
indispensable for managing the banking crisis, and for sustaining or rebuilding market 
confidence. Confidence rebuilding is explicitly related to bank insolvency regulations, 
particularly the loss allocation mechanism, i.e., who, and on what legal basis, bears the 
losses of an insolvent bank. The absence of any bank resolution regime has led to the need 
to rescue banks by means of public funds and taxpayers’ money whereby governments 
were uncertain about the scale of impact on the financial system that might arise due to 
the failure of a bank. Thus, the bank resolution regime functions as a banking crisis man-
agement tool, which diminishes financial risk and, accordingly, helps to prevent banks’ fi-
nancial crises in the future. Bank resolution is an integral component of the financial crisis 
prevention and limitation of the risk of bank default. Apart from it, the legal framework of 
resolution has a positive effect on lending decisions and reduces the degree of risk to the 
financial market759. In other words, the legal framework of bank resolution provides the 
755 G-20 Report, 2010. 
756 If, in the opinion of public authorities, there is no threat to financial stability and taxpayers, a bank (or 
the respective parts of it) may be allowed to fail in the ordinary way, by means of bankruptcy proce-
dure
757 BRRD. Recital (45).
758 Attinger J.B. Supra note 49. P. 4.
759 Hüpkes E. Resolving Crises in Global Financial Institutions: The Functional Approach Revisited. 
Shortcomings of Existing Resolution Regimes. (in) Supra note 27. Chapter 5. P. 106.
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basis for fundamental assumptions, which determine creditors’ decisions, i.e., how likely a 
bank will be able to restore solvency, to revive and recover its activities, and how soon the 
bank will recover the value of its assets, etc.
Third, the doctrine argues that it is impossible to handle the failure of both large, oper-
ationally complex and systemically important banks and other banking institutions with-
out an effective and reliable legal framework for bank resolution. Bank resolution tools are 
intended to reduce and mitigate adverse effects resulting from bank insolvency (liquida-
tion) rather than to prevent bank liquidation (bankruptcy procedures)760. The primary 
objective of bank resolution is to furnish society with tools to deal with insolvency (bank-
ruptcy procedures) of banks, especially those systemically important, as well as to manage 
the consequences without taxpayer support. Besides, effective and sound bank resolution 
regimes, operating across national borders, are compulsory for a “healthy” international 
monetary and financial system761. It is equally important that prudential supervision of 
banks and short-term measures, as well as operational independence of banks go hand in 
hand with the sound and efficient legal regulation of bank resolution. Otherwise, it would 
inevitably demand more taxpayers’ money, more issues of government securities, and 
considerably larger international commitments to a particular member state. Under the 
effective legal framework of bank resolution, public funds are subject to less pressure762.
In order to make the bank resolution regime effective and important to national econ-
omies, it must meet two key requirements: i) resolution rules must be predictable, i.e., the 
end result, conditions laying down the resolution process, and selection of specific legal 
tools for resolution; ii) the rules must be sound (minimised risk of litigation). 
2.3. Objectives of the Bank Resolution Regime and its Distinctive Features
It should be noted that all the general objectives of bank insolvency procedures, dis-
cussed in section 8 of Chapter 1 of the Thesis, are also applicable to the bank resolution 
regime. This section is dedicated to specific objectives of bank resolution, laid down in 
both the doctrine and positive law of separate jurisdictions, as well as to significance of the 
said legal regulation. The doctrine acknowledges that the bank resolution regime is pursu-
ing specific objectives associated with the public interest: i) at the time of banking crisis, 
to provide sufficient legal tools for dealing with failed banks while preserving systemic 
stability, in the sense of securing the continuous provision of the key functions of the bank 
and maintaining as a going-concern; ii) ex ante, to create an effective and appropriate set 
of incentives for banks facing financial difficulties, so as to preserve market discipline and 
avoid financial hazard763.
Some researchers argue that in order to guarantee the efficiency of bank resolution tools 
to manage banking crises, the bank resolution regime must aim to establish appropriate legal 
and financial structures to control a failing bank, and to deal with the financial hazard arising 
760 Hadjiemmanuil C. Supra note 79. P. 13-16.
761 Ibid.
762 Tucker P. (in) EUROFI. Supra note 92. P. 10-16, 56-68.
763 Hadjiemmanil C. Supra note 79. P. 10.
179
from commencement of ordinary bank insolvency procedures764. This position is implaus-
able as provisions of the bank resolution regime are designed to regulate ex ante a bank’s 
loss allocation to both shareholders and holders (owners) of debt instruments, in case the 
bank becomes insolvent. First of all, it is obvious that such a preventive regulation raises the 
responsibility of private stakeholders in normal bank operation It also restricts the negotiat-
ing freedom of private individuals dealing with competent authorities in a period of crisis. 
Secondly, under the bank resolution rules and explicit regulations, competent authorities are 
empowered to take prompt and legally undisputable actions upon taking control of the bank 
facing severe financial difficulties. When applying resolution tools and exercising resolution 
powers, relevant authorities should consider resolution objectives and choose legal tools and 
powers to achieve the best possible outcome under special circumstances.
Another objective of the bank resolution regime worthy of attention is to offer appro-
priate solutions for specific technical failures of a bank which are unfeasible in general insol-
vency law, in particular, with a view to maximising the value of shares and the bank’s assets, 
maintaining ongoing transactions in the markets and/or payment and settlement systems. 
Once the insolvency procedures are initiated, it is no longer possible to rapidly suspend or 
completely terminate such transactions765.
All the stakeholders involved in bank insolvency procedures seek protection of an in-
solvent debtor’s assets, therefore, we can identify maximisation of the bank assets’ value 
(whether it is allocation of total assets of the bank in liquidation or resolution of an insol-
vent legal entity) as one of objectives of the bank resolution regime. Upon resolution of a 
bank, creditors’ interest is retained to maximise the bank’s assets with regard to the priority 
of their specific claims, as well as to allocate the losses due to the bank’s insolvency in ac-
cordance with pre-defined and clear legal principles and in a predictable manner. The basic 
idea is to prevent destructive asset “racing” among certain creditors, which take place in all 
cases a business operator becomes insolvent because the uncoordinated actions of creditors 
may be focused solely on individual interests, and disregard common collective interests. 
Otherwise, debtor‘s assets might be disposed of in whole or part, so, stakeholders expect 
the bank to continue as a going concern and give added value to its creditors. The main 
objective of insolvency procedures within the general insolvency law is to increase the total 
mass of assets in a way that considers and meets all creditors’ interests (e.g., individual 
recovery actions, collective procedures, the pari passu treatment of creditors and the statu-
tory ranking of financial claims, etc.). However, bank resolution procedures are different 
from the ones of other business entities. Bank resolution procedures are specially designed 
to provide efficient solutions and related legal tools to handle highly specific bank solvency 
problems, while best meeting both creditors’ needs and public interests of the state766.
764 Hüpkes E. Allocating Costs of Failure Resolution. Shaping Incentives and Reducing Moral Hazard. 
(in) Supra note 74. Lastra M.R. Cross-border bank insolvency. P. 104-107.
765 Hüpkes E. Supra note 71. The legal aspects of bank insolvency. P. 88.
766 In particular, the differences between the nature of financial assets and liabilities in the balance sheet 
can justify derogations from general, corporate insolvency law rules in order to increase stock tak-
ing and asset capture opportunities and avoid unwanted secondary, adverse effects of the insolvency 
proceedings. Another important factor - the transactions carried out on financial markets and/or pay-
ment and settlement systems. Since the commencement of insolvency procedures, it may materially 
affect the speed of such operations.
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Bank resolution is associated with payment of compensation to depositors that is not 
among common objectives of corporate insolvency procedures, since deposit settlement 
typically takes place apart from bank insolvency procedures. The key effect of such pay-
ments is that they bring a certain class of bank liabilities over the entire insolvency proce-
dure or, otherwise, determine the subrogation of a deposit insurer against original creditors 
(the right is transferred to the deposit insurer, who continues to take part in the insolvency 
procedure). Accordingly, one more noteworthy objective of the bank resolution regime is 
to assure administrative consistency and continuity by means of banking supervision, de-
posit insurance, and resolution procedure. It is of high importance to ensure the integrity 
of administrative actions, their consistency, smooth communication, and follow-up in the 
processes of supervision of banks, deposit guarantee scheme, and bank resolution.
EU legal framework lays down the following main objectives for the bank resolution 
regime: a) to ensure the continuity of critical functions; b) to avoid a significant adverse 
effect on the financial system, in particular by preventing contagion, including to market 
infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline; c) to protect public funds by mini-
mising reliance on extraordinary public financial support; d) to protect depositors and in-
vestors; e) to protect client funds and client assets767. When pursuing the above objectives, 
the resolution authority seeks to minimise the cost of resolution and avoid destruction of 
value unless necessary to achieve the resolution objectives. The resolution objectives are 
of equal significance, and resolution authorities balance them as appropriate to the nature 
and circumstances of each case768. When choosing resolution tools within the EU legal 
framework, resolution objectives need to be taken into account, whereas resolution tools 
are selected and resolution powers are exercised so as to achieve the major objectives of 
resolution: i) assurance of continuity of a bank’s critical functions; ii) avoidance of a sig-
nificant adverse effect on the financial system for the EU and its Member States769.
During the recent banking crisis, a significant lack of adequate tools forced Member 
States to save banks using taxpayers’ money. Thus, one of the key objectives of the bank 
resolution framework is to obviate the need for such public support to the greatest extent 
possible770. Another equally important objective of the bank resolution framework is that 
the resolution regime, particularly in view of the fact that EU banks are highly integrated 
and interconnected, should enable Member States to seize control of a failing bank using 
legal tools and to resolve it in a way that effectively prevents broader systemic damage and 
not to undermine Member States’ mutual trust and the credibility of the internal financial 
services market771. The onset of the financial crisis affected the access to funding of a large 
proportion of banks; the resolution regime would secure access to funding for banks that 
are otherwise solvent in order to avoid failures which would have consequences for the 
overall economy (for example, liquidity support from Central Banks and guarantees from 
Member States for securities issued by solvent credit institutions)772.
767 BRRD. Art. 31.
768 BRRD. Art. 31 (2).
769 BRRD. Art. 32 (5).
770 BRRD. Recital (1).
771 BRRD. Recital (3).
772 BRRD. Recital (2).
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A resolution action shall be treated only as in the public interest773, and this objective 
may disrupt the rights of shareholders and creditors. First and foremost, the power of the 
authorities to transfer the shares or all or part of the assets of an institution to a private 
purchaser without the consent of shareholders affects the property rights of shareholders. 
Secondly, the power to decide which liabilities to transfer out of a failing institution based 
upon the objectives of ensuring the continuity of services and avoiding adverse effects on 
financial stability may affect the equal treatment of creditors (priority of creditors’ claims). 
Thirdly, resolution action should be taken only where necessary in the public interest and 
any interference with rights of shareholders and creditors which results from resolution 
action should be compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. Fourthly, where creditors within the same class are treated differently in the con-
text of resolution action, such distinctions should be justified in the public interest and be 
proportionate to the risks being addressed and should be neither directly nor indirectly 
discriminatory on the grounds of nationality774.
Among other things, resolution should also aim to preserve financial stability and 
minimise economic and social effects in the Member States where the bank or group oper-
ates. To achieve these goals, authorities should have the power to impose preparatory and 
preventative measures775. When applying resolution tools, objectives should always be to 
ensure the continuity of critical functions, to avoid adverse effects on financial stability, 
to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support 
to failing institutions and to protect covered depositors, investors, client funds and client 
assets776. In all cases before applying resolution tools, the option to liquidate a failing bank 
through ordinary bankruptcy proceedings should be considered. A bank shall be deemed 
to be resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate 
it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying the different resolu-
tion tools while avoiding to the greatest possible extent any significant adverse effect on 
the financial system of the Member State or all the Member States or the Union and with 
a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by the bank777. A failing 
bank should be maintained through resolution tools as a going concern with the use, as 
far as possible, of private funds. That may be achieved either through sale to or merger 
with a private sector purchaser, or after having written down liabilities of the bank, or after 
having converted its debt to equity, in order to effect a recapitalisation778. When applying 
resolutions tools, resolution authorities should take all appropriate measures to ensure 
that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the bank’s 
management should in principle be replaced, that the costs of resolution of the bank are 
minimised, and that creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner. Use 
of the resolution tools may involve the granting of State aid; where resolution funds or 
deposit guarantee funds intervene to assist in the resolution of a failing bank.
773 BRRD. Art. 32 (1)(c) (5).
774 BRRD. Recital (13).
775 BRRD. Recital (18), (19).
776 BRRD. Recital (45).
777 BRRD. Art. 15 (1).
778 BRRD. Recital (46).
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The question arises how should public authorities act when conducting the bank resolu-
tion so as to ensure the best possible balance between private and public interests? In particu-
lar, a rapid and coordinated resolution action is necessary to sustain market confidence 
and minimise contagion. The circumstances under which the failure of a bank may occur, 
and in particular taking account the possible urgency of the situation, should allow resolu-
tion authorities to take resolution actions without imposing an obligation to first use early 
intervention powers779. Secondly, when taking resolution actions, resolution authorities 
should take into account and follow the measures provided for in resolution plans unless 
resolution authorities assess, taking into account circumstances of the case, that resolution 
objectives will be achieved more effectively by taking actions which are not provided for in 
the resolution plans780. Third, with certain exceptions, resolution tools should be applied 
before any public sector injection of capital or equivalent extraordinary public financial 
support to a bank781. This, however, does not impede the use of funds from the deposit 
guarantee schemes or resolution funds in order to absorb losses that would have otherwise 
been suffered by covered depositors or discretionarily excluded creditors. The Banking 
Union’s legislation provides for explicit and duly regulated resolution tools (as discussed in 
other chapters of the dissertation - aut.note). Where a particular resolution tool have been 
used to transfer systemically important services or viable business (e.g, mortgage loans) of 
a bank to a sound entity such as a private sector purchaser or a bridge bank, the residual 
part of the bank should be liquidated within an appropriate time frame having regard to 
any need for the failing bank to provide services or support to enable the purchaser or the 
bridge bank to carry out the activities or services acquired by virtue of that transfer. Even-
tually, according to legislation of the Banking Union, it should be the financial industry, 
as a whole, that finances the stabilisation of the financial system. This idea, first of all, is 
based on the fact that there may be circumstances when the effectiveness of the resolution 
tools applied may depend on the availability of short-term funding for a bank or a bridge 
bank, the provision of guarantees to potential purchasers, or the provision of capital to 
the bridge bank. Notwithstanding the role of Central Banks in providing liquidity to the 
financial system even in times of stress, it is important that Member States set up financ-
ing arrangements so as to avoid such funds required coming from national budgets782. It 
obliges Member States to establish their national financing arrangements through funds 
controlled by resolution authorities to be used for the resolution purposes. They should 
be allowed to collect mandatory contributions from banks which are authorised in their 
territories and which, in some cases, are not held through funds controlled by their resolu-
tion authorities. The contributions should be collected prior to and independently of any 
operation of resolution ex-ante or ex-post. It is compulsory that available financial means 
of the national financing arrangements amount at least to a certain minimum target level.
779 BRRD. Recital (53).
780 BRRD. Recital (54).
781 Extraordinary public financial support means- state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) para-
graph 1 TFEU, or any other supranational level of public financial support assistance at supra-national 
level, which, if provided for at national level, to would constitute State aid, and that a that is provided 
in order to preserve or restore the bank or banking group’s viability, liquidity or preserve or restore the 
solvency of a bank or a banking group.
782 BRRD. Recital (103).
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In the legal framework of the US, FDIC can decide to resolve a failing bank by a re-
ceivership783 or to act as a body empowered to take measures on resolving the solvency by 
a conservatorship784. The objective set out in the law requires the FDIC, as the receiver, to 
resolve a bank in accordance with principle of a least cost resolution in terms of a deposit 
insurance fund785. The FDIC may appoint itself as a receiver in order to reduce i) the risk 
that the deposit insurance fund would incur a loss with respect to the insured depository 
institution; ii) any loss that the deposit insurance fund is expected to incur; iii) on the 
grounds of the bank insolvency786. However, the exception provides that the FDIC may 
deviate from the principle of least cost resolution, if such a manner of bank resolution 
poses a potential threat to financial stability or the overall economy. As receiver, the FDIC 
may i) liquidate the bank in an orderly manner; ii) make any other disposition of any mat-
ter concerning the bank, as the FDIC determines is in the best interests of the bank and its 
depositors787. A similar legal regulation is laid down in the Dodd-Frank Act aimed at in-
solvency of SIFI, which, however, stipulates that the FDIC may be appointed as a receiver 
of any financial company operating within the US where it is in default or in danger of 
default and a resolution of which is likely to cause systemic instability according to provi-
sions of the US Bankruptcy Code788. Under the act, the FDIC is entitled to seize bank as-
sets, separate bank assets, or sell a bank whose default would have an effect on the financial 
stability of the United States. If the FDIC is appointed as the bank receiver, the Secretary 
of the US Treasury, based on the recommendation made by vote of no fewer than 2/3 of 
the members of the FED (Federal Reserve) Board of Governors and 3/3 of the members of 
the Board of Directors of the FDIC, determines that the bank is to be restructured using a 
particular resolution tool if the failure of the financial company and its resolution, under 
the US Bankruptcy Code (general insolvency law) i) would have serious adverse effects on 
the financial stability of the United States; ii) no viable private sector alternative is available 
to prevent the default of the bank; iii) bank resolution best meets interests of creditors, 
shareholders and counterparties, as well as other market participants; iv) resolution ac-
783 The FDIC concentration of powers is traditionally explained by the fact that: (a) there is a large need 
to take over control of the bank’s assets in a timely manner and thus increase confidence in the bank-
ing system; (b) the FDIC acts as the largest creditor and provides better opportunities to maximise the 
value of the bank assets. Hynes M.R., Walt. D.S. Supra note 11. P. 1
784 The FDIC may also be appointed as a trustee of the bank, but this option is rarely used. The FDIC can 
recover or rehabilitate a failing bank without withdrawing the banking license. In this case, the FDIC 
takes over the management of the bank, but the bank will continue to operate as its obligations are 
not automatically suspended. On the contrary, when the FDIC is appointed as the insolvency admin-
istrator, the bank is closed and the senior officials and the governing bodies are relieved of the bank’s 
management and this action does not require a court order. Then, the FDIC takes over all the bank’s 
insolvency process management, including the sale of assets and settlement with creditors. Ibid. P. 2.
785 The principle of ‘least cost’ is used by the FDIC in the context of an economically optimal solution to 
address the problems of a failing bank. The selection of the bank’s resolution measures should be in 
compliance with the total FDIC costs and obligations that would cause the least amount of costs to the 
deposit insurance fund, taking all possible measures of bank resolution into account. FDIC. Overview 
of the resolution process. 2014. Chapter 2. Least Cost Analysis. P. 60. [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-
12-10]. < https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-02.pdf>.
786 FDIA. 11 (5), (9) (A) (B) Section.
787 Ibid. 11, (13) (B) Section. Codified 12 U.S.C. 1821(c).
788 Dodd-Frank. Title II, Sec. 203 (a).
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tions mitigate adverse effects on the economy and the financial system and the cost to the 
general fund of the Treasury; v) the potential to increase excessive risk taken on the part of 
creditors, counterparties, and shareholders in the bank; vi) it is assessed and determined 
that the bank liquidation cannot be initiated for any other reason789.
In the Swiss legal framework, systematic analysis of the banking act and secondary 
legislation allows that the main objectives of bank resolution are the protection of stability 
of the financial system - including settlement systems790, protection of depositors and in-
vestors791, protection of client funds and client assets792 under bank insolvency procedures, 
which best meets the interests of creditors, shareholders and stakeholders of the bank 
on the brink of insolvency793. The aim of bank restructuring proceedings is to provide 
a financially stricken bank with the opportunity to continue its business operations to 
the best possible satisfaction of its creditors, with the support of measures from the au-
thorities794. Creditors are likely to fare better than within the insolvency procedure795. The 
continuation of individual banking services is another objective of the resolution regime 
in Switzerland796. FINMA also aims to protect the payment system and financial market 
infrastructure797.
In summary, it can be stated that objectives of the bank resolution regime are achieva-
ble only if the existing legal regulation allows for early, quick, broad and decisive resolution 
actions to be taken by a resolution authority as soon as a bank appears to be at financial 
risk. Following the analysis of legal frameworks within relevant individual jurisdictions, 
it must be concluded that main objectives of the bank resolution regime are to reduce the 
cost to society and taxpayers to the maximum extent possible, to maintain the stability of 
the financial system and critical functions of banks. Further, a secondary objective of bank 
resolution – to maintain market discipline, which obliges not to pass the adverse effects of 
bank insolvency and costs from stakeholders of the bank onto taxpayers. In all cases, bank 
resolution is assumed to be based on the cost-benefit analysis which should be carried 
out prior to making decision on resolution. The bank resolution requires legal certainty, 
transparency, and predictability, while the above principles of law inevitably presume a 
certain attitude toward shareholders and creditors of a bank. Bank resolution is aimed at 
preservation of the value of bank assets, which otherwise would likely be affected by the 
bank insolvency procedure. One of the key positive characteristics of bank resolution is 
the opportunity given to creditors to get a clearer picture of the investment-related risks 
upon repealing the provision implying that banks are rescued by public funds. Eventually, 
financial arrangements of resolution under the State aid rules will ensure a much greater 
chance to achieve objectives of the resolution regime.
789 Dodd-Frank. 203 (2) (b) Section.
790 Swiss Banking act. Art. 27.
791 Ibid. Art. 29.
792 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 51.
793 Ibid. Art. 40 (1) (a).
794 FINMA. Supra note 42.
795 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 40 (1) (d) (a).
796 Ibid. Art. 40 (1).
797 Ibid. Art. 53.
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2.4. Fundamental Conditions and Principles of the Bank Resolution Regime 
EU legal framework of bank resolution provides for timely entry into resolution before 
a financial institution is balance-sheet insolvent and before all equity has been fully wiped 
out. Resolution actions shall be treated as in the public interest if it is necessary for the 
achievement of and is proportionate to resolution objectives, and winding up of the bank 
under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the 
same extent798. The adoption of an early intervention measure is not a condition for taking 
resolution action799. The fact that a bank does not meet the requirements for authorisation 
should not justify per-se the entry into resolution, especially if a bank is still or likely to still 
be viable. The need for emergency liquidity assistance from a Central Bank should not, per 
se, be a condition that sufficiently demonstrates that a bank is or will be, in the near future, 
unable to pay its liabilities as they fall due800. The resolution action is taken in accordance 
with the following principles: a) original shareholders of the bank under resolution bear 
first losses; b) creditors of the bank under resolution bear losses after the shareholders 
in accordance with the order of priority of their claims under normal insolvency pro-
ceedings; (c) management body and senior management of the bank under resolution 
are replaced, except in those cases when the retention of the management body and sen-
ior management, in whole or in part, as appropriate to the circumstances, is considered 
to be necessary for the achievement of resolution objectives; (d) management body and 
senior management of the bank under resolution provide all necessary assistance for the 
achievement of resolution objectives; (e) natural and legal persons are made liable, subject 
to Member State’s law, under civil or criminal law for their responsibility for the failure of 
the bank; (f) creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner; (g) no creditor 
shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the bank had been wound up 
under normal insolvency proceedings in accordance with safeguards of asset separation; 
(h) covered deposits are fully protected; and (i) resolution action is taken in accordance 
with the safeguards applicable to creditors and shareholders801.
The Swiss bank resolution regime802 is based on two key principles of bank resolution: i) 
bank restructuring (approval of the restructuring plan) must protect the interests of bank 
creditors and shareholders in the best possible manner. In the case of a viable prospect for 
bank restructuring or continuation of functions, by extension a public authority is obliged 
to commence the restructuring procedure803. The restructuring plan is submitted to FIN-
MA for approval; it does not require the consent of shareholders of the bank804. Execution 
of the restructuring plan cannot be launched without the approval of FINMA805 in accord-
ance with the following principles: ii) bank restructuring assists in maintaining continuity 
of the bank’s functions; iii) the bank’s assets have been valued on the basis of asset valua-
798 BRRD. Art. (32) (1) (5).
799 BRRD. Art. 32 (3).
800 BRRD. Art. 32 (4).
801 BRRD. 34.
802 Swiss law impose the bank restructuring definition rather than resolution.
803 Swiss Banking law. Art. 28.
804 Ibid. Art. 29.
805 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 40.
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tion standards; iv) creditors find themselves in a better position upon the restructuring of 
the bank than liquidating it under normal insolvency procedures; v) creditors of the bank 
under restructuring bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of pri-
ority of their claims; shareholders bear losses first806; vi) the restructuring plan adequately 
takes into account legal and economic links of the bank’s assets, liabilities, contractual ob-
ligations; vii) other bank insolvency procedures are not capable of adequately addressing 
the bank’s distress while the restructuring plan allows for new bank capital by converting 
bank debt into capital807; viii) FINMA discloses the restructuring plan to the public; ix) the 
liabilities and contractual relationships and the change of debtor involved do not infringe 
upon the rights of the creditors808; x) any property rights held may jeopardize the restruc-
turing plan, as denied; xi) the majority of creditors may reject the restructuring plan un-
less the bank has SIFI status - in which case, the creditors’ rejection is inadmissible809. It 
should also be noted that bank restructuring within the Swiss legal framework is based 
on corporate governance principles810. Restructuring activity must ensure that creditors 
take precedence over owners of the bank while at the same time generating sufficient new 
capital that, following restructuring, the bank meets the capital adequacy requirements. 
Therefore, equity capital and debt instruments that the bank has issued for such cases 
(additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital) have to be completely reduced before debt capital is 
converted into equity capital811.
In the US legal framework, the narrative section of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
expands the scope of application of the resolution model under the Law of Federal In-
surance Institution from deposit accepting (commercial) banks to systemically important 
financial institutions in default or in danger of default812. Under the new legal regime, bank 
resolution should be carried out consistently in compliance with the following three basic 
principles: a) creditors and shareholders bear losses of the financial company in default; b) 
management held responsible for the condition of the financial company are not retained; 
c) the FDIC and the other public authorities take all steps necessary and appropriate to 
assure that all parties having responsibility for the condition of the financial company 
bear resulting losses, consistent with their responsibility, restitution or compensation813. 
A further provision lays down that taxpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of any 
authority by the FDIC under the title of receiver814. Authorities must address financial 
troubles of conventional banks being empowered by the special resolution body – FDIC. 
The main principle of bank resolution is so called the least-cost insured deposit method. 
The least cost procedures require the FDIC to choose the resolution method in which the 
806 Ibid. Art. 47 (1) (a), Art. 46, 45.
807 Swiss Banking law. 31, 31(a), 31 (b). 
808 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 46 (2).
809 Ibid. Art. 46.
810 Ibid. Section 3.
811 FINMA. New FINMA Banking Insolvency Ordinance. A Key element in the effective restructuring 
and orderly market exit of banks, 2012. P. 2-3.
812 Dodd-Frank. Section 203 (a).
813 Dodd-Frank. Section 204 (a).
814 Dodd-Frank. Section 214.
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total amount of expenditure and obligation incurred by the FDIC815 (including any im-
mediate and long-term obligation and any direct or contingent liability) has the least cost 
to the deposit insurance fund, regardless of other factors816. When taking resolution ac-
tions, the FDIC has two main options. First, to close the bank a) through the purchase and 
assumption transaction and bank liquidation by paying off deposits and, in both cases, 
winding up the legal entity; b) using the open bank assistance817 where the State grants 
loans, guarantees, or capital injections to the bank818. The powers granted to the FDIC as 
receiver under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act are analogous to those the FDIC uses to 
resolve failed insured depository institutions under the FDI Act. Such powers are also con-
sidered the core bank resolution principles: (i) bank resolution is given priority over the 
ordinary bank liquidation procedure - which allows continuation of essential functions 
and maintains asset values of the bank; (ii) the ability to make advance dividends on credi-
tor claims and prompt distributions to creditors based upon expected FDIC‘s recoveries 
in the future; (iii) the ability to continue key, systemically important operations, includ-
ing through the formation of one or more bridge banks; and (iv) the ability to transfer all 
qualified financial contracts with a given counterparty to another entity and, thus, avoid 
their immediate termination and liquidation to preserve value and promote stability819. 
Furthermore, the FDIC must always take into account its potential operational cost to the 
deposit insurance fund, resolution costs and the deposit insurance fund’s earnings, as well 
as the impact on operation of the payment system, and other risk factors820. 
2.5. Bank Resolution Tools. Analysis of the EU and the US legal frameworks 
Early intervention potentially involving liquidity support, internal recapitalisation or 
intra-group asset transfers, withdrawal of the management body, appointment of a tempo-
rary administrator, etc. might prove insufficient to address the difficulties of a failing bank 
and may fail to restore a bank‘s solvency. Where, despite the failure of early intervention, a 
bank retains some franchise value, the quickest, most cost effective solution causing least 
threat to financial stability may be a form of special bank resolution or, as a positive law 
defines, bank resolution tools821. For example, the bank is transferred to a private sector 
815 The law provides one exception, in the case it is concluded that systemic problems may arise that also 
affect other financial market participants. Such findings require the approval of 2/3 of the FDIC Board 
of Directors, members of the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Secretariat, after consultation 
with the President of the United States. FDIA Act. 13 (c) (4) (A) A Section. Codified 12 U.S.C. 1823 
(c) (4) (A).
816 The difference in the accounting of the bank’s assets and liabilities, the level of guaranteed and unse-
cured deposits, the contributions paid by the buyer, losses on creditors’ claims, property value, if the 
assets are liquidated through the ordinary bankruptcy procedure, and the guarantees provided by the 
bank. Sale of business tool enables depositors to maintain access to their funds. FDIC. Overview of 
the resolution Process. Chapter 2. Least Cost Analysis. P. 60.[interactive] [accessed on 13-12-2014]. 
<https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-02.pdf>.
817 FDIA. Section 13 (c).
818 FDIA. Section 9.
819 FSB. Thematic review on resolution regimes. Peer review Report. 2013. P. 46.
820 FDIA. Sec. 7 (2). Codified 12 U.S.C. 1816.
821 Fonteyne W., Bossu W., Cortavarrial-Checkley L. Supra note 453. P. 44.
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purchaser by means of a purchase and assumption transaction or a bridge bank tool. Such 
private sector solutions allow competent authorities to isolate and preserve those more 
valuable assets and protect liabilities of the bank which are to be saved or mandatorily 
saved, leaving behind impaired assets and unsecured creditors in the bank to be placed 
into ordinary insolvency procedures. Bank resolution tools should be applied to achieve 
resolution in line with the objectives and principles set for the national framework. In 
addition, before taking a decision on resolution or approving the resolution scheme, a 
competent authority shall take into account other factors that might affect the entire bank 
resolution procedure, in particular, assets and liabilities of the bank under resolution, 
as assessed by the valuation of property. Second, liquidity of the bank under resolution. 
Third, market value of the bank’s franchise, with regard to competitive and economic con-
ditions in a given market. Fourth, the time factor. Bank resolution tools can be applied 
individually or in a combination, with the exception of the asset separation tool, to be used 
in conjunction with other resolution tool only. Where a bank business is sold or a bridge 
bank is established, the resolution is aimed at a partial purchase and assumption, while 
the remaining part of the bank, in which the purchase and assumption transaction was 
conducted, is liquidated by initiating ordinary bankruptcy proceedings.
Bank resolution is a complicated legal procedure. It requires a financial and legal infra-
structure. For example, a bank’s functions and some of its contractual relations, facilities, 
and human resources (employment contracts) are subject to separation and transfer, ir-
respective of their belonging to a legal entity of a bank or a banking pool. Further, a situ-
ation may force regulators to ex post legally and functionally separate some critical busi-
ness lines (e.g., loans). To properly carry out such actions, competent authorities should 
assume responsibility for review and assessment of business models in banks operating 
within their jurisdiction, a structure of the banks or the banking pool, as well as the resist-
ance of resolution tools to the banking crisis. In order to minimize rescue of the failing 
bank by using public finances, costs and alternative exposure to the financial contagion 
are to be diminished. 
2.5.1. The Sale of Bank Business 
In the normal merger-acquisition market environment, a healthy, private-sector fi-
nancial institution having no financial trouble and with regard to the nature of the sale of 
business tool purchases all or part of assets and/or part of the business of a failing bank, 
as well as the rights and, thus, assumes all or part of the liabilities of the failing bank, in 
particular, its insured deposits. Otherwise, the transfer of the bank‘s assets may assume 
the transfer of both shares and other equities to another solvent financial institution. The 
essence of this resolution tool is a merger of a failing bank with a purchasing bank, in 
parts or as a whole. One of the key requirements herein is that the transaction should 
not give rise to competition law infringement822. Through the business sale transaction, 
competent resolutions authorities are able to isolate and preserve more valuable assets and 
protect liabilities of the bank; as shareholders, unsecured creditors are uninsured deposi-
tors and retain their rights in the part of the bank to be sold. The transferred part of the 
822 Ibid. P. 61.
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failing bank continues as a going concern but thenceforth is owned by another legal entity. 
A purchaser may demand any rights of the insolvent bank, including rights of member-
ship and access to payment, clearing and settlement systems, stock exchanges, and deposit 
guarantee schemes. It is also important that the competent authorities have the power to 
force the sale of a distressed bank, otherwise the bank’s shareholders could oppose such 
a transaction. This is a key difference from ordinary insolvency procedures, under which 
shareholders can still influence the manner of resolution of a firm823. When exercising the 
sale of business tools, a purchasing bank accepts not only all the assets and liabilities of a 
failing bank, but also becomes the owner of the legal entity.
2.5.1.1. The EU Regulatory Framework
Perhaps the most important feature under the EU legal framework is that the sale 
of business tool can be applied without obtaining the consent of shareholders of a fail-
ing bank or any third party other than a purchaser, and without complying with any 
procedural requirements under company or securities law, with the exception of the 
requirements laid down below824. Meanwhile, a failing bank’s assets that have no market 
demand are liquidated under normal insolvency procedures, unless it jeopardises finan-
cial stability. Under this legal tool, instruments of ownership, issued by a bank under 
resolution or all of a part of assets, rights and liabilities of a bank under resolution are 
transferred (sold) to a purchaser that is not a bridge bank825. When applying the sale of 
business tool, the resolution authority may exercise the transfer power more than once 
in order to make supplemental transfers of shares or other instruments of ownership is-
sued by a bank under resolution or, as the case may be, assets, rights or liabilities of the 
bank under resolution826. When the above tool is applied, the decision on resolution sets 
out the assets, rights, liabilities or shares or other instruments of ownership to be trans-
ferred, as well as commercial terms having regard to the circumstances and the costs and 
expenses incurred in the resolution process, pursuant to which the national resolution 
authority shall make the transfer. As well, following an application of the sale of business 
tool, resolution authorities may, with the consent of the purchaser, exercise the transfer 
powers in respect of assets, rights or liabilities transferred to the purchaser in order to 
transfer the assets, rights or liabilities back to the bank under resolution, or the shares 
or other instruments of ownership back to their original owners, and the bank under 
resolution or original owners shall be obliged to take back any such assets, rights or li-
abilities, or shares or other instruments of ownership827. Any consideration paid by the 
purchaser shall benefit i) owners of shares or other instruments of ownership, where the 
sale of business has been effected by transferring shares or instruments of ownership 
issued by the bank under resolution from holders of those shares or instruments to the 
purchaser; ii) the bank under resolution, where the sale of business has been effected 
823 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 44.
824 BRRD. Art. 38 (1) (b).
825 SRM. Art. 24 (1) (a) (b).
826 BRRD. Art 38 (5).
827 BRRD. Art. 38 (6).
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by transferring some or all of assets or liabilities of the bank under resolution to the 
purchaser828.
Thus, the sale of business tool means a transfer by a resolution authority of instruments 
of ownership issued by an institution under resolution, or its assets, rights or liabilities to 
a purchaser. In all cases, the transaction must comply with the procedure of resolution, 
banks, marketing of assets, rights, and liabilities established by EU Member States’ nation-
al resolution authorities. In addition, the sale of business shall be carried out in accord-
ance with the following procedural requirements. Primarily, it shall be as transparent as 
possible and shall not materially misrepresent the assets, rights, liabilities, shares or other 
instruments of ownership of that bank that the authority intends to transfer, having regard 
to the circumstances and in particular the need to maintain financial stability. Second, 
it shall not unduly favor or discriminate between potential purchasers829. The resolution 
authority shall not be prevented from soliciting particular potential purchasers. However, 
the exception provides that in order to preserve the stability of the financial system, an 
issuer that is a credit institution or a financial institution, may, on its own responsibility, 
delay the public disclosure of inside information, including information which is related 
to a temporary liquidity problem and, in particular, the need to receive temporary liquid-
ity assistance from a central bank or lender of last resort, provided that all of the following 
conditions are met : a) immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the issuer and of the financial system; b) the public interest requires to delay the disclosure 
of inside information provided; c) the confidentiality of that information can be ensured . 
d) the competent authority has consented to the delay830. An issuer or an emission allow-
ance market participant, may, on its own responsibility, delay disclosure to the public if a) 
immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuer or emission 
allowance market participant; b) delay of disclosure is not likely to mislead the public; c) 
the issuer or emission allowance market participant is able to ensure the confidentiality of 
that information831.
It should be emphasized that the EU legal framework provides for an exception where 
the public authority – the resolution board – may apply the sale of business tool without 
complying with the marketing requirements when it determines that compliance with 
those requirements would be likely to undermine one or more of the resolution objec-
tives and in particular where the following conditions are met: i) The Board considers 
that there is a material threat to financial stability arising from or aggravated by the failure 
or likely failure of the bank under resolution; ii) The Board considers that compliance 
with those marketing requirements would be likely to undermine the effectiveness of the 
sale of business tool in addressing that threat or to avoid significant adverse effects on 
financial stability of the entire EU or relevant Member States, in particular by preventing 
contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline832. 
Third, conflicts of interest must be avoided in all cases. Fourth, it shall not confer any 
828 Ibid. Art. 38 (4).
829 Ibid. Art. 39 (2) (f).
830 Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014. Art. 17 (4) (5).
831 Ibid. Art 17(1), (4) (5).
832 SRM. Art. 24 (3).
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unfair advantage on a potential purchaser. Fifth, when applying the sale of business tool, 
the need for resolution actions to the greatest extent possible must be considered833. Sixth, 
the sale of bank business tool is aimed to maximise, as far as possible, the sale price of the 
shares or other instruments of ownership, assets, rights, and liabilities. Eventually, it must 
be established whether the compliance with the marketing requirements by the national 
resolution authority is likely to undermine one or more resolution objectives834.
In summary, it is important to note that the major advantage of the sale of business 
tool according to the EU regulation is that it enables public authorities to effect a sale of 
a bank or parts of its business to one or more purchasers without the consent of share-
holders. When applying the sale of business tool, authorities should make arrangements 
for the marketing of that bank or part of its business in an open, transparent and non-
discriminatory process, while aiming to maximise, as far as possible, the sale price, and 
not to confer any advantage on a potential purchaser, and avoid any conflict of interest. If 
possible, a transfer must be made on commercial terms, based on fair and realistic valu-
ation of the assets carried out by an independent third party. If the assets do not cover all 
transferable obligations, the purchasing bank acquires the compensation to the extent of 
the price shortage. Compensation consists of DGS payments to the extent that the transfer 
comprises insured deposits835. Financing is compensated from the resolution fund which 
is sufficient to complement DGS payments to the extent that other rights of creditors are 
transferred by insufficiently covered assets. Moreover, a situation may arise, depending 
on pre-financing, where such payments may cause a deficit in DGS and resolution funds, 
such a lack, therefore, should be temporarily offset by using public finances. This case 
may require borrowing from the money market for compensation payments. One of the 
points of criticism is that the legal framework does not strictly require an auction to be 
held for potential purchasers – on the contrary, the resolution authorities may propose 
a potential purchaser of their choice836. On the other hand, shareholders’ and creditors’ 
rights are protected based on the ‘no creditor disadvantaged’ principle. Shareholders and 
833 Kkkoris I. Supra note 726. P. 259.
834 SRM. Art. 24 (e).
835 Sale of business tool enables depositors to maintain access to their funds.
836 In the US, the FDIC creates a virtual data room for each failing bank, dedicated to the market and po-
tential buyers. This allows access to the distressed bank’s financial data, legal documents, information 
on the legal verification procedures, possible bidding procedures, descriptions of potential resolution 
transactions that are offered by the competent authorities. After creating a virtual data room, the 
FDIC sends an e-mail-invitation to potential buyers interested in the failing bank, together with the 
electronic system access data. Before that, the potential buyers sign confidentiality agreements with 
the FDIC. Access is granted 24 hours a day, seven days a week, thereby providing an opportunity 
for potential buyers to make a proper assessment of the financial situation of a failing bank before 
supplying the commercial proposal. Proposals shall be submitted to the FDIC by the appointed dead-
line, usually in one or two weeks. Proposals will be evaluated by comparing them with the potential 
liquidation costs. The price usually consists of two terms: the amount of the franchise value (e.g., the 
price is proposed only for insured deposits, or for all deposits), and the price for failing bank assets, 
estimated at current market conditions. In addition, by offering their price, purchasers can also take 
advantage of the value increase tool, which basically means that this tool can guarantee to the FDIC  
that particular interests will be secured by the buyer’s shares at a specific price and at a specific time.
FDIC. Resolution Handbook. Chapter 3. Resolution Process. 2014. P.12. [interactive]. [accessed on 
2014-12-15] <https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/drr_handbook.pdf#page=13>.
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creditors whose interests are not transferred (written down or converted) should receive 
at least the same treatment they would have received if the bank had been wound up un-
der normal insolvency proceedings immediately prior to the transfer (or write down and 
conversion)837. If it is determined that shareholders and creditors have received inferior 
treatment, they should be entitled to compensation of that difference to be paid by the 
resolution authority838. In order to determine the amount of compensation to which the 
shareholders and creditors are entitled, a secondary independent valuation of the assets 
must be carried out839.
2.5.1.2. The US Regulatory Framework
The sale of business tool has been particularly helpful and effective in handing bank 
failures in the US840 When the FDIC is appointed as the receiver of a failing bank, an in-
stitution may use the purchase and assumption transaction to transfer part or all of the 
assets of the failing bank to a healthy financial institution, at the same time, selecting all 
or part of the bank’s liabilities. In light of the fact that insured and uninsured depositors 
have priority over unsecured creditors, the FDIC usually switches places with insured de-
positors (subrogation) to become the largest creditor of the bank, while unsecured credi-
tors assume greater losses841. This legal regulation allows for a situation where deposits 
and current account holders are transferred to the purchaser. The main difference is that 
secured depositors and DGS share uninsured deposits on a pari passu basis. According 
to the ‘no creditor disadvantaged’ principle, which is mandatory for the FDIC, general 
unsecured creditors may demand substantial compensation from resolution authorities, 
which, consequently, could significantly increase the cost of the bank resolution. Besides, 
the required additional valuation inevitably slows down the resolution process. Partial 
transfers of mostly small and medium sized banks’ assets to a private sector purchaser (or 
a bridge bank) were conducted effectively in United States842. In contrast, large and com-
plex banks found it difficult to apply the resolution tool due to the constraints of legal and 
operational structures. Core bank functions, such as risk management, IT, treasury and 
cash management could be centralised or arranged through different business functions, 
in view of the possibility of taxation and arbitration. Separation of the above functions, 
as well as preservation of their effectiveness, is legally complicated and time-consuming. 
This problem is believed to be solvable, first of all, through ex ante proper planning of bank 
recovery and resolution. It should be noted that the US legal framework requires the writ-
ten approval of a competent authority (Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, or FDIC) to apply the sale of bank business tool843. Notice 
837 BRRD. Art. 65.
838 Ibid. Art. 67.
839 Ibid. Art. 95.
840 Zwet A. Crisis Management Tools in the EU: What Do We Really Need? DNB Occasional Studies. Vol. 
9, No. 2, 12-18, 2011. P. 10-11. FDIC. Merger Transactions. Decisions on Bank Application [interac-
tive]. [accessed on 2014-12-15] <https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/Merger/>.
841 Hynes R., Walt S. Why Banks are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy. Supra note 11.
842 Zwet A. Supra note 856. P. 2.
843 FDIC. 18 Section (F) (c) (2).
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of the application of the sale of business tool must be published prior to the granting of 
official approval844. The FDIC shall not approve the sale of bank business tool, if i) any 
proposed bank merger transaction would result in a monopoly, or which would be in 
furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize 
the business of banking in any part of the United States, or ii) may substantially reduce 
competition, or tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in re-
straint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction 
are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of meeting the conveni-
ence and needs of the community; iii) in every case, the responsible authority shall take 
into consideration financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing 
and proposed institutions, the convenience and needs of the community to be served, and 
risk to the stability of the US banking or financial system845.
The importance of the sale of bank business tool to the bank restructuring procedure 
within the US legal framework has been accurately identified in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
case: ‘United States v General Dynamics Corp’ 846. The court ruled there that management, 
shareholders, and creditors were benefiting from the applying the sale of business tool in 
respect of the bank which was facing financial difficulties. As the Court has stated, it is 
unlikely that shareholders might lose their investment as a result of applying this bank 
resolution tool, on the contrary, they are more likely to gain in case the sale of the bank 
is commercially profitable. Creditors would also benefit without losing their rights to the 
debtor (the bank) in case of sale, and it is more likely that they will be rewarded and repaid 
their portion of the loan granted to the bank. By contrast, creditors’ claims are unlikely to 
be fully satisfied in the case of liquidation.
2.5.1.3. Criteria and Principles of the Sale of Business Tool in the EU and US  
Case-Law
It is important to identify criteria for effective bank resolution. Legal frameworks in 
both U.S. and the EU have highly developed criteria for assessing the potential of the tool 
by a failing bank847.
First of all, it is necessary to consider the general criteria. Competent public authori-
ties play a crucial role in bank sales. They are responsible for identifying and establishing 
whether a bank merger will negatively impact competition. In such cases, the authorities 
must prohibit such transitions, which effectively means failure of the bank resolution848. 
National market economies with a competitive banking sector must follow the key busi-
ness sale criteria, and when applying the resolution tool should take into account any 
co-benefit resulting in increased effectiveness of the bank’s operational capacities, focus-
844 FDIC. 18 Section (F) (c) (3).
845 Ibid.
846 United States v. General Dynamics Corp 415 U.S.486. 1974.
847 See more Olivares C. Expedited Corporate Debt Restructuring: An International Comparative Analysis. 
The Hague. Kluwer Law. 2007. Chapter Implications of Merger Legislation for corporate Restructur-
ing Procedures.
848 Kkkoris I. Failing Firm Defence: a Success or Failure for Corporate Restructuring? International Cor-
porate Rescue, 2007. P. 149.
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ing the business capabilities on business entities with a socially higher added value, pres-
ervation of jobs, and sale of the distressed bank’s loan commitments to a healthy bank. 
Economic criteria are also no less important: - greater economies of scope and scale and 
positive social consequences849. Furthermore, it should also be assessed whether the fail-
ing bank should be sold in the near future, or forced out of the market because of financial 
difficulties if not taken over by another financial enterprise. In the absence of a merger 
and sale of business tool, the bank, along with its assets, would inevitably exit the market. 
Another criteria is that the failing bank should be de facto insolvent or become insolvent 
in the near future, rather than just have temporary financial difficulties850. Economic and 
social effects must also be considered prior to the transaction. The extent of social costs 
and benefits of the bank failure are difficult to identify, however, it is important to assess 
the potential burden in the context of higher prices (for example, reduced fixed costs of 
the bank) or lost benefits of consumers, as well as potential losses to employees, the com-
munity, which encompasses the bank’s assets851.
In the EU legal framework, the criteria for the sale of bank business has been revised in 
three manners: through issuing interpretative guidelines852, by case law853 and by develop-
ing Banking Union legislation854. In scientific literature, a comprehensive description of 
the EU model of sale of a banking business is found in the work by Fiordes F855. The author 
believes that the most important criteria is to determine whether a causal link between a 
bank merger and any potential impact on competition structure can be established. It is of 
high importance to ensure the procedural rights and the right of defence of a failing bank. 
Thus, in all cases, the comparative analysis of the opposite situation is necessary to look 
at the failing bank’s right of defence in the competitive environment and the conditions 
that may become a reason for prohibiting bank mergers856. European guidelines consider 
the following three criteria to be relevant for the application of sale of a business tool: i) 
the allegedly failing bank would in the near future be forced out of the market because 
of financial difficulties if not taken over by another financial undertaking; ii) there is no 
alternative purchase which would have a lesser impact on competition than the sale of the 
business tool. For example, there may be a situation where the purchaser is interested in 
purchasing failing bank’s assets only after the bank exits the market (under the insolvency 
procedure). The bank’s withdrawal from the market may also provide new opportunities 
for a new legal entity to enter the market. Or a competitive environment may benefit more 
if several purchasers acquire the bank’s assets rather than a single purchaser acquires all 
849 Ibid.
850 Kkkoris I. Supra note 726. P. 239.
851 Ibid.
852 Guidelines on the assesment of horizontal mergers under the Council regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings. Official Journal C31, 2004. P. 5-18. EC. Directorate General for 
Competition. OECD Competition Committee Meeting. Roundtable on Failing Firm Defence Note by 
the services of the European Commission Directorate-General for Competition, 2009.
853 Kali v. Salz/MdK/Treuhand Case IV/M308 [1994]. France v. Commission, Societe Commerciale es Po-
tasses et de l‘Azore (SCPA) v Commision Cases No. C-68/94 and No. C-30/95 [1998] ECR- I-1375.
854 See more 1 chapter 5 sec. 2 subsec.
855 Fiordes F. Mergers and Acqusitions in European Banking. Palgrave Macmillan. Great Britain, 2009.
856 Ibid.
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assets of the bank; iii) what would happen in the absence of the purchase and assumption 
merger and if the assets of the failing bank inevitably exit the market. Where a failing 
bank’s right of defence is assured, the merger is believed not to entail major legal barriers 
to the effective competitive environment857.
EU case law demonstrates the development of criteria in detail. In particular, it should 
be noted that the burden of proof with regard to the transaction‘s suitability lies with the 
parties concerned. For example, in the case Kali & Salz/MdK/Treuhand858, the Court has 
noted that a failing bank’s right to a fair hearing through the sale of business tool is an 
exceptional situation. The most important thing that must be considered is whether the 
sale of the bank business might lead to a strengthening of a dominant position. The tool 
can be regarded as creating a dominant position in the market even in the event of the 
merger being prohibited, if the purchaser will inevitably create or strengthen a dominant 
position. Existence of a causal link between the concentration and the deterioration of 
competition is excluded if i) the acquired bank will in the near future be forced out of the 
market or purchased by another firm; ii) the acquiring bank would gain the market share 
of the acquired bank if it was forced out of the market; iii) there are no better -competitive 
alternatives to the sale of business.
In another case, BASF, Eurodil v. Pantochim859, the Court set out the following criteria. 
According to the Court of Justice, existence of a causal link between the concentration 
and the deterioration of the competitive structure of the market can be excluded if a bank 
merger could be regarded as a rescue measure and only if the competitive structure result-
ing from the concentration is expected to deteriorate similarly860. The condition under this 
case that there is no anti-competitive alternative purchase is interpreted as the require-
ment not to gain a larger market share. It should be established whether assets of the ac-
quired bank are likely to be forced to inevitably exit the market upon liquidation under the 
normal bankruptcy procedure. Furthermore, a basic rule sets out that, in view of a merger, 
where one of the parties is a failing bank, the sale of business tool should not be regarded 
as an ordinary acquisition-merger, which excluded the failing bank. Another point is that 
if competent authorities reject a bank merger as a potential bank resolution method, it 
should be evaluated whether the liquidation of the bank would not cause significant harm 
to competition compared with the potential outcome of applying the sale of bank business 
tool861. When determining whether there are alternative purchasers, good faith efforts in 
searching for other purchasers should be taken into account. It imposes an obligation to 
the failing bank to elicit alternative offers in the market. This would help to keep the fail-
ing bank in the market by causing the least possible harm to the competitive environment. 
The Bank is still forced to look for alternatives and bona fide commercial offers. This is a 
kind of protection against further losses in the competitive environment. However, it is 
too early to make assumptions that the offer of one of the potential purchasers is better for 
857 Ibid. 90 para.
858 Kali v. Salz/MdK/Treuhand. Case No. IV/M308, OJ L186/30 [1994].
859 BASF v. Eurodiol/Pantochim. Case No. M.2314, [2001].
860 Newscorp v. Telepiu. Case No. COMP/M. 2876, OJ L110/73 [2004]. 207 para.
861 Ibid. 212 para.
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being based on the future price premiums (payments for the expected benefits or gains) 
arising from the transaction or on the market power after effecting the transaction.
US case law puts much emphasis on interpretation of terms and content of alternative 
purchase of bank business or part of it. One of the key cases is Citizen Publishing Co v.United 
States862. According to the Court, in view of the benefits of the sale of bank business tool 
without prejudice to the principle of effective judicial protection, it is obvious that the 
right to a fair hearing should have priority over the interests’ of other market participants. 
For example, market participants may simply seek a higher income stream, and sources 
of revenue, with no intention to act as potential competitors in banking activities in the 
implementation of long-term investment plans. Further, the court points out that during 
a financial crisis, with the lack of available capital in the market, it may be difficult enough 
to find an alternative purchaser – as a result, the lack of capital might hamper the entry 
of new “market players”. In this case, it is likely that the purchasers will fail to raise the 
adequate level of capital to purchase a failing bank. Thus, in the long-standing practice of 
the US it has been established that competent authorities should not expect a large num-
ber of potential alternative purchasers. Priority should be given to a less anti-competitive 
purchaser with lower liquidity shortage. A failing bank’s rights of defence should be re-
garded in conjunction with other relevant criteria, such as social and public policy (re-
lated to the protection of private parties, e.g., in assessing whether creditors would benefit 
from reserving their rights against the debtor and commitments satisfied, the shareholders 
would retain their investment, which is likely if the merger is profitable) and labour rela-
tions (potential job losses). These aspects may influence the assessment of the sale of bank 
transaction as a whole, therefore, competent authorities must take into account the above 
aspects., when applying this resolution tool. 
Another distinctive feature are the concepts “failing”, “quasi-failing” and “weak com-
petitor”, which have been formed in US case law863. The Court has identified that the bank 
merger causes fewer problems than the overall market share of the acquiring bank. The 
term “weak competitor” derives from the fact that the entity wishing to acquire the bank 
finds it difficult to borrow capital. In this case, the Court has supported the sale of the bank 
business, even though the acquiring company lacked the sufficient reserves necessary to 
compete effectively in the industry. The US Supreme Court rejected the argument of the 
affected banking industry and stressed the importance of considering all the relevant fac-
tors, particularly, in cases where the relevant markets or industries had a fluctuating and 
dynamic nature. It was noted that the US Competition Authority might also consider and 
assess the banking industry upon effecting the transaction, as one of the likely arguments 
for supporting or rejecting the sale of a bank business. The challenging financial status of 
the industry may result in increased restrictions on market entry and, thus, make it much 
harder to obtain approval for the transaction. Nevertheless, Competition Authorities are 
obliged to consider the impact of economic conditions and purchasers’ ability to raise 
capital and make investments that are necessary to become an efficient competitor. Gov-
ernment is willing to support transactions on the sale of bank business, especially, during 
a banking crisis. For example, in US, the Bank of America acquired the investment bank 
862 Citizen Publishing Co v. United States. Case No. 243, 394 U.S. 131, [1969]
863 United States v General Dynamics Corp. Case No. 85-1385, 481 U.S. 239, [1974]
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Merrill Lynch – a leader in national retail banking. This transaction entered into force on 
15 September 2008, soon after the commencement of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy pro-
cedure under Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (ordinary bankruptcy procedure). The 
transaction value – USD 50 billion. The bank’s business was sold primarily due to the fact 
that Meriil Lynch’s had bad assets worth several billion USD. The purchase was approved 
by the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve of the US, which did not allow for 
due diligence in full by reason of effects of the financial crisis, and the transaction was im-
mediate. The size of bad assets was unknown upon effecting the transaction. At the end 
of the first quarter of 2009, the US government injected capital amounting to USD 45 bil-
lion, alongside granting a loan to the Bank of America, which was purchasing additional 
capital. In this case, the sale of business tool was aimed at mitigating effects of some bad 
asset write-offs resulting from the decline of stock market value. Moreover, as the purchas-
ing bank still had to prove that it could retain its solvency following the transaction, the 
immediate execution of the transaction could interfere with the financial strategy of the 
Bank of America for many years. This transaction has set out the following criteria to be 
taken into account: the size of the industry and the scope of the transaction and which is 
best evidenced through price-earnings ratio, accounting, cash flow, cost-income ratio, and 
a maximum selling price analysis864.
2.5.2. The Bridge Bank
In the absence of private sector purchasers, competent authorities may apply the 
bridge bank resolution tool in respect of a failing bank. It is important to note that the 
bridge bank is an auxiliary interim solution for banks, which is operated in a conservative 
manner, where a market shows neither interest nor demand for a bank’s assets or business. 
This tool postpones the immediate liquidation of the bank for a period of time. If it is not 
possible to sell the bridge bank through the bank acquisition-merger transaction, i.e., the 
banking consolidation (within a reasonable period of time) or to apply any other bank 
resolution tool more suitable for particular circumstances, competent authorities must 
terminate the bank’s operations, revoke it‘s operating license, and liquidate the bank busi-
ness865. When applying the bridge bank tool, competent authorities should transfer all or 
part of the bank’s assets, rights and liabilities on temporary grounds to a newly founded 
bank. In essence, a bridge bank is a legal entity owned by one or more of the public au-
thorities and founded to take over all or some of assets, rights and liabilities of a bank 
under resolution, as well as to provide all or some of services of the bank under resolution 
and carry out all or some of its activities. The main goal of the bridge bank is to purchase 
the failing bank’s rights, assets and liabilities and preserve its going concern value until it is 
sold to a private sector purchaser or is liquidated. This tool may be attractive in particular 
to large and complex banking organisations, especially in cases where it is difficult to find 
a private purchaser within a short period of time866. 
864 DePamphilis D.M. Mergers, Acquisitions, and other Restructuring Activities. Sixth Edition. Elsevier, 
United States, 2012. P. 169-171.
865 Haentjens M., Wessels B. Supra note 92. P. 62.
866 Čihak M., Nier E. Supra note 15. P. 16.
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2.5.2.1. The EU Regulatory Framework
A systematic analysis of EU regulation867, first of all draws attention to the fact that 
a bridge bank is a legal entity that meets basic requirements for bank establishment and 
operation. The requirements state that a legal entity is one that is wholly or partially owned 
by one or more of the public authorities, which may include the resolution authority or 
the resolution financing arrangement and is controlled by the resolution authority. Such 
tool is needed, in particular, when the purchase-acquisition market is not functioning or 
a bank is too large to be merged with another bank, and, therefore, it is not possible to 
sell the failing bank within a short timeframe. The EU legal framework specifies, that it 
is created for the primary purpose of receiving and holding some or all of the shares or 
other instruments of ownership issued by a bank under resolution or some or all of the 
assets, rights and liabilities of one or more banks under resolution. Therefore, legislation 
of the Banking Union shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to transfer 
to a bridge bank shares or other instruments of ownership issued by one or more banks 
under resolution, all or any assets, rights or liabilities of one or more banks under resolu-
tion. The transfer referred may take place without obtaining the consent of shareholders of 
the banks under resolution or any third party, and without complying with any procedural 
requirements under company or securities law868. The core principle is that when applying 
the bridge bank tool, the resolution authority should ensure that the total value of liabili-
ties transferred to the bridge bank does not exceed the total value of the rights and assets 
transferred from the bank under resolution or provided by other sources869.
The question arises: how does the bridge bank tool work? Following an application of 
this tool, the resolution authority may transfer rights, assets or liabilities back from the 
bridge bank to the bank under resolution, or the shares or other instruments of ownership 
back to their original owners, and the bank under resolution or its original owners shall be 
obliged to take back any such assets, rights or liabilities, or shares or other instruments of 
ownership. Resolution authorities may take such actions if the possibility that the specific 
shares or other instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities might be transferred 
back is stated expressly in the instrument by which the transfer was made and the specific 
shares or other instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities do not in fact fall 
within the classes of, or meet the conditions for, transfer of shares or other instruments 
of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities specified in the instrument by which the transfer 
was made870. The bridge bank may continue to exercise the rights of membership and 
access to payment, clearing and settlement systems, stock exchanges, investor compensa-
tion schemes and deposit guarantee schemes of the bank under resolution, provided that 
it meets the membership and participation criteria for participation in such systems871. 
In cases when the resolution authority seeks to sell the bridge bank or its assets, rights or 
liabilities, it shall be ensured that the bridge bank or the relevant assets or liabilities are 
marketed openly and transparently, and that the sale does not materially misrepresent 
867 Bridge bank provisions found in both the BRRD and the SRM.
868 BRRD. Art. 40 (1).
869 Ibid. Art. 40 (3).
870 Ibid. Art. 40 (7) (a), (b).
871 Ibid. Art. 40 (10).
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them or unduly favor or discriminate between potential purchasers872. Any such sale is 
made on commercial terms873.
It should be ensured that the operation of the bridge bank meets the following require-
ments. The contents of the bridge bank’s constitutional documents are approved by the 
resolution authority which appoints the bridge bank’s management body, the remunera-
tion of the members of the management body and determines their appropriate respon-
sibilities. Further, the resolution authority approves the strategy and risk profile of the 
bridge bank. The bridge bank must be authorised (obtain a license) to carry out the activi-
ties or services. Accordingly, the bridge bank should comply with the requirements of and 
is subject to supervision in accordance with the EU State aid framework874. Notwithstand-
ing the above provisions and where necessary to meet the resolution objectives, the bridge 
bank may be established and authorised without complying with Directive 2013/36/EU or 
Directive 2014/65/EU for a short period of time at the beginning of its operation. To that 
end, the resolution authority shall submit a request in that sense to the competent author-
ity. If the competent authority decides to grant such an authorisation, it shall indicate the 
period for which the bridge bank is waived from complying with the requirements. Sub-
ject to any restrictions, the management of the bridge bank shall operate the bridge bank 
with a view to maintaining access to critical functions and to selling the bank, it‘s assets, 
rights or liabilities, to one or more of the private sector purchasers when conditions are 
appropriate and within the set period.
The bridge bank terminates its activities in the following cases: i) the bridge bank 
merges with another entity; ii) the bridge institution ceases to meet the requirements of 
a legal entity; iii) the sale of all or substantially all of the bridge bank’s assets, rights or li-
abilities to a third party; iv) the expiry of a period of two years after the date on which the 
last transfer from a bank under resolution pursuant to the bridge bank tool was made875. 
The resolution authority may extend this period for up to one year. Where the operations 
of a bridge bank are terminated, the bridge bank is wound up under normal insolvency 
proceedings. Any proceeds generated as a result of the termination of the operation of the 
bridge bank shall benefit the shareholders of the bridge bank.
In summary, the EU legal framework shall ensure that a bridge bank exercises all the 
rights transferred to it from a failing bank, including the rights of membership and ac-
cess to payment, clearing and settlement systems, stock exchanges, and deposit guarantee 
schemes. The transfer of such assets may take place without obtaining the consent of the 
shareholders of the bank under resolution or any third party and without complying with 
any procedural requirements under company or securities law that would otherwise be 
applicable. The bridge institution’s assets are completely wound down and its liabilities are 
completely discharged. Shareholders and creditors, whose claims are not transferred, have 
no right to the residual value of the bank’s assets resulting from the disposal of the sold 
assets of the bridge bank. Furthermore, it should be noted that the setting up of a bridge 
bank and the capitalisation may impose additional administrative costs to the resolution 
872 Ibid. Art. 41(4).
873 Ibid. Art. 35 (4).
874 Ibid. Art. 41 (1).
875 Ibid. Art. 41 (3).
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institution, including wages to senior management and other staff . Public authorities may 
incur ex post losses in two cases: 1) if a bridge bank can be sold to a private sector pur-
chaser only at a price lower than original cost of capitalisation; 2) if liquidation procedures 
do not cover the cost of capitalisation in full. When applying the bridge bank tool, the 
resolution authorities shall transfer all or part of the bank’s business to a state-controlled 
entity. The bridge bank must be authorised, meet capital needs, and operate on commer-
cial terms, subject to restrictions imposed in accordance with the state aid framework. 
Activities of a bridge institution are of a temporary nature, and the main purpose is to sell 
the business to the private sector under appropriate market conditions. Meaning, the ef-
ficient implementation of the mechanism is highly dependent on the capacity of the bridge 
bank to operate profitably within a reasonable time period. Otherwise, a valid question 
arises whether a purchaser would ever enter the market willing to purchase a bridge bank.
2.5.2.2. The US Regulatory Framework
In the U.S. legal framework, two temporary and correlated bank resolution tools exist: 
establishment of a de novo depository national bank and a bridge bank.
As soon as possible after the default of a bank, the FDIC should, if it finds that it is ap-
propriate and in the interest of the insured depositors, organise a new national bank in the 
same community as the bank in default was located. The purpose of such a bank resolution 
process is to assume the insured deposits of such bank in default to perform temporarily 
the functions hereinafter provided876. The law prescribes that no capital stock need be paid 
in by the FDIC to the new bank, however, the FDIC is the only source of funding, and 
basic requirements for the authorisation (license) to carry out activities are set out at the 
FDIC’s discretion. Further, the new bank should not have a board of directors, but should 
be managed by an executive officer appointed by the Board of Directors of the FDIC, who 
should be subject to its directions. In all other respects the new bank should be organised 
in accordance with the current existing provisions of law relating to the organisation of 
national banking associations877. It is important to note that the new bank shall be exempt 
from all taxation imposed now or hereafter. The FDIC should make available to the new 
bank an amount equal to the estimated insured deposits of such insured bank in default 
plus the estimated amount of the operating expenses of the new bank relating to the trans-
fer of deposits878. All the earnings of the new bank should be transferred over or credited 
to the FDIC. If the new bank, during the period it continues its status as such, sustains 
any losses which may lead to insolvency, the FDIC should furnish to it additional funds in 
the amount of such losses879. Besides, the FDIC should assure funding for payment of the 
insured deposits. Another important aspect is the issue and redemption of the new bank’s 
stock. Whenever by the judgment of the Board of Directors it is desirable to do so, the 
FDIC should cause capital stock of the new bank to be offered for sale on such terms and 
conditions as the Board of Directors shall deem advisable in an amount sufficient, in the 
876 FDIA. Sec. 11 (m) (1).
877 Ibid. Sec 11 (m) (3) (4) (5).
878 Ibid Sec 11 (m) (11).
879 Ibid Sec 11 (m) (12) (13).
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opinion of the Board of Directors, to make possible the conduct of the business of the new 
depository institution on a sound basis880. The stockholders of the bank should be given the 
first opportunity to purchase any shares of common stock so offered881. At the next stage of 
the legislative procedure, upon proof that an adequate amount of capital stock in the new 
bank has been acquired, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency may require the organization 
certificate to be obtained by the bank to conform to the requirements for the organisation 
of national banks. Thereupon the bank should cease to have the status of a new bank, and 
should be managed by directors elected by its own shareholders, and should be subject to 
all provisions of law relating to national banks882. If the capital stock of the new bank is not 
offered for sale, or if an adequate amount of capital is not subscribed and paid for by the 
shareholders, the Board of Directors of the FDIC might offer to transfer its business to any 
depository institution in the same community. Such financial institution would take over 
assets of the new bank, assume its liabilities, and pay to the FDIC for such business such 
amount as the Board of Directors of the FDIC may deem adequate. Eventually, unless the 
capital stock of the new bank is sold or its assets are taken over and its liabilities are as-
sumed by another insured bank within 2 years after the date of its organisation, the FDIC 
shall wind up such a new bank. Thereafter, the FDIC should be liable for the obligations of 
such a new bank and should be the owner of its assets883.
One of the legal means to mitigate default of a bank is a bridge bank884. The FDIC has 
been applying this legal tool since 1991885. The main purpose of a bridge bank is to take 
over and maintain banking services to the customers of a failed bank886. Its legal regula-
tion and procedure are designed to “bridge” the temporary gap between the failure of a 
bank and the time when the FDIC can implement a satisfactory and effective purchase and 
assumption by a third party. An important aspect of the bridge bank tool applied by the 
FDIC is that the creation of the bridge bank allows the FDIC to take control of the failing 
bank and stabilize it in the market, to monitor the bank’s franchise value, and to evalu-
ate alternate forms of bank resolution887. Additional time also allows for due diligence of 
the failing bank by potential purchasers. Furthermore, after a bridge bank is established, 
assurance is provided to depositors that their money is safe, and potential purchasers are 
given time for a thorough assessment of the failing bank’s condition in a more stable envi-
ronment. In the case of multiple bank failures, a bridge bank can facilitate the handling of 
multiple failures in a short time888.
880 Ibid Sec 11 (m) (15).
881 Ibid. Sec 11 (m) (15) (b).
882 Ibid. Sec 11 (m) (16).
883 Ibid. Sec 11 (m) (17) (18).
884 Ibid. Sec. 11 (n).
885 FDIC. Chapter 6. Bridge Banks. P. 171-175. [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-15] <https://www.fdic.
gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-06.pdf>.
886 FDIA. Sec.11 (n). Managing the Crisis. FDIC History. Chapter 6. [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-
15] <https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing>.
887 Ibid. 175.
888 FDIC. Supra note 855. P.175. [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-15] <https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/managing/history1-06.pdf>.
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When 1 or more depository banks are in default or might default in the near future, 
the FDIC might, at its discretion, organise a bridge bank. A bridge bank shall have the 
following rights: i) to assume insured deposits of a bank that is in default or in danger 
of default as the FDIC may, at its discretion, determine to be appropriate; ii) to assume 
other liabilities (including liabilities associated with any trust businesses) of the bank; iii) 
to purchase assets (including assets associated with any trust businesses) of the bank; iv) 
to perform any other temporary functions889. A bridge bank shall have an interim board 
of directors consisting of not fewer than 5 and not more than 10 members appointed 
by the FDCI. Additionally, a chief executive officer (CEO) is selected. This might be the 
private sector representative or FDIC senior staff member tasked to conduct day-to-day 
bank operations. The interim board of the bank, along with the CEO, is responsible for 
developing a strategic plan for the bank to address any operational issues confronting the 
bank. In any case, the FDIC board retains authority to effect a final resolution of the bank 
and approve the sale of bank assets890. The bridge bank staff must complete an inventory to 
identify, evaluate, and work out troubled assets. Besides, it develops realistic market values 
for assets and assigns appropriate loss reserves. The bridge bank may sell transferred assets 
of the failing bank. For a period of up to 90 days after the bridge bank begins operations, 
assets that could benefit from the powers of receivership or assets that would be difficult 
to sell to a franchise acquirer can be transferred by the bridge bank management to the 
receivership. The assets transferred from the bridge bank to the receivership would be 
those with the most problems and the least potential for improvement, including non-
performing loans891. Like any other bank that has assumed deposits from the FDIC, the 
bridge bank must notify depositors that their accounts have been transferred to the bridge 
bank. In turn, depositors must contact the bank within 18 months to claim their deposits. 
Bridge bank management also decides whether to maintain or change the interest rates 
paid on deposits by the failing bank. The FDIC requires that rates remain the same for the 
first 14 days and that the bank provide depositors 7 days notice of any rate change. Bank 
customers can withdraw their funds without penalty until they enter into new contracts 
with the bridge bank. Among other things, the FDIC is obliged to review the failing bank’s 
liquidity during the preparation phase, and to monitor liquidity levels in the bank, to de-
termine if the bridge bank can meet its own funding needs and re-establish lines of credit 
and correspondent banking relationships that were maintained by the failing bank.
The law sets out three key conditions for the establishment of a bridge bank. First, 
the requirement that the amount which is reasonably necessary to operate a bridge bank 
should not exceed the amount which is reasonably necessary for liquidating, including 
paying the insured deposit accounts. Second, the continued operation of such a bank in 
default or in danger of default with respect to which the bridge bank is chartered is es-
sential to provide adequate banking services in the community where such bank is lo-
cated. For example, the bank may accept deposits and issue low-risk loans to regular bank 
customers. Third, the bridge bank resolution tool should be applied, and the continued 
889 FDIA. Sec 11 (n) (B).
890 FDIC. Supra note 855. P. 176.
891 Ibid.
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operation of the business should be carried out “in the best interest of the depositors”892. 
The transfer of any assets of a bank in default shall be effective without any approval of 
stakeholders, such as shareholders and creditors, under Federal or State law893. No capital 
stock is required to be issued to a bridge bank894. The FDIC shall make available funds for 
the operation of the bridge bank. Apart from the asset transfer, the bridge bank tool may 
be applied in conjunction with the sale of business tool895.
The status of a bridge bank as such shall terminate at the end of the 2-year period fol-
lowing the date it was granted a charter. The Board of Directors might, at its discretion, ex-
tend the status of the bridge bank for an additional 1-year period896. The bridge bank shall 
be terminated upon the earliest of i) the merger or consolidation of the bridge bank with 
a depository institution that is not a bridge bank; ii) at the decision of the FDIC, the sale 
of a majority of the capital stock to an entity other than the FDIC or another bridge bank; 
iii) the sale of 80 percent, or more, of the capital stock of the bridge bank to an entity other 
than the FDIC; iv) at the decision of the FDIC, either the assumption of all or substantially 
all of the deposits and other liabilities of the bridge bank by a bank holding company or a 
bank that is not a bridge bank, or the acquisition of all or substantially all of the assets of 
the bridge bank by a bank holding company, a depository institution that is not a bridge 
bank, or other legal entity; v) the expiration of the period subsequent to the charter being 
granted or the earlier dissolution of the bridge bank on other grounds (for example, at the 
decision of the board of directors at any time or the FDIC acting as receiver of the bank in 
default to liquidate a bridge bank)897. It is important to note that the FDIC might organise 
multiple bridge banks, i.e., 2 or more bridge banks to assume any deposits of, assume 
any other liabilities of, and purchase any assets of a single bank in default898. The law also 
prescribes regulations prohibiting the sale of certain assets of a bridge bank. For example, 
to persons who engaged in improper conduct with a failing bank, who cause losses to 
the bank and contributed to the failure to perform the bank’s obligations or defaults or 
to the weakening of the bank’s collateral positions, or persons found to have engaged in 
fraudulent activity, which respectively resulted in the failure to perform the bank’s obliga-
tions on time in the past, etc899. To prompt the purchase and assumption transaction by 
the FDIC, all or part of assets and liabilities of the failed banks may be transferred to the 
bridge bank. This gives potential bidders sufficient time for a due diligence process and 
allows the FDIC to clean up the failed bank, to achieve greater transparency, and sell assets 
for a higher price900.
Following the U.S. legal framework, a bridge bank tool has several major advantages. 
First of all, the establishment of a bridge bank allows a concurrent going concern. A bridge 
892 FDIA. Sec 11 (n) (2) (A).
893 Ibid. Sec 11 (3) (4).
894 Ibid. Sec 11 (5) (A), (B).
895 Ibid. Sec 11 (8) (A), (B).
896 Ibid. Sec 11 (B) (9).
897 Ibid. Sec 11, (10) (A)-(E).
898 Ibid. Sec 11, (13).
899 Ibid. Sec 11, (p) (1) (2).
900 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 115.
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bank allows customers to maintain due relations with the bank, at the same time, minimis-
ing disruption to the financial system. Second, when applying the bridge bank resolution 
tool, the FDIC is able to plan sufficient time to the market to assess the financial condition 
of the failing bank, while the bank continues as a going concern. Third, the bridge bank al-
lows a failing bank to be liquidated under the ordinary procedure, in case market attempts 
are unsuccessful901. The legal regulation of the bridge bank and practical application of this 
legal tool in the United States has several drawbacks. The prompt corrective action provi-
sion limits regulatory discretion and requires that institutions be closed by their charter-
ing authority within 90 days of their becoming critically undercapitalized (capital is less 
than or equal to 2 percent). In particular, in the case where a bank is a publicly traded 
institution, enforcement of such measures becomes public information and can lead to de-
posit withdrawals and liquidity crises for the failing bank. Second, FDIA also restricts the 
authority of a Federal Reserve Bank to make advances to banks that are undercapitalized 
or critically undercapi-talized. For example, by limiting a failing bank’s ability to borrow 
from the Federal Reserve Bank, FDIA makes it more likely that failing bank could face 
liquidity shortages in the future. Third, when the FDIC creates a bridge bank from a failing 
bank and maintains control of it until it is sold or resolved, the bridge bank is in effect a 
nationalised bank. Critics have expressed concern that the government is running a bank 
and is effectively competing against other non-government owned banks. That concern 
can be mitigated by the short-term nature of the bridge bank as the bank is meant to be 
sold as quickly as possible902.
To summarise the EU and U.S. legal frameworks and their doctrinal approaches;-the 
following general and specific advantages of the bridge bank tool can be identified i) the 
need for a bridge bank arises if there is a risk that, despite an attractive bank franchise, it 
may, nevertheless, become insolvent before it finds a purchaser; ii) the creation of a bridge 
bank allows day-to-day operations of the bank to continue; iii) market circumstances im-
ply that it is unreasonable to commence formal liquidation procedures, for example, in 
case where reluctance is expressed to carry out formal liquidation procedures upon the 
failure of multiple banks at the same time903. One of the most criticised aspects of the 
bridge bank tool is at the moment when a bank or a group of banks is facing financial trou-
ble. In this case, this tool seems more difficult to put into practice, a decision to apply the 
bridge bank tool is taken only after assessing longer-term perspectives. This is an impor-
tant issue in dealing with bank solvency problems, as there is a potential threat of adverse 
effects. Therefore, the need for additional time is a very significant aspect, in particular, 
when resolving banks which might carry a systemic risk. Second, after a bridge bank is 
set up, the costs and potential liabilities and financial assets of the failing bank, as well as 
interim safeguard measures applied to the bank, to be purchased by other market partici-
pants in the future, are unknown. Third, the bridge bank tool might be not suitable enough 
for addressing financial problems and operations of complex multinational banks904. The 
901 FDIC. Failed Bank Information. Questions and Answers Guide for Silverston Bank. [interactive] [ac-
cessed on 2014-10-21] <https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/silverton_q_and_a.html>.
902 FDIC. Supra note 855. P. 184.
903 General Guidance for the Resolution of Bank failures. (in) Cambell, LaBrosse, Mayes etc. Deposit 
Insurance. Basingstole. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. P. 252.
904 Mayes. D.G. Resolution Methods for cross-border Banks in the Present Crisis. (in) Supra note 27. P. 303.
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main purpose of a bridge bank isto find a purchaser as soon as possible. If banks are al-
lowed to operate for a longer period of time, they are exposed to additional risks, e.g., 
what forms of capital should be allowed for their operation and what capital adequacy 
ratios should be applied – particularly in view of the fact that a bridge bank would come 
into direct competition with other commercial banks during the “transitional” period. It 
is highly important to determine debt repayment terms in case of granting public support 
to the bridge bank. The bridge bank should also be governed by professional management 
bodies. When setting up a bridge bank, government guarantees should also be considered 
for thepurpose of bank viability905. Furthermore, it must be always ensured that the bridge 
bank is operating subject to the same prudential regulations and capital standards. That is 
the only way to prevent political risk and intervention906.
2.5.3. The Bank Asset Separation Tool and/or Purchase and Assumption 
Transactions
Purchase and assumption agreement is basically the most widely used and one of the 
most effective methods of restructuring in the global bank resolution practice907. The asset 
separation tool is a bank resolution tool that allows for the transfer of a troubled bank’s 
operations, assets, rights, transactions, and liabilities to another, healthy bank. The resolu-
tion process usually involves the withdrawal or revocation of the license of the troubled 
bank, the termination of the shareholders’ rights, the assumption of the troubled bank’s 
deposits and good assets, and the take-over of the bank’s problem assets by the resolution 
authority908. Alternatively, the competent authority can apply this transaction to transfer 
only parts of the assets of a failing bank to a bridge bank and subsequently sell the bridge 
bank to a private acquirer and liquidate the remaining parts of the bank’s assets909. Thus, 
one of the forms of the asset separation tools is a bridge bank. A purchase and assumption 
agreement is, in general, considered a kind of bank asset separation tool, which is primar-
ily aimed at enabling the resolution authorities to dispose of impaired or bad assets to 
another credit institution to manage and, eventually, process the assets, and to avoid the 
adverse effects of immediate liquidation910. Assets should be transferred at their market or 
long-term economic value in order to recognise the transaction losses during the transac-
tion, i.e., the asset transfer process. In order to minimize deterioration of competition and 
moral hazards, this tool is mainly practiced in conjunction with other forms of resolution 
tools. First of all, doctrinal aspects of this resolution tool will be analysed, then, special fea-
tures will be outlined and introduced into the regulatory framework of individual case law. 
A bank purchase and assumption transaction tool is applied in the U.S. legal framework. 
Swiss and the EU legislations apply a type of bank asset separation tool. The purposes of 
905 LaBrosse R.J. International Experience and Policy Issues in the Growing Use of Bridge Banks. (in) 
Supra note 27. Chapter 14. P. 234. McGuire C.L. Simple Tools to Assist in the Resolution of Troubled 
Banks. WB, Washington, DC, 2012. P. 7. Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 45.
906 Hoelscher D.S, Supra note 2. P. 116.
907 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 45.
908 McGuire C.L. Supra note 905. P. 3.
909 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 45.
910 Hoelscher D. S. Supra note 2. P. 106-110.
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these legal tools are correlating. In both cases, the competent authority is seeking to sell a 
failing bank as a whole (the business) or in parts to a sustained, healthy purchaser. The key 
difference from the sale of business tool is that in the purchase and acquisition agreement, 
the purchasing bank only buys assets and obligations, but not the bank license or any other 
potential obligation911.
An analysis of scientific literature shows that the legal doctrine912 distinguishes the 
following key types of asset separation (hereinafter referred to as the P&A) transactions:
i) P&A with Asset Pools. A P&A can also be offered to potential purchasers with a 
failed bank’s asset pools and, later, with loans from the failed bank’s portfolio di-
vided into separate pools of like loans, such as loans within the same geographic 
location or with the same payment terms. The other method of using this resolu-
tion tool is to divide loans into performing and non-performing. Such pool can 
be marketed separately from the deposit base. Bidders are thus able to bid on 
the parts of a failed bank’s business that fit best with their own business model. 
The key advantage of this type of transaction is that this arrangement allows for 
marketing to a greater number of potential acquirers, which can lead to a greater 
number of assets being transferred from the failed bank. A potential disadvantage 
is that assets may be understated, i.e., be heavily discounted to sell (undervalued) 
if nonperforming assets are included in the asset pools. Additionally performing 
loans that are directly related to the bank’s customers - who generally hold cur-
rent accounts with the bank, assist in the retention and continuation of the bank’s 
functions;
ii) Loan Purchase P&A/Modified P&A. In these transactions, the purchasing bank 
acquires the performing loan portfolio of the failed bank (the performing loan 
portfolio along with timely fulfilled liabilities or the mortgage loan portfolio) by 
paying for it in cash or cash equivalents. Key advantage - installment loans and 
mortgages usually provide the acquirer with a base of performing loans in the 
future.
iii) Loss Share P&A. The acquirer and the resolution authority enter into an agree-
ment to share any future losses on a defined set of assets. By limiting the risk for 
the acquirer, the resolution authority might be able to attract more bidders for the 
purchase of the failed bank’s assets. The acquirer is reimbursed for a percentage of 
the expenses associated with managing the assets transferred. The acquirer also 
assumes a percentage of the losses, which is designed to incentivise the acquirer 
to engage in good credit management. The main advantage: limiting the risk to 
the acquirer to a fixed amount may attract more bidders for assets. Disadvantage: 
the acquirer must work closely with the resolution authority throughout the term 
of the loss share agreement and take on administrative duties, which may not be 
attractive to potential acquirers913.
911 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 45.
912 McGuire C.L. Supra note 905. P. 7-8. Hoelscher S.D. Supra note 2. P. 106-117. Hüpkes E. Supra note 
71. P. 90-93. IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 39-41. Parker D., IMF. Supra note 86. P. 196-199, 200-204.
913 McGuire C.L. Supra note 905. P. 7-8. Hoelscher S.D. Supra note 2. P. 106-117.
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2.5.3.1.  The EU Regulatory Framework
EU lawmakers apply an asset separation tool, which enables authorities to transfer as-
sets, rights, or liabilities of a bank under resolution to a separate vehicle. Asset separation 
tool means the mechanism for effecting a transfer by a resolution authority of assets, rights 
or liabilities of a bank under resolution to an asset management vehicle914. That tool should 
be used only in conjunction with other tools to prevent any undue competitive advantage 
for the failing bank915. In particular, the new resolution regime ensures that Member States 
have the power to transfer assets, rights or liabilities of a bank under resolution or a bridge 
bank to one or more asset management vehicles. The transfer may take place without 
obtaining the consent of shareholders of the banks under resolution or any third party 
other than the bridge bank, and without complying with any procedural requirements 
under company or securities law916. Second, for the purposes of the asset separation tool, 
an asset management vehicle is a legal entity, wholly or partially owned by one or more 
public authorities which may include the resolution authority or the resolution financ-
ing arrangement and is controlled by the resolution authority, created for the purpose of 
receiving some or all of the assets, rights and liabilities of one or more banks under reso-
lution or a bridge bank917. Third, the objective is set out and it is presumed that an asset 
management vehicle shall manage the assets transferred to it with a view to maximising 
their value. Eventually, the assets are sold or wound up in an orderly manner.. The opera-
tion of an asset management vehicle respects the following provisions and principles: a) 
the contents of the asset management vehicle’s constitutional documents are approved by 
the resolution authority; b) subject to the asset management vehicle’s ownership structure, 
the resolution authority either appoints or approves the vehicle’s management body; c) the 
resolution authority approves the remuneration of the members of the management body 
and determines their appropriate responsibilities; d) the resolution authority approves the 
strategy and risk profile of the asset management vehicle918.
Resolution authorities may exercise the power granted to transfer assets, rights or lia-
bilities in compliance with applicable principles. This type of transaction is allowed only if 
a) the situation of the particular market for those assets is of such a nature that the liquida-
tion of those assets under normal insolvency proceedings could have an adverse effect on 
one or more financial markets; b) such transfer is necessary to ensure the proper function-
ing of the bank under resolution or bridge bank; or c) such transfer is necessary to max-
imise liquidation proceeds919. Any consideration paid by the asset management vehicle in 
respect of the assets, rights or liabilities acquired directly from the bank under resolution 
shall benefit the bank under resolution. Such a consideration is not prevented from having 
nominal or negative value920. Resolution authorities might transfer assets, rights or liabili-
ties from the bank under resolution to one or more asset management vehicles on more 
914 BRRD. Art. 2 (55).
915 Ibid. Recital (66).
916 Ibid. Art. 42 (1).
917 Ibid. Art. 42 (2).
918 Ibid. Art. 42 (4).
919 Ibid. Art. 42 (5).
920 Ibid. Art. 42 (6), (7). SRM Art. 26 (2) (b).
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than one occasion and transfer assets, rights or liabilities back from one or more asset 
management vehicles to the bank under resolution if the possibility exists that the specific 
rights, assets or liabilities might be transferred back, and is stated expressly in the instru-
ment by which the transfer was made and/or the specific rights, assets or liabilities do not 
in fact fall within the classes of, or meet the conditions for the transfer of rights, assets or 
liabilities specified in the instrument by which the transfer was made921. Shareholders or 
creditors of the bank under resolution and other third parties whose assets, rights or li-
abilities are not transferred to the asset management vehicle shall not have any rights over 
or in relation to the assets, rights or liabilities transferred to the asset management vehicle 
or its management body or senior management. The objectives of an asset management 
vehicle shall not imply any duty or responsibility to shareholders or creditors of the bank 
under resolution, and the management body or senior management shall have no liability 
to such shareholders or creditors for acts and omissions in the discharge of their duties un-
less the act or omission implies gross negligence or serious misconduct in accordance with 
national law which directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors922.
2.5.3.2. The US Regulatory Framework
FDIC, as a receiver of a failing or failed bank, might use two basic resolution tools: a 
deposit pay-off (liquidation) or a purchase and assumption agreement923. The third option 
is as open bank assistance924. The P&A is the most common method used by the FDIC to 
resolve a failing bank and is considered the least disruptive to local communities925. This 
transaction can vary based on factors such as the amount of time available to arrange the 
transaction, the location and size of the bank, the nature of its deposits, and the assets 
available for transfer926. In essence, the purchase and assumption is designed in the U.S. 
legal framework to provide flexibility since each potential acquirer has different interests 
and market conditions change over time. For example, some acquirers may believe it is es-
sential to acquire a substantial portion of the bank’s assets with the deposit franchise; other 
acquirers may prefer to only purchase assets or deposits. Generally, the FDIC attempts to 
921 Ibid. Art. 42 (10).
922 Ibid. Art. 42 (12) (13).
923 FDIA. Sec. 11 (d) (10) (11). Compensation is paid to insured depositors, whereas uninsured deposi-
tors and other general creditors must submit their financial claims, which, after their determination, 
would allow pay dividends on proved claims received from liquidation of the insolvent bank’s assets.
924 Ibid. Governmental financial aid is granted in order for the bank facing financial difficulties to re-
main as a going-concern. State aid can take several forms. In a general sense, by providing open bank 
assistance, the FDIC requires new managing bodies of the bank in order to ensure that the bank’s 
share of property is distributed and be equal to the nominal value of the bank and that attempts are 
undertaken to obtain funding from the private sector. The main objectives and benefits of this specific 
measure is to maintain public confidence in the banking system and the continuity of banking ser-
vices in a local community. This measure is mainly criticized for a reason that the shareholders and 
other creditors of a failing bank benefit at taxpayers’ expense when receiving public assistance. FDIC. 
Overview of the Resolution Process. Resolutions Handbook. Chapter 5.
925 FDIC. Overview of the Resolution Process. Resolutions Handbook. Chapter 4. 2014. P. 16.
926 Ibid. P. 16.
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dispose of as many of the failing bank’s assets as possible at the time of its closing; however, 
the offer prices must meet the requirements of the “least cost” principle.
To begin with, the P&A agreement is a closed bank transaction. Therein, a healthy 
financial institution purchases some or all of the assets of a failed bank and assumes some 
or all of the liabilities, including insured deposits. The FDIC is looking for an acquiring 
bank which would purchase all or part of the failed bank’s assets and liabilities. The ac-
quirer generally bids separately for assets and deposits927. Due to the fact that the deposit 
gathering function of the failed bank is transferred to the acquirer, the acquirer’s bid for 
the liabilities may reflect the franchise value of the failed bank. In most cases, the acquirer 
receives most or all of a failed bank’s assets and deposits in return for a one-time payment. 
The acquirer’s bid reflects the value of the deposit franchise less expected loss in the book 
value of the assets928. The FDIC may transfer any asset or liability of the bank in default 
(including assets and liabilities associated with any trust businesses) without any approval, 
assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer929.
From 2008 to September 2013930, the FDIC as receiver has used this bank resolution 
tool within the U.S. legal framework to 452 of 502 financial institutions. There are several 
variations of P&A transactions:
i) Basic P&A. In this transaction, the assuming bank or acquirer generally takes on 
only limited assets of a failing bank. Usually, the transaction is settled in cash or 
cash equivalents. Bank premises, including furniture and fixtures, can be offered 
to other acquirers on an optional basis. In this case, a purchase price is agreed 
upon by the acquirer and the resolution authority. Liabilities of the failing bank 
are then matched to the assets taken and consist of either all or some of the de-
posits. To the extent that the resolution authority wants the acquirer to take on 
more liabilities than there are assets to be acquired, it needs to prove that the 
resolution authority will offset the difference and make a cash payment to the 
acquirer or provide an official note that will equalize the asset and liability sides 
of the balance sheet. It should be noted that the amendment of the FDIA Act in 
1991 had a significant impact on this resolution practice. Previously, the FDIC 
had structured most of its transactions to transfer both insured and uninsured 
deposits along with certain assets of a failed bank. After the introduction the 
“least cost” method to the legislation, the FDIC began entering into P&A transac-
tions that included only the insured deposits931. The key advantages of this type 
of transaction are that consumers with insured deposits suffer no loss in service, 
they may have new accounts with the new institution, but old cheques can still 
be used. It should also be noted that consumers do not lose interest on deposits 
927 FDIC. Overview of the Resolution Process. Resolutions Handbook. Chapter 2. 2014. P. 56.
928 Bennett R.L. The Effects of Resolution-Method Choice on Resolution Costs in Bank Failures. FDIC Divi-
sion of Insurance and Research. Haluk Unal Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, FDIC 
CFR, 2009. P. 6. [interactive] [accessed on 2014-12-15] <https://fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2009/
july/CFR_2009_bennett.pdf>.
929 FDIA. Sec. 11 (d) (G) (ii).
930 FDIC. Industry Analysis. Failed Banks. Loss-Share Questions and Answers [interactive]. [accessed on 
2014-12-15] <http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lossshare/> .
931 FDIC. Overview of the Resolution Process. Resolutions Handbook. Chapter 4. 2014. P. 17.
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held in the accounts (insurance up to USD 250,000). The acquiring financial in-
stitution has an opportunity to gain new customers. Besides, the FDIC can use 
this method when there is not enough time to complete due diligence. Finally, 
the FDIC transaction costs are less than a deposit pay-off or bank liquidation. 
Among the disadvantages of such a transaction, should be mentioned that the 
receivership must liquidate the majority of the failed bank’s assets; as a result, 
unsecured depositors may suffer losses in the event of the bank liquidation. In 
addition, the FDIC financial costs related to the bank resolution increase.
ii) Whole Bank P&A. In this type of transaction, the acquirer purchases the entire 
portfolio of the failed bank on an “as-is” basis, i.e., the maximum amount of as-
sets of the failed bank, with no guarantees to the competent authority. The main 
advantage of this type of transaction is that it minimizes the one-time FDIC cash 
outlay by having the acquiring institution purchase all assets, with the FDIC hav-
ing no further financial obligation to the acquiring institution. Furthermore, the 
transaction reduces the amount of the failed bank’s assets held by the FDIC for 
its future liquidation under the normal insolvency procedure. In addition, loan 
customers continue to be served by the acquiring financial institution (mainly 
operating in the same community). However, it should be considered that the 
transaction may not prove to be the least costly method compared to other types 
of resolution. For example, in case of a systemic crisis, negative bidders may enter 
the industry.
iii) Option shared loss P&A. Essentially, the FDIC, as receiver, agrees in resolution 
transaction to share losses on certain types of a failed bank’s assets with the 
proposed acquirer. To create a greater incentive for acquirers to bid on a failed 
bank’s assets, the competent authority can provide a “put” option on some of the 
transferred assets. This agreement is similar to the whole bank P&A except for 
the sharing provision on the assets purchased. For example, during the recent 
financial crisis, the FDIC offered loss share where the acquirers accept 20 percent 
of the losses, or more, depending on the bid932. The assets are typically distressed 
assets of the failing bank that otherwise might not appeal to potential acquirers 
without some sort of public incentive by authorities or protection from losses. 
Therefore, under this option, the FDIC splits pre-defined losses and expenses 
on certain assets with the acquirer. The assets have typically been single-family 
residential loans, commercial loans, commercial real estate loans. Among ad-
vantages, it should be noted that this type of deal reduces the FDIC’s immediate 
funding needs through the liquidation procedure. In operating terms, it is an eas-
ier solution – the option moves assets quickly into the private sector. In addition, 
this type of transaction allows the purchaser to have additional time, for example, 
60 or 90 days, before the resolution authority determines the asset volume, size 
and value more precisely. The key disadvantages of the transaction, are giving the 
acquirer, e.g., 90 days to look over assets while it decides what assets to assume. 
Assets which are not chosen can deteriorate. Additionally asset quality may de-
teriorate from lack of attention (requiring additional administrative supervision 
932 Ibid. P. 18.
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from both the acquiring institution and the FDIC), thereby making it harder for 
the resolution authority to market such bank assets or collect on them later. Such 
agreements can be administratively impractical in certain cases, as they generally 
last for 8 to 10 years933. The FDIC does not control the assets, thus, retains a large 
risk of potential loss.
iv) Bridge bank P&A. In the transaction, the FDIC acts temporarily as the acquir-
ing institution. The failed bank is closed by appointing a public authority to act 
as a receiver. A new, temporary bank is created. The deal provides a purchaser 
with the time necessary to assess the bank’s assets condition in order to submit 
their offers. Before establishing a bridge bank, a cost analysis must show that the 
franchise value of the bank is greater than the marginal costs of operating the 
bridge bank, thus being less costly than a deposit pay-off. The sale and closure of 
a bridge bank is similar to the sale and closure of other failed banks. The FDIC 
requires at least 16 to 24 weeks to properly prepare for the sale, which includes 
gathering information, soliciting interest from potential acquirers, arranging for 
due diligence by potential acquirers, and receiving and analysing bids. The trans-
action has several key advantages: first, it provides the FDIC time to arrange a 
permanent transaction; second, prospective purchasers are given time to assess 
the bank’s condition in order to submit reasonable bids; thirdly, the transaction 
provides continuity of service to bank customers. Among disadvantages, there 
should be noted duplicating elements of the resolution process. The FDIC must 
complete two closures, one for the original bank and one for the bridge bank. 
In addition, it is difficult to retain key employees during the transition period. 
Economic conditions may continue to deteriorate leading to lower premiums. 
Premium customers may leave the failing bank for a more stable environment, 
thereby reducing it‘s franchise value. 
2.5.3.3. Lithuanian Bank ‘Ūkio Bankas’ case study 
Pursuant to the regulatory framework of Lithuania, existing upon the failure of ‘Ūkio 
Bankas‘ bank, on activities of which a moratorium was announced and to which a tem-
porary administrator was appointed, assets, rights, transactions and liabilities may be 
transferred to another bank if: 1) there is a real threat that the net value of assets of the 
bank subject to administration will fall below the bank’s liabilities or that the bank will 
meet other conditions established by legal acts adopted by the supervisory institution for 
recognising the bank as insolvent, or it is established that the bank already meets the con-
ditions for recognising the bank as insolvent, and 2) the transfer of assets, rights, transac-
tions and liabilities of the bank subject to administration to another bank would retain 
the confidence of depositors in the stability and soundness of the banking system and 
otherwise protect public interest, while liquidation of the bank subject to administration 
due to bankruptcy would not protect such interests to the same extent934.
933 Ibid.
934 Republic of Lithuania Law on the Bank of Lithuania. Official Publication Valstybės žinios. 2004, No. 
54-1832. Art. 7.
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The assets, rights, transactions and liabilities of a bank subject to administration may 
be transferred only after the performance of their assessment by an audit firm and/or 
property appraisal company engaged by the temporary administrator. When transferring 
the assets, rights, transactions and liabilities of a bank subject to administration to another 
bank, the assets, rights, transactions and liabilities of the bank subject to administration 
may be transferred in their entirety, or in part. Furthermore, the already transferred assets, 
rights, transactions and liabilities may be returned to the bank subject to administration 
under the terms and conditions provided for in the documents on the transfer of assets, 
rights, transactions and liabilities, where necessary by appropriately adjusting the amount 
covering the difference in values paid, where such a possibility is explicitly specified in 
such documents or the circumstances indicate that the transferred assets, rights, transac-
tions and liabilities had not been intended for transfer. It should be emphasized that when 
applying the asset separation tool, the provisions of the Civil Code of the Republic of 
Lithuania, other laws and legal acts or transactions concluded by the bank stipulating the 
requirement to notify in advance creditors, borrowers or other persons about the actions 
performed for the purposes of the transfer of assets, rights, transactions and liabilities, 
the requirement to obtain permits or consents of other persons for the performance of 
such actions, including the consent of the creditor to transfer the debt to another person, 
or otherwise limiting the performance of the transfer of assets, rights, transactions and 
liabilities shall not apply. In addition, the transfer of assets, rights, transactions and li-
abilities shall not be considered as a violation of the transaction and/or a valid ground for 
creditors, borrowers or other persons to terminate a transaction concluded with the bank 
subject to administration. If the creditors, borrowers or other persons terminate a transac-
tion disregarding this provision, such a transaction may be returned to the bank subject 
to administration935.
At the beginning of the recent banking crisis, the Bank of Lithuania announced ’Ūkio 
Bankas’ was insolvent and revoked its license936. The transfer of assets, rights, transactions 
and liabilities of a bank subject to administration upon approval of the supervisory institu-
tion and in observance of its instructions are organised and performed by the temporary 
administrator937, therefore, the Bank of Lithuania authorised the temporary administrator 
to begin negotiations with other banks regarding the transfer of assets and liabilities of 
’Ūkio Bankas’ to another bank. The publicly available information in the media shows that 
the temporary administrator had to consider for basic options of bank resolution: bank re-
capitalisation, creation of a bridge bank, declaring a bank bankrupt, or the transfer of part 
of assets, rights, transactions, and liabilities of the bank. In view of the fact that the transfer 
of assets, rights, transactions and liabilities of the bank to another bank would maintain 
the trust of depositors in the stability and soundness of the banking system and otherwise 
protect public interest compared to liquidation of ’Ūkio Bankas’ due to bankruptcy, the 
Bank of Lithuania proposed to the State Deposit and Investment Insurance to take part 
in financing the transfer of assets, rights, transactions and liabilities of ’Ūkio Bankas’ to 
another bank, which, under the Art. 46 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Bank of 
935 Ibid. Art. 76 (1).
936 2013, February 18th, Decree of the Bank of Lithuania No.03-31 on the insolvency of ‘Ūkio bankas‘.
937 Supra note 934, Art. 76 (4).
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Lithuania, took over the assets, rights and obligations of ’Ūkio bankas’ in order to cover 
the difference in values of the liabilities transferred and assets, rights and transactions, 
which, according to estimates of the temporary administrator of ’Ūkio bankas’, was equal 
to LTL 800 million938. It should be noted that in accordance with Law on the Insurance of 
Deposits and Liabilities to Investors of the Republic of Lithuania, the insured event is con-
sidered to have occurred where the bank is not able to settle with creditors, i.e., becomes 
insolvent939. Thus, the decision was justified by the consideration that the bank division 
would assure the continuity of payment and part of the other financial services rendered to 
customers of the failing bank to a greater extent than the sale of all assets of ’Ūkio Bankas’ 
under the bankruptcy procedure, and would preserve the value of the failing bank.
In summary, there are arguments highlighting advantages of this resolution tool, how-
ever, there also are reasons why this legal tool should not be applied.
On the one hand, it should be emphasized that the application of this measure alone 
helps to lower administrative costs incurred. This method is particularly advantageous 
when the bank is funded mainly by depositors’ contributions. Operational issues are 
among the difficulties in undertaking bank resolutions940. One of the benefits of this type 
of transaction is that it can be executed quickly (e.g., in the United States, these trans-
actions are typically accomplished over a weekend941, in Lithuania, the transaction was 
entered into 11 days after the announcement of a moratorium of ‘Ūkio Bankas’). Speed 
is important since it is a critical factor in maintaining public confidence in the financial 
system. Moreover, it is a relatively easy transaction to explain to the public and depositors, 
since, as far as they are concerned, there are no other changes rather than their accounts 
being transferred to a new bank. If there are several potential purchasers, the transaction 
enables a government and/or a deposit insurer to seek to satisfy the creditors’ and the 
state’s interests through maximising a cost of such a transaction and reaching a maximum 
value for the assets managed by the bank. This helps to reduce high fiscal costs, usually 
arising from the immediate execution of the bank bankruptcy. Among other things, the 
transfer of the bank’s assets, rights, transactions, and liabilities prevents the contagion ef-
fects of systemic risk (which is more likely under immediate liquidation), and the inef-
ficient bank is removed from the financial system. Current bank debtors maintain the 
loan relationship with the purchasing bank, thus minimising damage to the settlement 
system. The purchasing bank takes over the failing bank’s liabilities and its position in the 
settlement and payment system. The transfer and assumption agreement is also attractive 
for the mechanisms of safeguarding the creditors’ rights prescribed therein and consisting 
of preliminary and final stages of the disposed asset valuation, e.g., a purchasing bank’s 
obligation to repay the difference in value of part of the bank’s assets acquired in case of an 
increase in it, and the transferring bank’s option right to purchase a part of the disposed 
assets.
938 Public information provided by the temporary administrator of bank ‘Ūkio bankas‘ [interactive]. [ac-
cessed on 2013-03-13]. <http://www.ub.lt/>.
939 Republic of Lithuania Law on Insurance of Deposits and Liabilities to Investors. Official Publication 
Valstybės žinios. 2002, No. 65-2635. Art. 2.
940 Hoelscher D.S. Supra note 2. P. 109.
941 Ibid.
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On the other hand, there also can be identified adverse legal effects of applying the 
purchase and assumption tool. One of the major drawbacks of this type of transactions is 
that they are more difficult to accomplish technically and operationally. Another possible 
disadvantage is that assets, rights, transactions and liabilities of ‘Ūkio bankas‘ in insolven-
cy have been transferred under the contract to another bank based on a preliminary asset 
valuation of questionable legal effect942. Following the revised, comprehensive, and sec-
ondary asset valuation, the difference is transferred either to the insurance or in the other 
contractual manner, however, this may entail a number of related legal issues and increase 
the likelihood of litigation. Furthermore, bank ‘Ūkio bankas‘ insolvency procedure gave 
rise to the situation where ‘Šiaulių bankas’, which acquired the portfolio, tried to regain the 
money transferred to the savings deposit accounts after finding out that depositors would 
open cumulative or universal deposit accounts with the former insolvent bank (to assure 
the possibility to fill them at anytime and, thus, benefit from compound interest effect) and 
deposited? after the restriction of the bank’s activities. It is therefore natural that the bank 
which acquired the assets and liabilities, would be reluctant to pay the interest promised 
by the insolvent bank, since such deposits may be in conflict with market conditions. After 
having purchased and taken over the failing bank’s liabilities, the purchaser may choose to 
unilaterally amend terms of the contract on deposits taken over from the insolvent bank 
and transfer all of this type of deposit to the “bad” assets of the insolvent bank, or impose 
a new tax of such deposits. This leads to a high probability of bringing actions by some of 
the former depositors of the insolvent bank against the portfolio acquirer to defend their 
rights. Besides, these transactions are aimed, in some degree, at meeting public interest 
objectives (maintaining the trust of depositors in the stability of the banking system and 
otherwise protecting public interest), however, the involvement of the supervisory au-
thority in such transactions alone does not assure a balance between a public and private 
interest and no infringement of the bank creditors’ rights.
2.5.4. The Bail-in
At the international level, the bail-in tool (hereinafter – bail-in) and the correspond-
ing approach to regulation of this bank resolution tool are deemed as the fundamental 
measure of bank resolution within the overall new paradigm of legal regulation governing 
bank insolvency943. Nationally, jurisdictions in relation with this research have already 
implemented such a legal tool944 and have accordingly granted legal powers to compe-
942 Under the Lithuanian Framework Law for Asset and Business Valuation, the estate market price shall 
be determined in the asset valuation report prepared in accordance with the law, while the law fails 
to define the legal status of the preliminary property assessment (Framework Law on Property and 
Business Evaluation, Art. 23. The supplied preliminary assessment statements often fail to comply 
with the above-mentioned law and the requirements set therein for the final asset valuation report, 
and therefore there is no reason to follow the asset value set in this document (Article 24(1) of the 
Framework Law on Property and Business Assessment).
943 In 2011, the FSB established a set of rules governing bank resolution. Inter alia, it made recommenda-
tions for the states to create a bank regime comprising bail-in tool as part of bank resolution tools, 
and bank stabilisation measures undertaken by the competent authorities. See more chapter 1 sec. 5 
subsec. 1.
944 FSB. Thematic review on resolution regimes. Supra note 11.
215
tent authorities to ensure that investors, not taxpayers (bail-out), bear the cost of bank 
failure, thus, reducing the necessity of external capital injection into the failing bank945. 
The primary objective of bail-in is to enable the relevant institution to avoid a sudden and 
disorderly liquidation by enabling it to continue in business as a going concern (presump-
tion of the going concern) until the bank can be restructured or the decision is made to 
liquidate it along with its assets946.Thus, the bail-in is aimed at avoiding formal insolvency 
procedures by allowing the bank to be returned to balance sheet stability and ensuring it as 
a going concern and without the destructive consequences of such a procedures. In other 
words, the aim of the bail-in tool is to create an alternative legal tool to taxpayer-funded 
rescues of banks or, at least, initially, to force its subordinated creditors and some senior 
creditors to take losses and to contribute to the bank resolution before taxpayer’ funds 
are put at insolvency related-risk. In some sense, it is a system of sanctions against indi-
viduals that basically means that bank insolvency costs are imposed on its shareholders 
and creditors. The doctrine supports the view that this bank resolution approach avoids 
the significant destruction of the bank value, reduces financial contagion, and potentially 
preserves critical banking functions947. A detailed critical analysis of this legal tool is a 
separate topic of thesis or scientific publication (for example, a special regulation of this 
tool is applied to banking groups, important financial institutions, multinational banks 
with G-SIFI status, etc.). There are plenty of scientific articles on this relevant topic948. But 
despite all the research – relevant jurisdictions apply this bank resolution tool as a part of 
positive law – it has never been put into practice. For example, the EU legal framework is 
planning to introduce this tool at the latest by 1 January 2016, and most Member States 
have not yet incorporated the directive into their national law. This subsection is intended 
to discuss only a few key potential advantages and disadvantages of this tool, legal aspects, 
and particularities of positive law in separate jurisdictions.
In legal concept, the bail-in tool is straightforward. In general terms of the legal frame-
work of bail-in, some of the bank’s debts (creditors’ claims) are compulsorily converted 
into equity. The supervisory authority establishes the resolution procedure at its own dis-
cretion, while the bank is still a going concern. In other words, these are the means of 
bank resolution, applied as one of the main tools to restore viability of the failing bank. 
This increases the immediate loss-bearing capacity of the bank and enables the competent 
authorities to conduct an orderly wind-down of the bank949. The only difference is that 
the resolution authority would decide how and when to wind down the bank as a going 
concern: whether to wind down one or more business lines of the bank, to sell all or part 
of the bank to a third party, to create a bridge bank, or to transfer the bank’s deposits to 
945 Gleeson S. Supra note 15. P. 2.
946 Huertas F.T. The case for Bail-ins. International Institute of Finance, 2012. P. 1.
947 Gleeson S. Supra note 15. P. 2.
948 Coffee C.J. Bail-ins versus Bail-outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk. Columbia 
University School of Law, New York. Working Paper No. 380, 2010. Avgouleas E., Goodhart Ch. A 
Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation mechanism. Internatinal Macroeconomics, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, No. 10065, London, 2014. Smits R. Is my money safe at Eu-
ropean banks? Reflections on the bail-in provisions in recent EU legal texts. Capital Markets Law 
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2014. Schillig M. Supra note 47. P. 88-98.
949 Huertas F.T. Supra note 25. P. 2.
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a third party. What is the bail-in composed of? The first is a special resolution regime for 
banks, the jurisdiction must have one, and it must give the resolution authority statu-
tory power to impose this resolution tool. A special resolution regime must empower the 
resolution authority to initiate resolution and to direct the affairs of the failed bank in 
much the same manner as an insolvency practitioner would be able to direct the affairs 
of a company in administration. The second precondition – there must be an amount 
outstanding of instruments subject to bail-in that is sufficient to write off or convert in 
order to recapitalise the bank. Write-off may be applicable to the bank’s equity as well. The 
doctrine suggests that the minimum amount of debt instruments subject to bail-in should 
be from 7% to 10% of the bank’s risk weighted assets. That is considered to be enough to 
restore the bank’s common equity (Tier 1 capital) to its minimum level950. Instruments 
subject to bail-in should include any instrument that counts as capital for the bank, in 
particular, it would include non-core Tier 1 capital instruments such as preferred stock as 
well as Tier 2 capital instruments such as subordinated debt. A third precondition is the 
provision of liquidity to the bank in resolution951. The bank in resolution is likely to require 
liquidity, in order to remain in operation and continue to meet customer obligations. For 
the framework to be practical, measures must be taken to assure that the bank in resolu-
tion will actually have unencumbered assets (assets without guarantee) that might serve as 
collateral for such a liquidity facility. Therefore, priority should be given to write-off and 
conversion of investors’ capital, which will assist in assuring the continuity of customer 
obligations and critical functions. Fourthly, measures will have to be taken to ensure that 
the bank in resolution does not disrupt financial market infrastructures. Fifth, and per-
haps most fundamentally – banks and the authorities have to establish reliable parameters 
with respect to how investors will be treated in bank resolution952. Investors need to have 
some idea of the process that the resolution authority will treat each element of the bank’s 
equity structure. Finally, all of the above needs to be accomplished at great speed. If the 
supervisor places the bank into resolution at the close of the business day, bail-in and the 
arrangements to assure continuity of customer obligations have to be in place by the start 
of the next business day. That generally leaves the competent authorities with at most 36 
to 48 hours (elapsed time between close of business on Friday and opening of business on 
Monday) to complete all the tasks required to make resolution successful953. These actions 
require considerable advance planning and preparation, therefore, resolution plans are an 
important step in this direction.
How does the bail-in tool work? Bail-in, by definition, is a legal process which applies 
to some but not all of the senior creditors of a bank. Chief amongst those to be protected 
950 Ibid. P. 5.
951 Zhou J., Rutledge V., Wouter B. etc. From Bail-Out to Bail-In: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Sys-
temic Financial institutions. Retrieved from IMF Staff Discussion Note, IMF, 2012. International In-
stitute of Finance. Making Resolution Robust-Completing the Legal and Institutional Frameworks for 
Effective Cross-Border Resolution of Financial Institutions, 2012. P. 38-41.
952 Huertas F.T. Supra note 25. P. 55-59.
953 For this reason, bank resolution regime imposes no obligation on the resolution authorities to obtain 
court approval before deciding on bank resolution. The bank resolution regime applies other require-
ments that may preclude the resolution authorities from intervening and performing resolution ac-
tivities within 36-48 hours.
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are depositors. The failing bank is to be preserved as a going concern where its “trade 
creditors” – payment services customers, short term creditors, securities and trading ex-
posures – are preserved intact, and the bail-in process is applied to the long-term invest-
ment creditors of the bank – loosely, bondholders and holders of subordinated debt. The 
essence of this resolution tool is the idea that some senior creditors of a bank should, in 
certain circumstances, have part of their claim against the bank written down in whole 
or in part, after the write down of lower ranking subordinated claims and equity. In turn, 
senior creditors may receive new shares in the bank, but subordinated creditors may have 
their claims simply extinguished954. As demonstrated in the brief example below, a full 
spectrum bank might have total assets of EUR 1 billion financed by inter alia EUR 50 
billion of shareholder equity, EUR 20 billion of subordinated debt and EUR 200 billion of 
senior debt securities. Thus applying a write-off of 40% to the senior debt securities would 
be more than sufficient to restore the bank’s equity capital and to replace its subordinated 
debt with equity, assuming that the bank’s losses burn through these layers of protection.
2.5.4.1. The EU Regulatory Framework
EU legal framework defines “bail-in tool” as the mechanism for effecting the exercise 
by a resolution authority of the write-down and conversion powers in relation to liabilities 
of a bank under resolution955. Resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool to meet the 
resolution objectives in accordance with the resolution principles for any of the major 
purposes: i) to recapitalise a bank that meets the conditions for resolution to the extent 
sufficient to restore its ability to comply with the conditions for authorisation (to the ex-
tent that those conditions apply to the entity), to continue to carry out the activities, and to 
sustain sufficient market confidence in the bank or banking group; ii) to convert to equity 
or reduce the principal amount of claims or debt instruments that are transferred a) a 
bridge bank with a view to providing capital for it; b) under the sale of business tool or the 
asset separation tool956. Competent authorities may apply the bail-in tool only when rel-
evant resolution objectives are achieved and the bank is restored in question to its financial 
soundness and long-term viability957. In exceptional circumstances, the bail-in tool may be 
applied, by excluding certain liabilities from the application of the write-down or conver-
sion powers where i) covered deposits; ii) secured liabilities including covered bonds and 
liabilities; iii) any liability that arises by virtue of the holding by a bank of client assets or 
client money, provided that such clients are protected under the applicable insolvency law; 
iv) any liability that arises by virtue of a fiduciary relationship between the bank (as fidu-
ciary) and another person (as beneficiary) provided that such a beneficiary is protected 
under the applicable insolvency or civil law; v) liabilities to banks, excluding entities that 
are part of the same group, with an original maturity of less than 7 days; vi) liabilities with 
a remaining maturity of less than 7 days, owed to systems or operators of systems or their 
participants and arising from the participation in such a system; vii) liability to employees, 
954 Gleeson S. Supra note 15. 2012. P. Zhou J., Rutledge V, etc. Supra note 965.
955 BRRD. Art. 2 (53).
956 Ibid. Art. 43 (2).
957 Ibid. Art. 43 (3).
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i.e., liability in relation to accrued salary, pension benefits or other fixed remuneration, 
except for the variable component of remuneration; viii) a commercial or trade creditor 
arising from the provision to the bank of goods or services that are critical to the daily 
functioning of its operations, including IT services, utilities and the rental, servicing and 
upkeep of premises; ix) tax and social security authorities; x) deposit guarantee schemes 
arising from mandatory contributions. In exceptional circumstances, where the bail-in 
tool is applied, the resolution authority may exclude or partially exclude certain liabilities 
from the application of the write-down or conversion powers of the parties concerned 
where: a) it is not possible to do this within a reasonable time notwithstanding the good 
faith efforts of the resolution authority; b) the exclusion is strictly necessary and is propor-
tionate to achieve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines in a manner 
that maintains the ability to continue key operations, services and transactions; c) the 
exclusion is strictly necessary to avoid giving rise to widespread contagion, in particular 
as regards eligible deposits held by natural persons and micro, small and medium sized 
enterprises, which would severely disrupt the functioning of financial markets in a man-
ner that could cause serious disturbance to the economy of a Member State; d) the appli-
cation of the bail-in tool to those liabilities would cause a destruction in value such that 
the losses borne by other creditors would be higher than if those liabilities were excluded 
from bail-in958.
Thus, when applying the bail-in tool within the EU’s legal framework, the resolution 
authorities are empowered to write off claims of a failing bank’s unsecured creditors and to 
convert debt claims to equity. The tool may be used to recapitalise a failing or likely to fail 
credit institution since it enables the authorities to restructure during the resolution process 
and, after having restructured it, to restore its viability. In order to apply the bail-in tool, 
resolution institutions must that the bank has on its balance sheet a sufficient amount of 
liabilities eligible for a bail-in tool. This is the key requirement of this bank resolution tool. 
Before the Member State is allowed to use the ESM funds for recapitalisation of a failing 
bank, national resolution funds and the bail-in tool must be applied first. The minimum 
amount of liabilities is calculated on a proportion and adjusted to each bank based on their 
risks (liabilities) and a percentage of own funds. This amounts to no less than 8 percent of 
shareholders’ and creditors’ liabilities before the competent authorities may use national 
resolution funds, loss absorption, or new capital injection into the bank, and only then 
write off 5 percent of the bank’s liabilities959. The resolution authority may seek funding 
from alternative financing sources provided that i) contribution to loss absorption and re-
capitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of total liabilities including own funds 
of the bank under resolution, measured at the time of resolution and in accordance with the 
valuation, has been made by shareholders and holders of other instruments of ownership, 
and holders of relevant capital instruments and other eligible liabilities through write down, 
conversion or otherwise; ii) the contribution of the resolution financing arrangement does 
not exceed 5 % of total liabilities including own funds960. In extraordinary circumstances, 
the resolution authority may seek further funding from alternative financing sources after 
958 Ibid. Art. 44 (3).
959 BRRD. Art. 44 (5), (7), Art. 37 (10) (a), Recital (73).
960 Ibid. Art. 44 (5) (a) (b).
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the 5 % limit has been reached; and all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities, other than 
eligible deposits have been written down or converted in full961. In any case, resolution 
authorities shall give due consideration to the principle that losses should be borne first by 
shareholders and then, in general, by creditors of the bank under resolution in preference 
order. Consideration should also be given to the level of loss absorbing capacity that would 
remain in the bank under resolution if the liability or class of liabilities were excluded and to 
the need to maintain adequate resources for resolution financing962. Historical losses which 
have already been absorbed by shareholders through a reduction in their own funds prior 
to such valuation should not be included in those percentages963. Furthermore, a system-
atic analysis of the Directive BRRD shows that there is apparently no prohibition for the 
bank’s losses to exceed 13 percent of liabilities of the bank under resolution, on carrying 
out another stage of this resolution tool in order to cover remaining losses by creditors and 
unsecured, non-preferred depositors before using public or ESM funds. On the other hand, 
the use of public funds is permitted (including temporary public ownership, nationalisation 
according to Art. 58 of BRRD) in the very extraordinary situation of a systemic crisis”964, on 
approval under the EU State aid framework965. In any case, the requirements for the use of 
public funds are very strict, they are used as a last resort966.
Within the EU legal framework, we can identify a number of problematic aspects of 
the bail-in tool regulation. If the insolvency concerns a banking group, operating outside 
the Member State, resolution authorities may carry out smooth coordination, however the 
decision on the use of bail-in has an effect of loss allocation to obvious losers. In some 
cases, this may cause a crisis of confidence in the banking system of the certain Member 
State and provoke major disagreements on (in the case of a banking group’s insolvency) 
the bank branch which is subject to this tool and that which is not. When a bank branch 
operates outside the Member State, such disagreements may seriously affect inter-state rela-
tions, especially in cases of uneven loss allocation. Possible solution – to follow the banking 
group’s resolution approach and to allocate all the losses to a particular legal entity of the 
banking group on behalf of the entire banking group, which operates within the EU. How-
ever, in that case, the bail-in and the amount of debt written off or converted at the group 
level shall be carried out in a holding company for the banking group operating in the EU; 
otherwise, the competent authorities will be forced to subsidise the bank. Another chal-
lenge concerns the liquidity support from resolution funds and Central Banks. The support 
can be provided either through each legal entity of the banking group with regard to the 
available collateral in each bank, or directly through assistance to the parent undertaking. 
In both cases, it would take place in the Euro area, where all liquidity support from the 
Central Bank ultimately needs to be reserved in the ECB’s balance sheet, at least, until the 
bank resolution is successfully carried out. In addition, in case of the lack of backstop967 to 
961 Ibid . Art. 44 (7).
962 Ibid. Art.44 (9).
963 Ibid. Recital (75).
964 Ibid. Art. 37 (10).
965 TFEU Art.107. BRRD. Art. 56, 58, 37 (10).
966 BRRD Art. 37 (10), 56, 58.
967 Ambrasas T. Supra note 444. P. 20-24.
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other parts of the financial system, creditors may start to change banks, which may alter the 
financial system, even if banks manage to retain sufficient amounts of liabilities eligible for 
bail-in. There are opinions expressed that the main impact of this tool will be the incurring 
of higher debt servicing costs by banks. Bail-in and changes in the hierarchy of creditors’ 
and depositors’ claims will substantially increase bank borrowing costs968.
2.5.4.2. The US Regulatory Framework
U.S. legal framework provides that creditors and shareholders are the first to bear the 
losses of the financial company, whereby the Orderly Liquidation Authority969 acts as a 
receiver and takes control of the company. The bail-in concept should be interpreted and 
associated with the primary goal of the Dodd-Frank Act stated in the Preamble “to protect 
an American taxpayer by ending bailouts upon the bail out.” It should be emphasized that 
the narrative section of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the FDIC with new rights 
and powers designed to address the default of solely SIFI banks. The FDCI can be assigned 
as a receiver of any U.S. financial institution which meets the specific criteria laid down in 
the Dodd-Frank Act and where the bank resolution under the US Bankruptcy Code (or-
dinary insolvency procedure) is likely to cause systemic instability in the country. In order 
to enhance the effectiveness of a bank or banking group resolution and minimize systemic 
disruptions, the FDIC has opted for the single point of entry970 model as a last resort of 
the effective bank resolution regime971. This means that the FDIC, acting as receiver in 
accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act, is given all rights, powers and privileges to act and 
intervene in creditors’ rights and claims relating to counterparties and lenders of the bank 
under resolution, which, consequently, may affect the bank’s assets. Provisions of Section 
210 of the Dodd-Frank Act provide for the right to compensation after termination of con-
tractual rights or revocation of counterparties’ or creditors’ claims. With the purpose of in-
tervention into counterparties’ or creditors’ rights, the FDIC organises a bridge bank and 
transfers ownership rights of the failing bank or banking group to the healthy legal entity 
through the separation of the banking group’s or bank’s shareholders and creditors from 
the failing bank’s assets972. Furthermore, the FDIC holds and implements the procedure of 
satisfying creditors’ claims and establishes the priority for satisfying claims of the creditors 
of the bank under resolution without taxpayers’ money973. Eventually, the bail-in institu-
tion provides that the receiver shall satisfy creditors’ claims in accordance with and subject 
to the debt securitisation requirements, taking into account the priority of creditors under 
Section 210 and allowing the bank to raise debt and equity. Before converting creditors’ 
claims to securities, the FDIC shall determine the value of the bridge bank, based on inde-
pendent asset valuation. It was also noted that the FDIC presumes that the counterparties’ 
968 HM Treasury. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive Impact Assesment. Opinion, 2014. 
P. 2.
969 Dodd-Frank. Section 204 (a) (1).
970 FDIC. Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: the Single Point of entry Strategy. 
78 Fed. Reg. 243, 2013.
971 Dodd-Frank. Section 619 (d).
972 Ibid. Section 210 (a), 210 (h). Title II, Sec. 201 (3).
973 Ibid. Section 210.
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capital, subordinated debt and a large part of unsecured liabilities, with the exception of a 
seller’ claims, are treated as residual claims to be recovered by the receiver974. This is the es-
sence of the bail-in procedure. The tool allows the bridge institution to have clean commit-
ments and healthy bank, instead of converting unsecured creditors of the insolvent bank 
into the bridge bank’s shareholders975. Upon the establishment of a bridge bank that holds 
a significant part of assets and a much smaller amount of liabilities of the parent holding 
company, it is assumed that the bridge bank has a more stable balance sheet and, conse-
quently, is in a better position to borrow money from conventional markets under normal 
conditions. If this tool is insufficient and there is still a capital deficit, the FDIC may apply 
to the Orderly Liquidation Fund976. All other expenses incurred in the bank resolution by 
the FDIC as a receiver in case of the failure of the above methods shall be borne by the in-
dustry as ex-post contributions. In addition, provisions of Dodd-Frank expand the powers 
of the FDIC, including the power to select assets and liabilities that might be transferred 
to a third party. Further, the FDCI can treat the same class of creditors in different ways, 
for example, to give priority to short-term creditors over long-term creditors or to provide 
creditors with more favorable conditions over bondholders or lenders. The FDCI, in such 
discretion, prescribes that a creditor shall in no event receive less than the amount that the 
creditor is entitled to receive in case of liquidation of the bank977.
According to researchers, the primary weakness of the U.S. legal framework is in the 
case of breakdown of a parent bank within a banking group, with respect to providing 
required funding for recapitalisation, operating bank branches, that may impose a repu-
tational risk on the entire banking group, including operating branches. As the poten-
tial contagion of reputational risk shows, it may lead to severe consequences978. If such 
a risk occurred, CB or deposit / resolution fund would inject a large amount of capital 
into banks to increase bank liquidity. Secondly, there is the issue of speed – how quickly a 
bridge bank’s capital structure can be restored. This question becomes very relevant after 
the bankruptcy procedure against the parent holding company is commenced. While the 
bail-in tool is applied, the bank is not isolated. The use of the tool is a part of the bank 
resolution process, involving the replacement of senior management and restructuring of 
business of the banking group. However, it takes quite some time to restore a new bridge 
bank’s capital structure, therefore, public authorities in the end have an undercapitalized 
structure of an operating bank and incur large liabilities on the public sector. The govern-
ment would not force private sector purchasers to acquire a new bridge bank’s capital or 
(subordinated) debt. This may also involve rumours. Thus, despite the enforcement meas-
ures such as the suspension of dividends or redemption constraints, in particular, during 
the financial crisis, it is not easy to collect non-distributed profits or restore capital. The 
third potential problem is related to the application of the measure and associated costs 
incurred by the banking sector. If the bank is rescued through the write-off or conversion 
974 FDIA. Art. 17.
975 Dodd-Frank. II Section of the Preamble.
976 FDIA. Sec. 11 A.
977 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 210 (a) (7) (B).
978 Kanas A. Pure Contagion Effects in International Banking: The Case of BCCI‘s Failure. Vol. 8, Journal 
of Applied Economics, 2005. P. 101-123.
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of private debt instruments, the transfer of liabilities is very likely to affect the banking 
industry’s prices.
To summarise the doctrinal concept of the tool and peculiarities of positive law in 
various jurisdictions, we can distinguish the following key advantages of the bail-in tool: 
the bank, which is not able to deal with its financial trouble independently, is usually seek-
ing additional funding in the capital market either by issuing new equity instruments to 
market investors or by seeking private solvent acquirers. These methods, however, are not 
suitable for all banks and only in certain situations. Application of this tool presumes a 
time issue; besides, privately funded recapitalisation makes it more or less impossible to 
identify every significant creditor, in particular, of a SIFI, in any reasonable timescale979. At 
this point, public intervention is still required, while the bail-out helps in resolving a bank, 
by requiring at least some creditors to contribute to privately funded recapitalisation. Pri-
marily, this tool allows public subsidies to replace private sanctions or particular private 
insurance, causing the banks to assume the costs of internal operating risks within the 
course of their business980. In general, apart from the bearing of bank insolvency losses by 
shareholders under the new paradigm of bank resolution, bank insolvency losses are also 
covered by ex ante (or ex post) resolution funds financed with industry contributions and 
specific classes of the bank’s creditors, and the fixed amount of their debt claims to a bank 
are converted to capital. This allows for the restoration of the bank’s equity capital (capital 
conservation buffer) as required for normal banking operations. Second, a change of un-
secured debt to bail-in should encourage creditors to pay more attention to monitoring, 
thereby, restoring market discipline. For example, potential bank insolvency costs would 
be allocated not only to creditors, but also to shareholders. It is assumed that creditors 
will become more careful with bank leverage in this case, by limiting the most likely bank 
solvency and management costs associated with excessive leverage effects981. Sharehold-
ers are interested in having the greatest possible leverage level in order to maximise their 
return on capital982. Third, it is likely that the bail-in will ensure a greater legal certainty 
on a sufficient amount of funds to cover bank losses and induce early recapitalisation of 
banks in view of pre-planned agreements between creditors and the bank. Finally the tool 
helps to maintain activities of the bank acting as a business entity and to avoid the adverse 
effects of liquidation.
Apart from distinctive disadvantages of individual jurisdictions, the bail-in tool also 
has a number of problematic aspects. One of the primary weaknesses of a bail-in as a bank 
resolution tool is that although it renders the bank creditworthy, it provides no new cash. 
Thus in order to survive, the bank must not only be creditworthy, but credibly creditwor-
thy to at least its Central Bank, and preferably to the market as a whole. There are also 
issues around the objectives of resolution. It has been noted that the objectives of bail-in 
differ in various jurisdictions. For example, the bail-in procedure in U.S., whereby credi-
979 Gleeson S. Supra note 15. P. 13.
980 KPMG. Bail-in liabilities: replacing public subsidy with private insurance. 2012.
981 Admati A.R., DeMarzo P.M., Hellwig M.F. etc.The Leverage Ratchet Effect. Working Paper Series of the 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. Vol. 13, 2013.
982 Admati A.R., DeMarzo P.M., Hellwig M.F. etc. Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation. Rocke Center 
for Corporate Governance at Standford University Working Paper No. 114, MPI Collective Goods 
Preprint, No. 2012/5, 2012.
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tors’ claims are written off or converted, is designed for SIFI banks only and is organised 
through the Orderly Liquidation Authority and in accordance with regulatory provisions. 
Under the narrative section of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, the bail-in tool aims to 
provide sufficient capital to the bank. Thereafter, the resolution is normally carried out by 
liquidating a non-viable part of the bank. The tool is intended rather for parent banks op-
erating within banking groups. The EU system explicitly distinguishes between eurozone 
and non-eurozone Member States. BRRD Directive and the European Stability Mecha-
nism Act require bank creditors to bear bank resolution costs. This means that either the 
bank is kept operational, and the bail-in tool and bank recapitalisation procedure restore 
the bank’s viability (the bank continues as a going concern), or, by applying the tool in 
conjunction with other resolution powers, it is considered that the bank has lost the going 
concern presumption (the bank is closed). Among the disadvantages can be mentioned 
that this resolution measure requires swift actions, and has to be accomplished over a 
weekend (within as short as possible a time period after the market closes). There may 
emerge some challenges around the fact that the tool can be applied without the consent of 
shareholders or creditors, without public hearings or consultations being held, and where 
hardly any conditions are provided for the judicial follow-up of administrative decisions, 
mainly, in the context of expropriation of ownership rights. It is also believed that this tool 
will not produce a zero-failure environment for banks. Recapitalisation only works for 
good businesses with bad balance sheets. Businesses which are fundamentally bad will not 
and should not be bailed in, but will be left to a resolution regime in the ordinary way. It 
is also possible for a bail-in to fail – if the initial assessment of the extent of the losses of a 
bank is sufficiently adrift, or the amount of new capital created by the bail-in is insufficient 
to support the business. Possibly more importantly, a bailed-in bank will only survive if 
counterparties, creditors and customers believe that the bank is now robust. Besides, mar-
ket confidence in the bailed-in bank requires to be quickly restored in order to maintain 
the franchise value of the bank or to cover the official liquidity support.
2.6. Peculiarities of Swiss Bank Resolution Tools 
The Swiss legal framework provides that the FINMA opens the restructuring proceed-
ings after it issues a ruling and approves the restructuring plan. In its opening ruling, 
FINMA may specify whether existing protective measures are to be maintained or altered, 
or replaced by new ones, including the application of bank resolution tools983. The law 
provides for mandatory elements to be covered by the restructuring plan, including, but 
not limited to the bank’s assets and liabilities, the bank’s future organisation and manage-
ment, whether and how the restructuring plan affects the rights of the bank’s creditors, 
transactions which require an entry in the Commercial Register or in the Land Register, 
and provisions of resolution tools, if any984. The. Law gives priority to the continuation of 
services of a failing bank985. Special priority is given to the bank’s asset separation tool. 
The restructuring plan may provide for the transfer of the bank’s assets or parts thereof, 
983 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 41.
984 Ibid. Art. 44 (2).
985 Swiss Banking law. Art. 30.
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including assets and liabilities as well as contractual relationships, to other entities or to a 
temporary bridge bank986. If contractual relationships or the bank’s assets or parts thereof 
are transferred, the transferee will take the place of the bank, provided the restructuring 
plan foresees this, therefore, the Mergers Act of 3 October 2003 is not applicable987. If as-
sets are transferred, the FINMA will order an independent valuation of these988.
The Swiss legal framework sets out three key bank resolution tools: asset separation, 
bridge bank989, and bail-in990. The transfer of bank assets, contractual relationships, and 
liabilities to another bank might take place by applying the asset separation tool or a 
bridge bank. The restructuring plan shall describe in detail the above bank resolution 
tools which are subject to the following key requirements: a.) name the legal entity or 
entities to which such banking services and assets are to be transferred; b.) describe the 
assets, liabilities and contractual relationships to be transferred and the compensation 
to be provided for them; c.) describe the banking services that are to be continued and 
transferred; d.) list the corporate actions undertaken and, where banking services are to 
be transferred to a bridge bank, describe how assets and liabilities will be shared between 
the bank and the bridge bank; e.) stipulate an obligation on the bank’s part to take any 
action necessary to ensure that all of the assets and objects to be transferred, including in 
particular those located abroad or subject to foreign law, can be transferred to the other 
legal entity; f.) explain whether compensation is to be paid, how such compensation is 
to be calculated and whether a maximum compensation amount is to be imposed; g.) 
explain whether systems and applications will be used jointly by the bank and the other 
legal entity and, if banking services are to be continued by a bridge bank, how the latter 
will be guaranteed access to payment transactions and financial market infrastructure 
and how it will be able to use this; h.) describe how to preserve the legal and economic 
connections between assets, liabilities and contractual relationships, thereby ensuring 
that only the following can be transferred: i) all claims and liabilities on the bank’s part 
vis-à-vis a counterparty or several counterparties that can be offset, in particular those 
that are subject to a netting agreement; ii) secured claims and liabilities together with 
their collateral; and iii) structured financing arrangements or comparable capital market 
agreements to which the bank is a party, together with all rights and obligations pertain-
ing to them991.
As soon as the approved restructuring plan is enforceable, all transferred assets or 
contractual relationships, together with all rights and obligations pertaining to them at the 
time of the approval of the restructuring plan, pass to the new legal entity or entities992. The 
bridge bank mainly serves to ensure the temporary continuation of individual banking 
services transferred to it. FINMA shall grant the bridge bank a license with a fixed term 
986 Ibid. Art. 30 (2).
987 Ibid. Art. 30 (3).
988 Ibid. Art. 30 (b).
989 Swiss Ordinance. 51 str.
990 Ibid. Art. 48, 49.
991 Ibid. Art. 51 (1).
992 Ibid. Art. 51(2).
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of two years. It may deviate from the licensing requirements when granting it. The license 
may be extended in necessary993.
The Swiss legal framework has established the bail-in tool. The essence of this tool, as in 
other jurisdictions relevant for the purposes of the research, is that all bank claims, with a 
few clearly defined exceptions, are subject to compulsory conversion of debt into equity or 
compulsory waiving of claims. The resolution tools prescribed by the legal regulation can be 
combined and applied together or individually at the same time. When FINMA instructs 
creditors to waive their claims, it is not obliged – in contrast to the procedure for converting 
debt into equity – to completely wipe out the junior creditors before calling on the next sen-
ior category of creditors to share in the loss, thus, establishing a new creditor hierarchy. This 
means that FINMA can distribute a loss across a range of creditor groups. From a quantita-
tive perspective many Swiss banks are likely to have adequate “bail-in” debt. However, it re-
mains to be seen whether this debt is in the ‘right’ legal entity and in the right form (e.g. as a 
subordinated bond)994. Furthermore, Swiss law defines the key principles for converting debt 
capital into equity capital. If the restructuring plan provides for this tool, then a) sufficient 
debt capital must be converted into equity capital to ensure that the bank holds the required 
capital to continue its business activities after the restructuring is completed; b) share capital 
must be completely written down before converting debt capital into equity capital; c) debt 
capital may be converted into equity capital only if the debt instruments issued by the bank 
as part of additional core capital or supplementary capital have already been converted into 
equity capital, in particular contingent convertible bonds; d) the following order of rank 
shall be observed when converting debt capital into equity capital where claims of the next 
rank are only converted if the conversion of claims of the previous rank does not suffice to 
meet the capital adequacy requirements in accordance with letter a: i) subordinated claims 
without capital adequacy eligibility, ii) other claims not excluded from the conversion, with 
the exception of deposits, and iii) deposits, in so far as they are not privileged995. All debt 
capital can be converted into equity capital, with the exception of privileged claims in classes: 
employees’ and public authorities’ claims and insured depositors for up to CHF 100,000, 
pension funds’ claims996; as well as secured claims to the extent that they are secured and 
offsettable claims to the extent that they are offsettable, if the creditor can credibly demon-
strate the existence, amount and the fact that the claim is the object of a relevant agreement, 
or this is evident from the bank’s books997. When converting debt capital into equity capital, 
FINMA may order a partial or full reduction in claims998.
FINMA shall give public notice that the bankruptcy proceedings or the restructuring 
proceedings have been completed999. Meanwhile, the restructuring agent shall report to 
FINMA, summarising the progress of the restructuring proceedings1000. 
993 Ibid. Art. 52.
994 FINMA. New FINMA Banking Insolvency Ordinance. A Key element in the effective restructuring 
and orderly market exit of banks. Bern, 2012. P. 4.
995 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 48.
996 Swiss Banking law. 37 (a)(1)-(5). DEBA Art. 219 (4).
997 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 49.
998 Ibid. Art. 49.
999 Ibid. Art. 58 (3).
1000 Ibid. Art. 58 (1).
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2.7. Financial Stabilisation Tools – the Way of Dealing with Bank in Distress?
Legislation of relevant jurisdictions establishes an alternative to bank resolution as 
a last resort – application of government stabilisation measures (government guarantee, 
redemption of bank assets, public equity support tool, and taking bank shares for pub-
lic needs). They are, in essence, government financial stabilisation tools, intended for the 
banking system. The doctrine1001 and research-related jurisdictions do not treat this meas-
ure for dealing with financial trouble as a bank resolution tool due to the difference of its 
legal nature from other legal means of bank resolution, therefore it is analysed in more 
detail outside this study1002. This presumption, among other things, is made because the 
financial stabilisation tools consist of public equity support and temporary public owner-
ship tools1003. For example, in the EU, financial stabilisation tools are construed as ex-
traordinary public financial support, direct intervention in the bank’s activities in order 
to avoid its winding up1004. It should be noted that in the absence of alternatives to bank 
resolution tools and/or an effective legal regime of bank resolution, this measure had been 
used quite often in the latest banking crisis, particularly, in view of the fact that jurisdic-
tion provided for the only other solution for bank insolvency – immediate liquidation of 
the bank1005. Yet, in practice there were instances where one of the financial stabilisation 
tools – nationalisation – had been used even under the legal framework of resolution 
tools. Nationalisation is a stabilisation mechanism, when a bank’s shares are taken for state 
needs and duly compensated1006. However, this tool requires wider discussion in relation 
to the nationalisation and later liquidation of the Lithuanian bank ‘Snoras‘ during the 
recent banking crisis. This tool was typically applied in the event of large failing banks 
such as Continental Illinois National Bank1007 and intensively practiced in Sweden. The Swiss 
nationalisation scheme was as follows: firstly, the state nationalises bank property, then 
public authorities use the asset separation tool in respect of the bank owned and estab-
lish a ‘bad” bank for shifting “bad” assets and loans into. The remaining “good” bank is 
recapitalised by the government. The Government receives performing loans, while the 
bank can normally operate as a going concern. Meanwhile, it is gradually allowed to sell 
troubled assets to the “bad” bank which accepted its non-performing assets, and, thus, to 
prevent the scale of losses that would inevitably result from immediate sale of the assets. 
In essence, the “bad” bank serves as an asset management company. Crisis Management 
Authority was responsible for undertaking the tasks under administration of the “bad 
1001 Frydl E.J., Quintyn M. The Benefits and Costs of Intervening in Banking Crises. (in) Bank Restruc-
turing and Resolution. IMF, Washington, 2006. P. 32-33.
1002 In the doctrine, they are understood as pre-insolvency bank resolution tools, applied after the para-
digm shift prior to public sector capital injection in the bank, or before providing public financial 
support, or treated as a measure of last resort.
1003 BRRD. Art. 56 (5).
1004 BRRD. Art. 56 (1).
1005 Hoelsher D.S. Supra note 2. P. 105.
1006 Ibid. Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 47. P. 46.
1007 FDIC. Continental Illinois and „Too Big to Fail“. Chapter 7. An Examination of the Banking Crises of 
the 1980s and Early 1990s. Vol. 1. History.
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bank” insolvency1008. Through the micro-comparative method, this tool is demonstrated 
in the insolvency case of the Lithuanian bank ‘Snoras’, where the tool’s strengths and weak-
nesses have been analysed. Second, it should be considered specifically how the tool is 
interpreted within the new bank insolvency procedure of the EU legal framework.
The reason why this measure cannot deal with bank distress and be considered a bank 
resolution tool is explained through the EU regulatory framework. In particular, the EU 
legal framework establishes the principle that resolution of a bank should maintain it as a 
going concern and, solely as a last resort, involve government financial stabilisation tools, 
including temporary public ownership1009. The public ownership and assumption of risk 
should be accompanied by reward. Therefore, the financial stabilisation measure does 
not constitute bank resolution tools. Second, the government financial stabilisation tools 
are used as a last resort after having assessed and exploited any other resolution tools to 
the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability. The competent 
ministry or the government makes the decision after consulting the resolution author-
ity1010. Third, when applying for government financial stabilisation tools, there shall be 
conventional resolution tools applied as a priority only if all the following compulsory 
conditions are met: a) the competent ministry or government and the resolution author-
ity, after consulting the Central Bank and the competent authority, determine that the 
application of the resolution tools would not suffice to avoid a significant adverse effect 
on the financial system; b) the competent ministry or government and the resolution au-
thority determine that the application of the resolution tools would not suffice to protect 
the public interest, where extraordinary liquidity assistance from the Central Bank has 
previously been given to the bank; c) in respect of the temporary public ownership tool, 
the competent ministry or government, after consulting the competent authority and 
the resolution authority, determines that the application of the resolution tools would 
not suffice to protect the public interest, where public equity support through the equity 
support tool has previously been given to the bank1011. Fourth, the financial stabilisa-
tion tools consist of the public equity support tool and temporary public ownership tool 
(in doctrine, also known as nationalisation). The regulation of the public equity support 
tool provides that a Member State may participate in the recapitalisation of a bank, by 
providing capital to the latter in exchange for Common Equity Tier 1 instruments and 
Additional Tier 1 instruments or Tier 2 instruments1012. Where a Member State provides 
the public equity support tool, it shall ensure that its holding in the bank is transferred 
to the private sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow1013. Mean-
while, a temporary state ownership stipulates that a nominee of the Member State or a 
company fully owned by the Member State as a transferee may make one or more share 
transfer orders1014.
1008 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 101-102.
1009 BRRD. Recital. (8).
1010 BRRD. Art. 56 (3).
1011 Ibid. Art. 56 (4).
1012 Ibid. Art. 57 (1).
1013 Ibid. Art. 57 (3).
1014 Ibid. Art. 58 (2).
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2.8. Lithuanian Bank ‘Snoras’ case study
Bank nationalisation is a legal tool whereby shareholder management is replaced by 
the government (or rather the deposit insurer) management. The Government of Lithu-
ania shall take bank shares for public needs1015 in exceptional cases only where the public 
ownership of bank shares is deemed necessary to allow the State to take immediate action 
aimed at stabilising the banking system if other available measures are not suitable or 
the measures that have been applied are insufficient to achieve this objective. The bank’s 
shares are taken by decree of the Government by granting fair compensation1016. The right 
of ownership of the shares taken is transferred to the State once the decree of the Govern-
ment to take bank shares for public needs enters into force. Nationalisation requires large 
fiscal costs (especially if the majority of creditors of the bank are insured) and is practiced 
worldwide only in extreme cases1017. When shares are taken for public needs according to 
the Law on Financial Sustainability of the Republic of Lithuania, shareholders may appeal 
the decision, but only in part for a fair price (since the law provides an exception to the 
general regulation that shares shall be transferred to state ownership upon the adoption 
of the decree by the Government of RL rather than the settlement). It should be noted 
that other legislation also provides for taking shares for public need1018. Pursuant to the 
Lithuania Law on Insurance of Deposits and Liabilities to Investors, the Board of the State 
Deposit and Liabilities Insurance shall make a decision to take bank shares from share-
holders after having been informed by the supervisory authority that the bank operation 
is not safe or sound and that the bank may become insolvent and if it may have sufficient 
grounds to believe that the possible insured event of the bank could endanger liquidity of 
the insurance company and adequate payment of insurance claims. The key distinctive 
feature of the mechanism of taking bank shares for public needs in this case is the right 
of appealing the transfer of ownership. The bank nationalisation consists of several stages. 
First, the bank shall be announced as insolvent by decision of the supervisory authority1019, 
1015 Article 8(6) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Financial Sustainability states that the Government 
shall approve the price of shares, taking into account the proposals of the audit company and/or 
property evaluator, and the costs of identifying the share price shall be covered by public funds. In 
determining the bank’s share price, the measures to strengthen financial stability already applied or 
planned to apply to the bank in accordance with this Law cannot be taken into account. When share 
price is paid to the former shareholders, interest shall also paid in accordance with Article 6.210 (1) 
of the Civil Code as of the intended share price . In addition, fixed rate of interest paid for the shares 
shall be paid for the period from the date of entry into force of the resolution to take over the shares 
until the date of settlement with the former shareholders.
1016 Republic of Lithuania Law on Financial Sustainability. Valstybės žinios. 2009, No. 93-3985. Art. 8.
1017 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 76. P. 46.
1018 Expropriation of shares for public demands is provided for in the Law on Insurance of Deposits and 
Liabilities to Investors and the Law on Banks.
1019 According to the Decree No. 132 of the Bank of Lithuania of 7 September 2012 on the insolvency of 
credit institutions, insolvency of a credit institution shall be determined in accordance with credit 
institutions’ financial and supervisory reports, information received from other credit institutions 
or other persons, documents and/or, where appropriate, the credit institution’s inspection (review). 
The board of the Bank of Lithuania may decide to declare insolvency of a credit institution if at 
least one of the following conditions are met: 1. The credit institution’s net asset value is less than 
the credit institution’s liabilities; 2. For six months in a row, the credit institution fails to fulfill the 
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and the existing legislation shall allow the supervisory authority to apply certain enforce-
ment measures. Second, the state shall be able to recapitalise the bank under the current 
legal framework, that is, to fill the resulting financial gap. This involves the cleaning of 
negative capital and depositing additional capital by the state or the Central Bank, acting 
as a lender of last resort. The essence is that the bank shall have capital adequacy ratios set 
out by the supervisory authority.
The State of Lithuania nationalised bank ‘Snoras’ during the recent banking crisis1020. 
This decision was taken in accordance with provisions of the Law on Banks and the Law 
on Financial Sustainability, conferring the right to apply appropriate enforcement meas-
ures in exceptional cases where a bank is likely to fail, and if they are insufficient - to take 
bank shares for public needs1021. Such a decision hinders the bank in meeting its com-
mitments. The bank cannot assume new obligations, principally, the bank’s activities are 
suspended, which has a negative impact on its customers (execution of framework agree-
ments entered into with this bank prior to nationalisation is suspended, restrictions on the 
provision of banking services causes inconvenience to customers, etc.)1022.
On one hand, if activities are arranged in an adequate and timely manner, the decision 
on bank nationalisation can be taken quickly enough (while planning and negotiations on 
other resolution tools to be applied may take several months) and allows the preservation 
of “healthy” lending relations in the state, protects creditors against further losses, main-
tains public confidence in the financial system, and reduces the systemic hazard to the fi-
nancial system. Timely application of the nationalisation tool, therefore, assists in avoiding 
major delays, relating to the immediate liquidation of a large bank and severely affecting 
creditors and financial stability in the further bank insolvency procedure. The tool helps 
to manage systemic risks in case of fragile public confidence in the banking system. Once 
the bank decides to continue as a going concern, solvent clients can maintain their legal 
credit-loan relations with the bank. This is particularly beneficial in situations where there 
are no alternative sources of credit in the state, or they are limited1023. Similarly, upon the 
effective application of this tool, there is no disruption to the banking settlement and pay-
ment system. In addition, the timely use of this tool does not increase state “fiscal outlay”. 
capital adequacy (solvency) ratio set by the Bank of Lithuania; 3. The credit institution cannot satisfy 
any reasonable creditor’s claim within 5 working days (by reason of lack of funds in its accounts it 
is unable to fulfill the customer’s order, return deposits and other borrowed funds or perform other 
financial obligations).
1020 Lithuanian bank ‘Snoras‘ report of bankruptcy process. [interactive]. [accessed on 2013-02-10]. 
<http://www.lb.lt/seimo_posedyje_ab_banko_snoras_bankroto_proceso_apzvalga_1>.
1021 Republic of Lithuania Law on the Bank of Lithuania. Official Publication Valstybės žinios. 2004, No. 
54-1832. Art. 90.
1022 It is a common international practice as well. For example, the insolvency of the Continental Illinois 
National Bank in the US. At that time, the country’s eighth-largest bank was declared insolvent. 
Instead of direct liquidation of the bank, a  ruling was adopted, under which the Federal Deposit 
Insurance company took over USD 3 billion of liabilities and a billion dollars of bad loans from the 
insolvent bank. The state-owned company also invested a significant amount of cash in order to 
restore capital adequacy requirements. Shareholders gave up and rejected their property rights with 
regard to the bank’s residual value, and refused their claims to the assets obtained after winding-up 
the ‘bad’ assets.
1023 Hoelscher D.S., Supra note 2. P. 109.
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With nationalisation, the fiscal outlay is limited to the amount of funds needed to bring 
the capital level up to supervisory norms (the size of the hole plus additional capital)1024.
On the other hand, nationalisation may have adverse effects. Bank nationalisation in 
any case erodes the discipline of the financial market, distorts the market (as the govern-
ment gives an explicit guarantee, besides, less strict prudential regulatory requirements are 
imposed). Bank shares, that have been taken over by the government are almost impos-
sible to sell, moreover, it usually causes additional indirect costs. For example, borrowing 
funds on international markets (subject to political will) is, respectively, directly related to 
the slowdown in the state’s financial development and financial output or, to further litiga-
tion on the value of shares. Another related legal issue is evidenced in the Lithuanian legal 
framework – the legislation does not prescribe any deadline for settlement with sharehold-
ers for the shares disposed of. One other major disadvantage of this tool is that if other 
creditors of the bank believe that the government will step in and protect them anytime a 
bank fails, they will have no reason to monitor the bank’s operations and fiscal security i.e., 
they fail to impose discipline. Legal literature describes this term as a risk of moral hazard. 
Among other things, in case of nationalisation, the government or the supervisory author-
ity is not a competent, experienced bank owner, it does not have necessary knowledge or 
resources (e.g., human), which suggests that it would not be capable of managing the bank 
in a proper and effective manner, moreover, political risk arises, decision-making is not 
efficient enough1025, and there are doubts around methods and grounds of information 
transmission to third parties; the speed and quality of decision-making are to some extent 
dependent on a political will. Furthermore, if the bank, as a going concern, does not apply 
the bank resolution tools to its troubled assets, the bank may continue to incur losses even, 
after being takenover by the state. For example, a state-owned bank may also be under-
capitalised. It should also be noted that pursuant to the Law on Insurance of Deposits and 
Liabilities to Investors of the Republic of Lithuania, deposits by natural and legal persons 
of up to EUR 100 thousand are insured. This means that upon the suspension of the bank’s 
activities or failure of the bank to meet its obligations, all persons holding deposits of up 
to EUR 100 thousand within the bank would recover them. However, the deposit amount 
exceeding EUR 100 thousand is not insured and there is a risk that the assets held by 
the bank will not be sufficient to repay these deposits. Moreover, it should be borne in 
mind that the litigation to protect against unfair actions of shareholders (especially when 
managers’ and owners’ actions are not only unsuccessful but also blatantly criminal, or, 
depositors’ funds are pledged for loans or transferred to other schemes potentially associ-
ated with shareholders in offshore jurisdictions, etc.) and to “pump” assets to the bank or 
1024 Ibid.
1025 The Government adopts the decision on the financial stability measure. The Ministry of Finance 
examines and analyses the information received, identifies the problem, selects accurate particular 
measure, determines the availability of resources, and prepares the draft government resolution. In 
2008, the government of the Republic of Lithuania approved the financial crisis prevention and man-
agement plan and set up a permanent Financial Crisis Prevention and Management Commission. In 
all cases, the information can be reviewed both by the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Crisis 
Prevention and Management Commission, it therefore implies that the group of people involved is 
too large.
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to declare certain transactions void may become time-consuming, meanwhile, the bank’s 
assets may be devalued or become illiquid.
It is important to note that there are instances in practice where bank stabilisation 
measures are confused with temporary administration (early intervention and/or official 
administration tool). It should be noted that the temporary administration of the bank is 
just the initial phase of bank insolvency procedures taking place before recognition of the 
bank’s insolvency, where the supervisory authority, as a part of exercising its rights, takes 
over control of the bank’s operations and decides what further actions to take in respect of 
the failing bank. The purpose of such actions is twofold: i) provides legal protection to the 
Bank (solvency diagnosis) ii) at the same time, allows for the consideration of methods 
to deal with the bank’s financial trouble, including a possible application of financial sus-
tainability measures, bank resolution alternatives, and immediate liquidation of the bank. 
The “temporary administration” procedures should be equated with bank insolvency pro-
cedures as they are applied in the pre-insolvency stage, whereupon the bank’s activities 
are temporarily suspended. Further, pursuant to the law, the official administrative pro-
cedures involve an official authority (in EU – a temporary administrator and/or a special 
manager1026; in Switzerland – a special investigating agent1027, who takes control of the bank 
in order to protect the bank’s assets, to assess the current condition of the bank, and to 
restore the solvency of the bank to the greatest extent possible. The powers of the official 
administrator cease after the bank has been restored as a going concern, or it is decided to 
apply a certain bank resolution mechanism, and/or to liquidate the bank. Official admin-
istration has a temporary nature and, thus, must be performed as quickly as possible1028. A 
more comprehensive analysis is not a part of this thesis.
1026 Temporary administrator either replaces the managing body of the bank on a temporary basis, or 
temporarily works in conjunction with the senior management of the bank. The competent author-
ity in each case defines the powers of the temporary administrator. The key functions are: to secure 
the financial situation of the bank, to administer bank business (or a part thereof) administration 
to preserve or restore the financial condition of the bank and application of measures in order to 
restore the sound and prudent management of the institution’s activities. The special administrator 
replaces the managing body of the bank and can implement reforms towards the implementation of 
the resolution objectives, under the control of the conversion authority.
1027 Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority of 22 June 2007 (Status as of 1 Janu-
ary 2015). Art. 36.
1028 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 26-31.
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III. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND RESOLUTION  
DECISION CONTROL
3.1. Key Public Authorities Involved in Bank Insolvency Procedures,  
their Role
The doctrine names the following critical functions of public institutions directly related 
to bank insolvency procedures: prudential regulation, supervision, lender of last resort, de-
posit insurer, and insolvency administrator. The infrastructure of public authorities, which 
play a significant role in the bank insolvency procedures, consists of the following main 
institutions: banking supervision authority, deposit insurance authority, and courts. Ini-
tially, the role and significance of public authorities have emerged in the general insolvency 
law and differences in the bank resolution legislation. For example, there are significant 
differences in bank insolvency and/or resolution provisions, as well as criteria for com-
mencing bank insolvency procedures. The right of initiative in the insolvency procedures, 
in particular, belongs to the following counterparties: the company, creditors, who are seek-
ing to satisfy their financial claims against the borrower, and shareholders. The banking 
supervisory authority commences bank insolvency procedures at its own initiative. It plays a 
central role and exercises exclusive rights in maintaining stability of the banking (financial) 
system, managing information on banking activities, thus, it can assess the real situation 
and the extent of financial problems faced by the bank in the most objective manner. This 
common regulation and its essence is based on the assumption that after the official com-
mencement of bank insolvency procedures, the information may have a systemic effect on 
the society and banking supervisory authorities should therefore be responsible for the 
consequences thereof. The importance of the supervisory authority is best demonstrated 
by the example to the contrary, as to what would happen if banking supervision procedures 
were decentralised. Creditors could take unreasoned or even lightminded actions against 
the bank to satisfy their claims, start “assets races”, and so on. The role and powers of the 
deposit insurance authority depend on the jurisdiction in which it operates. On the one 
hand, the primary purpose of the deposit insurance authority is to compensate bank deposi-
tors for losses resulting from bank failure and to protect depositors against systemic risk 
and, at the same time, to protect the bank against massive deposit outflows. On the other 
hand, in some cases a deposit insurer may acquire more extensive rights. For example, if 
a bank faces financial trouble, the DIA can take over the bank and act as an administrator 
of the insolvent bank, thus controlling the entire bank insolvency procedure (in the case 
of the U.S.). Eventually, bank insolvency procedures are inseparable from courts, acting in 
certain states as competitive priority enforcement authorities. First, national courts enforce 
justice; second, the courts have powers to administer bank bankruptcy procedures; third, 
they act as a verifying authority that reviews administrative decisions, enabling the parties 
concerned to defend their rights and interests and to expect an independent judgment on 
decisions taken by the banking supervisory authorities (legality and validity review). It is 
important to note that the banking crisis and its management may inter alia involve public 
funds and cause additional related costs, therefore, the government (national ministries of 
finance) may also play its role in the bank insolvency procedures.
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The recent banking crisis has demonstrated that a failing or likely to fail bank needs 
public intervention, not only in the form of bank resolution and/or liquidation proce-
dures, but also by providing the means, even if short-term, to finance bank resolution1029. 
This assumption is based on the fact that, once insolvency procedures start, the banks are 
likely to lose access to private funding markets, and the state therefore often remains the 
only source of liquidity and capital for the distressed bank. Another important aspect is 
related to the need for simultaneous intervention of several public authorities with dif-
ferent roles in the bank insolvency procedures. Why is it so important to delimit public 
authorities and the functions implemented by them in the bank insolvency procedures? First 
of all, the detailed discussion on the role of public authorities in different jurisdictions is 
important both nationally and internationally, in particular, if banks are operating across 
several countries where the roleof of the relevant public authorities may vary. Second, 
public authorities, such as the Central Bank, IDI, play their vital role both at the bank 
pre-insolvency phase and after the recognition of bank insolvency. Third, banking crises 
and the corresponding bank defaults are inseparable from political risk. In case of a seri-
ous banking crisis, it is very likely that some governments will be forced to engage in 
bank insolvency procedures1030, for example, request information that is usually subject 
to strict confidentiality provisions, or even make attempt to manage the banking crisis, 
in search for the ways to resolve the financial difficulties faced by a bank. Moreover, the 
recent banking crisis echoed numerous prominent political statements and attempts to 
influence (even including uncontrolled interference or attempts to promptly amend the 
existing legal regulation of bank insolvency procedures) in many states. Such government 
intervention in resolving solvency problems is based on the logic that politicians often 
seek to be in the public eye and attempt to manage and find certain solutions for the 
banking crisis. Once a bank faces financial trouble in any State, it will be unlikely to avoid 
political elements and political influence, unless the bank is very small and is considered 
to be systemically irrelevant. With regard to this aspect, it is very important to identify the 
role of public authorities and their key functions. Fourth, it should be noted that the laws 
governing legal bank insolvency relations are, to some extent, convergent, depending on 
the legal framework of a particular jurisdiction, which consequently leads to diverse roles 
and powers of the relevant authorities in both bank resolution and liquidation processes. 
Insolvency procedures of multinational failing banks are even more complicated. Since 
the complexity of bank insolvency procedures determines the responsibility of public au-
thorities, it is extremely important to understand the rules applicable to the ex ante bank 
insolvency procedures and designed to resolve failing banks. The banking crisis, bank 
resolution and/or liquidation mechanisms are inseparable from the banking crisis preven-
tion, particularly, from adequate and sufficient banking supervision and effective legal 
regulation of insolvency procedures to be enforced by the relevant competent authorities. 
Eventually, single authority of a certain jurisdiction can perform more than one function. 
1029 Pauly L.W. The Old and the New Politics of International Financial Stability. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 47, No.5, 2009. P. 958-959.
1030 This phenomenon could be observed throughout many banking crises. A good example is the situ-
ation in the UK, where the Prime Minister Gordon Brown has firmly taken the lead in search of 
solutions to the crisis and was keen to be seen in the society as the solver of the difficulties faced by 
the distressed bank. Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. P. 75-80. 
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3.1.1. Supervisory Authority and/or Central Bank
The Central Bank (the CB) is a public entity1031. One of the most common character-
istics of the CB legal framework is the multifunctionality of CB objectives in exercising its 
powers1032. For example, the Central Bank is responsible for formulation and implemen-
tation of the national monetary policy, supervision of the payment system, keeping and 
managing national external reserves, supervision of commercial banks, etc. It implements 
the above functions by virtue of particular rights and powers granted under the law and in 
accordance with particular responsibilities1033. According to the doctrine, the CB has three 
main objectives and roles: (i) to maintain price stability in consistence with the national 
monetary policy; (ii) to maintain financial stability and foster financial development; (iii) 
to meet the financing needs of the state during the crisis, and to restrict the state’s abuse of 
financial powers in normal economic conditions1034. The analysis of the specific principles 
and objectives of the CB related to the implementation of the financial stability policy is 
provided below.
The banking supervisory authority is in charge of banking licensing, approval of a 
bank as a legal entity, its compliance with licensing (operational) requirements, it also im-
plements and enforces prudential regulations, as well as monitors and supervises banking 
activities1035. Besides, one of the primary duties of the supervisory authority is to monitor 
banks, to take appropriate legal measures aimed at the protection of interests of bank de-
positors, to determine cases of bank insolvency, to take corrective actions, i.e., to impose 
sanctions that would assist in maintaining market discipline, including revocation of the 
banking license, initiation of bank insolvency proceedings, and/or bank takeover, to adopt 
other decisions on bank resolution and/or liquidation.
In the relevant jurisdictions, the banking supervisory authority has the power to com-
mence bank insolvency procedures. In essence, this situation is opposite to corporate in-
solvency procedures in which both creditors and managing bodies are entitled to com-
1031 Gianviti F. The Objectives of Central Banks. (in) Cottier T., Lastra R.M., Tietje Ch, Satragno L. The 
Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs. Cambridge University Press, 2014. P. 449.
1032 Ibid. 
1033 The powers (imperium) allow their holders to take binding decisions (e.g., the power to collect taxes, 
adopt secondary legislation or a decision to close the bank). A right (jus) is understood as a legally 
protected interest (such as the right to collect fees associated with the provision of services, the right 
to ensure the fulfillment of contractual obligations, the right to property, the right to compensation, 
the right to sell the product, etc.).
1034 Goodhart C.A.E. The Changing Role of Central Banks. Financial Markets Group. London School of 
Economics, 2010. P. 1. Parker D., IMF. Supra note 86. P. 7-12.
1035 The doctrine distinguishes the following essential powers of the supervisory authority: (a) to give 
orders and to oblige the bank to comply with restrictions with regard to the payment of dividends or 
salaries and bonuses to the managing bodies, to restrict lending and investment transactions and/or 
limit the collection of deposits or otherwise limit the indebtedness; (b) to order the bank to change 
the system of its managing  bodies or to undergo other organisational changes, to adjust its internal 
control systems (e. g., the Prevention Department) or the methodology applied by its managing 
bodies; (c) to give instructions to avoid certain unreasonable business operations and the associ-
ated restrictions; (d) to order the bank to introduce additional security conditions for certain loans 
already issued, to prepare for capital increase, close bank branches, etc.; (e) to limit deposit-taking/
collection; (f) to restrict the bank’s license. Hüpkes E. Supra note 71. P. 32-36.
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mence insolvency procedures theirselves. The powers of banking supervisory authorities 
with regard to bank licensing and supervision allow assuming that the banking supervi-
sory authority is in a good position to determine when and to what extent a bank is facing 
severe financial trouble, which requires further intervention by the supervisory authority 
or application of other sanctions. This position can be considered fair, because, first of all, 
unlike the banking supervisory authority, creditors do not have access to all financial in-
formation in order to adequately assess the financial situation of the bank, moreover, they 
may lack specific knowledge on the complicated legal and economic nature of banking. 
Second, if creditors had the right of initiative to commence bank insolvency procedures, 
it would imply a risk of delay of insolvency procedures in order to prevent any personal 
loss, which, consequently, would aggravate financial trouble of the bank or even encourage 
more intense outflow of deposits from banks, and also disrupt the restoration of solven-
cy of the bank under resolution. Third, apart from deposit collection and lending, many 
banks, as mentioned above, are involved in additional financial activities, such as place-
ment of securities, management of investment funds, asset management and insurance 
businesses. These issues are subjected to different and highly specific regulation that may 
be misunderstood by creditors.
Among other duties, the CB acts as a supervisory authority, as a financial stability en-
forcer, which is one of its primary objectives. In essence, the CB formulates and imple-
ments the state monetary policy, supervises the payment system, controls and manages 
national external reserves, etc. The CB implements these functions under certain rights 
(powers) and obligations. Financial stability is widely recognised as one of the main objec-
tives pursued by the CB1036 and established by law. In other cases, legal regulation obliges 
the CB to perform this specific function under implementing provisions, such as the provi-
sions regulating the CB emergency financial assistance to banks, the lender of last resort1037 
function, or maintenance of the payment system. Supervision of banks (or other financial 
institutions) reflects the common endeavour to seek for financial stability. However, the leg-
islation does not usually define common objectives of financial stability1038 or their impact 
on the Central Bank’s activities, powers, and monetary policy objectives. Thus, one of the 
objectives of the CB is to contribute to overall stability of the financial system1039.
For example, in the U.S. legal framework, the Federal Reserve performs multiple func-
tions with no specific priority, and generally describes all the functions as monetary policy 
instruments and objectives. Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act of 19331040 (the Act 
was supplemented in 1977) provides that the CB seeks “monetary policy objectives,” “The 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee 
1036 Gianviti F. Supra note 1031. P. 474.
1037 Winkler A. The ECB as Lender of Last Resort: Banks versus Governments. LSE Financial Markets 
Group Special Paper Series, 2014. 
1038 Other definitions of financial stability can also be found: financial stability is defined as a condition 
under which the financial system is able to cope with economic shocks and financial imbalances and 
it is unlikely that financial intermediaries will suffer enough various negative disorders significantly 
affecting the profitable investment opportunities. Shinasi G. Financial Stability-Theory and Practises. 
IMF, Washington DC, US, 2006. P. 80.
1039 Gianviti F. Supra note 1031. P. 485.
1040 12 USC 225 (a).
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shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with 
the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals 
of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” Implemen-
tation of the monetary policy is not the only and primary function of the Federal Reserve. 
The primary objective of the CB is to address financial difficulties of banks, and deposit 
panic issues, thereby, the Federal Reserve implements maintenance tasks, functions, regu-
lates activities of banks acting as a lender of last resort, which is directly related to financial 
stability1041.
Within the Swiss legal framework, in accordance with Swiss Ordinance to the Federal 
Act on the Swiss National Bank of 18 March 2004. (January 1st, 2015), the CB seeks mon-
etary policy objectives that serve the interests and welfare of the entire country. The CB 
must ensure price stability, and, for this purpose, properly monitor economic development, 
in other words, achieve financial stability objectives1042. One of the regulatory objectives is 
contribution to the stability of the financial system1043. In determining whether a financial 
market infrastructure is important for the stability of the financial system, the CB shall, 
in particular, take the following factors into account: (i) the transactions that are cleared 
or settled through the financial market infrastructure, and in particular whether they are 
related to foreign exchange, money market, capital market or derivatives transactions, or 
transactions that serve to implement monetary policy; (ii) the transaction volume and 
amount cleared or settled through the financial market infrastructure; (iii) the currencies 
in which transactions are cleared or settled through the financial market infrastructure; 
(iv) the number, nominal value and currency of issue of the financial instruments held in 
central bank; (v) participants; (vi) links with other financial market infrastructures; (vii) 
the possibility of participants to switching to another financial market infrastructure or to 
an alternative clearing and settlement arrangement at short notice in order to clear and 
settle transactions, and to avoid the associated risks; (viii) credit and liquidity risks associ-
ated with the operation of the financial market infrastructure1044. In addition, the CB shall 
prepare a plan to ensure the recovery of the SIFI in the event of impending insolvency or 
other scenarios jeopardising its viability as a going concern1045.
In the EU legal framework, the primary objective of a supervisory authority shall be to 
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the European 
1041 Federal Reserve Act. Preamble. 
1042 Ordinance to the Federal Act on the Swiss National Bank of 18 March 2004. (Status as of 1 Janu-
ary2015). Art. 3.
1043 Ibid. Art. 19. Financial stability is defined over the stability of the financial market infrastructure, 
which respectively relates to the entire Swiss financial system: (i) if there is no access to the financial 
market infrastructure, especially because of the technical and operational problems or financial dif-
ficulties, when any entity operating in the market can lead to severe losses, liquidity weaknesses or 
financial or operational problems for intermediaries or other financial market infrastructures, or 
result in serious adverse financial market shocks; (ii) payment or compliance problems of one market 
participant could spread to other market participants or influence the financial market infrastruc-
ture, incurring serious losses, the lack of liquidity or operating problems, or cause serious financial 
market shocks.
1044 Ibid. Art. 20 (2). 
1045 Ibid. Art. 26.
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System of Central Banks shall support general economic policies1046. Second, the ESCB 
shall act in accordance with the principle of open market economy with free competition, 
favoring an efficient allocation of resources1047.
The Central Bank may also act as a supervisory authority. The reasons why banks must 
be supervised different from normal businesses, were clearly identified and codified by the 
BCBS. In 1997, it issued the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, that were 
later regularly revised and updated1048. They define 25 principles for effective supervision. 
It was decided that in view of the fact that bank insolvency is inevitable in any system, their 
financial difficulties should be supervised by the public sector, since the effects on the soci-
ety might be severe in the case of bank failure. Thus, governments must provide the neces-
sary legal, administrative and judicial powers to supervisory authorities for a timely and 
effective intervention in banks when needed. The legal doctrine presumes that govern-
ment intervention must be prompt (with no long, disturbing periods between intervention 
announcement and de facto intervention), transparent (creditors and other counterparties 
must be aware of how the intervention will affect their property exposures) correspond to 
market practices (without prejudice clearing, settlement systems, payment completeness, 
set-off and netting arrangements, collateral enforcement systems and procedures)1049. Su-
pervisory authorities are also responsible for bank licensing and monitoring of banking 
activities: whether operators meet the licensing requirements and prudential regulation. 
In addition, supervisory authorities are responsible for the supervision of banks, enforce-
ment of prudential legal regulation, taking adequate measures in order to protect the in-
terests of bank depositors, determine whether a bank is insolvent, imposition of sanctions, 
including revocation of banking license, and initiation of potential administration, resolu-
tion and liquidation procedures. Actions of a banking supervisory authority during the 
banking crisis must best serve the public interest, as well as the entire economy, by mov-
ing away from private economic and political interests. In the case of successful national 
monetary policy-making and effective banking supervision, independence is one of the 
key characteristics and criteria. Independence, decisive and clear actions, and uniform 
application of the law to all market players (level playing field) make the legal banking 
supervision system more reliable.
The role of a supervisory authority is demonstrated in the example of the EU. The 
recent banking crisis has revealed major weaknesses in the supervision of financial in-
stitutions within the EU legal framework, both in terms of individual cases and the entire 
financial system. It was found that the pre-existing banking supervisory measures were 
insufficient to avoid, manage and overcome the crisis. It became evident that national 
supervisory models were far behind the reality - integrated and interconnected European 
financial markets, in which many financial institutions operate across borders. The finan-
1046 TFEU. Art.127.
1047 Ibid. Art. 119.
1048 BIS. BCBS. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 2012 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-
12-05] <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm>. 
1049 Gleeson S. International Regulation of Banking: Capital and Risk Requirements (2nd Edition), Ox-
ford University Press, 2012. Why Banks are supervised? Chapter 2. Part I: The Elements of Bank 
Financial Supervision. P. 29.
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cial crisis has revealed major issues of cooperation among national supervisory authori-
ties, coordination of their activities, consistency and confidence.
It is extremely important to mention the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)1050 that 
has been established and is now operating within the EU legal framework. It comprises a 
regulation conferring tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) and amending Regula-
tion on establishing the European Banking Authority (EBA). The SSM system will include 
the ECB and national supervisory authorities. Currently, the ECB is responsible for the 
efficient functionality of the entire SSM.
The amended EBA regulation provides for the ECB’s involvement in the activities of 
the EBA, changes EBA’s voting and decision-making procedures, in view of the fact that the 
EBA will involve Group 2 countries – participating SSM and non-participating SSM. The 
Regulation, inter alia, confers supervisory tasks on the ECB. The SSM comprises the ECB 
and national supervisory authorities. The ECB will be responsible for efficient operation of 
the SSM. In cooperation with national supervisory authorities, the ECB will directly super-
vise large, systemically important banks in the SSM participating Member States (at least 
3 largest banks in each state). Smaller banks will be directly supervised by the national su-
pervisory authorities in accordance with the ECB guidelines and recommendations. In ad-
dition, national supervisory authorities will be accountable to the ECB for their decisions.
All the eurozone Member States have joined the SSM, while the states outside the 
eurozone will be able to choose whether to participate in the SSM (sign the “close coopera-
tion” agreement with the ECB, stating that competent authorities shall follow all regula-
tions of the ECB). Distribution of supervisory functions between the ECB and the national 
supervisory authorities will depend on the degree of relevance of banks1051. Bank relevance 
will be viewed based on their size, importance for both the economy of a certain SSM par-
ticipating Member State and in terms of cross-border operations. Among other things, the 
Regulation confers the following basic supervisory tasks on the ECB: (i) to authorise credit 
institutions and to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions; (ii) to assess notifica-
tions of the acquisition and disposal of qualified majority shares; (iii) to ensure compliance 
with the prudential requirements in the areas of own funds, securitisation, large exposure 
limits, liquidity, and leverage; (iv) to ensure compliance with regard to reliable governance 
arrangements (including risk management processes, internal control mechanisms, remu-
neration policies and practices); (v) carry out supervisory checks, including stress testing; 
(vi) to carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans, and early intervention, 
where a credit institution is in breach of prudential requirements. Within the scope of its 
supervisory tasks, the ECB will exercise the rights granted by the EU legislation regulat-
ing banking activities (including national legislation of the participating Member States 
1050 See more 1 chapter sec. 5 subsec. 2.
1051 The credit institution is considered as important, if at least one of the following conditions are met: (i) 
the total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion; (ii) the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the 
participating Member State of establishment exceeds 20%, unless the total value of its assets is below 
EUR 5 billion; (iii) the national competent authority has determined that the credit institution is sys-
temically important for the local economy; (iv) the ECB considers the credit institution as relevant, 
as it has subsidiaries engaged in banking activities in more than one participating Member State and 
its cross-border assets and liabilities represent a significant portion of the total assets or liabilities; 
(v) financial assistance was requested or directly supplied to it from the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) or the European Stability Mechanism. SSM. Art. 50. 
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transposing the Directive), e.g., to set the requirements for additional capital, liquidity or 
reporting, to restrict activities, etc.), it will be empowered to impose pecuniary sanctions, 
and to conduct investigations and inspections.
In the U.S. legal framework, the banking supervision system is unique for its high com-
plexity and consists of five federal regulators – the Board of Governors of the FED1052, 
twelve Federal Reserve Banks1053, the Federal Open Market Committee1054, Member-
banks, and advisory committees1055. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem consists of 7 members, it supervises 12 Federal Reserve Banks and is responsible for 
the U.S. national monetary policy. The Twelve Federal Reserve Banks operate regionally 
and act as the Federal Reserve’s “hand.” The Banks assume a number of responsibilities 
and functions, such as to keep cash reserves in depository banks of the United States, 
provide loans to these institutions, supervise member banks, and develop and implement 
the U.S. monetary policy. The Federal Open Market Committee is directly responsible for 
regulation and management of open-market operations. Under the law, all U.S. banks are 
members of the Federal Reserve System, including the Federal Reserve and over 50 U.S. 
banks and Offices of Thrift Supervision. The U.S. Federal Reserve System implements its 
functions in cooperation with the Federal Deposit Insurance Institution (FDIC), which 
was founded upon the adoption of the Banking Law in 1933, during the Great Depression. 
The main objective of the FDIC is to address the issue of massive withdrawal of deposits 
(bank runs), to create an effective banking supervision scheme, to effectively deal with fi-
nancial difficulties of insolvent banks, to establish a supervision system for national banks, 
to provide guarantees and insurance1056. Therefore, the U.S. banking supervisory system 
is unique for its complexity, as it consists of four federal governors, including the Federal 
Reserve, and more than 50 national bank supervising authorities. The Federal Reserve 
System pursues the following primary monetary policy objectives: to maintain long-term 
monetary, credit market, economic growth, to increase banking production, in order to 
effectively promote the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates1057. In Switzerland, the tasks related to bank insolvency procedures are 
conferred on different public authorities (the CB and FINMA). Therefore, both the CB 
and the supervisory authority collaborate and share relevant information1058. For example, 
it may be required to assess whether a bank has crossed the regulatory limits with regard 
to insolvency and to encourage a number of specific actions to be taken by the regulated 
authorities. Financial market supervision pursues the objectives of protecting creditors, 
investors, and insured depositors as well as ensuring the proper functioning of the fi-
1052 Federal Reserve. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Mission [interactive]. [accessed 
on 2014-1-05] <http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm>. 
1053 Federal Reserve Act. Section 4. Federal Reserve Banks. 
1054 Federal Reserve Act. Section 12 A. Federal Open Market Committee. Codified12 USC 263(a). 
1055 Federal Reserve Act. Section 2. Partially codified 12 USC 222, 223.
1056 FDIA.12 USC Sec 1811 (f).
1057 Federal Reserve Act. Section 2 A. Codified 12 USC 225a. 
1058 Swiss Federal Constitution. Art. 98. Federal Act of 22 June 2007 on the Swiss Financial Market Super-
visory Authority. FINMA. Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA 
of 15 October 2008 on the levying of supervisory fees and duties. 
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nancial market. It thus contributes to sustaining the reputation and competitiveness of 
Switzerland as a financial centre1059.
Finally, the CB may act as a lender of last resort. In some cases, in addition to con-
ventional macro-prudential measures, the CB may apply systemic financial stabilisation 
(sustainability) mechanisms, i.e., take the opportunity to lend to distressed banks and thus 
provide liquidity to them, for example, to a certain bank that faces difficulties, but having 
the ‘too big that fail’ status. In this case, if the CB cannot allow liquidation of the bank 
because of the adverse legal effects, and the market fails to provide more capital, the only 
means of financing is taxpayers’ money. The doctrine of the CB as a lender of last resort 
is based on four key elements. First, the CB, acting as a lender of last resort, should pre-
vent the collapse of a still solvent bank with temporary liquidity issues. The CB provides 
loans on a short-term basis. Second, the CB should ensure free lending, but charge interest 
rates for its loans. Third, the CB shall provide loans to all banks that have good collaterals 
valuated before panic emergence. Fourth, the CB shall be prepared to implement this task 
by determining borrowing terms in advance. In addition, the doctrine explicitly states 
that a lender of last resort should act in a discretionary but not mandatory manner. The 
CB must not only evaluate whether the situation allows identifying bank illiquidity or 
insolvency, but also whether bank insolvency could result in financial “contagion”. The 
aim of this task is not to protect a single bank, but to protect the entire market or the fi-
nancial system1060. For example, the functions of the U.S. CB, the Federal Reserve System, 
as a lender of last resort, were established in 1914. However, the main amendments took 
place in 1991.1061 The fundamental difference was in easing loan collateral requirements 
for emergency lending by the CB1062. The main goal was to prevent financial “panic from 
spreading and to provide a mechanism for limiting any crises that did occur”1063. This ob-
jective enabled creating an ‘asset-backed’ currency market and to establish reserve banks 
to hold the reserves of the banking system and provide additional currency for short-term 
borrowing1064. During the recent financial crisis, the FDIC expanded the lending frame-
work1065. In 2007–2010, the Federal Reserve, acting as a lender of last resort, lent more 
than USD 16 billion1066. Therefore, based on the latest approach U.S., a lender of last resort 
should generally provide liquidity to markets as a whole rather than focus on a certain 
bank, but rather to, as bank insolvency inevitably causes severe adverse effects on credit 
1059 Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority of 22 June 2007 (Status as of 1 Janu-
ary 2015). Art. 5.
1060 Lastra M.R. Lender of Last Resort. An International Perspective. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol.48, 1999. P. 340-361.
1061 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act amended Section 13(3) of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act.
1062 Walker F. T. FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity Provisions. Cleveland Federal Reserve, Economic Review, 
No. Q III, 1993. P. 20.
1063 Carlson M.A., Wheelock D.C. The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 Years. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Working Paper 2012-056B, 2013. P. 2. 
1064 Ibid.
1065 Michel J.N. The Fed’s Failure as a Lender of Last Resort: What to Do About It. The Heritage Founda-
tion, Washington DC. No. 2943, 2014. P. 8-9.
1066 Ibid. P. 9.
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markets. According to the general rule, if a financially troubled bank can no longer fulfill 
its obligations, it must be allowed to fail, while investors must bear losses. However, if it 
is possible to identify justified risks of systemic bank collapse and systemic risk, the FED 
shall intervene and ensure adequate liquidity in the banking system in order to rebuild 
market confidence1067. 
3.1.2. Deposit Insurance Institution
Deposit Insurance Authority (DIA) implements two main aims in the context of bank 
insolvency procedures: protects against systemic risk and provides protection for indi-
vidual depositors, while addressing social inequalities1068. Another goal of the DGS– is 
to compensate depositor losses resulting from bank insolvency and protect depositors 
against systemic risk, while safeguarding the bank from massive withdrawal of depos-
its1069. It also facilitates the operation of the single market in certain jurisdictions, such as 
the EU common market. The doctrine explains the legal nature of DIA through the exist-
ing information asymmetry in the banking business1070. It is presumed that banks have 
more knowledge and information about their own products and the financial, legal and 
regulatory environment in which they operate, compared to consumers or even securities 
analysts1071. Therefore, DGS, among other things, seeks to resolve the information asym-
metry problem. DIA guarantees that depositors will recover their cash if the bank becomes 
insolvent. In addition, it should be noted that, given the experience of the banking crisis, 
it is obvious that avoiding moral hazards in the absence of DGS is not possible1072. Were 
it not for the DGS and DIA, investors would fear losing their deposits in the case of bank 
insolvency. It is likely that in the absence of DGS, many depositors would withdraw their 
deposits from the bank at the same time, as they often behave irrationally. Such a situation 
would obviously destabilise the activities of the bank, which would fall short of funds and 
be forced to go bankrupt1073. DGS is designed to cover and protect only certain deposi-
tors1074 secured by the law and only to a certain extent, accordingly, it would not secure 
1067 Wallison P.J. The Future of Banking: The Structure and Role of Commercial Affiliations. Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago’s. Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition. American Enter-
prise Institute. May 5, 2000.
1068 Cartwright P. Understanding, Awareness and Deposit Insurance. (in) Supra note 27.Chapter 9. P. 139-140.
1069 Reiser N. Supra note 94. P. 3. 
1070 Sabourin P.J. Rethinking The Role of Deposit Insurance: Lessons From the Recent Financial Crisis. 
(in) Supra note 27. Chapter 8. 
1071 Ibid. P. 141.
1072 White E. Deposit Insurance. WB Policy Research Working Paper No. 1541, 1995. P.12. Diamond 
W.D. Banks and Liquidity Creation: a Simple Exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig Model. (in) Fed. 
Res. Bank, Richmond Econ Q, Vol. 93, No. 2, 2007. P. 189.
1073 Diamond W.D. Banks and Liquidity Creation: a Simple Exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig Model. 
(in) Fed Res Bank, Richmond Econ Q, Vol. 93, No. 2, 2007. P. 189.
1074 For example, in the EU legal framework, Member States shall ensure that the coverage level for 
the aggregate deposits of each depositor is EUR 100 000 in the event of deposits being unavailable. 
Deposit repayment excludes deposits held by other credit institutions on their behalf and for their 
own account, deposits of collective investment undertakings, deposits of public authorities and other 
deposits referred to in the Directive. DGS. Article 6(1), Art. 5 (1).
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unprotected depositors1075 or other creditors of the bank. For example, other banks or in-
surance companies may be excluded from the scope of deposit insurance, normally raising 
considerable amount of cash held in a particular bank. Such a restriction is aimed at avoid-
ing moral hazard problems, maintaining market discipline and exerting certain economic 
pressure on banks. In addition, as mentioned above, banks have more knowledge about 
their activities, such as the quality of assets, size of liabilities, staff competences and their 
intentions and strategic plans for the future. For this reason, DGS is a solution to the in-
formation asymmetry problem. Decision of bank customers on where to deposit and keep 
their cash becomes a less significant problem when depositors are guaranteed that they 
will recover their (secured) deposits in the case of bank insolvency. In the EU, the US and 
Switzerland, DIA is responsible for proper administration of the DGS. DIA collects fees 
from banks, invests the accumulated funds and pays monetary compensations to bank 
depositors after the bank is declared insolvent. After depositor claims are compensated, 
IDI takes over all the rights, with the ensuing obligations for the debtor, and subrogation 
occurs1076. Then the insured is involved in the liquidation procedures of the insolvent bank 
and often becomes the main creditor in the bank bankruptcy procedure. For the reasons 
mentioned above, IDI has a direct interest in preventing bank insolvency, and in most 
jurisdictions the deposit insurance agency, inter alia, disposes extensive inspection and 
audit powers and acquires the right to request all the relevant information and documents 
on the financial situation of the bank and impose sanctions. The jurisdictions relevant for 
the study are characterised by specific DIA features.
DGS is an important element in the EU financial supervision system. The main aim 
of the revised Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive is to ensure the same level of legal 
protection for depositors throughout the EU, to protect them against the consequences 
of bank insolvency, which would accordingly eliminate internal market distortions and 
unfair competition1077. However, at the same time, DGS performs incidental functions, 
as it should contribute to bank resolution financing1078. Thus, in the EU Member States, 
where permitted according to their national law, that DGS is able to pursue compensation 
function, but also performs a preventive function, i.e. seeks to use the available resources 
1075 Deposit insurance does not cover the repayment of deposits in excess of EUR 100 000. Social and 
other types of deposits may be protected during the relevant period above EUR 100 000. DGS. Ar-
ticle 6(2).
1076 After a creditor realises its claim, they becomes a new creditor instead of the old creditor and as-
sume the same rights held by the former creditor, and shall not acquire rights not held by the for-
mer creditor. Whether it is useful to treat an Deposit Insurance Corporation as an average creditor, 
is a difficult and complex issue. This issue is analysed in more detail in a separate article written by 
the author. In the event of subrogation, the insurer takes over the rights and duties of the deposi-
tors, as the majority of liabilities pertain to depositors, and the Deposit Insurance Corporation be-
comes the largest creditor of the insolvent bank and continues to play a very significant role in the 
bank resolution process. If under the insolvency laws depositors are treated as preferred creditors, 
as in the case of Lithuania, in Switzerland and the United States, respectively, the deposit holder 
transforms into a preferred creditor shortly after the funds are paid to depositors. Ambrasas. T. 
Supra note 460. 
1077 DGS. Recital (6).
1078 Ibid. Recital (15).
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in order to avoid bank defaults1079, compensation of costs to depositors and other adverse 
effects. To achieve these objectives, EU Member States shall designate the appropriate ad-
ministrative authority1080. The competent public authorities, the designated authorities, 
resolution authorities and the respective administrative authorities must cooperate with 
each other1081. In addition, each Member State must imperatively ensure that at least one 
or several DGS authorities is introduced and officially recognized on their territory. If 
these requirements of the Directive are not complied with, in essence, this means that 
the bank may not accept deposits in that Member State, and a threat of license revocation 
arises. Another obligation of the DIA in view of the size of the bank and interconnections 
between credit institutions is to determine ex ante whether bank liquidation under normal 
insolvency procedure will not jeopardise the financial stability of the bank and whether 
the bank is better suited for a resolution procedure. DGS is also entitled to perform in-
spection activities1082. The main objective of this right is to ensure that the costs of such 
measures undertaken to prevent credit institution default should not exceed the costs as-
sociated with the preservation of insured deposits in the credit institution or the protec-
tion of the institution itself. Thus, the deposit insurance agency must actively cooperate 
with the principal banking supervisory authority, e.g. the CB, in order to avoid liquidation 
of the bank. The role of DIA coincides with the role undertaken by the bank resolution 
authority. IDA should be able to offer assets for purchase to another bank in order to facili-
tate merger procedures with another bank or to reduce the total closure risk and damages 
that may result from the subsequent bank insolvency. Other relevant aspects of the EU 
DIA are discussed in point 2, Section 5, Chapter 1.
In the U.S. legal framework all deposit-taking financial institutions are subject to fed-
eral deposit insurance rules under the FDIC Act1083 or under the Federal Credit Union 
Act. The DGS was revised in 20061084. The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act1085 and 
the related legislative amendments provided for a common deposit insurance fund, while 
the bank insurance fund and the Savings Banks Association Insurance Fund have been 
1079 The recital to the Directive notes that unavailable deposit’ means a deposit that is due and payable 
but that has not been paid by a credit institution under the legal or contractual conditions applicable 
thereto, where either:(a) the relevant administrative authorities have determined that in their view 
the credit institution concerned appears to be unable for the time being, for reasons which are di-
rectly related to its financial circumstances, to repay the deposit and the institution has no current 
prospect of being able to do so; or (b) a judicial authority has made a ruling for reasons which are 
directly related to the credit institution’s financial circumstances and which has the effect of suspend-
ing the rights of depositors to make claims against. DGS. Art 2(1) (8), (a) (b).
1080 DGS. Art. 3 (1).
1081 Ibid. Art. 3 (2).
1082 Ibid. Recital (16).
1083 FDIA. Section II. 12 U.S.C. 1813 (c) (1). 12 U.S.C. § 1821.
1084 The FDIC is vested with broad powers with regard to “deposit-taking institutions”, “banks that are 
defined as banks and members of savings banks association”. 12 U.S.C. 1813 (c) (1), the 1815th. 
1085 The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conform-
ing Amendments Act of 2005 Public Law No. 109-171, tit. II, 2101-2109, 120 Stat. 4, 9-21 (Febru-
ary 8, 2006) Public Law 109-173, 119 Stat. 3601 (February 15, 2006). See more FDIC. Highlights of 
the Reform Act [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-11-05]. <https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/
reform.html>. 
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merged. In addition, in October 2008 the FDIC increased the deposit insurance amount 
from USD 100 000 to USD 250 0001086. The increase of the temporary deposit insurance 
coverage came into effect in 2009 and operated until 2013. Eventually, a permanent legal 
act was adopted, by incorporating its provisions into the Dodd-Frank Act and consumer 
protection legislation. Under the existing DGS system, the US deposit insurance fund is 
financed ex ante, after considering the key bank risk profile-based criteria governing col-
lection of fees. All the banks must pay the fee, in view of the bank’s income and total assets 
held, and the concentration in the legal system of bank insolvency procedures. In contrast 
to the Swiss legal system, deposit insurance fees are based not only on the balance sheets 
of insured banks, but also on the risks posed by banks to the deposit insurance fund (risk-
based approach). This legal regulation allows the FDIC to interpret individual risks faced 
by a specific bank in their broad sense1087. Individual bank risk is assessed taking the four 
key risk elements into account. A system based on individual bank risk is understood as a 
potential of the bank to incur losses for the deposit insurance fund, in view of the bank’s 
assets and liabilities, the amount of losses after the collapse of the bank and the revenue 
needed for the deposit insurance fund1088. Where necessary, the FDIC is entitled to collect 
additional charges ex post to finance the fund after a certain bank becomes insolvent. The 
FDIC can borrow from the US Treasury, the Federal Financing Bank, the Federal Loans 
Bank and other insured deposit-taking financial institutions1089. In addition, deposit in-
surance is guaranteed by the federal government1090. Thus, the US deposit insurance sys-
tem is based on a hybrid financing scheme funded both ex ante and ex post.
The FDIC operates under federal law, except where legal regulation expressly provides 
for other, more specific provisions. The FDIC holds extensive rights, powers and privi-
leges1091. Although the main purpose of the FDIC is insure bank deposits1092, it should be 
noted that the outstanding feature of the U.S. legal framework that the FDIC, while oper-
ating as a DIA, is not only responsible for the federal administration of the DGS, but also 
can act as receiver of the insolvent bank1093, if the deposit-taking financial institution, the 
bank, as an insured person, becomes insolvent1094. The FDIC is in charge for the adminis-
tration of the federal deposit insurance system1095, but it also acts as the administrator of 
the insolvent bank, directed by the following key functions and powers: (i) to find an op-
1086 Federal Deposit Insurance reform Act. 2013 (c). Codified 12 U.S.C. 1821 (a) (3) (A).
1087 FDIRA. 2104-2106, 120 Stat. 4, 12-16. Codified12 U.S.C 1817 note, 1817 (b) (1) (E)-(F), 1817 (b) (2) 
(A)-(B), (D), (b) 3, (b) (5), (g), 1828 (h).
1088 FDIC. Reform of Deposit Insurance. Risk Based Assesment System [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-
11-05]. <https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/reform.html#rbas>. 
1089 FDIC. Financial Statements and Notes. Deposit Insurance Fund. P. 67. FDIC Act. Sec. 11A. Codified 
12 U.S.C. 1821. 
1090 FDIA. Sec. 11 A (B) (c). Codified12 U.S.C. 1821a(c)-(f).
1091 Supreme Court. O‘Melveny&Myers v FDIC. No. 93-489, 512 U.S. 79 [1994].
1092 Williamson P.B. Insolvency Issues And The FDIC, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010. EBSCO-
host.
1093 FDIA. Sec. 9 (a). Corporate powers. Codified 12 U.S.C. 1819(b).
1094 Ibid. Sec. 12. Codified 12 U.S.C. 1822.
1095 Regarding to the dual competences see more Goodwin v. FSLI, 806 F.2d 1290 [1987]. Womble v. Dix-
on, 752 F. 2d 80 [1984]. 
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timal bank resolution solution (with respect to the deposit insurance fund); (ii) to strictly 
comply with the legally established hierarchy of bank creditor claims1096. Thus, the US law 
provides for dual responsibility of the deposit insurer: responsibility for the insolvency 
procedure of the failing bank and responsibility for using the income accrued in the fund, 
i.e., for payoffs to approved creditors and the distribution of assets. However, this situation 
is rather extraordinary both for the EU and Switzerland, as the DIA is granted with fewer 
powers and rights, and it comes into play only after the insured event and the ensuing 
duty to cover depositor claims. However, as in other jurisdictions, in the United States, 
the FDIC seeks to maintain minimum own losses and to recover the maximum share of 
the insolvent bank assets. Thereby the DIA ensures that in the face of financial difficulties 
of the bank, public finances will be preserve to the maximum. It should be noted that the 
US law provides for an exception in the system under which the FDIC may depart from 
the least cost principle, if any bank resolution tool poses a threat to financial stability or 
the real economy.
The second package of DIA functions, rights and obligations relates to the fact that 
the FDIC may act as conservator of the insolvent bank1097, but this is rarely used in prac-
tice. A bank may be subjected to conservatorship, by appointing the FDIC as a conserva-
tor, replacing senior management of the bank, or placing temporary restriction on their 
rights. The purpose of conservatorship is to reform the banking operations in order to 
strengthen the financial position of the bank or to prepare for bank purchase or merger 
with another financial institution rather than to close the bank on a temporary basis1098. 
Acting as the bank supervisor, the FDIC may rescue and rehabilitate the bank without 
revoking its license. In this case, the FDIC takes over the management of the bank from 
the its managing bodies, but the bank will continue to operate. If the FDIC is appointed 
as the insolvency administrator of the bank, the bank is finally closed in legal terms and 
removed from civil circulation. In this case, senior managing bodies and shareholders are 
excluded from bank management without court intervention. The third group of the FDIC 
functions and rights is related to the controlled liquidation process of the bank, if the 
FDIC decides to use immediate bank liquidation tool (depositors pay-off), including asset 
sale and cash distribution to creditors. In this context, it should be noted that the FDIC, 
acting as the administrator of the insolvent bank, can employ two basic bank resolution 
methods: (i) direct deposit pay-off and subsequent liquidation of the bank; (ii) transfer of 
the bank’s assets, rights, transactions and liabilities, and the liquidation of the remaining 
“bad” assets. If the first option is selected, the insured depositors receive their part or the 
insolvent bank is sold to a sound bank. In the first case, the FDIC liquidates the “bad” as-
sets of the bank and sells the bank assets (acting through the creditors’ committee) and 
at least partly covers the losses incurred, by paying compensations to depositors. Deposit 
pay-off method is rarely used, because it is believed that the bank asset liquidation process 
is expensive and, furthermore, the FDIC must commission the fund in advance to make 
immediate payouts to insured depositors, and the process can protract. In the second case, 
1096 FDIA. Sec 11, 2 (a).
1097 Ibid. Sec. 11, (c)-(e), (2) (A) (8). Codified 12 U.S.C. 1821(c).
1098 McGuire C.L. Simple Tools to Assist in the Resolution of Troubled Banks. World Bank, Washington, 
DC, 2012. P. 3.
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the FDIC is looking for a purchaser, a financially capable bank, willing to buy all or a part 
of the bank’s assets and liabilities. Finally, it is important to note that in August 2010 the 
FDIC Board of Directors established the Complex Financial Institutions Bureau, which 
became the focal point acting as a systemic bank resolution authority. Its main purpose is 
to coordinate bank insolvency procedure along with other FDIC departments and offices, 
by ensuring an adequate level of expertise and support for the implementation of the FDIC 
functions1099: monitoring (systemically important, complex banking risk management), 
restructuring planning and implementation (responsible for the review of restructuring 
plans ex ante), coordination of international action (coordination of action with the com-
petent authorities of foreign jurisdictions in the case of cross-border bank resolution) 1100.
The Swiss banking law came into force in 1935.1101 This legal act was governing the 
privileges granted to bank depositors in the case of insolvency, by restricting their scope, 
for example, by insuring depositors up to CHF 5000 CHF 1102. More stringent rules gov-
erning depositor protection were created only in 20041103. Moreover, in view of the global 
financial crisis of 2008, the deposit insurance system was reviewed once again and the final 
version of the law came into force at the end of 20101104. The last amendments were made 
in September 20111105. Under the current wording of the law, if a Swiss bank fails, deposi-
tors are immediately compensated up to CHF 100 000 CHF1106. Before such payment, the 
FINMA needs to assess the liquid assets of the bank and the priority of the remaining 
creditor claims1107. Banks are under an obligation to participate in the deposit insurance 
system1108. Depositors must be paid within 20 business days from the date of application of 
resolution tools to the bank or opening of bankruptcy proceedings. According to the self-
regulatory principles, the minimum regulatory standards approved by FINMA1109 provide 
that the compensation must be paid to depositors within 5 days from the date of official 
confirmation of the resolution tool1110. The banking industry was subjected to a new maxi-
mum amount of the DGS, which can be collected from the banking industry, i.e., from 
CHF 4 billion up to CHF 6 billion. The insurance amount is still funded ex post. Ex ante 
DGS funding was rejected by the Parliament1111. Therefore, the money is collected from 
1099 Office of Inspector General. The FDIC’s Progress in Implementing Systemic Resolution Authorities 
under the Dodd-Frank Act. Office of Audits and Evaluations. Report No. AUD-14-00, 2013. P. 1. 
1100 Ibid. P. 9.
1101 Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen. (Bankengesetz, SR 952.0).
1102 FINMA. Chronologie. [interactive].[accessed 2014-12-05]. <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classi-
fied-compilation/19340083/history.htm>. 
1103 Emch/Renz/Arpagaus (Fn 18). N 1462.
1104 Botschaft des Bundestrases zur Anderung des Bundesgesetzes uber die Banken und Sparkassen vom 
5. November 2008, BB1 2008, 8841, 8853.
1105 Bericht des Eidgenossischen Finanzdepertements uber die Vernehmlassungsergebnisse zu einem 
Bundesgesetz uber die Sicherung der Bankeinlagen, Februar 210.
1106 Swiss Banking law. Art. 37 (b), 37 (a) (1). 
1107 Ibid. 37 (b), (1), (2).
1108 Ibid. Art. 37 (h), 37(a). 
1109 Ibid. Art. 37(h), para 1. 
1110 Ibid. Art. 5, para 5.
1111 Reiser M. Supra note 94. P. 6.
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operating Swiss banks only when a certain bank fails and triggers the obligation to pay 
compensation to depositors1112. At the same time, each bank is under a duty to keep the 
amount of liquid assets to cover at least half of total potential bank charges1113. Moreover, 
Swiss banks have a duty to constantly maintain the level of local creditor claims or dispose 
other assets, which account for 125% of the protected deposit amount1114, regardless of the 
bank risk profile.
3.1.3. Courts
Courts play different roles in the context of bank insolvency procedures. First, courts 
administer justice. Therefore, they assist the banking supervisory authority in implement-
ing and executing its decisions and resolutions. Second, courts administer regular bank 
insolvency (liquidation) procedures. Third, courts act as a judicial review authority that 
secures the parties concerned with their right to an independent judgment, which is usually 
adopted by a supervisory authority1115. Fourth, court rulings or certain enforcement actions 
may be initiated by banking supervisory authorities. For example, under the U.S. legal regu-
lation, the FDIC may apply to the US state court for an injunction or application of interim 
protection measures against the bank, i.e. for suspending or terminating the operation of 
the bank1116. Finally, legal proceedings are necessary in view of the disputed bank resolution 
tools in order to ensure fundamental rights of individuals and the rights of defence.
The role of courts varies in the context of administration of bank insolvency proce-
dures, depending on a particular jurisdiction. However, the legal doctrine defines the 
following main judicial powers directly relating to bank insolvency procedures: interim 
protection measures (to prevent enforcement actions against a bank), appointment of an 
administrator or liquidator, and judicial review of administrative decisions1117. It should 
also be noted that the powers of courts and supervisory authorities may intertwine or co-
incide to a certain extent. Bank insolvency procedures in the EU, the US, and Switzerland 
fall within the scope of administrative procedures that may be initiated without permis-
sion from the court.
3.1.4. Court Role and Key Bank Resolution Functions in the EU 
The EU legal framework conceives a judicial authority in the broad sense as the au-
thority competent in the field of winding-up tools, whereas the administrative authority is 
1112 Ibid.
1113 Winzeler Ch. Basler Kommentar zum Bankengesetz, Basel 2013. Art. 37 (h), N29.
1114 Swiss Banking law. Art. 37 (a), (6).
1115 European Convention of Human Rights. Chapter II, III, IV. 
1116 Codified 12 USC 1818 (d).
1117 In order to determine whether the competent authorities acted in accordance with the law, the gen-
eral rule is that courts are not allowed to overestimate the decisions made by administrative authori-
ties in exercising their discretion, unless there are clear evidence or factual insufficiencies, abuse or 
misuse of powers. The law must explicitly regulate the right to losses (compensation) and this issue 
could also be addressed in court. Hüpkes E. The legal aspects of bank insolvency. Supra note 71. P. 29. 
IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 5, 22-25.
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competent in the field of reorganisation measures1118. Perhaps the most important judicial 
function – to ensure the fundamental rights of individuals and the rights of defence – is 
analysed in Section 5 of this Chapter. This section briefly reviews other court functions 
prevailing in the context of the bank resolution regime.
The EU legal framework admits that crisis management measures undertaken by 
national resolution authorities may require complex economic assessments and a large 
margin of discretion. It is presumed that national competent administrative authorities 
are specifically equipped with the expertise needed for making such assessments and for 
determining the appropriate use of the margin of discretion1119. Therefore, it is important 
to ensure that the complex economic assessments made by competent national authorities 
in the context of bank insolvency procedures form the basis for national courts when re-
viewing bank insolvency procedures. However, judicial procedures addressing disputable 
bank resolution solutions are still needed in order to guarantee fundamental rights and the 
rights of due defence. Therefore, the regulation contains a reservation to the effect that the 
complex nature of those assessments should not prevent national courts from examining 
whether the evidence relied on by the resolution authority is factually accurate, reliable 
and consistent, whether that evidence contains all the relevant information which should 
be taken into account in order to assess complex situations and whether this information 
is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn therefrom. Given that crisis manage-
ment measures may require urgent application due to serious financial stability risks in the 
Member State and at the EU level, national law must provide an extraordinary procedure 
relating to the application for ex ante judicial approval of a crisis management measure 
and the consideration of such an application in court. Given the requirement for urgent 
application of a crisis management measure, the court shall rule on bank resolution within 
24 hours and the Member State shall accordingly ensure that the respective authority can 
decide immediately after obtaining the court’s approval. This must be without prejudice to 
the potential right of the parties concerned to request the court to set aside the decision 
for a limited period of time, after the resolution authority initiates the respective crisis 
management measure 1120.
The role of the court is reflected in on-site inspections at the residential or business 
premises of the banks or related individuals. For example, subject to prior notification to 
national resolution authorities and the relevant national competent authorities, the Board 
may conduct all the necessary on-site inspections, such as: inspecting the employees of 
the bank and third parties entrusted with certain functions or activities by the bank, in-
specting premises of natural or legal persons. Where the proper conduct and efficiency 
of the inspection so requires, the Board may carry out on-site inspection without prior 
announcement to the respective legal persons 1121. On-site inspections shall be conducted 
on the basis of a decision of the Board. If an on-site inspection requires authorisation of 
a judicial authority in accordance with national rules, the Board shall request such au-
1118 BRRD. Art. 2. 
1119 BRRD. Recital (89).
1120 Ibid. Recital (92).
1121 SRM. Art. 36 (1).
249
thorisation1122. On-site inspections are conducted under the supervision of the relevant 
national authorities. In controlling the proportionality of the coercive measures, the na-
tional judicial authority may ask the Board to provide detailed explanations, in particular 
relating to the grounds relied on the Board for suspecting an infringement, the seriousness 
of the suspected infringement and the nature of the involvement of the person subject to 
coercive measures. However, the national judicial authority shall not review the necessity 
of the inspection itself and shall not require the provision of information contained in the 
Board’s file. The Court of Justice of the EU is the only authority empowered to review the 
lawfulness of the Board’s decision1123.
Another function of courts under the EU legal framework relates to enforcement and 
allocation of fines and periodic penalty payments. The fines may be imposed on banks, 
whenever they fail to supply information requested for resolution purposes or whenever 
banks do not submit to a general investigation in respect of natural or legal persons with 
regard to information, or an on-site inspection in accordance (where the Single Resolution 
Board conducts all the necessary on-site inspections at the business premises of natural or 
legal persons), or where they fail to comply with the obligation to cooperate and exchange 
information, or fail to comply with a decision addressed to them1124. Enforcement is gov-
erned by applicable procedural rules in force in the participating Member State where the 
penalties are to be paid. The order for its enforcement shall be appended to the decision 
without applying any other formality than verification of the authenticity of the decision 
by the authority designated by the government of each participating Member State for 
that particular purpose and notified to the Board and to the Court of Justice. When those 
formalities have been completed, the enforcement procedure may be initiated1125. Enforce-
ment may be suspended only by a decision of the Court of Justice. However, the courts of 
the participating Member State concerned shall have jurisdiction over complaints on the 
legality of enforcement1126.
Another judicial function in the EU legal framework relates to the pre-eminent role of 
the Court of Justice. First of all, under to the SRM regulation, which comprises the Board, 
the Council, the Commission and resolution authorities of the Member States, the Court of 
Justice has jurisdiction to review the legality of decisions adopted by the Board, the Council 
and the Commission, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, as well as to determine their 
non-contractual liability. Furthermore, under Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice is 
competent to give preliminary rulings upon request of national judicial authorities on 
the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies or agencies of the EU. 
National judicial authorities, in accordance with their national law, shall be competent to 
review the legality of decisions adopted by the resolution authorities of the participating 
Member States in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by this Regulation, as well 
as to determine their non-contractual liability1127. Second, proceedings may be brought 
1122 Ibid. Art. 37 (1). 
1123 Ibid. Art. 37 (2). 
1124 Ibid. Art. 34, 35, 36, 38.
1125 Ibid. Art. 41 (3). 
1126 Ibid.
1127 SRM. Recital (120).
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before the Court of Justice in accordance with Article 263 TFEU contesting a decision 
taken by the Appeal Panel or, where there is no right of appeal to the Appeal Panel, by the 
Board. Furthermore, the EU institutions, as well as any natural or legal person, may insti-
tute proceedings before the Court of Justice against decisions of the Board, in accordance 
with Article 263 TFEU. Another important aspect is that if the Board has an obligation to 
act and fails to take a decision, the proceedings for failure to act may be brought before 
the Court of Justice in accordance with Article 265 TFEU1128. The Court of Justice shall 
have jurisdiction to review any dispute relating to the liability of the Resolution Board. 
Proceedings in matters arising from non-contractual liability shall be barred after a period 
of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto1129.
In order to protect the rights of shareholders and creditors to receive no less than 
they would have recovered under normal insolvency proceedings, clear obligations are 
laid down concerning the valuation of assets and liabilities. The valuation shall form an 
integral part of the decision to apply a resolution tool or exercise a resolution power. The 
valuation itself is subject to a separate right of appeal, but it may be subject to an appeal 
together with the decision taken by the resolution authority. Sufficient time is allowed for 
valuation to assess the treatment that shareholders and creditors would have received if 
the bank had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. In addition, an ex 
post comparison between the treatment that shareholders and creditors have actually been 
afforded and the treatment they would have received under normal insolvency proceed-
ings is obligatory and should be carried out after resolution tools have been applied. If it 
is determined that shareholders and creditors have received in payment the equivalent of 
less than the amount that they would have received under normal insolvency proceedings, 
they should be entitled to recover the difference. As opposed to the valuation prior to the 
resolution action, it should be possible to challenge the difference separately from the 
resolution decision. Member States should be free to decide on the procedure of payment 
of any difference identified to shareholders and creditors. The difference, if any, should be 
covered by using financial arrangements.
Eventually, the role of a court is to ensure the compliance with requirements of profes-
sional secrecy. Information subject to requirements of professional secrecy shall not be 
disclosed to any other public or private entity, unless such disclosure is required for the 
purpose of legal proceedings1130.
3.1.5. Government and/or the Ministry of Finance
It is likely that the Ministry of Finance will be involved in the bank insolvency pro-
cedures, subject to any chance of using public financial assistance to bail out the bank 
facing financial difficulties or several banks operating in certain jurisdictions. The CB pro-
vides temporary assistance in the form of liquidity (lender of last resort) and shall not be 
 
 
1128 Ibid. Art. 86. 
1129 Ibid. Art. 87 (5).
1130 BRRD. Art. 84. SRM. Art. 88. 
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involved in the bank recapitalisation process. This function is reserved for the Govern-
ment and the Ministry of Finance in particular1131.
3.2. Administrative or Judicial Resolution Procedures?  
Analysis of the Arguments
There is an established opinion in the doctrine and the positive law of the relevant 
jurisdictions (see Section 4 of this Chapter) that the effective solutions of bank resolu-
tion and the solutions for banks facing financial difficulties in general are hard to achieve 
through general commercial courts. It is stated that judicial proceedings are long-lasting, 
the appeals are time-consuming, and this can result in a variety of adverse legal conse-
quences, such as license revocation, settlement with depositors, etc.
The doctrine notes that each system - both judicial and administrative – of decision-
making in the field of bank resolution has both advantages and disadvantages1132. First of 
all, the doctrine analyses arguments reflecting the court-based adoption of resolution de-
cisions and the resulting benefits: (i) the court may be forced to intervene in the bank in-
solvency procedures, as they are often concerned with or even repealed by property rights 
(such as shareholders’ rights). Thus, the relevant legislation in certain jurisdictions may 
provide for an obligation to entrust such actions to courts only; (ii) a society characterised 
by confidence in the judiciary may have an established attitude that possible infringement 
of individual rights is best remedied when the matter is adjudicated by the court; (iii) the 
judicial system is considered to be more transparent and more accountable; (iv) in the case 
of cross-border bank insolvency, it may be easier to strengthen cross-border cooperation, 
where as a result of bank insolvency, court orders are adopted in the place of adminis-
trative decisions of supervisory authorities; (v) the chance of complaints is less likely, if 
the first stage of decision-making on bank resolution takes place in court, and only then 
judicial review takes place at first instance and on appeal. The arguments that highlight 
the advantages of the bank resolution administrative decision-making system: (i) a spe-
cialised, public administrative body is presumed to have more experience in banking, in 
contrast to the judicial system. Courts lack specialised knowledge, furthermore, courts 
are rather slow in adopting judgments and this complicates the judicial procedures. This 
is particularly true in countries with no specialised courts and no specialised judges. It is 
still theoretically possible to imagine a legal situation when a judge hearing family and/
or divorce disputes before a general court must examine bank insolvency proceedings; 
(ii) the courts generally act slower than the specialised administrative authorities and the 
judicial proceedings take longer than administrative procedures. In addition, specialised 
administrative authorities can urgently take certain actions related to bank resolution and/
or winding-up and often give priority to such actions, depending on the jurisdiction and 
the legal regulation; (iii) in addition to that, administrative authorities have more capac-
ity and human resources in determining whether a bank is insolvent. Agility in solving 
the financial problems of distressed banks is one of the essential conditions for success. 
General courts may not have enough judges because of the number of other important 
1131 Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. P. 48. 
1132 IMF, WB. Supra note 86. P. 18-20.
252
cases pending in parallel, or by reason of removal or challenge of judges engaged in bank 
insolvency proceedings; (iv) administrative processes can save more costs related to bank 
insolvency procedures1133.
In summary, it can be said that there is no bank insolvency decision-making and man-
agement system that is absolutely correct, as everything depends on the positive law of a 
particular jurisdiction and the performance of a judicial system in a given country. Most 
importantly, whatever model is established, the legal system must provide a clear oppor-
tunity for the public authority to commence bank insolvency procedures, in accordance 
with the bank insolvency threshold and criteria. Full accountability for decisions must be 
maintained. In any case, the right to judicial review of administrative decisions must be 
in place.
3.3. Is it Appropriate to Set up a Specialised Panel to Deal with Financial 
Institution Insolvency Proceedings? The US Study Case
Although in the EU Member States, specialised courts prevail in Germany, the UK, 
France, Spain, and Belgium1134, specialised courts dealing exceptionally with bankruptcy 
proceedings outside the system of general courts are a rare example. A similar situation 
is in Switzerland1135. However, some researchers are of an opinion that specialised courts 
are the future of the judicial system in many countries1136. The opposite situation is found 
in the U.S. legal framework, which is characterised by deeply routed traditions of bank-
ruptcy proceedings1137. For instance, the US bankruptcy law of 1898 provided for referee 
dealing with bankruptcy proceedings , appointed by the US state court judges in certain 
cases with the main function to administer judicial bankruptcy proceedings. In the long 
run, after the adoption of additional legislation, the statutory powers of bankruptcy judges 
were expanded, gradually taking over the powers from the state courts1138. The first federal 
rules governing bankruptcy procedures were adopted in 1973, which further expanded 
the limits of liability of the US bankruptcy judges1139. In 1978, the Bankruptcy Code was 
created and further revised after 1984. The federal courts were granted exclusive jurisdic-
1133 Lastra R.M. Cross-border bank insolvency. Supra note 74. P. 49. 
1134 Zimmer M.B. Overview of Specialised Courts. International Journal for Court Administration, 2009. 
P. 14-15.
1135 Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The Paths to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court An Outline of Swit-
zerland’s Judiciary Structure. 2013 [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-05] <http://www.bger.ch/
wege_zum_bundesgericht_e.pdf>. Swiss Civil Procedure Code of 19 December 2008 (Status as of 1 
May 2013). 
1136 The following key advantages should be mentioned: efficiency, consistency, expertise, knowledge, 
case management improvement, flexibility, better quality mechanisms to review administrative deci-
sions, consistency with the administrative law. Ibid. P. 1-3.
1137 See more United States Courts. Bankruptcy Courts. [interactive]. [accessed on 2014-12-05] <http://
www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts.htm>. 
1138 Chandler Act. Chapter 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
1139 Delk P. Special Masters in Bankruptcy. The Case against Bankruptcy Rule 9031. Mo. L. Rev. Vol.67, No. 
29, 2002.
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tion to act as courts dealing with bankruptcy issues1140. The state courts were obliged to 
refer bankruptcy proceedings to the federal court. Moreover, it is important to note that 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 contained a provision requiring a thorough analysis as to 
whether or not set up special courts dealing with insolvency cases of financial institu-
tions, and special masters or panels of judges to supervise insolvency cases of financial 
institutions under the Bankruptcy Code to minimise the negative impact on the financial 
markets without moral hazard1141.
Following the U.S. legal framework with deeply rooted legal tradition it is worth to 
analyze in more detail why it is appropriate to distinguish specialized judges and/or even 
special judicial panels dealing exclusively with insolvency proceedings of financial institu-
tions. The doctrine holds different opinions on this issue.
Some academics find positive features of such regulatory direction and, moreover, 
the U.S. courts specialising in bankruptcy proceedings propose to establish a special ju-
dicial panel that can deal with insolvency proceedings of financial institutions holding 
at least USD 100 billion or more mixed financial assets or to leave the insolvency cases 
of financial institutions for consideration in separate chambers1142. The proposal recom-
mends to insert new provisions in Chapter 28 of the Bankruptcy Code, which would al-
low designation of specialised state court judges to deal with bankruptcy cases of large 
financial institutions in second and last instance, excluding such cases from the jurisdic-
tion of general courts1143. The judges appointed to examine the insolvency cases of large 
financial institutions would be vested with exclusive rights and prevented from referring 
such cases to general courts. Moreover, judges could appoint special masters to the panel, 
which could hear cases and the entire civil proceedings to the same extent as a bankruptcy 
judge and together with the latter1144. Thus, according to this mixed regulatory scheme, the 
cases of financial institutions would be dealt with by special state judges in conjunction 
with special masters, appointed and selected from among such judges, in order to ensure 
full independence from the influence of any possible financial institution, government or 
creditor. Other proposals urge general appointment of special masters in all bankruptcy 
proceedings, making the appropriate amendments to Article 53 of the Federal Code of 
Civil Procedure1145. These arguments supporting and rejecting the reforms diverge.
Researchers, in particular, identify the positive impact of such regulation, finding 
that the management tool in the form of a special master will encourage and optimise 
the aims of the bankruptcy system to “protect the immediate and economically most ad-
vantageous administration of each bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code 
and more operational, inexpensive actions for determining and conducting insolvency 
1140 28 U.S.C. Section 1334 (a).
1141 Dodd-Frank. Section 216 (a) (2) (B).
1142 Jackson H. T. Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14. A proposal. P. 29. Hoover Institution Resolution Task 
Force, 2011. Jackson H.T. Chapter 11 F: A proposal for the use of Bankruptcy to Resolve Financial 
Institutions. In Ending Government Bailouts as we know Them, 2010. P. 232.
1143 Ibid. Chapter 14. P. 6.
1144 Ibid P. 6-7.
1145 Kesan J.P. Ball G.G. A Study of the Role and Impact of Special Masters in Patent Cases. Federal Judi-
cial Center 2009.
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procedures”.1146 This idea is based on the fact that in federal cases, special masters would 
be appointed from among private lawyers, retired judges or academics selectively ap-
pointed to decide on matters of special, exceptional effects of such cases and complex 
problems resulting from them. Other suggestions argue that it would be useful to change 
the federal Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, in particular, providing for the right of bank-
ruptcy judges to appoint special masters only in certain exceptional cases, when the court 
is faced with complex and difficult application of the law and fact. In this case, a special 
master could contribute to solving complex, difficult problems, scientific discoveries and 
more effective initiation and conducting the negotiation with regard to the out-of-court 
agreement (the Lawsuit Agreement) 1147. The essence of this process is that the special 
master would contribute ‘to the administration of justice’, maximise the effectiveness and 
management of the proceedings, provide expert knowledge in complex cases that can-
not be handled by common judges1148. According to some opinions, such reforms would 
improve the effectiveness of the procedure designed to identify creditor claims, as the 
special master could ‘contribute to the security of oral civil procedure, save time and legal 
costs and speed up bankruptcy procedures for other borrowers who need the attention 
of bankruptcy judges’.1149Among other things, some of the proposals encourage the ap-
pointment of a special master in certain cases only, when it can provide expert knowl-
edge in cases where the judicial machine is not self-sufficient.1150 Given the caseload of 
general courts dealing with insolvency proceedings, judges lack the time in order to gain 
deeper understanding of large and complex bankruptcy procedures1151. In addition, it is 
argued that special masters can contribute to multinational financial institution insolven-
cy proceedings, particularly involving many countries and necessitating comprehensive 
collection, evaluation, and examination of evidence, thus inclusion of both foreign and 
national experts will also serve this objective.
However, the existing U.S. legal framework contains no harmonised rules with re-
gard to the appointment of a special master. Consistent approach among stakeholders, 
researchers, practitioners as to the effectiveness of the US Bankruptcy Code in addressing 
the problems of insolvency of financial institutions is still lacking. The proponents use the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy model to justify their position, especially because the court 
procedure was too complicated and the courts lacked expertise with regard to banks hold-
ing complex financial structures1152. Many new legislative proposals have been submitted 
in this regard1153. It is assumed that the arguments supporting the position of introducing 
1146 Clift S. R. Should the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure be Amended to Expressly Authorize 
United States Dsitrict and Bankruptcy Courts to Appoint a Special Master in an Appropriate and 
Rare bankruptcy Case or Proceeding. Vol. 31 U. Mem. L. Rev, 2001. P. 353, 399.
1147 Ibid. P. 355.
1148 Delk P. Supra note 1148. P. 50-52.
1149 Kaufman D. Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy. Stan. L. 
Rev., Vol. 35, 1982. P. 153, 173.
1150 Clift S.R. Supra note 1155. P. 373. 
1151 Ibid. P. 376.
1152 Chann S., Appelbaum B. They’ve Got It: Fixes for the Financial System, N.Y. Times, 2010 [interactive]. 
[accessed on 2014-12-06] <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/weekinreview/25chan.html>. 
1153 Ayotte K., Skeel D. Bankruptcy or Bailouts? Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 35, 2010. P. 469. 
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special masters are rational. Appointment of specialised state courts or bankruptcy court 
judges to hear insolvency cases of financial institutions in any case requires changes to the 
Bankruptcy Code and conferral of additional powers.
3.4. Bank Resolution Decision-Making Mechanisms. Who Makes Decisions 
on Bank Resolution Decision-Makers: Administrative Authorities or 
Creditors?
3.4.1. Centralised Resolution Decision-Making in the EU
As already mentioned above, one of the primary elements of the Banking Union is 
the the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) Regulation, with the main objective to en-
able the EU to create a centralised mechanism to address bank resolution and insolvency 
issues and adopt decisions in a centralised manner by a central resolution body, i.e., the 
Single Resolution Board1154 (the Board), in order to ensure clear, uniform and consistent 
approach across the internal market. The BRRD Directive establishes minimum harmo-
nisation rules, but does not provide for centralisation of decision-making in the field of 
bank resolution, which basically means that common bank resolution tools and resolu-
tion powers are conferred on the national authorities of each Member State, leaving the 
discretion to national authorities as to the methods of application of such tools and the 
use of national financing arrangements to support resolution procedures. In addition, the 
BRRD still leaves the possibility for the Member States to adopt different and potentially 
inconsistent decisions regarding the resolution of cross-border bank groups which may 
affect the overall costs of resolution. Moreover, as it provides for national financing ar-
rangements, the Directive does not sufficiently reduce the dependence of banks on the 
support from national budgets and does not completely prevent different approaches by 
Member States as to the use of the financing arrangements; centralised resolution powers 
are established and entrusted to the Resolution Board established by the SRM Regulation 
and to the national resolution authorities1155. Within the SRM framework, it is possible 
to directly resolve any credit institution of a participating Member State1156. The Board is 
empowered to take decisions in relation to significant banks or banking groups, banks or 
banking groups directly supervised by the ECB, or cross-border banking groups1157.
1154 The Board is a special EU agency with a concrete structure in line with its specific tasks. Its model 
is different from that of all other EU agencies. The composition of the Board should ensure that due 
consideration is given to all the interests involved in resolution procedures. Taking into account the 
tasks of the Board, the President, the Vice-President and four other full-time members of the Board 
should be assigned according to their merits of banking and finance knowledge and understanding 
of financial supervision, and the experience relevant for regulation and restructuring. The President, 
the Vice-President and four other full-time members of the Board should be selected following an 
open selection procedure, of which the European Parliament and the Council should be adequately 
informed and which should respect the principle of gender balance, experience and qualifications. 
The Commission should present the final list of candidates for the chairman, the Vice-chairman and 
four other full-time members of the Board to the competent committee of the European Parliament
1155 SRM. Recital (11). 
1156 Ibid. Recital (22).
1157 Ibid. Recital (28).
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Until the latest banking crisis, the divergences between national bank resolution rules 
in different Member States and the corresponding different administrative practices and 
the lack of a unified decision-making process for resolution in the Banking Union have 
contributed to the reduced market confidence and increased market instability, as it was 
impossible to predict the possible outcome of bank failure, and persons responsible for 
strategic decision on the insolvency of a specific bank were not clear1158.
Under the SRM framework1159, the EU Member States have a central decision-making 
mechanism and a single resolution fund (consisting of Member States’ national compart-
ments during the transitional period), which supposedly allows ensuring coordinated and 
effective decision-making across participating Member States, minimising the negative 
impact on financial stability and reducing the dependence of bank creditworthiness on 
governments1160. The SRM could not work properly without a common financing source. 
If the funding of resolution were to remain at the national level in the longer term, the link 
between the public sector and the banking sector would not be fully broken, and investors 
would continue to establish borrowing conditions according to the place of establishment 
of the banks rather than their creditworthiness1161.
Several key elements of the resolution decision-making mechanism should be distin-
guished. The Board is responsible for adopting a resolution scheme. Immediately after 
the adoption of the resolution scheme, the Board shall transmit it to the European Com-
mission. Within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, 
the European Commission shall either endorse the resolution scheme, or object to it with 
regard to its discretionary aspects. Within 12 hours from the transmission of the resolu-
tion scheme by the Board, the European Commission may propose to the Council (a) to 
reject the resolution scheme on the ground that the resolution scheme adopted by the 
Board does not fulfill the criterion of public interest (achievement of, and is proportion-
ate to one or more of the resolution objectives and winding up of the entity under normal 
insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent); 
(b) to approve or object to a material modification of the amount of the Fund provided 
for in the resolution scheme of the Board. For approving or objecting decisions on the 
resolution scheme, the Council shall act by simple majority1162. The resolution scheme may 
enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the Council or by the European 
Commission within a period of 24 hours after its transmission by the Board. The Council 
or the European Commission, as the case may be, shall provide reasons for the exercise of 
their power of objection. Where, within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution 
scheme by the Board, the Council has approved the proposal of the European Commis-
sion for modification of the resolution scheme on the ground referred to or the European 
1158 Ibid. Recital (2).
1159 SRM regulation is already published and came into force. Major provisions are applicable from 1st 
January 2015 with some exceptions that will apply from 1st January, 2016.
1160 CoE. Single Resolution Mechanism: Council confirms deal with EP. Brussels, Press release, 2014. 
[interactive]. [accessed on 2014-09-20] <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ecofin/142512.pdf>.
1161 SRM. Recital (19). 
1162 SRM. Art. 18 (7). 
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Commission raises objections, the Board shall, within eight hours modify the resolution 
scheme in accordance with the stated reasons1163.
3.4.2. Is the Single Resolution Board Empowered to Take Legally Binding 
Decisions That Would Prevail Over Decisions of National Authorities?
The SRM – aims for the common resolution mechanism with centralised decision-
making and centralised governing body and the single resolution fund, benefiting the 
Member States, taxpayers, banks and financial stability in the EU. However, like every 
piece of legislation, this Regulation may entail potential legal risks, which may be experi-
enced in the practical application of the SRM Regulation.
First of all, it should be noted that the legal basis of the SRM Regulation plays a very 
important role within the context of this Chapter. The SRM is based on Article 114 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, authorising Member States to adopt 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. This aspect deserves par-
ticular attention, because it is very likely that the bank resolution-related decisions will in 
all cases be addressed in court because of their highly political nature. The issue of the legal 
basis has been extensively discussed by legislative bodies and essentially relates to the fact 
whether the SRM will maintain the integrity of the internal market, improve the function-
ing of the internal market, remove barriers to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, and 
help avoiding excessive distortion of competition. The SRM provides for the rights and 
powers of the SRB 1164 with a high degree of intervention into private rights (intervention 
of ownership rights in the contractual relationship) and can result in significant fiscal im-
pact on both private parties (e.g. creditors) and the SRM participating Member States. The 
legislative process was surrounded by extensive discussions with regard to the legal basis. 
The main problematic issues relate to the following aspects: (1) the SRM legal framework 
(it is questionable whether the internal market of TFEU, Article 114 can be employed as 
a legal basis for the SRM proposal; 2) doubts were raised regarding the new institutional 
framework of the EU’s development and appropriateness SRB compliance with the Mero-
ni1165 principles; 3) the legal basis of financing arrangements and levies from the industry 
It is questionable whether Article 114 TFEU provides a sound legal basis for the collec-
tion of contributions from the EU banking industry. It is assumed that these contributions 
could be established based on Articles 310, 311 TFEU (articles designated for the forma-
1163 Ibid. Art. 18.
1164 In order for all the participating Member States to have full confidence in the quality and impar-
tiality of the banking resolution process, in particular as regards the impact on the local economy, 
resolution decisions will be prepared and centrally monitored by the Single Resolution Board. Such 
a resolution scheme will ensure consistency and uniform approach.
1165 In 1958, the ECJ in Meroni vs. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community established 
the fundamental principles that could be used in the context of delegation of powers to the new au-
thorities. The ECJ stated in that case that the delegation of powers was compatible with the Treaty if 
the executive powers, the implementation of which may be rigorously supervised by the delegating 
entity, were clearly defined. According to the ECJ, discretionary powers could not be given to au-
thorities not listed in the TFEU, as this may disrupt the institutional balance enshrined in the Treaty.
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tion of the EU budget) or Article 352 TFEU (article designated for agreements on actions, 
if the EU Treaties fail to provide the appropriate powers, requiring unanimity in the EU 
Council, if contributions are not included in the general budget of the EU). Thus a ques-
tion arises whether Article 114 provides for a reliable legal basis to collect contributions 
from the European banking industry? Article 352 could be the legal basis for the SRM, as 
it aims to safeguard financial stability in the SRM Member States by, among other things, 
including economic and monetary provisions set out in Article 119 TFEU. Therefore it can 
be assumed that Article 352 TFEU may be a more appropriate legal basis for ensuring that 
the SRB is vested with effective rights and powers, and the resolution procedures are im-
plemented promptly. Legal risk also occurs when bank resolution decisions may actually 
impact the national budgets of the Member States, which suggests that the SRM Regula-
tion still lacks stronger provisions for protecting the budget of the participating Member 
States to ensure compliance with the Member States’ constitutions. A more serious legal 
problem may arise while implementing the Regulation in practice after analysing whether 
the powers of the Board comply with the EU treaties and the general principles of EU law, 
in accordance with the principles of the Meroni case-law.
SRM consists of uniform bank resolution rules and procedures to be applied by the 
SRB together with the European Commission, the EU Council and the resolution au-
thorities of the participating Member States. The adopted and approved SRM Regulation 
is based on Article 114, which provides for and allows the adoption of certain measures 
for the approximation of Member State laws and other legal provisions designed for the 
creation and functioning of the internal market 1166. It should also be noted that part 2 of 
the same article provides that the approximation shall not apply to fiscal provisions. So 
far, this legal basis worked well for harmonising the majority of financial services legisla-
tion, except for the cases established in the case-law to the effect that this legal framework 
limits the smooth functioning of the internal market, based on the principles of consist-
ency (proportionality) and subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5 TEU1167. The question is 
1166 According to the proposal, national laws on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms are harmonised to the extent necessary to ensure that the Member States have the 
minimum level of tools and methods to eliminate systemic failures. Thus, a coherent system should 
promote the financial stability of the internal market, by ensuring a minimum requirement for reso-
lution of credit institutions across Member States and by facilitating cooperation between national 
authorities in the case of failure of cross-border banking groups.
1167 Under the principle of subsidiary enshrined in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on the European Union, in 
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at cen-
tral level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level. Only EU action can ensure that the Member States use 
measures sufficiently compatible with each other to seize failing institutions. Although the EU bank-
ing sector is highly integrated, the banking crisis resolution systems are established on the national 
basis and vary widely. Currently, according to many national legal systems, the institutions are not 
given the powers necessary for the orderly winding up of financial institutions and thereby to sustain 
the services which are essential to safeguard the financial stability, minimising the losses sustained 
by taxpayers in the result of such support for insolvency. In order to properly cope with cross-border 
crises, such divergent national legislation is inappropriate and complicates the cooperation between 
the home Member State and the host Member State. Moreover, the essential differences between na-
tional resolution procedures could pose unacceptable risks to financial stability and threaten effective 
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whether centralisation of executive competences and powers complies with the Article 114 
TFEU. The argument to the contrary is that the Commission, in part with the EU Coun-
cil is granted wide powers and responsibility for the functioning of the bank resolution 
system, which Article 114 TFEU fails to provide. This article is intended for the creation 
of the internal market, therefore its suitability is open to doubt, whether it is appropriate 
to pursue exceptional objectives for strenghthening financial stability only in some of the 
EU Member States (i.e., only in the participating MS, instead of all 28 MS). Therefore, it 
is questionable whether this article confers the right on the Commission to assume the 
powers of a resolution authority in one segment of the common market only, i.e. the eu-
rozone, and whether such regulation could lead to the fragmentation of the single market, 
and whether this will assist in maintaining integrity and enhancing the functioning of the 
internal market.
Another potential problem with regard to the legal basis may arise from the degree of 
centralisation and a potential conflict between the EU primary law and principles (e.g., 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and secondary EU law. The problem may also 
arise due to the status and powers of the SRB conferred by regulatory analogy of the EU 
agencies (Article 114 TFEU). It must be assumed that, first of all, the SRM may in require 
future revision of primary EU law. As recently confirmed by the Advocate General of the 
CJEU in the proceedings for Short Selling Regulation1168, Article 114 TFEU restricts the 
powers of agencies that cannot replace national authorities from the moment when such 
powers held by agencies exceed harmonisation powers. Secondly, the operating limit of the 
SRM regulation remains unclear, especially in the transfer of competencies from Member 
States to the Commission and/or to the Council, and then the question arises whether this 
issue relates to the internal market principles. The principles established in Meroni1169 still 
restructuring of cross-border groups, since for proper adjustment procedures to be laid down at the 
Union level, national law must be closely harmonised. According to the principle of proportionality, 
the content and form of the Union action should not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objec-
tives of the Treaties. See more judgment of the ECJ in Germany v. Parliament and Council C-376/98, 
[2000] ECR- I 8419..
1168 See more Advocate General judgement United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. 
Council of the European Union and Europian Parliament, Case No. C-270/12, 12 September 2013.
1169 In Meroni vs. High Authority the ECJ laid down the conditions under which it was possible to del-
egate powers to the new authorities. It stated that the delegation of powers was compatible with the 
Treaty if the executive powers, the implementation of which may be rigorously supervised by the 
delegating entity, were clearly defined. According to the ECJ, entities and structures not identified in 
the Treaty could not be given broad discretionary powers. Article 7 of the European Economic Com-
munity Treaty (The achievement of the tasks entrusted to the Community shall be ensured by: the 
European Parliament, a Council, a Commission, and a Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors) ex-
presses the principle of institutional balance. According to the Court, this principle becomes ineffec-
tive when broad powers of discretion are transferred to administrative entities. Therefore, two main 
principles were formulated in that case: (i) the delegating authority cannot grant powers to another 
authority other than those granted to the delegating authority by the Treaty, and not to comply with 
those powers; (ii) it is not possible to transfer powers covering a broad discretion on many different 
objectives and tasks, thereby shifting the responsibility and avoiding political control. In Meroni, the 
ECJ has somewhat expanded the narrow limits of Article 7 of the European Economic Community 
Treaty, by allowing delegation of certain executive functions to the derivatives not listed in the Treaty, 
and setting strict conditions when such a structure can be established. ECJ. Meroni vs. High Authority 
of the European Coal and Steel Community. Case No. C-10/56, ECR 157. [1958].
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serve as a precedent for establishing new institutions (agencies) of the EU through second-
ary EU law. This case still restricts the discretion and powers held by a particular agency, 
especially those described by the delegating authority (EC), and when delegating powers 
falling outside the scope of Commission’s own competence. This may cause a conflict of 
interest in the primary legislation of the Member States, e.g. in the Constitution.
Despite the SRM’s entry into force, the suitability of Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis 
for the establishment of the SRM and SRF may still be debated. It is very likely that the va-
lidity of this legal basis will subsequently be addressed in court. This statement is primarily 
based on the fact that the Board (the agency) has a very broad mandate to prepare bank 
resolution plans and schemes and to require their implementation. It is very important 
that the SRM decisions for bank resolution, their adoption and voting mechanisms ensure 
the effective and timely decision-making, especially at the time of a financial crisis. Finally, 
the Regulation must ensure that any bank resolution decision is taken by the Board, the 
Commission, and/or the EU Council as soon as the situation so requires. The SRM re-
quires uniform application of the rules on bank resolution, it is therefore uncertain wheth-
er the same result cannot be accordingly achieved using other harmonisation methods. At 
the same time, in order to avoid legal risks in the future, amendments to the EU treaties 
may even be required. The amendment of the EU Treaties1170 is a complex and lengthy 
process, therefore, if implemented, this method would require national referendums to be 
held in certain countries, as the issue touches the transfer of significant competences from 
the national to the EU
3.4.3. US Resolution Decision-Making Mechanism
Unlike the Federal Bankruptcy Code, according to which decision-making procedures 
and supervision are court-based, bank resolution regime of the United States is character-
ised by administrative decision-making procedures. The law delegates broad administra-
tive powers to FDIC in order to address the problems faced by failing banks, including the 
decision-making procedure1171. When a bank meets the statutory bank insolvency trig-
gers, before making a decision on bank resolution, the FDIC staff first makes a written 
recommendation to the FDIC Board of Directors1172, asking for the approval of the bank 
resolution tool and of the relevant transaction. The recommendation contains, inter alia, 
the copy of the ‘least cost’ analysis and the information regarding the potential losses and 
their allocation, which would be born by bank customers through uninsured deposits held 
in the bank. The Recommendation also talks about the need to make advance payments to 
bank customers holding uninsured deposits, i.e., whether they may recover a part of credi-
tor’s claim as long as the FDIC bank is engaged in the resolution process and the transfer 
of the remaining assets of the bank. Finally, the FDIC Board of Directors is responsible 
for the choice of the bank resolution measures in line with the “least cost” principle and 
the execution of the transaction. The Board of Directors may delegate the selection of 
the best purchaser to the corresponding FDIC Section Director. After the FDIC Board 
1170 The Treaty of Lisbon was created before the financial and economic crisis.
1171 FDIA. Sec. 11. 
1172 Ibid. Sec. 10, (a).
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adopts the resolution transaction, the FDIC staff shall notify the purchaser, all the other 
unsuccessful purchasers and licensing authority1173. Before closing the bank, the FDIC 
shall hold a meeting with the customer, and executes all the legal documentation in order 
to implement the transaction1174. Furthermore, the FDIC continues to co-ordinate bank 
closing procedures with the purchaser. The last step is the closing of the bank. After that, 
when the bank is closed, the bank’s assets acquired by the purchaser and the transferred 
deposits are passed on the purchaser. The licensing authority closes the bank and appoints 
the FDIC to act as a bank receiver. Then, the FDIC becomes responsible for the current 
affairs of the bank, including swift balancing of accounts, transfer of specific assets and 
liabilities, identification of payment amounts specific for the customer (assumed bank li-
abilities, if less assets are purchased, and the setting of contributions). When acting as a 
receiver, the FDIC is legally and functionally separated from the FDIC as a deposit insur-
ance authority. The FDIC, as a receiver, has different rights and duties, compared with the 
FDIC acting as a DIA. The courts have long recognised this dual functionality and indi-
vidual capacities1175. The formal resolution procedure starts when the bank licensing body 
sends a ‘failing bank letter’ advising the FDIC to open insolvency proceedings. Once the 
FDIC receives the letter, its team contacts the bank and discusses the logistical and senior 
bank management roles in the resolution, and requests to supply loan and deposit data. 
After the FDIC receives the primary data, a team of 5–10 professionals goes to the bank 
to analyse the additional information related to its activities. Alongside, the information 
package is prepared, giving potential purchasers the opportunity to evaluate all the assets 
of the bank, by determining the amount of uninsured deposits, the resolution structure 
and plans, the date of bank closure and the date of opening insolvency proceedings1176.
According to Dodd-Frank Act, rather sophisticated bureaucratic procedures were de-
veloped, under which the bank insolvency process is administered and in particular the 
decision-making procedures for the resolution of large, complex and non-bank financial 
institutions1177. An exceptional public authority OLA deals with banks whose insolvency 
and resolution under the ordinary bankruptcy procedure (the Bankruptcy Code – aut.
1173 National banks – Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, federal saving banks – Office of Thrift 
Supervision.
1174 On the technical details of the resolution measures see more FDIC. Supra note 852. P. 8-14. Once the 
FDIC receives information that a bank fails, it not only prepares the restructuring plan for the pro-
cedure but also has a number of different tasks: to prepare a failing bank newsletter to stakeholders, 
to prepare the information package, to perform valuation of assets, to determine the best conversion 
tool and structure, to carry out individual analyses and checks in order to prepare for bank closure.
1175 FDIC. Resolution Handbook. Chapter 5. Receivership Process – Post-closing Activities. 2014. P. 25-26.
1176 FDIC. Overview of the Resolution Process. Chapter 2. P. 57.
1177 In the US, a new regulatory reform and the legislative review took place after the collapse and bank-
ruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. The main problems arose from the fact that the 
bank could not be taken over by the competent authority (FDIC) as other banks, as according to its 
status it was an investment company, and investment companies fell outside the scope of convention-
al bank insolvency procedures. Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act created a new public body - Orderly 
Liquidation Authority – the mandate of which apply not only to banks but also to other financial 
institutions, including investment firms whose insolvency in terms of the US Treasury Secretariat 
would cause serious adverse consequences for the financial stability of the US. This procedure gave 
unprecedented rights and discretion to the administrative authorities, leaving the scope of bank-
ruptcy laws far behind. Dodd Frank Act, Title II.
262
note.) can cause systemic risks and severe problems1178. OLA is designed in a way that 
as soon as certain bank meets the default threshold or imminent default conditions, 
the FDCI is promptly appointed and starts to act as a receiver1179. In order to determine 
whether the financial difficulties faced by the bank can cause systemic risk, the FDIC 
and the Federal Reserve Board shall (on their own initiative or at the request of the State 
Treasury Secretariat – aut.note.) appoint the FDIC, which should act as a receiver of the 
eligible financial institution 1180. First of all, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC adopt joint 
guidelines for the Secretariat of the Treasury, which are based on certain assumptions of 
facts, including the reasons why the bank should not be subject to bankruptcy proceedings 
under the Bankruptcy Code. Then Treasury Secretariat adopts conclusions within 7 days 
by determining whether the bank has serious financial default risks (due to lack of capital 
or inability to meet the obligations that have fallen due). It should be concluded that if the 
above-mentioned financial difficulties are to be dealt with according to the Bankruptcy 
Code, it would lead to severe negative consequences to the US financial stability1181. Such 
decision of the Treasury Secretariat requires the support of 2/3 of the Federal Reserve 
and the FDIC votes1182. The Treasury Secretariat has no right to object and must adopt 
a petition to appoint the FDIC in a federal court as a receiver, despite the agreement or 
disagreement of the Bank Board1183. The law requires to decide within 24 hours. If no ma-
jority is reached and consent is not given, the Treasury Secretariat must apply to the US 
Columbia State Court with a request to appoint the FDIC as a receiver1184. Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act restricts the scope of judicial review as to whether the determination by 
the Secretariat was ‘justified’ and ‘lawful’ considering the appointment of the FDIC as a 
receiver. If the court fails to respond within 24 hours, the FDIC automatically becomes the 
administrator1185. The appeal is limited to the extent referred above1186. An appeal to both 
the financial institution and the Secretariat may be filed within 30 days, and the complaint 
is examined as a matter of urgency1187. However, an appeal shall not interrupt the resolu-
tion procedure1188. Therefore, a practical opportunity to review the appointment of the 
receiver is very limited. When the FDIC is appointed as a receiver it has the authority to 
liquidate the financial institution falling within the scope of the Act, to transfer the assets 
to a bridge bank and etc.1189
1178 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 201(a)(11). Codified 12U.S.C. §5381 (a) (8), 5383 (b).
1179 Dodd Frank. Sec. 202(a)(1)(A)(i).
1180 Dodd Frank. Sec. 203(a)(1(A). 
1181 Dodd Frank. Sec. 203 (b). 
1182 12 U.S.C.A. § 5383 (a) (1) (A).
1183 12 U.S.C.A. §5382 (a) (1) (A) (i).
1184 Ibid.
1185 12 U.S.C.A. §5382 (a) (1) (A) (iv) - (v). The action of the state court is limited to the extent that in set-
ting or if the FDIC finds that the financial institution is failing or likely to fail and meets the definition 
of a financial institution, and whether the decision was justified and lawful.
1186 12 U.S.C.A. §5382 (a) (2). 
1187 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 202(a)(2)(A).
1188 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 202(a)(1)(B).
1189 12 U.S.C.A. §5390 (h) (1) (B).
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One of the problematic aspects of such decision-making is linked to the conduct of 
the court hearing dealing with the question whether to open a bank resolution procedure. 
First, the closed and secret court hearing is held in which the Secretariat presents all the 
relevant documents supporting the Authority’s recommendation and its conclusions. Sec-
ondly, the bank may make defensive arguments and evidence relating to the assessment 
of the property portfolio and capital level or possibility to access the sources of liquidity. 
Third, the judge shall consider and assess all the contradictory facts and evidence. Fourth, 
the court shall adopt a ruling designating the receiver, or issue a written opinion, consider-
ing any reason that would justify a refusal to accept the petition. If the federal court fails 
to achieve these tasks within 24 hours, a resolution is guaranteed by law1190. An important 
aspect is that, in spite of the obvious limitation of effective supply of rebutting evidence 
and arguments on the part of the bank, the findings and conclusions are based on court 
judgment adopted within a shortened period of time1191.
Another problematic aspect relates to the fact that, if the Treasury Secretariat decides 
to take a resolution action, it must first obtain the consent of the FDIC Board of Direc-
tors. The question then arises whether the government has exceeded its authority, if such 
consent is not obtained, which often is the case. It is very likely that the board members 
of the bank will try to deal with the Secretariat, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC simul-
taneously by all legal means, and challenge the resolution decision. For example, they can 
exercise the advantage conferred by the Dodd-Frank provisions of Section 207, which 
protect them from liability, without giving permission to start the resolution procedures 
in good faith or to appoint the receiver. If the Secretariat fails to obtain the consent, it shall 
be entitled to petition the US state court (Columbia District court) to appoint the FDIC as 
the administrator of the insolvent bank1192. According to the existing US legal framework, 
the bank may address to court only with regard to this restrictive issue. However, even 
when submitting the petition to District court, its subject-determination is limited to the 
scope of whether a covered financial company satisfies the definition of financial company 
or is in default or in danger of default and is arbitrary and capricious under the Dodd- 
Frank provisions 201 (a) (11)1193 The next stage is the appointment of the FDIC. When 
the FDIC starts acting as a receiver, any procedural issues arising from the bankruptcy 
court or against the SPIC (Securities Investor Protection Corporation) are rejected1194. The 
FDIC may exercise its powers by acting as an administrator for a period of up to 5 years 
(administration may be extended for no longer than 2 years, if this is further necessary to 
ensure adequate representation in courts and litigation)1195. The limits of operation of the 
FDIC vary depending on the type of financial institution. For example, in case of insol-
vency of financial intermediaries and securities dealers, the FDIC must appoint SPIC to 
act as a trustee. If the assets held by any of those entities is not transferred by the FDIC to 
the bridge bank, the bank continues to be administered by the SPIC in accordance with 
1190 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (A) (v). 
1191 Ibid. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (B), 202 (a) (1) (3).
1192 Ibid. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (A) (i).
1193 Ibid. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (A) (iii).
1194 Ibid. Sec. 208.
1195 Ibid. Sec. 202 (d) (4).
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the normal rules applied to the liquidation of financial intermediaries and securities deal-
ers1196.
Another problematic aspect that will be analysed in the section below in more detail– 
relates to expropriation. Like any other government act regarding the seizure of property, 
it allows the affected individuals to challenge such decisions in court. First of all, it is noted 
that the Dodd-Frank legislation repeatedly holds that limitation on judicial review is as 
follows “no court shall have jurisdiction over any claim or action for payment from , or any 
action seeking a determination of rights with respect to , the assets of any covered financial 
company for which FDIC has been appointed receiver”, including assets which the Corpora-
tion may acquire from itself as such receiver”1197 The Act allows complaining against deci-
sions relating to the beginning of the receivers’ appointment, after crossing the statutory 
threshold of insolvency, but not against decisions concerning the details of the insolvency 
process. Therefore, in principle, while the FDIC acts as a receiver, the court only examines 
disputes concerning the amount of creditors’ claims and ensures adequate protection of 
depositors’ rights. 
3.4.4. FINMA and Swiss Resolution Decision-Making Mechanism
The Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority on the Insolvency 
of Banks and Securities Dealers provides that the FINMA shall start bank resolution pro-
cedure by adopting an individual ruling. The law does not provide for the possibility to 
open the restructuring procedure automatically1198. As a next step, FINMA must imme-
diately give a public notice with regard to the opening of bank restructuring procedures, 
by specifying whether the existing protective measures are to be maintained1199. When 
FINMA opens the restructuring procedures, it may also approve the restructuring plan 
which is the cornerstone element of the entire restructuring procedure. In addition, FIN-
MA must clarify in the decree regarding the bank restructuring commencement whether 
the application of prompt corrective actions and measures under Article 26 of the Banking 
law must be maintained or replaced with new ones.1200 FINMA shall also issue a ruling on 
the appointment of the restructuring agent, unless it decides to act as a restructuring agent 
itself1201. When FINMA appoints a restructuring agent, it must ensure that the latter has 
sufficient time and knowledge to carry out the mandate in a diligent, efficient, and effective 
manner and that the agent is not related to any conflict of interests that may compromise 
its ability to perform the mandate. In its ruling, FINMA shall determine the restructuring 
agent’s powers and whether the latter is authorised to act in place of the bank’s managing 
1196 Dodd-Frank Act. Sec. 205 (a), (b). In addition, SPIC must apply to the state court for protective 
measures, and the court is obliged to adopt a resolution automatically. 205 (a) (2) (A), 205 (c) To the 
extent that the parties involved do not agree to transfer assets to a bridge bank, they may bring an 
action for damages in a state court. 205 (e).
1197 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 210 (e), 210 (a) (9) (D). 
1198 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 40 (1).
1199 Ibid. Art. 41 (2).
1200 Ibid. Art. 41 (3).
1201 Swiss Ordinance. Art. 42 (1). 
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bodies1202. No consent of the bank board is required to approve the restructuring plan 1203. 
The plan could be appealed against in 2 years from the date of its adoption1204. In addition, 
FINMA must specify the details of the administrator’s tasks, in particular the restruc-
turing costs, covering administrative, accounting (reporting) and control costs1205. The 
restructuring plan provides details of the restructuring plan, by setting out the basic ele-
ments of the restructuring, the bank’s future capital structure and business model after the 
restructuring, and explaining how it fulfills the conditions for approval. After the approval 
of the restructuring plan, FINMA shall publish the basic features of the restructuring plan, 
stating how the affected creditors and owners can inspect and review the plan1206. Strategic 
decisions, including the bank restructuring procedures, are taken by the FINMA Board 
of Directors (bank restructuring is treated as entailing public interest features, moreover, 
it can lead to significant consequences for financial markets if one of the supervised fi-
nancial institutions is of systemic importance1207) in accordance with the internal rules of 
FINMA1208. Decisions are taken by a simple majority of votes present1209. The Executive 
Board performs the role of the subsidiary managing1210. It is a collective managing body 
carrying out the functions falling outside the scope of the competences entrusted to the 
Board of Directors and assisting in preparing and implementing decisions.
In summary, it must be stated that both the BRRD, the FDIA, the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
Swiss banking law or secondary act governing bank insolvency1211 and other relevant acts 
do not include bank insolvency or resolution mechanisms, which are legally similar to the 
ordinary insolvency procedures and general corporate restructuring mechanisms. Instead, 
bank resolution regime prefers all viable solutions while applying the specific resolution 
tools and powers. For instance, as far as the EU is concerned, such decisions are imple-
mented by the resolution authorities of individual EU Member States, in cooperation with 
the supervisory authorities and in consultation with other competent authorities, such as 
the ministries of finance1212. The decision-making model of the bank resolution system 
1202 Ibid. Art. 42 (3).
1203 Swiss Banking law. Art. 31 (2). 
1204 Ibid.. Art. 32 (3) (b), (d). 
1205 Ibid.
1206 Ibid. Art 45 (2). 
1207 Regulations on the organisation of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA.18 
December 2008 (Status as of 1 March 2015). Art 2 (3). 
1208 Ibid. Section 2. 
1209 Ibid. Section 8. 
1210 Ibid. Section 3. 
1211 In addition, it should be noted that FINMA decision-making is an administrative procedure. Federal 
Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority of 22 June 2007 (Status as of 1 January 
2015). Art. 53.
1212 BRRD. Art. 3. The resolution authority shall be a public administrative authority or authorities en-
trusted with public administrative powers. The staff performing the functions of a resolution author-
ity shall be structurally separated from the staff performing maintenance tasks (in accordance with 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU), or from other staff performing the tasks 
of the relevant authorities, it is also subject to other reporting guidelines. Institutions performing 
maintenance and restructuring and persons performing those functions on behalf of such authori-
ties shall closely cooperate in developing, planning and applying resolution solutions both in the 
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is based on an administrative rather than judicial decision-making concept and process. 
Judicial decision-making procedure is established in ordinary insolvency procedures. For 
example, in the EU, the reason for administrative decision-making procedure and the rel-
evant legal regulation is given in one of the recitals of the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive – ‘to ensure the required speed of action, to guarantee independence from eco-
nomic actors and to avoid conflicts of interest’1213. It is assumed that the regulatory model 
of administrative decision-making for bank resolution purposes is more effective, taking 
into account the following key considerations:
1. In administrative procedures, decisions are taken by a group of people. General 
insolvency law requires voting on the proposed legal measures and qualified 
majority (of creditor votes) for certain decisions. This voting method is time-
consuming, and time factor is crucial in bank resolution1214. The delays are di-
rectly related to the depreciation of assets. On the contrary, the decisions taken 
by a single person authorised by an administrative authority or generally by an 
administrative authority, in accordance with the strict internal decision-making 
procedures, duties and responsibilities, may be adopted in a few hours, which is 
why this model seems more suitable in the context of bank resolution regime.
2. Decision-making in specific public institutions excluding court involvement, 
when decisions are adopted by individual judges, should be viewed as a better 
choice, since such decisions are more accurate and require specific expertise 
knowledge. Bank resolution procedures are very complex, addressing socially 
sensitive issues and difficult legal issues, which often happens in the face of the 
banking crisis, highlighting further need for swift decision-making. It is assumed 
that a specific public authority has more knowledge, resources and operational 
skills in a very specific, most complex and dynamic area of financial industry. 
However, it should be noted that the courts are sometimes also able to effectively 
manage bank insolvency cases that involve significant legal and financial conse-
quences and the impact on international policy or the economy. However, the 
analysis of the lessons learnt from the recent banking crisis in the field of bank 
insolvency law clearly shows that such cases were exceptional. The key reason 
to follow the administrative resolution decision-making model is the increasing 
need for cooperation with other state bodies (supervisory authorities, ministries, 
heads of state, government authorities of other Member States) during bank reso-
lution.
case where resolution authority and the competent authority are separate entities, both in the case 
when the functions are performed by the same entity. Member States shall ensure that any resolution 
authority has special knowledge, resources, and practical capacity to apply the restructuring actions 
and to exercise its powers rapidly and flexibly, to the extent necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
restructuring. In addition, there is still the EBA, which cooperates with the competent authorities 
and resolution authorities, develops the necessary expertise, resources, and know-how capabilities.
1213 SRM. Recital (15).
1214 Empirical research shows that the link between the cost, complexity, and time required to perform 
resolution procedures is very clear. Scmieder C., Schmieder S.P.A. Impact of Legislation on Credit 
Risk-Comparative Evidence from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. IMF Work-
ing Paper. WP/11/55, 2011.
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3.5. Right of Judicial Review of Administrative Resolution Decisions and 
Restrictions
3.5.1. Right of Judicial Review and Restrictions in the EU 
Article 47 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines the right to due pro-
cess of law and the rights of defence against the sanctions applied to any person. It follows 
that judicial review of bank resolution decisions taken by resolution authorities and the 
right of appeal is mandatory. In order to protect third parties that have purchased the as-
sets, rights and liabilities of the bank under resolution and when public authorities apply 
resolution tools, also in order to ensure the stability of financial markets, the right of ap-
peal should not affect administrative decisions and/or transactions entered on the basis of 
the annulled decision. In this case, the remedies with regard to the unfair decision are lim-
ited to a compensation for the damage suffered by affected persons. The question arises as 
to the legal consistency of this presumption and whether the balance of competing inter-
ests is secured. It is equally important that the suspension of the decision taken by resolu-
tion authorities may interfere further implementation of the key banking functions, so the 
question is whether the law provides for the impossibility to suspend the enforcement of 
resolution decisions in the result of an appeal or in regard to a temporary court decision.
The EU legal framework provides for ex ante court approval of decisions regarding 
preventive measures against the banking crisis or banking crisis management measures 
(including bank resolution tools), on a condition that the application for approval with 
regard to the decision shall also be submitted to court in accordance with national law, 
which shall consider it as a matter of urgency1215. Given the fact that the crisis manage-
ment measures need to be applied expeditiously, the court should decide within 24 hours, 
and the EU Member States are therefore under the obligation to ensure that the relevant 
authority may adopt a decision as soon as the court approval is obtained. This is without 
prejudice to the potential right of the interested parties to request the court to postpone 
the decision for a limited period of time after the resolution authority has introduced a 
crisis management tool1216. National law of the EU Member States provides for the right 
to appeal against that decision to apply the crisis management measure or the decision to 
exercise any of the powers falling outside the scope of the crisis management measures. 
Member States shall ensure that the review is expeditious and that national courts use the 
complex economic assessments of the facts carried out by the resolution authority as a 
basis for their own assessment. 
The following criteria should be applied with regard to judicial review: (a) the complaint 
lodged against the decision shall not entail any automatic suspension of the effects of the 
decision under appeal; (b) the authority’s decision on bank resolution is immediately en-
forceable and is subject to a non-rebuttable presumption that the suspension of enforce-
ment would be against the public interest. When it is necessary to protect the interests 
of third parties who have acquired shares in good faith, other instruments of ownership, 
assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution by virtue of the use of resolu-
tion tools or exercise of resolution powers by a resolution authority, the annulment of a 
1215 BRRD. Art. 85. 
1216 Ibid. Recital (92).
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decision adopted by a resolution authority shall not affect any subsequent administrative 
acts or transactions concluded by the respective resolution authority and based on the an-
nulled decision. In this case, the remedies for a wrongful decision or action adopted by a 
resolution authority is limited to a compensation for the loss suffered by the applicant in 
the result of that decision or action1217.
Another important requirement is an obligation to ensure, if necessary for the effective 
application of the resolution tools and powers, that when the bank is under resolution, res-
olution authorities may request the court to apply a stay for an appropriate period of time 
in accordance with the resolution objective pursued, on any judicial action or proceeding 
in which the bank under resolution is or becomes a party1218. In addition, no ordinary 
bankruptcy proceedings shall be opened, except for the case where the decision opening 
bankruptcy proceedings is taken only with the consent of the resolution authority. The 
petition for bankruptcy may not be considered in court if the resolution authority fails to 
notify the authorities responsible for normal bankruptcy proceedings, that it intends to 
undertake resolution actions with regard to the bank in difficulty and a period of 7 days 
has not passed from the date of notification1219. In any case, the implementation of rights 
to security measures shall not be affected. 
Thus, in the EU legal framework, a remedy against a wrong decision can only be limit-
ed to a compensation for the damage suffered by the affected persons. In addition opening 
of other legal actions are prevented with regard to the bank under resolution. Therefore, 
the existing regulatory framework provides that before opening any bankruptcy proceed-
ings against any credit institution of the EU Member State, a national judge has a duty to 
notify to the resolution authority of such requests. 
It is important to note that, before bank resolution actions are taken, an impartial, cau-
tious and realistic valuation of bank assets and liabilities should be carried out1220. Asset 
valuation for bank resolution purposes is an integral part of the decision to apply resolu-
tion tools, to exercise resolution powers or to apply capital write-down or conversion pow-
ers1221. The asset valuation itself shall not be subject to appeal, but can be appealed against 
together with the resolution decisions.
It also provides for the right of shareholders, creditors and third parties to appeal 
against the transfer of shares or other equity instruments, assets, rights and liabilities, as 
well as the creditors’ right to appeal against bank bail-in tool and write-off or conversion 
of liabilities1222. Moreover, after applying the resolution tool, the bank shareholders and 
1217 Ibid. Art. 85. 
1218 Ibid. Art. 86 (3). 
1219 Ibid. Art. 86 (2). 
1220 SRM. Recital (63). Before any resolution action is taken, a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the 
assets and liabilities of the entity should be carried out. Such valuations should be subject to fair, 
prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the entity should be carried out. The 
value of liabilities should not, however, be affected in the valuation of the entity’s financial situation. 
It should be possible, for reasons of urgency, for the Board to make rapid valuation of the assets or 
the liabilities of a failing entity. That valuation should be provisional and should apply until an inde-
pendent valuation is carried out.
1221 BRRD. Art. 36 (13). 
1222 BRRD. Art. 66 (6), (a), (b). 
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creditors shall be supplied with an ex post comparison of the terms applied and the terms 
that they would have been subjected to under normal insolvency proceedings. If it is de-
termined that shareholders and creditors have obtained a lower amount, compared to the 
one they would have obtained after the opening of normal insolvency proceedings, they 
should be entitled to compensation. The difference, if any, should be paid from the Single 
Resolution Fund.
Another important moment for the right to lodge a complaint relates to the centralised 
resolution decision-making mechanism in the EU according to the SRM regulation. The 
SRB sets up the Appeal Commission, which adopts decision on appeals and acts as the first 
instance for centralised administrative resolution decisions. The Appeal Commission con-
sists of five persons of good repute from the EU Member States, with relevant knowledge 
and professional experience supported by documentary evidence (including experience in 
the field of bank resolution) acquired in the fields of banking or other financial services, 
excluding current board staff of the SRB and employees of resolution authorities or other 
national or EU banking institutions, bodies and agencies participating in the Board’s af-
fairs1223. Any natural or legal person, including resolution authorities, may appeal against a 
resolution decision of the Board adopted with regard to that person, or against a decision 
that is directly and individually concerned with that person1224. In addition, the resolution 
decisions adopted by the Board could be complained to the European Ombudsman or 
proceedings could be initiated before the Court of Justice. Prior to that, it is obligatory to 
lodge a complaint with the above-mentioned Appeal Commission1225. 
3.5.2. Right of Judicial Review and Restrictions in the US
In the US legal framework, expropriation of bank property (ownership), like any other 
property seizure performed by the government, allows persons affected by such decisions 
to initiate judicial review. However, in the bank resolution procedures the role of the ju-
diciary is limited.
First, no court can take action that may affect the resolution or order taken by the 
FDIC Board of Directors or otherwise affect the exercise of the rights or functions held by 
the FDIC acting as a receiver or a conservator1226. It should be noted that the Dodd-Frank 
legislation reiterates that “no court may take such restrictive practices or does not otherwise 
affect the receiver’s powers and functions and the implementation of any legal protection 
against the FDIC, as an administrator, and should be limited only by the scope of damages 
in accordance with this article1227”. Such legal regulation allows appealing only against de-
cisions relating to the start of appointment of a receiver, when the threshold of statutory 
regulation for insolvency conditions is overstepped. However, no appeal is possible against 
decisions regarding the details of insolvency administration process, including the choice 
of bank resolution tools. In principle, at the time of operation of the receiver, the court 
1223 SRM. Art. 85 (2).
1224 Ibid. Art. 85 (3). 
1225 Ibid. Art. 90 (3). TFEU Art. 228, 263.
1226 FDIC Sec. 11 (j). Codified 12 U.S.C. 1821(j).
1227 FDIC Sec. 11 (j). Codified 12 U.S.C. 1821(j).
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may only review disputes arising out of the size of the creditors’ claims, seeking to ensure 
adequate protection of the rights held by secured depositors.
Some US researchers argue that OLA lacks a comprehensive mechanism for judicial 
review and securing the rights of defence (for example, by requiring the court to approve 
or reject the FDIC receiver’s candidacy within 24 hours, after the request of the Secretari-
at). For example, Skeels argues that if the public authority decides to take over the financial 
institution or put it under resolution, the administrative decision adopted by the FDCI, 
the State Treasury and the Federal Reserve by using their significant discretion makes it 
almost impossible to raise objections against the financial institution, filing a complaint 
against an administrative decision, on the grounds that no time and legal basis for objec-
tions is provided, thereby violating the fundamental rights of defence.1228 A similar posi-
tion is shared by other researchers, such as Scott1229. It is noted that when the Secretariat 
decides to take a resolution action, it must first obtain the consent of the bank’s board of 
directors. The question is whether, if no such consent is obtained (which is almost a com-
mon practice), the government exceeds its powers. It is very likely that at the same time, 
the bank’s board members will try to fight with the Secretariat, the Federal Reserve and 
the FDIC by all legal means and to challenge their actions. For example, it is very likely 
that they will benefit from preferential Dodd-Frank provision provided in section 207, 
which protects the bank’s board from liability against the receiver in the cases when the 
permit for bank resolution is not granted on a voluntary basis and in good faith. If the 
Secretariat fails to obtain the consent of the bank’s board, it shall be entitled to petition to 
the US state court (Columbia District), in order to obtain a resolution decree in order to 
appoint the FDIC as a receiver of the bank1230. According to the US law, the bank may only 
appeal against this narrow procedural bank resolution moment. However, the complaint is 
limited in the scope of “the determination by Secretariat that the financial institution falling 
within the scope of the Act is in default or in danger of default and it satisfies the definition 
of financial institution under 201 (a) (11) is lawful and justified”1231 The court must decide 
within 24 hours1232 The petition shall be granted by operation of law, which means that if 
the court fails to make an order, the petition is automatically granted.
The next stage concerns the appointment of the FDIC. When the FDIC starts acting as 
a receiver, any procedural disputes arising in the bankruptcy proceedings or before the Se-
curities Investor Protection Corporation (SPIC)1233 shall be rejected. In addition, the FDIC 
may exercise its powers and capacities as a receiver up to 5 years (administration may be 
further extended, if necessary to ensure proper representation in courts and litigation) 1234. 
FDIC operational scale varies depending on the type of financial institution. For example, 
1228 Skeel D.A. The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its (Unintended) Con-
sequences. The New Financial Deal. U of Penn, Inst for Law & Economic Research Paper No. 10-21, 
2011. P. 152.
1229 Scott K.E. Dodd-Frank: Resolution or Expropriation? (in) Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: 
Orderly Liquidation Authority and A New Chapter 14. 2011. P. 199-203.
1230 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (A) (i).
1231 Ibid. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (A) (iii).
1232 Ibid. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (A) (v).
1233 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 208.
1234 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 208.
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in case of financial intermediaries and securities dealers insolvency, the FDIC shall ap-
point SPIC as a trustee. If any assets of such entities are not transferred by FDIC to a bridge 
bank, it should be further administered by the SPIC in accordance with the ordinary rules 
applicable to liquidation of financial intermediaries-securities dealers1235.
Judicial review of administrative actions is the central safeguard both against pos-
sible errors, as well as abuse of powers. It should be noted that the state court ruling can 
be appealed against, but the appeal cannot be delayed, subject to shortened procedural 
time-limits, and it must be examined within 30 days, thus in any case the court of appeal 
shall urgently examine the appeal1236. Among other things, the court’s judgment cannot 
be delayed or otherwise procedurally suspended because of pending appeals1237. At this 
point, the question of constitutionality arises with regard to the Fifth Amendment to 
the US Constitution, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property other than that provided by law.” The rule of law and that constitutional provi-
sion forms a key part of the U.S. legal framework. The statutory provisions enshrine the 
rights of defence and the right of due process. However, in different legal contexts, the 
right to an effective legal remedy (rights of defence and right to a fair hearing) is un-
derstood differently. Therefore, different interpretations of the principle of effective legal 
remedy in different legal contexts also creates a problem long dealt with by common law 
courts in England and the US before reaching a reasonable degree of clarity1238. Typically, 
administrative law measures and actions in taking over ownership must be undertaken 
by notifying the persons concerned and by ensuring the rights of the defence before a 
national court1239. If the court finds that the property was expropriated by reason of the 
actions which, taken as a whole, can be described as emergency circumstances (similar 
to the position adopted by the US Supreme Court in the case for appointment of the su-
pervisory authority as a receiver or conservator of the bank1240), in this case it is assumed 
that the rights of the persons concerned are guaranteed and the expropriation is justified. 
At a later stage, after the receiver or conservator is appointed and takes over the control of 
the bank, the latter may apply to the federal court disputing the legality of the expropria-
tion. Also, the parties can apply the federal court with regard to the legality of expropria-
tion and request an open hearing within the framework established by law. Thus, it can 
be debated whether the above-mentioned amendment to the US Constitution prohibits 
the government from expropriating private property in the name of public interest and 
without proper compensation. At this point, it should be noted that the FDIC, acting as 
a bank receiver, takes over private property for public interest objectives. In addition, the 
law confers very broad powers to the FDIA: “all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of 
1235 Also SPIC must apply to the state court for protective measures, and the court is obliged to adopt a 
resolution automatically. To the extent that the parties involved do not agree to transfer assets to a 
bridge bank, they may bring a claim for damages in state court. Ibid. 205 (a), (b), 205 (a) (2) (A), 205 
(c), 205 (e).
1236 Ibid. 202 (a) (1) (B), 202 (a) (2).
1237 Ibid. 202 (a) (1) (B).
1238 Scott K.E.P. Supra note 1229. P.199.
1239 Ibid.
1240 Fashey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-5 [1947].
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the covered financial company and its assets, and of any stockholder, member, officer, or 
director of such company”.1241
The Dodd-Frank legislation expressly provides for the right to compensation to the 
affected parties. Any person has the right to bring a lawsuit against the FDIC, acting as a 
receiver, and obtain a compensation guaranteed by the amount that a particular person 
would have received if the FDIC had not been appointed to act as a receiver, and the bank 
had been liquidated under state or federal law1242. It is assumed that such a compensation 
scheme is valid only in the theoretical sense. In practice, the amount of compensation 
would be extremely low or equal to zero. This position is based on the fact that if bank 
insolvency endangers the overall state of the economy, it is hard to imagine the compen-
sation that would be paid to creditors in a situation where the whole economy is collaps-
ing and the government has not taken any steps to prevent this. In this case, the amount 
of compensation and the remedies of the parties concerned would be negligent. Among 
other things, the Dodd-Frank provides that “no court may take such action which may 
restrict or affect the receiver’s powers and the implementation of functions”. The U.S. legal 
framework recognizes the right of affected parties to claim for monetary damages un-
der the Tucker Act1243. Under the existing practice, it is sufficient to avoid complications 
caused by property takeover1244.
The right to due process is even more problematic. Due process means a civil process in 
which a financial institution is given an early warning of expropriation and the possibility 
of hearing a dispute before a judiciary authority1245. In general, the notice and the right to 
be heard are part of the right to due process1246. In legal terms, difficulties arise from the 
right to be heard at the hearing, and the possible interpretation of the related legal rules. 
State courts are not allowed to review the Secretariat’s decision on the merits. Instead of 
that, the court is bound to focus on the analysis of two narrow issues: (i) whether a finan-
cial institution is in default or in danger of default (ii) whether a financial institution falls 
within the definition of financial institutions. Furthermore, the state courts must apply 
the principles of legality and reasonableness in conjunction with the principle of judicial 
review. On the one hand, the standard of legality and reasonableness itself is not problem-
atic. It has been a while that US Supreme Court is of the opinion that such judicial review 
of administrative decisions meets the rule of law and the ensuing issues1247. This standard 
is normally used in administrative law and considered suitable by the courts for assessing 
the decision appointing the receiver under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act1248. On the other hand, a potential problem arises with regard to 
the restrictions on civil procedure, i.e., the scope of review. The Court has no authority 
to review other critical, crucial, bank resolution-related conclusions adopted by the Sec-
1241 Fashey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-5 [1947].
1242 Ibid. Sec. 210 (d) (2).
1243 Ibid. Sec. 210 (e).
1244 Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102 [1974].
1245 Dodd-Frank. 202 (a) (1) (A) (iii).
1246 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank&Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 [1950].
1247 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 [1944].
1248 Franklin Sav. Ass v. Directors, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127 [1991].
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retariat prior to the appointment of the receiver. These conclusions assess the impact of 
bank insolvency on the US as a whole, whether no “adverse consequences for the financial 
stability and viable and appropriate private sector alternatives” arise1249. Most probably, 
such limits defined in positive law are based on the idea that determination of existence 
of a possibility of judicial review, even if the findings are legitimate and reasonable, and 
the related regulations prevent the court from taking action. However, the line of case-
law on potential constitutional problems remains unclear1250. Another potential problem 
relates to the authorisation of procedures within 24 hours, while ensuring full secrecy of 
such procedures1251. It is assumed that the court is unable to reflect on and to understand 
such complex and difficult legal issues in such a short period of time. Such time limits 
apparently reduce the right to be heard before executing the expropriation, which can 
cause potential problems in the field of possible violations of the right of due process1252. 
In other words, the owners of financial institutions may seek judicial review of the deci-
sion, but be unable to suspend the enforcement of decisions, while consideration of the 
appeal is pending. Therefore, it is likely that the dispute will be considered at a time when 
the appeal has already been decided. The third problem is related to professional secrecy. 
Once the petition is registered in court, the state court obliged to act without publicly 
revealing any information related to the process. In addition, any other third party is not 
allowed to disclose information about the ongoing judicial process. A person who has 
negligently disclosed such information shall be punishable under criminal law, and is a 
subject to criminal sanctions, including a 5-year imprisonment sentence1253. Such protec-
tion of professional secrecy may be constitutionally questionable not only because of the 
enforcement of the right to due process, but also with regard to the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution. In some of its cases, the US Supreme Court has held that secret criminal 
proceedings are incompatible with the press rights provided in the Fifth Amendment1254. 
At the same time, so far the Supreme Court has not addressed the right to public access in 
civil proceedings, but occasional cases have occurred in the lower courts, and the ensuing 
1249 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 203 (b).
1250 The doctrine is very complex on this aspect. The case-law offers to give broad powers to the Congress 
by limiting judicial review of decisions Faloon H. Etc. Hart& Wechsler’s the Federal Courts and the 
Federal System, Sixth edition, 2009. Chapter 4. 
1251 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 202 (a). The state court judge during this certain period of time from the time of 
filing the petition must: (i) report to the bank and hold a closed hearing; (ii) review (under two of the 
required 7 findings of the administrative bodies); (iii) to authorize the insolvency administrator to 
determine whether the Secretariat actions were lawful and justified; (iv) in the latter case, to supply a 
written statement for each cause justifying the judge’s opinion.
1252 The FDIC has emphasized that the Dodd Frank Act enables restrictions and decision review earlier 
than allowed by other federal laws for opening the receivership of the failing bank and then starting its 
administration. The immediately ongoing review of the decision according to the Dodd-Frank is pri-
oritised under other legislation. FDIC. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street reform and Consumer Protection Act. 12 CFR Part 380. P. 4208 n. 1. January 25, 2011.
1253 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 202 (a) (1) (C).
1254 Press-Enterprise Co. V. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 [1984]. It must be noted that open court 
hearings play a vital role in the administration of justice. This position is based on the fact that people 
not actually attending court hearings must have access to information in accordance with the stan-
dards of trust and fairness. The openness of court hearings makes it possible to monitor the process 
and to publish the deviations, if any.
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negative consequences of disclosing such information are easy to imagine1255. Although 
the lawmakers have adopted professional secrecy protection provisions, the US Supreme 
Court has noted that it is requires individually to prove the rebut of presumption accord-
ing to the specific features of the particular case and the circumstances involved1256. It 
should also be born in mind that the possibilities to challenge this provision are limited 
by the long tradition of non-disclosure of information in the field of banking regulation 
to third parties1257. In addition, it is easy to imagine the negative consequences of early 
disclosure. It should be noted that in this case, the only persons who can bring the com-
plaint are the financial institution’s directors as the only persons disposing the relevant 
information. Finally, the affected parties have the right to apply to court at a later time for 
the review of legality of their claims1258.
In summary, it is difficult to conceive of an objective situation, when the government 
expropriates property overnight and the persons adversely affected can later apply to court 
only with regard to the well-foundedness of their claims. In any case, damages are more 
theoretical and minimal. In addition, it is difficult to rely on the effectiveness of such ju-
dicial review and believe that it provides adequate legal protection against abuse of public 
power. It is usual in banking, that the administrative authority adopts its decision at the 
end of the business day, for instance, in the case of the US, after the petition is filed in the 
US court and detailed documents-recommendations are submitted to the State Treasury, 
prepared by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the SEC. The bank receives those docu-
ments the next morning, analyses them and prepares thousands of stock assessments and 
urgently presents them for the court hearing. At noon, the judge must review the com-
plete documentation, come to reasonable conclusions, write an explanatory decree in a 
few hours or issue an order without going into much detail, against which the affected 
counterparties are practically unable to take full legal action. In the EU legal framework, 
the relevant situation is complicated as well, because national courts must approve the res-
olution decision within 24 hours. In addition, if the resolution decision is centralised, the 
resolution scheme is as follows: the Board of Directors confirms the resolution scheme at 
its meeting according to the ECB estimates. Within 24 hours, after the Board forwards the 
resolution decision to the EC and the Council, the latter authorities may raise objections. 
If any objections are raised against the resolution scheme, the EU Council has the casting 
vote and decides on amendments within 24 hours. It is hard to imagine an objective situa-
tion, in which the court must assess the data from four public institutions within 24 hours, 
especially when it is related to the resolution of large and complex banks.
1255 Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116 [2004].
1256 Supra note 1250. Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. P. 510. It should noted that the presumption of open-
ness could be resolved if the competing interests are protected by the judgment so the reason dis-
closing such information is designed to protect higher values, therefore the satisfaction of the public 
interest might be reduced.
1257 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (8).
1258 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 2010 (a) (4).
275
IV. IMPACT OF BANK RESOLUTION PROCEDURES ON  
BANK SHAREHOLDERS AND CREDITORS
4.1. Implications and Limitations of Bank Resolution Regime  
on Shareholders Rights
Bank resolution procedures may to a certain extent impact not only on shareholders’ 
property rights, but also their rights in connection with corporate governance1259. The 
shareholders’ meeting is usually convened to elect a director, to vote for a variety of corpo-
rate strategic issues, such as changes in the capital structure, or when dealing with the large 
asset transfer, asset acquisition or pre-emptive rights in regard to the acquisition of shares. 
Most of the national laws of the EU Member States also secure shareholders’ right to draw 
up a shareholders’ meeting agenda or to convene an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. 
However, under the new bank resolution regime, the competent authorities may tempo-
rarily suspend or even terminate some or all rights of the parties involved (shareholders of 
a failing bank) in the resolution procedures.
4.1.1. Impact on Shareholders’ Rights in the EU Legal Framework
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR protects shareholders from both direct expro-
priation of their property rights and indirect forms of intervention by public authorities. 
For example, the Convention protects the rights of shareholders from the effect of their 
own corporate conduct1260. The EU regulatory framework also contains relatively high 
minimum standards in the field of protection of shareholders’ rights. This raises the ques-
tion whether expropriation of shareholders’ property rights, especially shareholder debt 
write-offs or reduction of related shareholders’ rights or shares when converting debt into 
capital or recapitalising the bank can lead to the conflict of public and private interests, for 
instance, with regard to the provisions of Directive 2012/30/EU.
The Directive, inter alia, determines that the shareholders’ meeting must approve any 
change, increase or decrease in the capital level of the company1261. Furthermore, in cases 
where capital increases in cash, the newly issued shares must be offered on a pre-emptive 
basis to shareholders in proportion to the size of their interest1262. Finally, the Sharehold-
ers’ Rights Directive 2007/36/EC lays down minimum procedural requirements for share-
holders’ meetings, in particular with regard to the period prior to the shareholders’ meet-
ing and the form of convening the meetings1263.
Bank resolution regime shall ensure that the legal consequences arising from bank 
resolution and/or subsequent liquidation are consistent with the degree of protection of 
the rights of the interested parties during resolution, i.e. the level of protection that may 
1259 Hüpkes E. Supra note 78. P. 283-285.
1260 ECoHR. Sovatransavto Holding v Ukraine, Judgement. Case No. 485553/99, 25 July 2002. 91 para.
1261 Directive 2012/30/EU. Art. 29 (1), 34 (1). 
1262 Ibid. Art.33 (1). 
1263 Directive 2007/36/EC. Art. 5.
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be expect by counterparties under the applicable legal framework in certain jurisdictions. 
As discussed above, one of the main features delimiting resolution of financial institutions 
from resolution of non-financial institutions is swiftness of the procedure and its impor-
tance for bank resolution actions. The competent authorities must intervene and act as fast 
as possible, as soon as it is established that the bank is failing or likely to fail and no longer 
viable. In addition, public authorities must act to protect the bank’s core financial func-
tions that are relevant to the society as a whole. In order to resolve the difficulties faced by 
a failing bank quickly and effectively and in order to achieve rather radical bank resolu-
tion tools (by applying them individually or in combination), ideally in one weekend, the 
authorities must have a broad range of legal, restrictive intervention tools and powers. 
Before the change of bank insolvency law paradigms, such measures most often consisted 
of recapitalisation of shareholders or creditors and change of the governing bodies, sale of 
all or part of business operations to another bank or financial institution, establishment 
of a bridge bank, which temporarily continues the provision of essential banking services, 
or the establishment of a separate asset management company with the help of the asset 
separation tool, whereby the bad assets of the bank are transferred to the asset manage-
ment company1264. After the shift of paradigm, a bank bail-in tool was created, and also 
other classic bank resolution tools were significantly developed. In order to successfully 
implement the resolution tools, public authorities were empowered to take control of the 
bank management, convert or write off bank capital in the absence of the existing con-
tractual rights and obligations, and bank’s creditor claims, when it is necessary to cover 
bank insolvency losses, or transfer bank assets, liabilities (including depositors’ liabilities) 
and thereby share the ownership and the number of shares with other credible financial 
institutions, or a bridge bank, notwithstanding the contrary opinion or lack of consent on 
the part of the bank shareholders.
Interventions in the bank cause potential legal problems with regard to the protec-
tion of shareholders and creditors rights, especially at a time when the bank still appears 
to be in a state of positive net present value and is not de facto insolvent. Usually, early 
intervention involves the appointment of a temporary administrator of the bank, which 
provisionally takes over the bank’s business areas and activities, negotiates and controls 
the company, by trying to find a compromise with regard to the rights of shareholders. The 
decisions related to external capital attraction, transfer of part or all of the bank’s business 
to another financial institution, merger with another financial institution or decision to 
initiate winding up proceedings in all cases affects the rights and financial interests of the 
bank shareholders, including their preferential rights with regard to the governance of the 
bank and the rights to approve strategic transactions. Creditor rights are also affected in 
the sense that the bank contracts may be substantially modified by reason of the ongoing 
intervention. By reason of such actions on the part of public authorities, not only bank 
insolvency legal regulation, but also national constitutions and, if applicable, the ECHR 
provisions should be taken into account.
The ECHR defines corresponding shareholders’ rights as “a share in the company’s 
assets in the event of its being wound up, and other unconditioned rights, especially vot-
1264 BCBS. Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, 2010, Recom-
mendation No. 1. 
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ing rights and the right to influence the company’s conduct”1265 The Court makes the 
distinction between the right to remedies, i.e., the right to receive the rest of the com-
pany’s assets when it is wound up, and the management rights, such as the right to de-
velop the company’s business strategy. These rights vary depending on the jurisdiction. 
Hüpkes highlights the fundamental shareholders rights common to all jurisdictions: 
(i) the right to present the agenda for the shareholders’ meeting and the right to call 
an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting; (ii) the right to elect the (supervisory) board 
members; (iii) the right to approve fundamental operational decisions, including the 
statutes of the company, revision of the license, voluntary liquidation, significant asset 
sales; (iv) the right to receive a proportionate part of ownership of the company after 
settling with other creditors in the case of liquidation; (iv) the right of equal treatment 
of shareholders falling within the same class; (v) the shareholders are not personally li-
able for the debts of the company, except for the extent equal to the proportion of their 
investment share, and they are protected from legal claims against the company1266. 
In addition, it is important to note that although the US are considered a pioneer of 
capitalism, shareholder rights are firmly defended in the EU legal framework even in a 
broader scope1267. The US legal framework requires the adoption of only some decisions 
at the general meeting of shareholders and leaves the discretion in the distribution of 
powers to the company itself. Therefore, the fundamental governance powers belong 
to the Board. According to the EU law, shareholders meetings hold more important 
rights. Shareholders usually vote not only on the strategic decisions of the company 
(e.g., sales or mergers), but also on the decisions concerning parent companies, resolu-
tion or recapitalisation)1268.
Under the current EU bank insolvency legal regulation, if a bank is failing or likely to 
fail, resolution authorities have the power to impose bank resolution tools in accordance 
with the resolution objectives and principles1269. Unavoidably, certain tools can affect the 
bank’s property rights, including those held by bank creditors and shareholders. Article 
17 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights1270 establishes the right of ownership1271. It 
should also be noted that the Charter also protects the company’s share capital. Moreover, 
property rights are related to “civil procedural rights” under Article 6 (1) of the Charter1272, 
1265 ECoHR. Olczak v. Poland, Case No. 30417/96 ,7 November 2002.
1266 Hüpkes E. Supra note 78. P. 279.
1267 Ibid.
1268 Ibid.
1269 BRRD. Art. 31(2). See more 2 chapter 3 sec.
1270 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU Official Publication. C 83/389. 2010/C 83/02 [interactive]. 
[accessed on 2014-11-05] <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:
0389:0403:lt:PDF>
1271 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall 
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, 
in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contribu-
tions or penalties.”
1272 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, every-
one is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
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namely the right to a fair trial. The affected parties have the right to a fair judicial process 
and effective compensation in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter1273. This section 
analyses the extent to which the application of bank resolution tools under the EU legal 
framework is compatible with the obligations of the EU Member States concerning the 
right to property and the guarantee of a fair compensation of damages.
It should be stressed that the rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights match the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), therefore, insolvency procedures are considered to be legitimate in the context 
of property rights control and expropriation, in view of the public interest as recognized 
under the ECHR1274. Limitation of shareholders’ rights resulting from forced bank reso-
lution is determined by the aim to keep the bank operating as a business entity, and to 
maintain the bank’s asset value equal to the value of the operating assets, and may be pro-
portionate and justified by the broader public interest objectives, with the aim to protect 
the interests of depositors1275. The scope of such criteria shall be as defined in the Conven-
tion1276. According to Article 1 of the Additional Protocol No 1 to the ECHR (“Property 
rights”)1277, the contracting states are obliged to control the use of property in the light of 
the overall public interest. However, the actual situation must meet certain conditions. In 
each case, the term “property” should be interpreted individually, from the perspective 
of implementation of the ECHR objectives. The definition should include interests that 
fall outside the scope of property rights in a certain national legal order that is within 
the ECHR system. The European Court of Human Rights broadly interprets proprietary 
rights. In the sense of the above-mentioned, in addition to material goods, property may 
also take the form of certain rights and assets consisting of various interests (“the concept 
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties 
so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
1273 Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective 
remedy before a court under the conditions set in this article. Everyone has the right to a hearing 
within a reasonable time by public and fair hearing by an independent and impartial court
1274 EHRC, First Protocol Art.1. 2 para.
1275 Olczak v Poland Supra note 1265. In that case, the Polish CB wrote off a part of the insolvent bank’s 
capital and recapitalized the bank at its own expenses. Thereby, an attempt was made to protect the 
interests of bank customers and to avoid significant financial losses, which could bring the bank 
bankrupt (direct liquidation procedures). The ECHR noted that the objective pursued was appar-
ently in compliance with the National Bank’s powers set out in the Polish Law on Banks, and was 
consistent with the scope of the public interest concept.
1276 Article 52(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. According to the EU law, the same level of 
protection, but not lower than the protection provided by the ECHR must be guaranteed.
1277 Any natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in cases where it is necessary for the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. However, the 
leading provisions shall not, to apply such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest or to secure the taxes or other contributions or penalties for 
payment.
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of “possessions” is not limited to “existing possessions” but may also cover assets, includ-
ing claims“)1278.
4.1.2. Key Principles Balancing Private and Public Interests in  
the EU Legal Framework
The ECHR identifies three fundamental legal principles that protect property rights: 
1. Rule of law and legitimate expectations; 2. A legitimate public interest; 3. Proportional-
ity between the public interest and the protection of property rights.
The principle of legitimate expectations. The ECHR has found that the first and the most 
important aspect of Article 1 is the requirement that the purchasing parties falling within 
their jurisdiction shall have the rights guaranteed under the Convention1279, but any pub-
lic authority intervention in the private rights of individuals must be in accordance with 
the law1280. The principle of legitimate expectations or the principle of predictability is a 
general principle of law that requires any violation of property rights to have a legal basis 
and be primarily based on national law. Such legal basis must be: (a) available and pre-
dictable; (b) sufficiently precise; (c) foreseeable. The principle of legitimate expectations 
stems from the rule of law1281. It should be noted that all powers of legislative and execu-
tive (government) authorities shall have sufficient legal basis. To avoid the arbitrary use 
of powers, legal provisions must be regulated so as to be sufficiently clear and precise1282. 
The BRRD is characterised by clear and accurate legal regulation, which is to be achieved, 
harmonised and implemented in the relevant EU Member States. Moreover, it should be 
noted that when the competent authorities use their extensive powers and the related legal 
provisions governing resolution, it is unlikely that problems may arise due to the breach of 
this principle and the relevant provisions of the ECHR. The Convention seeks to protect 
against the use of powers of national authorities without sufficient legal basis. The rights 
and powers of resolution authorities are very explicitly regulated by the BRRD. A resolu-
tion authority may take action when a bank is insolvent or is close to insolvency threshold. 
This rule cannot be considered as insufficiently clear or imprecise. It is therefore assumed 
that in this case no problems should be encountered in application of the law, given the 
principle of legitimate expectations, when implementing the rights and obligations stated 
in the BRRD in practice.
The principle of a legitimate aim. According to second sentence of Article 1 of the Ad-
ditional Protocol No 1 to the ECHR, the state can control and restrict the use of personal 
property rights, in accordance with the general public interest, or in order to guarantee 
1278 ECoHR. Saghinadze v. Georgia, Case No. 18768/05, 27 May 2010. 103 para. The Court reiterates that 
the concept of “possessions” in the first part of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous mean-
ing which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is independent of the formal classifica-
tions in domestic law. Accordingly, as well as physical goods, certain rights and interests constituting 
assets may also be regarded as “possessions”.
1279 European Convention on Human Rights. Art. 1. The latest amendments and ratification and all the 
declarations and reservations list is published <www.conventions.coe.int>.
1280 ECoHR. Lelas v. Croatia. No. 55555/08, 20 May 2010. 71 para.
1281 Bingham T. The Rule of Law, Allen Lane, Vol. 55, No. 3, London, 2010.
1282 ECoHR. Sildedzis v. Poland. Case No. 45214/99, 24 May 2005.
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the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. The ECoHR interprets these 
provisions along with another principle - interference with property rights must serve 
legitimate expectations. The EU Member States have broad discretion in determining a 
legitimate aim in the context of the public interest1283. The ECoHR has stated that will 
respect all decisions, particularly those adopted in the context of macroeconomic policy, 
unless it is established that such decisions were adopted in a clearly wrong manner and 
without legal a justified legal basis1284. As discussed above, one of the primary goals of the 
BRRD is to maintain financial stability and minimise the losses to the public and especially 
taxpayers, also by ensuring comparable results that would arise in the course of ordinary 
bankruptcy procedures, in view of the sequence of allocation of losses to shareholders and 
creditors. The BRRD explicitly aims to address these challenges, therefore, its practical ap-
plication should not be problematic in this field.
Principle of proportionality or fair balance. The ECoHR attempts to balance the pro-
tection of public interest and the respect for human rights. Since bank resolution tools 
unavoidably affect the rights of shareholders and creditors, they must be justified and le-
gitimate in the context of public interest1285. As clearly settled in the ECoHR case-law, any 
interference with property rights must be proportional and ensure ‘balance’ between the 
general public interest and private interests1286. This means that the EU Member States 
must develop proportionate legal relations between the means applied and the ultimate 
aim to be achieved1287. Legal balance is violated in the case when interference into prop-
erty rights creates individual and excessive burden1288. Eventually, the circumstances of 
each case determine whether the fair balance will be maintained. It is also important to 
consider the actions to be undertaken by the resolution authority1289. The circumstances 
of the case must match both the content of the decision forming the basis of action on the 
part of the resolution authority and the appropriate bank resolution tool.
Despite the factual circumstances surrounding bank insolvency proceedings, after 
determining possible consequences arising from the principle of proportionality, some 
observations can still be made and a scientifically proven judgment reached. In the first 
1283 ECoHR. Chassagnou v. France. Case No. 25088/94, 29 April 1999. 75 para. There must be a reason-
able relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. Court rec-
ognises that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means 
of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the 
general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law.
1284 ECoHR. Grainger v. The United Kingdom Case No. 34940/10, 10 July 2012, para 39. Given the excep-
tional circumstances prevailing in the financial sector, both domestically and internationally, at the 
relevant time, a wide margin of appreciation is appropriate. The Court must respect the decisions of 
the national authorities unless it finds them to be “manifestly without reasonable foundation”.
1285 ECHR. Art. 2 (2-11), Art. 2, 15, 17, 18.
1286 ECoHR. Grainger v. The United Kingdom. No. 34940/10, 10 July 2012. 35 para. In particular, there 
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised by any measure applied by the State, including measures depriving a person of 
his possessions.
1287 ECoHR. Beyeler v. Italy. Case No. 33202/96, 5 January 2000. 114 para.
1288 ECoHR. Sporrong and Linnroth v. Zweden. Series A, Case No. 52, 23 September 1982. 69 para.
1289 Legitimate public expectations may be an important factor. See more ECoHR. Ambrousi v. Italie. Case 
No. 31227/96, 19 October 2000. 32 para.
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place, one of the main criteria for determining whether the principle of proportionality 
has been complied with, relates to the question of the amount of compensations to be paid 
to property right holders and individuals for expropriated property. According to the es-
tablished case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the amount of compensation 
is generally based on ‘expropriation’ or whether the tool essentially falls within the scope of 
public interest1290. As a general rule, expropriation without payment of reasonable price for 
the expropriated property which directly relates to the bank’s asset value, typically results 
in the disproportionate interference in the personal rights, which cannot be justified on 
the basis of the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 ECHR.
4.1.3. The ECHR Case Law
The ECHR has examined many cases concerning possible violations of shareholder 
rights under the provisions of the ECHR in the context of bank resolution procedures1291. 
Before distinguishing certain balancing legal safeguards provided for in the BRRD, which 
seek to provide a sound compensation in the case of expropriation, it is useful to take a 
deeper look at the specific cases of shareholder expropriation. In 2008 ECoHR examined 
the complaint of the former shareholders of the UK bank Northern Rock against the ex-
propriation of ownership rights in nationalising the bank. In that case, it was determined 
that soon before the bank nationalisation, the market value of its shares amounted to 90 
pence per share1292. According to the Investors Compensation Law, adopted in 2008, an 
independent asset valuator, when calculating the specific amount of compensation owed 
to former shareholders by the Treasury, required to identify and adopt an opinion the 
ability of the bank to continue its economic business activities; and thus forced insolvency 
(liquidation) procedures were initiated against the bank. In accordance with the facts of 
the case, the valuator relied on the assumption that the company was no longer viable, and 
there was no residual value of bank assets, which did not give rise to any compensation to 
former shareholders. In other words, the value of the shares was equal to zero. Neverthe-
less, the former shareholders of the Northern Rock bank appealed against the decision to 
the ECoHR. They based their claims on the fact that no monetary compensation was paid 
to shareholders. Moreover, the claim was based on the fact that the UK Government did 
not properly balance various public and private interests of the stakeholders (sharehold-
ers) involved when expropriating bank shares.
1290 In some cases, the ECHR makes no clear demarcation lines, by merely stating that the court thor-
oughly examines and verifies the legal measures applied in the light of ECHR, Article 1. Protocol. 1 
and the principles relating to the right to property. For example, in Sovtransavtp Holding v. Ukraine, 
the ECoHR took the view that the factors distinguishing interests of the company interact with in-
terference in property rights, without further qualification of distinctive features in the context of 
expropriation of property rights or use of control. ECHR, Sovtransavto v.Ukraine. No. 48553/99, 25 
July 2002. 91-92 para.
1291 Karell and Karellas v. Minister for Industry, Energy and Technology and Organismos Anasygkrotiseos 
Epicheiriseon AE [1991] ECR I-2691. C-381/89, Syndesmos Melon tis Elftheras Evangelikis Ekklissias 
and Others v. Greek State and Others [1992] ECR I-2111. C-441/93, Pafitis and Others v. Elliniko Di-
mosio (Greek State) and Organismos Oikonomikis Ansaygkrotisis Epicheireon AE (OAE) [1998] ECR 
I-2843.
1292 ECoHR. Grainger v. The United Kingdom. Case No. 34940/10, 10 July 2012. 15 para.
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The following problematic aspects of the case were raised: (i) terms of compensa-
tion under the relevant national legal regulation essentially imply legal assessment of the 
circumstances, more specifically, whether the applied legal measures took into account 
the required balance between public and private interests, and whether it was possible 
to determine imbalance with regard to shareholders’ actions; (ii) following Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol No 1, the right to full compensation is not guaranteed in all cases. 
Only aims directed at the implementation of economic reforms or measures designed to 
achieve essential objectives of social justice are to be regarded as legitimate aims seeking 
for higher public interest objectives. Therefore, the compensation may sometimes be be-
low full market value; (iii) on the one hand, the powers of the court for judicial review are 
limited to the assessment whether the adopted terms of compensation exceed the bounda-
ries of national discretion while expropriating property rights. On the other hand, expro-
priation without paying a reasonable compensation based on the amounts associated with 
the property value, normally  result in disproportionate interference  in  property rights. 
In general, failure to pay compensation can be justified under Article 1 of the Additional 
Protocol No 1 only in extraordinary cases1293; (iv) the ECoHR has noted that the court 
of appeal seized with the case took the view that the government had broad discretion 
in expropriating private property in the case at hand, since the disputed decisions were 
adopted in connection with the implementation of macroeconomic policy. Therefore, the 
ECoHR has agreed that in view of the exceptional circumstances prevailing at that time in 
the financial sector at both national and international level, and in the light of the relevant 
period, the broad discretion enjoyed by the government when applying the expropriation 
and it was the appropriate legal tool. Also, the ECoHR has noted that by reason of direct 
knowledge available to them, national authorities are in principle in a better position than 
international judges, especially considering the issue of ‘public interest’ and its legal quali-
fication. Therefore, national authorities, taking the public concern and direct knowledge 
into account, are in a better position to assess cases when general legal tools meet the eco-
nomic and social strategy of a particular society. This position is based on the fact that the 
national public authorities better understand the general public interest in their social and 
economic context. Among other things, the ECoHR has noted that it respects the policy 
implemented by the national legislator, unless it obviously lacks a reasoned legal basis1294.
The above case analysis reveals some valuable observations and conclusions. First of 
all, to maintain a balance between different interests and to find the balance in relation to 
expropriation of property rights, the amount of compensation to be paid shall be based 
on the relevant asset valuation at the time of expropriation. After proving the aforemen-
tioned fact, a balance between different - public and private – interests is ensured1295. Sec-
ond, the ECoHR is not keen to turn into a body and become another instance dealing 
with complaints related to the value of the expropriated property. Therefore, the review 
of complaints lodged to the ECoHR is limited in the sense that the court evaluates only 
whether the terms of the compensation payable do not exceed the discretion of the state 
and whether property located on a particular territory is correctly evaluated in procedural 
1293 ECoHR. Jahn and Others v. Germany. Case No. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, 117 para.
1294 Ibid. 36 para.
1295 ECoHR. Lithgow and Others v. The United Kingdom, Serias A, Case No. 102, 8 July 1986.
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terms1296.  This approach will considerably complicate the ability of shareholders whose 
rights have been seized to review the compensation amount or the absence thereof by 
reason of interference in their private rights. In addition, the issue of admissibility of the 
complaint lodged to the ECoHR is also very limited. Therefore, it must be assumed that 
the review performed by the ECoHR will be mostly focused on the procedural side of the 
dispute, rather than dealing mainly with the lawfulness of property valuation and whether 
the affected parties had an opportunity to seek judicial review of resolution decisions in 
the national courts. In Northern Rock case, a decision justifying bank nationalisation was 
adopted. The resolution decision was performed in compliance with the public interest, 
after duly balancing public and private interests and in accordance with the national le-
gal regulation. This position was based on the fact that the aim was to protect the entire 
UK financial sector from the financial crisis spread risk, which could spread to other fi-
nancial institutions in the case of collapse of Northern Rock, i.e. institution of ordinary 
bankruptcy procedures. In addition, an important detail is that when the bank was facing 
serious financial difficulties, initially the CB was acting as a lender of last resort1297, since 
it was not possible to find any other private sector solutions, which could have helped the 
bank to avoid liquidation1298. This action on the part of the government and the CB was 
aimed at protecting one of the main sectors of the economy, therefore, the ECoHR, having 
regard to the case-law, respects the decisions adopted by national authorities, unless they 
are obviously unfounded1299. Although financial assistance was provided to the Bank from 
the CB in order to protect the financial sector, this financial injection allowed the bank 
to continue its operations and trade for a few months only. The bank was subsequently 
unable to remain as a going concern in the short term and to find resolution solutions, 
including private sector solutions, thus it was still requiring financial support. Thus, the 
requirement for shareholders with regard to asset value which was estimated at zero, was 
far from clearly unreasonable grounds. On the contrary, it was explicitly held that such 
national policy and legal regulation, which apparently seeks to avoid moral hazard, in the 
court’s judgment, was entirely legitimate. Public authorities have decided to prevent the 
bank’s shareholders from profiting from the stock value of the property, which was mostly 
preserved only because of the   support from the state, namely taxpayers, in the form of 
temporary public financial assistance  in order to avoid bank bankruptcy. Among other 
things, a  vital principle was established to the effect that the creation of expectations on 
1296 Ibid. 36, 37 para.
1297 Financial aid was granted under a tripartite agreement and a memorandum of understanding be-
tween the three institutions: the Treasury, the CB and the bank. The primary goal of funding was not 
to protect the bank or its shareholders, but to protect the financial system as a whole, from a systemic 
crisis, to protect against damage to the general economy. Furthermore, this temporary financing 
ambition was to find a private sector solution, and in the absence of such method, in the meantime 
the government should adopt the laws and principles that would allow nationalising the bank and 
setting the compensation for the expropriated shares. Such a plan was chosen since the immediate 
liquidation of the bank would violate the public interest. Ibid. para 7. 
1298 While on 17 February 2008 two private sector proposals regarding the future of Northern Rock ap-
peared, both of them were related to the continuity of public support, and in consequence of that the 
government did not consider the proposals and did not consider that such proposals were a suitable 
solution for taxpayer costs. Ibid. para 12.
1299 Ibid. 39 para.
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the market, which would encourage other banks and their shareholders to pursue similar 
public support, must be avoided, as this can lead to losses to national economy. In addi-
tion, it was noted that such a decision of the ECoHR positively affected governing bod-
ies of other banks, by disencouraging the board of directors from adopting bad business 
decisions in financial institutions. Finally, an important aspect is that the appellants had 
not proved and the court did not find that the public authorities acted with negligence or 
misleading supervision of Northern Rock bank activities and especially liquidity prob-
lems. Nor has it been established that the bank’s liquidity problems were determined by 
any public legal act.
To continue with the case-law analysis, it should be noted that one of the key issues in 
order to balance public and private interests properly, relates to the determination of public 
interest and the extent to which it can justify the reduction of shareholders’ interests and 
rights, and the type of intervention of the competent authorities that is adequate and pro-
portionate. The objective of determination of the public interest requires to take into ac-
count the decision-making mechanism and structure and, inter alia, to determine whether 
the decision-making mechanism in all cases ensures sufficient degree of legitimacy and 
adequately ensures the interests of all shareholders. Normally, decisions regarding bank 
resolution require the consensus of several competent authorities, which better suits pub-
lic interest objectives. Another aspect relates to the determination of public interest, by re-
quiring that bank resolution procedures are legally reasoned, and a number of procedural 
and legal safeguards1300; also in addition, the resolution procedures must be operational. 
As noted by the ECoHR, there is a great need for simplicity and expeditiousness of bank 
insolvency procedures. In Camberrow MM5 AD v Bulgaria1301 the Court noted that the 
sale of the insolvent bank’s assets was adopted in order to implement the actions suiting 
best interests of all the parties involved, in particular, creditors interests. If the court were 
under a duty to consult with the shareholders and creditors, the bank insolvency proce-
dure would be significantly lengthened and the term of arrangement with creditors would 
be substantially delayed. The Court also noted that “in the specific areas of the economy, 
such as the banking system stability, the counterparties can exercise broader discretion”. 
In conclusion, the Court stated that the restriction of the controlling shareholders’ rights 
to participate in the bank’s insolvency proceedings, and more particularly the decision to 
sell the property of the operating part of the bank was not disproportionate in the light of 
legitimate public objectives, which were to protect the rights of creditors and to protect the 
proper administration of the assets of the bank.
In accordance with Art. 6 of the ECHR, counterparties affected by bank resolution 
must have the opportunity of judicial review. The counterparties concerned with the fail-
ing bank, if their rights are or may be affected by bank resolution tools, must be guaran-
teed their rights of defence, right to a fair hearing, due process and the possibility of ex-
post review of the adopted decision on bank resolution in a way that would not threaten 
the final result, but also provide a fair financial compensation1302. Decisions taken by the 
administrative authorities do not automatically satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the 
1300 EHRC. Art. 1., Protocal No. 1.
1301 ECoHR. Camberrow MM5 AD v Bulgaria, Case No. 50357/99, 1 April 2004.
1302 Ibid. 36 para.
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ECHR. Such decisions must be subject to further control and be reviewed by a legitimate 
body within fully reserved jurisdiction in accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR1303. For 
example, in Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria1304, a decision was made to revoke the banking 
license without informing the bank in advance and without allowing the bank to raise 
objections, or giving any other possibility of administrative or judicial review of decisions. 
The Court concluded that such a decision had caused severe and far-reaching negative 
consequences for the bank that would automatically loose the going concern assumption, 
and compulsory liquidation would be commenced. Such an act is legitimate if a reasonable 
opportunity has been given to the bank to defend its rights before the competent authority. 
The court also noted that such a procedure should be confidential and closed to the public. 
Revocation of banking license could be conditionally suspended before a final decision is 
taken, for instance, in the case of an appeal under internal administrative procedure. At 
the same time, the Court noted that this right was not absolute and could not limit the 
rights of shareholders, if the legitimate aims are pursued and the means to achieve these 
aims are proportionate. Such restrictions are particularly inherent in bankruptcy proce-
dure1305.
In the U.S., the scope of judicial review is more limited (mainly limited to the determi-
nation of systemic risk), compared to the EU framework in the ECHR case-law. Judicial 
review is limited to examining whether the determination of the decision was arbitrary 
and unlawful1306. Since bank insolvency procedures are characterised by predictability and 
certainty, the legal challenges and relative issues shall not result in failure to act or suspen-
sion of special legal measures undertaken for bank resolution purposes1307.
4.2. Analysis of the US Legal Framework
This chapter examines the operation of resolution procedures in the U.S. legal frame-
work. First of all, companies engaged in financial activities are regulated and supervised 
by the Federal Reserve (Fed), if they hold the SSFI status. The Treasury Secretariat, in 
view of the seven conditions and recommendations set by Fed, the FDIC or the Securi-
ties Commission, including the fact that the financial institution is failing or likely to fail, 
which may have adverse consequences for the financial stability of the United States, shall 
inform the bank of the intention to appoint the FDIC as a receiver. If the bank does not 
agree, the Federal Reserve applies to the Federal Court (based on company headquarters) 
to adopt a ruling on the restriction of bank’s activity. According to Section 202 (a) of the 
1303 In order to comply with the provisions of Article 6 ECHR, the court should, in principle, have the 
power to investigate any issues or facts and related regulations, which are directly related to the dis-
pute. A common expectation may appear that the courts will apply certain limitations while review-
ing the administrative decision or when adoption of the judgment requires special expertise, and the 
ECHR therefore noted that the decisions adopted by a legitimate body with overall jurisdiction are 
required in order to comply with Article 6 of the ECHR.
1304 ECoHR. Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria. Case No. 49429/99, 2005 November. 
1305 ECoHR. Skrobol v. Poland. Bylos No. 44165/98, 15 January 2002.
1306 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 202 para.
1307 One of the best examples is the case in Sweden Custodia v. Sveriges Riksbank. Can Swedish Authori-
ties Handle Distress Institutions? CB. Financial Stability report. No. 2, 2006.
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Dodd-Frank Act, the district court judge has 24 hours from the moment of receiving the 
petition: (i) to notify the bank and arrange a closed hearing; (ii) to review (limited to the 
extent necessary for the findings on the legality and reasonableness of the decision) and 
evaluate all evidence; (iii) to authorise the administrator or determine whether the ac-
tions of the Secretariat were “arbitrary, unreasonable, unlawful”; (iv) in the latter case, to 
provide a written statement for each particular reason, which would replace the court’s 
judgment. If the judge cannot implement all of these requirements within 24 hours, then 
the petition shall be applied in accordance with the law, by default. This means that the 
insolvency administrator immediately starts the resolution and/or liquidation of the bank 
(reorganisation is prohibited under Section 214 of the Dodd-Frank). The decision to com-
mence bank resolution does not mean that the prohibition of judicial review is applied. 
The Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court’s power of review is limited to the legality and 
founded nature of the determination made by the Secretariat. Such regulatory framework 
may raise practical problems. The first observation is that bank assets are often enormous, 
consisting of hundreds of billions of dollars in value. A large share of these assets includes 
companies or risk investment funds, financial instruments contracts, complex securities 
and other financial contracts. Most of these transactions are illiquid or at least not eas-
ily marketable. Therefore, it is very difficult to conduct an accurate, prompt and certain 
valuation of their assets. For instance, in the US, this was clearly demonstrated in January 
20081308, during the Goldman Sachs insolvency proceedings and the assets transfer to AIG. 
Under the existing legal regulation, the crucial determination of the Secretariat is that 
the bank is in default or in danger of default. If the bank has fewer assets than liabilities 
or fails to fulfill its obligations in due time in the ordinary course of business conditions 
or it is very likely that the bank will incur losses that will absorb a significant part of the 
bank capital, such a situation can be considered as a default1309. It is therefore very likely 
that, in all cases, the assessment of the bank’s assets will be in the center of the dispute and  
subjected to appeal. At the same time, the law provides for the possibility of review and the 
possibility of appeal in court. This is the key safeguard against the possible errors or abuse 
of powers of administrative authorities. Therefore, the hearing before the expropriation 
is meaningless. The following hypothetical assumption illustrates the situation. Accord-
ing to the established practice, the Secretariat carries out resolution actions within one 
business day. This has become a sort of unwritten rule in the US. The procedure seems to 
be very complicated. The Secretariat shall adopt a resolution on the basis of the detailed 
documents prepared by the Fed, the FDIC and/or the SEC and in accordance with the rec-
ommendations of several institutions and the assessment made by the Treasury staff. The 
next morning, the bank must obtain and analyse the documents, prepare its calculations 
for thousands of securities and valuation of assets and promptly deliver all this for the 
hearing. On the same day, the judge must review large amounts of resolution-related bank 
documents, come to reasonable conclusions and adopt a ruling, and write an explanatory 
opinion within a few hours. Another option is less complicated. The judge evaluates the 
resolution decision and the documents to the extent whether the conduct was justified, 
1308 Goldmansachs. Media Relations.Valuation & Pricing Related to Transactions with AIG. [interactivr] 
[accessed on 2014-05-12] <http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/in-the-news/archive/
response-to-fcic-folder/valuation-and-pricing.pdf>.
1309 Dodd-Frank. 202 (c) (4).
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non-arbitrary and legitimate1310. Therefore, it is assumed that the judicial review of resolu-
tion decisions is limited, superficial and one-sided. The courts cannot require more time, 
as any delays in the resolution process are forbidden, and bank resolution shall be carried 
out very swiftly. If the final decision were in favour of the bank, it could cause irremedi-
able damage to its successful operations. The bank is not allowed to claim damages against 
the US government, asking for compensation and protecting the rights of defence1311. The 
government has immunity against liabilities1312.
4.3. Key Principles Balancing Private and Public Interests in  
the US Legal  Framework
The principle of legitimate expectations. In the US legal system of bank resolution,  it is 
firstly necessary to refer to the principle of legality, which provides legal certainty and con-
sistency for shareholders. This principle requires that the actions of public authorities that 
affect private property rights are based on consistent legal regulation. In essence, it means 
that the conditions and legal criteria supporting the actions of competent authorities 
must be explicitly laid down by law. In the first place, this principle is governed in the U.S. 
legal framework by the detailed legal order of prompt corrective measures. The FDIA Act 
expressly provides for a “risk-based” system. This system estimates semi-annual financial 
estimations of banks as deposit-taking financial institutions, based on: (i) the likelihood 
that the DI Fund will suffer losses, having regard to the bank’s operational risks; (ii) dif-
ferent categories of bank liabilities and the concentration of both secured and unsecured 
depositors, with regard to defined and undefined deposits; (iii) any other factors which, 
according to the FDIC views, may be relevant to the assessment of the bank’s financial 
position; (iv) the expected insolvency losses; (v) costs for the deposit fund1313. The FDIC 
adopts a risk-based system as the legal basis for requiring the banks to submit detailed 
activity reports and expert evaluation of financial conditions of the bank. Subsequently, 
the FDIC analyses and assesses the financial data based on actual bank capital levels. The 
supervisory authority has a duty to apply sanctions and initiate bank insolvency proce-
dures, if the bank’s equity capital fails to match the capital ratio. Thus, the US legal regime 
of prompt corrective actions strengthens the principle of legitimate expectations, provid-
ing for an environment in which it is possible to determine and to foresee certain actions 
taken by public institutions against the bank, by providing legal certainty to shareholders. 
The protection of legitimate expectations of shareholders is thereby enhanced, and share-
holders can plan their actions according to clearly defined legall rules and form explicit 
1310 The US Supreme Court has recognised that the right to due process and related issues are related, 
whether the parties to the dispute have enough time to be heard. Miller v. French U.S. 327, 350 (2000). 
Another opinion was expressed by the judge Souter, who stated that leaving not enough time for the 
Court to investigate the facts can cause ‘serious questions’ as to whether Congress could practically 
presume judicial role’. Ibid. 352.
1311 Any actions should be directed against the government in the subject of the right to a fair hearing, 
not against the FDIC for its decisions and actions brought against the bank during the administra-
tion. 
1312 Scheafnocker v. C.I.R. 642 F.3d 426, 434 [2011]; Smith v U.S., 51 Fed. Cl. 36, 38 [2001].
1313 FDI Section 302 (a). 12 USC 1817 (b) (1) (C).
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expectations. For example, shareholders can assume what will occur to the bank’s control 
rights or economic interests if its financial conditions decline significantly. The chance that 
bank shareholders will lose control of the bank or that the value of their shares will sub-
stantially decrease,  forces the shareholders to supervise the managing bodies of the bank 
more efficiently and encourages to perform in a more socially responsible manner1314.
The right to a fair hearing. In the U.S. legal framework, shareholders have a more re-
stricted legal basis to challenge the decisions and actions adopted by public authorities, 
compared to the EU legal framework. For example, the US courts have frequently exam-
ined whether the FDIC procedures were in compliance with the rights of defence and 
whether they were consistent with the US Constitution. For example, in FDCI v. Cous-
hatta1315, the Court took the view that the FDIC must comply with three criteria, and ac-
cording to them the court must assess in determining as to which FDIC procedure com-
plies with the principle of the rights of defence, where the public authority expropriates 
the assets of the company. Legal protection of shareholders is also interpreted with regard 
to procedural aspects. First of all, it is necessary to assess whether private interests will 
be affected by the public authority actions and intervention in general. Secondly, the risk 
of inaccurate, illegal property expropriation for private interests must be assessed after 
applying the resolution tool during the resolution process, and the potential value of the 
property, if any, additional or alternative procedural safeguards. Thirdly, it is necessary to 
assess the government’s interests, including the functions associated with possible fiscal 
and administrative public burden, which can be caused by alternative procedural require-
ments1316. In essence, it is considered that the rights of defence must be understood in a 
flexible way and the US legal regulation demands the procedural protection required in a 
particular situation1317. The court came to a conclusion that insolvency procedures assess-
ing bank capital adequacy, and whether individual bank risk-based supervisory frame-
work is in compliance with the rights of the defense. The court also noted that the hearing 
taking place before the expropriation procedures is not guaranteed by the law, because 
the bank has enough adequate opportunities to respond to regulatory notices by written 
procedure. In addition, it was noted that the government’s interests were important on 
account of any delays or invasion of action that would importantly decrease the benefit, 
which is respectively related to insufficient bank capital level. The FDIC procedures satisfy 
the statutory rights of the defense, as they give banks a precautionary time limit to fix bank 
insolvency risks and lack of capital. They also provide for an opportunity to challenge 
and appeal against the resolution decision in accordance with the law1318. The decisions 
adopted by administrative authorities may be revoked only if illegal, ill-founded or admin-
istrative authorities exceed their powers.
1314 Alexander K. Supra note 79. P. 80-81.
1315 FDIC v Coushatta, 930 F 2d 122 (5th Cir), 502 US 857 [1991].
1316 Ibid. 335 para.
1317 Ibid. 334 para.
1318 FDIC procedures allow the bank to submit an application and supporting documents to the FDIC 
supervisory department. The procedures enable to request informal oral court hearings, and the 
FDIC can guarantee this on its own discretion “when the supervisory department determines that 
an informal oral hearing will be productive in the context of the relevant circumstances. 58 Fed Reg. 
34357, 34359 (25 June 1993). 12 CFR 327.3.
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The right to compensation. The intervention and actions of public institutions should 
be considered with regard to every possible loss or damage suffered by shareholders or 
third parties through implementing resolution powers. The terms of compensation is an 
important element in determining whether a public intervention is justified and does not 
lead to a disproportionate restriction of the rights and legitimate interests. Under the US 
federal banking law, shareholders have the right to a fair value of equity, calculated at the 
time when a receiver is appointed1319. In the US, shareholders’ right to compensation is 
interpreted by the source of strength doctrine. The scientific literature remains critical to-
wards the provision with regard to shareholder rights, under which the owner of shares is 
not personally liable for all debts of the company, except for those that are associated with 
the value of investment in the company, and is protected from any legal action against the 
company1320. The dual responsibility right of shareholders was enshrined in the United 
States prior to 1992. The doctrine also relates to the fact that most banks in the United 
States are banking groups (holdings). The largest US banks, such as Citibank or Bank of 
America, own many bank subsidiaries and branches. To avoid the risk of bank holding 
structures leading to greater risks for banking activity, the Federal Reserve has developed 
and applied the requirement for banking groups to provide financial resources to bank 
subsidiaries. In other words, this means that the parent company’s shareholders must con-
tribute to the subsidiary, where the latter is faced with financial difficulties. If the parent 
company carries out its obligations under the instructions of the Federal Reserve and aims 
to increase the subsidiary’s capital, when it is insufficiently capitalised, any transfer of bank 
funds or assets is protected from shareholders’ claims to cover damages. The doctrine 
reflects that the protection required by bank creditors is higher than that provided by 
general commercial law. This theory is further disclosed in the US Supreme Court case 
Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corporation1321. The central aspect of the case was 
that investors must provide additional financial support in addition to the existing range 
of investments, if the public body determines that the bank is failing or likely to fail. Share-
holders have the duty to strengthen the subsidiary.
4.4. Impact of Bank Resolution Procedures on Bank Creditors
It has already been discussed that the DGS serves to prevent massive banks runs and 
minimises the danger of adverse systemic risks in the banking system. The problem of 
systemic risk can also be resolved through increasing the seniority of performance of the 
contracts concluded by the SSFI and other bank creditors.
Bank’s netting agreements, bank contract execution and prohibition to conclude new 
contracts in bank resolution are necessary legal mechanisms that allow indirectly enhanc-
ing the possibility of satisfaction of specific bank creditors’ claims and reducing the nega-
tive impact because of particular bank’s insolvency.
Set-off in bank resolution procedures is an important element since the banks not only 
lend to borrowers, but often accept deposits from customers. Therefore, by reason of such 
1319 Alexander K. Supra note 79. P. 87.
1320 Hüpkes E. Supra note 78. P. 280.
1321 Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corporation. 439 US 234 [1978].
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borrowers, the bank’s net asset position is significantly weaker than the total assets posi-
tion of the bank. The meaning of set-off is the point at which the debtor fails to comply 
with its obligations or becomes insolvent, when the bank may set-off the entire balance 
sheet assets of the insolvent debtor into the borrower’s debt. This approach is considered to 
be a certain collateral for the debtor’s obligations, which the bank may use if the borrower 
fails to fulfill his commitments. Therefore, set-off can significantly contribute to reducing 
the risks of bank insolvency. In the general insolvency law, the addressee of the prohibi-
tion to discharge any financial obligations is the entity in bankruptcy itself (one entity in 
bankruptcy it is not allowed to discharge obligations), while set-off is usually performed 
by other entity engaged in legal relations, by unilaterally declaring set-off. The creditor 
performing set-off, rather than participating with other creditors pari passu in satisfying 
its claim, obtains such satisfaction by avoiding the performance of his obligations towards 
the debtor. Set-off – is the right to carry out counter-homogenous claims netting, a sort of 
priority right when the debtor is insolvent.
The protection of financial contracts essentially means that under bank resolution, the 
priority of creditor’s claims might be modified by departing from general insolvency law. 
Such a modification is understood in the doctrine as an attempt to come outside the 
framework of general insolvency law and to confer special higher status for specific busi-
nesses, to reduce systemic risk, negative social consequences and negative impact on the 
economy. Legal protection of financial contracts concluded by the bank gives the bank a 
better position, in comparison with other creditors.
Finally, it is important to note that, in order to prevent a systemic banking crisis, auto-
matic suspension of obligations held by a bank complying with resolution conditions could 
not be imposed on all creditors in all cases, for example, to insured depositors. Such de-
positors are compensated by the DIA, or they are transferred to a healthy bank. Suspen-
sion of unsecured deposit liabilities could cause considerable difficulties, since it can lead 
to liquidity shortages in other healthy financial institutions1322.
4.4.1. Early Contract Termination and Safeguards for Counterparties.  
The EU Regulatory Framework
Similar to shareholders’ rights, creditors’ rights are protected by the ECHR. Any le-
gally based financial claim of a creditor relates to the ‘management’ of the ownership right 
according to Art. 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR, if legal regulation provides 
no adequate legal tools to fulfill the ‘claim’, in certain cases, this can result in violation of 
creditor‘s rights. Bank resolution procedures fall into the scope of that article. However, 
the ECoHR does not provide detailed guidelines or criteria on the certain rights that credi-
tors should exercise within the legal framework of bank resolution. It should be noted that 
the procedural rights to a fair trial and due process are established in Art. 6 of the ECHR, 
which applies to all procedures, including the determination of civil rights. Possible viola-
tions may occur when bank resolution procedures lead to violation of creditors’ rights, for 
example, upon amending the terms and conditions of financial contracts or extending the 
1322 Marinč M., Vlahu R. Supra note 74. P. 137.
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contractual performance deadlines, thus reducing the claim value, converting creditors‘ 
financial claims into equity, or the transfer of financial claims to a third party.
In order to make the application of bank resolution tools effective, resolution authori-
ties shall have the power to suspend the rights of creditors and counterparties to run en-
forcement activities and to finalise, accelerate or otherwise terminate contracts with the 
failing bank. Within the EU legal framework, the termination right exercised during bank 
resolution is generally understood not only as the right to terminate a contract, but also 
as the “right to accelerate, close out, set-off or net obligations or any similar provision that 
suspends, modifies or extinguishes an obligation of a party to the contract or a provision that 
prevents an obligation under the contract from arising that would otherwise arise.”1323 The 
question is which model of regulatory framework for contract termination restriction and 
safeguards for the parties are given preference in the new EU paradigm of bank insolvency 
procedures?
Primarily, fundamental principles of the restriction on termination rights upon the 
commencement of bank resolution procedures are to be noted. The EU resolution authori-
ties have the power to suspend the termination rights of any party to a contract with a 
bank under resolution1324. The duty of the resolution authority to publish a copy or a notice 
on the decree or resolution tool requiring to undertake bank resolution1325.1326. Obligations 
pursuant to contracts whose termination is not allowed are partially suspended from the 
date of publication of a notice suspension until 5 p.m. of the next business day1327. Such 
legal regulation gives public authorities time to identify and evaluate those contracts to be 
transmitted to a solvent third party without the risk that the value and the extent of finan-
cial contracts will change upon using the contract termination rights by counterparties. 
The counterparties that stay with a failing bank, have right to terminate the contract at the 
end of suspension period. The key aspect of the restriction placed on contract termination 
in the EU legal system is that the transfer of the insolvent bank’s assets to a healthy third 
party should not be treated as a default, which would allow exercising the right to termi-
nate the contract. Any suspension of obligations shall not apply to (i) eligible depositors; 
(ii) payment and delivery obligations owed to systems or operators of systems designated 
for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, central counterparties, and central banks; eligible 
claims for the purpose of Directive 97/9/EC1328. Moreover, when suspending obligations, 
resolution authorities shall have regard to the impact the exercise of that power might have 
on the orderly functioning of financial markets 1329.
Abstention from actions, suspension of certain bank obligations. First of all, bank resolu-
tion authorities have additional powers that would ensure efficient transfer of bank shares 
or debt instruments and assets, or rights and obligations to a third party. These powers 
include the power to revoke the rights of third parties to transferred property or means 
1323 BRRD Art. 2 (82).
1324 BRRD. Art. 71 (1).
1325 BRRD. Art. 69 (1).
1326 BRRD. Art. 83 (4). 
1327 BRRD. Art. 69 (1). 
1328 BRRD. Art. 69 (4). 
1329 BRRD. Art. 69 (5). 
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and the power to enforce contracts and guarantee the continuity of agreements with the 
recipient of the transferred assets and shares. However, these powers shall not affect the 
employees’ rights to terminate the employment contract. An exception is also provided to 
the effect that the granted powers shall not affect the right of the counterparty to terminate 
the contract with the bank under resolution or the banking group entity for reasons other 
than the replacement of the bank under resolution with another bank1330. Second, in order 
to ensure that resolution authorities, when transferring assets and liabilities to a private 
sector purchaser or bridge institution, have enough time to identify the financial contracts 
that need to be transferred, finalised or otherwise terminated, it might be appropriate 
to impose proportionate restrictions on counterparties’ rights to close out, accelerate or 
otherwise terminate financial contracts before the transfer is made. Such a restriction is 
necessary to allow public authorities to obtain a true picture of the balance sheet of the 
failing bank, without the changes in value and scope that extensive exercise of termination 
rights would entail. In order to interfere with the contractual rights of counterparties to 
the minimum extent necessary, the restriction on termination rights should apply only 
in relation to the crisis prevention measure or crisis management measure, including the 
occurrence of any event directly linked to the application of such a measure, and contract 
termination rights arising from any other default, including failure to pay or supply a guar-
antee payment, should remain 1331. Third, in order to preserve legitimate capital market ar-
rangements in the event of a transfer of some, but not all, of the assets, rights and liabilities 
of a failing institution, it is appropriate to include safeguards to prevent the splitting of 
linked liabilities, rights and contracts, as appropriate. Such a restriction on selected prac-
tices in relation to linked contracts should extend to contracts with the same counterparty 
covered by security arrangements, financial collateral arrangements transferring title, set-
off arrangements, close out netting agreements, and structured financing arrangements. 
Where the legal safeguard applies, resolution authorities shall be bound to transfer all the 
linked contracts within a protected arrangement, or leave them all with the residual failing 
bank. Those safeguards should ensure that the regulatory capital treatment of exposures 
covered by a netting agreement for the purposes of Directive 2013/36/EU is not affected. 
Fourth, when exercising their resolution powers, the resolution authorities have the power 
to cancel or modify the terms of a contract to which the bank under resolution is a party 
or substitute a recipient as a party 1332. Bank resolution tools shall not, per se, be deemed to 
be an enforcement event or insolvency proceedings under a contract, including payment 
and delivery obligations, as well as provision of collateral1333. That requirement is mainly 
applied due to the fact that upon bank resolution, substantive obligations under the con-
tract, including payment and delivery obligations, and provision of collateral, continue 
to be performed, it shall not, therefore, per se make it possible for anyone to (a) exercise 
any termination, suspension, modification, netting or set-off rights, including in relation 
to a contract entered into by: (i) a subsidiary, the obligations of which are guaranteed or 
otherwise supported by the parent undertaking or by any group entity ; (ii) any banking 
1330 BRRD. Art. 87. 
1331 BRRD. Recital (94).
1332 BRRD. Art. 64 (1) (f).
1333 BRRD. Art. 68 (1). 
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group entity which includes cross-default provisions; (b) obtain possession, exercise con-
trol or enforce any security over any property of the credit institution or any group entity 
in relation to a contract which includes cross-default provisions; (c) affect any contractual 
rights of the credit institution or any group entity in relation to a contract which includes 
cross-default provisions1334. A suspension or restriction of a contract shall not constitute 
non-performance of a contractual obligation for the purposes of early intervention and 
resolution1335. All of the provisions contained herein shall be considered to be overriding 
mandatory provisions against the provisions of contractual obligations under the Regula-
tion1336. Eventually, the regulation provides for the power to restrict the enforcement of secu-
rity interests. Resolution authorities have the power to restrict secured creditors of a bank 
under resolution from enforcing security interests in relation to any assets of that bank at 
the end of the next business day 1337.
These necessary restrictions on contractual rights of the new bank resolution proce-
dures are governed and counterbalanced by protection measures of counterparties, which 
aim - inability of public authorities to split the relevant obligations, rights and contracts, 
i.e., in the case of partial property transfer, linked arrangements would be transferred in 
full or not at all moved. The arrangements include close-out netting arrangements, set-off 
arrangements for financial security transfer of title to the collateral agreements, collateral 
agreements and structured finance arrangements. The protection of in the EU is discussed 
below in more detail.
The first safeguard is asset valuation. This duty is set to ensure that, following the bank 
resolution operation, or actions, an independent property valuer shall carry out independ-
ent bank assets valuation as soon as possible. This assessment is separated from the assess-
ment carried out ex ante for resolution purposes. The main purpose of such evaluation 
is to assess whether shareholders and creditors would have faced better treatment if the 
bank under resolution had entered into ordinary insolvency proceedings. Therefore, the 
valuation of assets shall determine (i) the treatment that shareholders and creditors, or the 
relevant deposit guarantee schemes, would have received if the bank under resolution with 
respect to which the resolution action or actions were effected had entered into ordinary 
insolvency proceedings at the time when the decision was taken by the resolution author-
ity; (ii) the actual evaluation that shareholders and creditors have received at the time of 
resolution; and (iii) if there is any difference between the treatment referred to in point (a) 
and the treatment referred to in point (b). 1338. In addition, a very important point is that 
in performing the valuation of assets (a) it is assumed that the bank under resolution with 
respect to which the resolution action or actions have been effected, would have entered 
into normal insolvency proceedings at the time when the decision was taken by the resolu-
tion authority to put the bank under resolution; (b) it is assumed that the resolution action 
or actions had not been effected; (c) disregard of any provisions of extraordinary public 
financial support to the bank under resolution1339.
1334 BRRD. Art. 68 (3).
1335 BRRD. Art.68 (5). 
1336 Regulation (EU) No. 593/2008. Art. 9. 
1337 BRRD. Art. 70 (1). 
1338 Ibid. Art. 74 (2).
1339 Ibid. Art. 74 (3).
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The second safeguard – shareholder and creditor evaluation by partial asset transfer and 
the application of bail-in. The EU legal framework provides the obligation to ensure that 
after recourse to one or more bank resolution tools and, in particular, shareholders and 
creditor protection objectives: (a) except for in cases covered by bail-in, where one or more 
conversion authorities shall transmit only part of the rights, assets and liabilities, share-
holders and the creditors whose claims have been transferred, would be compensated at 
least the amount they would have received if the bank is liquidated by bringing ordinary 
bankruptcy proceedings at the time of the adoption of the resolution authority; (b) when 
the resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, shareholders and creditors, whose claims 
are neither written off or converted into equity securities are not exposed to greater losses 
than those which they would have incurred if the bank were liquidated by bringing ordi-
nary bankruptcy proceedings at the time of the adoption of the resolution authority1340. 
If the outcome of the discussed assets assessments finds that any of the shareholders or 
creditors, or DGS suffered greater losses than they would have experienced in the case of 
bank liquidation under normal insolvency proceedings, they are entitled to compensation 
i.e., the payment of difference from resolution financing arrangements1341.
Third safeguard of private interests - counterparties safeguard on the partial assets 
transfer. This measure ensures the appropriate protection of counterparties: (a) collateral 
arrangements under which a person holds the actual or imputed part of the transferred as-
set or part of the rights, regardless of whether this part is backed by specific assets or rights 
or variable property mortgage or similar agreement; (b) financial collateral arrangements 
under which the ownership is transferred, or under which a collateral provider supplies a 
collateral to ensure the fulfillment or coverage of specific obligations, by transferring full 
ownership of assets to the collateral beneficiary, by providing in the conditions that the 
collateral beneficiary shall transfers the assets, provided that the specific obligations are 
met; (c) set-off arrangements under which two or more claims or obligations to be met by 
the restructured bank and the counterparty against each other, may be offset in relation to 
each other; (d) netting arrangements; (e) covered bonds; (f) structured financing arrange-
ments, including securitisations and instruments used for hedging purposes, which form 
an integral part of the cover pool and are secured in a manner similar to covered bonds in 
accordance with national law, according to which the collateral is provided and held by the 
purchasing party or a trustee, agent, or the person appointed1342.
Protection of financial collateral, netting arrangements and set-off agreements. The EU 
legal framework establishes that in order to ensure adequate protection of financial col-
lateral arrangements, which transfer ownership and netting arrangements and set-off ar-
rangements so as to prevent the transfer of certain rights and obligations that are protected 
under a financial collateral arrangement, forming the basis for title transfer, under offset-
ting arrangement or netting agreement between the bank under resolution and another 
person. In addition, the availability of additional powers to modify or terminate the rights 
and obligations protected under a security financial collateral arrangement, under which 
the ownership is transferred, under offsetting agreement or offsetting agreement is lim-
1340 Ibid. Art. 73 .(a), (b).
1341 Ibid. Art. 75. 
1342 Ibid. Art. 76 (2). 
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ited. These agreements are considered to be protected if the counterparties have the right 
to set off or settle those rights and obligations1343. Therefore, to ensure the availability of 
insured deposits, the resolution authority may: (a) transfer the insured deposits, which 
are part of that agreement, without transferring any other assets, rights and obligations 
forming part of the same agreement; (b) transfer, modify or terminate such assets, rights 
or liabilities, without transfer of insured deposits1344.
Protection of collateral arrangements. In the EU framework, adequate protection of 
commitments secured by collateral arrangement must be ensured, thus the following is 
not allowed in bank resolution: (a) the transfer of assets securing an obligation, unless 
the transfer is accompanied by the obligation and the collateral benefit; (b) the transfer 
of secured obligation, unless accompanied by the transfer of the collateral benefit; (c) the 
transfer of the collateral benefit, unless accompanied by the transfer of the secured obliga-
tion; (d) modification or termination of the collateral arrangement by using additional 
powers, if the obligation remains unsecured due to such amendment or termination1345. 
Despite this obligation, where it is necessary to ensure the availability of insured deposits, 
the resolution authority may transfer the insured deposits forming part of the collateral 
agreement, excluding any other assets, rights and obligations that are part of the same 
agreement, and carry out the transfer, modification or termination of such assets, rights 
and liabilities, without transferring the insured deposits1346.
Protection of structured financing arrangements and covered bonds. The EU legal frame-
work provides for an obligation to ensure adequate protection for structured finance ar-
rangements and to prevent: (i) the transfer of some, but not all assets, rights and obli-
gations that make up all or part of a structured financing agreement, including covered 
bonds and securitisation and instruments used for hedging purposes, with the bank under 
resolution as a party to such instruments; (ii) terminate or change the assets, rights and 
obligations that make up all or part of a structured financing agreement, by using addi-
tional powers, including covered bonds and securitisation and instruments used for hedg-
ing purposes, and agreements to which the restructured bank is a party1347. In order to 
ensure the availability of insured deposits, the resolution authority is granted the following 
statutory rights: (a) to transfer the insured deposits, forming part of any of the above-
mentioned agreement, without transferring any other assets, rights and obligations, which 
are part of the same agreement, and (b) to transfer, modify or terminate the assets, rights 
or obligations, without transferring the insured deposits.1348
Protection of trading, clearing and settlement systems. Application of any bank resolu-
tion tool cannot affect the operation of systems and rules of systems covered by Directive 
98/26/EC, whereby the resolution authority: (a) transfers a part (but not all) of the assets, 
rights and liabilities of the bank under resolution to another entity; (b) exercises the reso-
lution powers to withdraw or amend the terms of the contract, to which the restructured 
1343 Ibid. Art. 77 (1).
1344 Ibid. Art. 77 (2).
1345 Ibid. Art. 78 (1). 
1346 Ibid. Art. 78 (2).
1347 Ibid. Art. 79 (1). 
1348 Ibid. Art. 79 (2).
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bank is a party, or replace the recipient as a party to such contract. Transfer, cancellation 
or amendment cannot cancel the transfer order in violation of Article 5 of Directive 98/26/
EC. In addition, the resolution cannot entail any changes or denial of transfer orders and 
offsetting, use of funds, securities or credit instruments, or collateral security1349. 
4.4.2. Contract Termination Restrictions and Protection of Counterparties. 
The US Regulatory Framework
The doctrine explains the reasons why bank resolution procedures are not subject to 
the US Bankruptcy Code, more specifically, the provisions governing automatic suspen-
sion of obligations only after application to initiate bankruptcy proceedings has been ac-
cepted, termination restrictions and priority ranking of creditors’ claims, inter alia, by the 
fact that the FDIC is required to carry out resolution actions in a very prompt manner1350. 
In addition, any collective insolvency proceedings of a company facing financial difficulties 
suspends individual investors’ efforts to recover their claim to the largest extent possible. 
The US Bankruptcy Code governs the automatic suspension of obligations of an insolvent 
entity by providing the right to automatically suspend all the obligations of the insolvent 
entity. Accordingly, this suspends all formal and informal collective efforts and the ‘race’ 
undertaken by creditors with regard to the borrower’s assets. Exceptional control of bank 
insolvency procedures is established in Chapter II of the Dodd-Frank Act. This act holds 
a partially similar position, but an exception is made for all cases limiting shareholder and 
creditor claims, except for shareholder, creditor rights to make payments, adopt decisions 
relating to their claims or any other methods for meeting their claims1351. After opening 
the insolvency procedure, that provision grants the bank with the right to terminate the 
rights enjoyed by bank counterparties (except for qualified financial contracts1352), ipso 
facto implementing the provisions within 90 days from the start of the insolvency proce-
dures, i.e., from the date of appointment of the receiver1353. The courts are also not allowed 
to adopt a ruling or issue a writ of execution directed against the debtor’s assets without 
the consent of the FDIC1354. At the same time, it is important to note that the start of re-
ceiver’s appointment under the provisions of Chapter II does not automatically suspend 
any disputes or legal proceedings to which the bank is a party. Therefore, the FDIC must 
submit an application-petition to the court requesting to suspend the judicial procedures 
with regard to the bank. Courts remain under an obligation to approve the petition, but 
the suspension cannot exceed 90 days1355. Similar terms make the FDIC act quickly in 
deciding whether to approve or disapprove the claims raised by bank creditors. Pursuant 
to the provisions of Chapter II, the procedure for approving creditors’ claims is defined in 
1349 Ibid. Art. 80. 
1350 Bliss R., Kauffman. G. Supra note 75. P. 51- 52.
1351 Dodd-Frank. 210 (a) (1) (M).
1352 Ibid. 210 (c) (13) (C) (ii).
1353 Ibid. 210 (c) (13) (C) (i). 
1354 Ibid.210 (a) (9) (C).
1355 Ibid. 2010 (a) (8).
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the same terms as in the US Bankruptcy Code1356. However, the decision on the approval 
or not of creditor claims must be adopted within 180 days from the date of appointment 
of the receiver (in some cases, this period may be extended)1357. If more speedy decision-
making is necessary in order to avoid ‘irreparable damage’ to the applicant, the FDIC must 
decide in 90 days1358. The FDIC may disapprove all or part of the financial claim lodged on 
time, if it finds that the facts do not meet the ‘sufficient standard of evidence in accordance 
with the FDIC assessment’. However, if the claim is not approved, the applicant may still 
apply to courts to determine the size of its financial claim, namely the federal court1359. It 
should be noted that, according to the U.S. legal framework, the FDIC has the right to ap-
prove or refuse to approve any transaction carried out by the counterparties of a contract, 
if it establishes the right to judicial review of the decision within a ‘reasonable period’1360. 
The parties concerned whose contracts were refused execution shall be entitled to dam-
ages, and may acclaim them at a later stage. However, claims for compensation, additional 
damage (such as losses related to fines), lost profits, moral damage, pain and suffering is 
not permitted by law1361. The distinctive feature, in comparison with the general provisions 
of the US Bankruptcy Code, is that upon bank resolution FDIC is empowered to enter into 
loan agreements and continue their performance. The FDIC is authorised to carry out and 
secure ‘any agreement increasing the creditworthiness and reliability of a financial institu-
tions or interim financial institution’1362. Such regulation is introduced with the purpose 
to ensure the operational nature of bank resolution procedures conducted by the receiver. 
According to the substance of this legal regulation, the FDIC can select only the most ad-
vantageous bank business lines for bank resolution.
Suspension of contracts and refraining from action. Some of the differences between the 
Bankruptcy Code and Chapter II of the Dodd-Frank Act are of little significance. For ex-
ample, Article 210 (a) (11) of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the suspension of the rights 
and powers of creditors in the light of the illegal, fraudulent intentions and behaviour or 
preferential conditions for the transfer of assets, as provided for in Sections 547 and 548 of 
the US Bankruptcy Code. These provisions are almost identical. An important difference 
is the application of the bona fide principle to the purchaser of bank assets. This means 
that the bank’s assets are transferred to another bank following the value determined by 
the ‘reference price standard’ in assessing whether the transfer of assets of the bank under 
resolution is optimal and at least hypothetically complies with the creditor’s rights and 
interests1363. Another difference from normal bankruptcy law is that claims with regard to 
intentional, fraudulent transfer to non-insiders. The Bankruptcy Code provides for and 
1356 Ibid. 210 (a) (4), 210 (c) (3) (E). FDIA. 12 U.S.C. 1821 (e) (3). Persons whose rights against the bank 
are uncertain and who have come to the conclusion that their rights may be differently defined and 
modified by a receiver in accordance with the FDIA. 12 U.S.C. 1821 (e) (3). The FDIC is authorised 
to assess uncertain and disputed claims lodged by creditors in the same way as the bankruptcy court.
1357 Dodd-Frank. 210 (a) (3) (A) (i). 
1358 Ibid. 210 (a) (3) (A) (i). 
1359 Ibid. 210 (a) (4).
1360 Ibid. 210 (c) (1) (2).
1361 Ibid. 210 (c) (3) (A), (B).
1362 Ibid. 2010 (a) (12) (D).
1363 Ibid. 210 (a)(11) (H) (i) (II).
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allows the trustee to challenge this kind of unfair transfers of creditor claims and to chal-
lenge the transaction, regardless of the borrower’s financial situation during transfer1364. 
In contrast, Section II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the receiver must intervene 
only if such transactions resulted in the company’s insolvency or have been carried out 
when the company had already been insolvent1365. Another difference is that there are no 
provisions analogous to Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, which, inter alia, confers the 
rights on the trustee to defend creditor claims, ensuring the security of the debtor’s assets. 
This law is interpreted in conjunction with Section 210 (a) (1) (d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which provides that the FDIC, acting as a financial institution’s receiver, might pursue 
recovery of bank assets held in other financial institutions, liquidate and close the legal 
person in view of all the completed payments and property transfers.
Qualified financial contracts. Financial contracts are generally the main non-banking 
or investment banking assets. For example, derivatives are key investment banking prod-
ucts. In essence, in simple terms, it is a bilateral contract with the value based on changes 
in interest rates, currencies or other inputs, when a certain event defined in the contract 
occurs (for example, the company starts failing in its obligations). One of the main objec-
tives of the Dodd-Frank Act is to control the risks arising out of derivative contracts, by 
providing for the obligation to carry out and further trade in derivative instruments even 
after the commencement of insolvency procedures1366.
Before the Dodd-Frank Act came into force, financial institutions facing financial diffi-
culties were confronted with major challenges encountered in managing the assets related 
to financial arrangements. Banks had to follow the general insolvency regime and ordinary 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the so-called automatic suspension of obligations after 
initiating bankruptcy proceedings. Under the Bankruptcy Code, institution of bankruptcy 
proceedings against a bank allowed terminating all agreements with the distressed institu-
tion or to carry out financial contract offsetting agreements and set-off, when calculating 
net obligations, seize the available collateral to the extent permitted by the net liabilities 
managed by the financial institution. Automatic suspension of obligations did not apply to 
financial counterparties. Even after the suspension of all obligations, certain exceptional 
bank counterparties could be classified as financial contracts: repos, urgent prior commit-
ments, commodity futures, securities contracts, asset swaps. There were no rules ipso facto 
governing the provisions or the preferential transfer of such or disputing the transactions 
vitiated by deception and the related instruments. In other words, the essence of the new 
legal regulation is that the rights of the counterparties related to financial contracts aris-
ing out of the latter cannot be remain unaffected by the bankruptcy process. The goal of 
such rule – is to reduce bank rescue with the use of public finances. The Dodd-Frank Act 
chose a different legal approach to the treatment of financial contracts at the time of bank 
insolvency. On the one hand, this act maintains the approach to suspension of the finan-
cial obligations during resolution. The related parties still retain immunity with regard 
1364 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548 (a) (1) (A).
1365 Ibid. 210 (a) (i), (ii).
1366 Skeel D.A. The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its (unintended) Con-
sequences, Research Paper No. 10-21. Institute for Law and Economics. 2010. P. 4. 
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to preferential and fair transfer of financial contracts to another financial institution1367. 
However, the suspension of obligations is considered in a broader sense than in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, as it applies to all counterparties of qualified financial contracts, and not only 
to certain counterparties referred to in the Bankruptcy Code. For example, while all asset 
swaps are benefiting from the protection guaranteed by the Bankruptcy Code in the case 
of insolvency1368, only the identified counterparties to the transaction, such as securities, 
commodities trading, futures contract brokers, stock exchange transactions brokers can 
obtain the benefits from the rules governing the protection of suspension of obligations 
provided for in the Bankruptcy Code1369. In addition, it is true that part II of the Dodd-
Frank Act regulates the protection of contractual rights of counterparties and makes it 
clear that the appointment of the bank’s receiver cannot change the rights of the parties 
of financial contracts. For example, “no one shall be allowed to refrain or prevent the 
implementation of any rights which this person may terminate, liquidate or otherwise ac-
celerate any qualified financial contracts of an insolvent financial institution, these rights 
and obligations arise from the date of appointment of the receiver (FDIC), or at any other 
time after the appointment1370. However, the Dodd-Frank Act provides for the possibility 
to suspend (at least temporarily) some important contractual rights of an insolvent bank. 
First, ipso facto the provisions (contract termination, offsetting agreements, set-off) are 
suspended from the date of the appointment of the receiver. The obligations shall be sus-
pended until the next business day, 5 p.m., or until the moment when qualified financial 
contracts are transferred to another financial institution1371. Similarly, the Act prohibits 
non-performance, by forbidding “suspension, effect, or cancellation of payment obliga-
tions” related to the parties of financial contracts only with regard to financial institution’s 
insolvency, or the fact that the FDIC is appointed to act as receiver1372. It provides for an 
exception. According to the provisions of Dodd-Frank Act, temporary suspension of the 
payment obligations of the insolvent financial institution is allowed1373. This exception, 
among other things, covers the suspension of qualified financial contracts traded through 
clearing organizations. If the FDIC fails to meet any “reserves, collateral, payment obliga-
tions under the rules of the clearing organisation, the latter shall be entitled to act without 
delay and refrain from all of its rights and the implementation of measures in accordance 
with its internal rules and applicable law1374.
Suspension of ipso facto clauses, in line with contract suspension for the defaulting 
party and payment obligations default (at least temporary) clauses, the Dodd-Frank Act 
gives the right and time to the FDIC to terminate qualified financial contracts or to trans-
fer them to another financial institution. The scheduled time is limited. Termination of 
1367 Dodd-Frank. 210 (c) (8) (C) (i).
1368 11 U.S.C. 101 (53C), 546 (g).
1369 Ibid. 546 (e).
1370 Dodd-Frank. 210 (c) (8) (A) (i) .
1371 Ibid. 210 (c) (10) (B).
1372 Ibid.210 (c) (8) (F) (i), (iii). It is presumed that these provisions are restored after qualified financial 
contracts are transferred to a third party (for approval in the case if a third party subsequently be-
comes insolvent).
1373 Ibid.210 (c) (8) (F) (i).
1374 Ibid.210 (c) (8) (G).
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contract fail to take place, and the payment obligation becomes enforceable again after (i) 
the contract is transferred to another legal entity, such as a bridge bank; (ii) until the next 
business day, 5 p.m., when the FDIC is appointed as a receiver1375. However, the coun-
terparty is unable to implement the termination rights only because qualified financial 
contracts were transferred to the temporary bank assigned with a conservator or receiver, 
the bankruptcy trustee, or other legitimate custodian, or who would have otherwise to un-
dergo ordinary insolvency procedure. The FDIC does not have the same contract perfor-
mance and default powers as those conferred by the Bankruptcy Code on the bankruptcy 
trustee and debtors, whose claims are secured. The Bankruptcy Code allows debtors with 
claims secured by assets to select an enforceable contract with a counterparty. Instead of 
approving several contracts for the calculation of the total obligation of the debtor, the 
Bankruptcy Code allows strategic actions of the secured debtor. For example, the takeover 
of secured agreement (by ensuring full payment to the counterparty), and by rejecting 
those contracts without a collateral (making sure the transaction parties are treated as 
regular unprotected lenders, who usually recover lower portion of the claim). The Dodd-
Frank Act explicitly prohibits selective ‘choices, since it requires that the FDIC terminates 
all or any financial contracts with the respective bank counterparty1376. The same ‘all or 
nothing’ principle applies to decisions taken by the FDIC when transferring financial con-
tracts to a bridge bank. The FDIC can transfer all or none of the financial contracts of a 
particular counterparty. Contract transfer must include not only the contract but also any 
other requirements associated with the counterparty, or any equity instrument or a credit 
enhancing security obligations under the contract1377.
The descriptive part of the Dodd-Frank Act II ensures that the insolvency of a finan-
cial institution does not affect the execution of financial contracts. The appointment of 
an administrator shall not lead to any changes in the contracts. After the contracts are 
transferred to the bridge bank, they are performed according to their original terms, as 
if nothing had changed. For example, all enforceable contracts provide borrowers with 
collateral the ability to benefit from healthy financial institutions from third countries. In 
essence, according to the Dodd-Frank Act, departing from the provisions of the US Bank-
ruptcy Code, the following main objectives are pursued: to encourage FDCI operational 
decision-making, to avoid bank rescue with public finances, by forcing the bank counter-
parties to accept losses, as well as to minimise the financial burden on taxpayers1378. 
4.4.3. Loss Allocation. Priority of Creditors’ Claims 
In order to purify the development and the potential of possible bank resolution strat-
egies, it is important to determine the creditors assuming losses incurred by reason of 
bank insolvency and the extent of such losses, and the creditors to be protected from bank 
resolution decisions. All regulatory models of bank insolvency procedures dealing with 
distressed banks are associated with the mechanism of distribution of loss resulting from 
1375 Ibid. 210 (c) (8) (F) (ii), (10 (B) (i).
1376 Ibid. 210 (c) (11). 
1377 Ibid. 210 (c) (9) (A).
1378 Ibid.204 (A), 206.
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bank insolvency. It is important to reveal the parties bearing the first losses in the event of 
bank resolution and whether such losses are fully allocated to the the bank counterparties, 
and whether a certain share of the financial burden and losses is borne by taxpayers.
In conventional bankruptcy cases of corporate entities, distribution of losses is con-
solidated in the main insolvency laws. The most important aspect of distribution of losses 
in general insolvency law is that the financial claims ranking at the top of the creditors’ 
sequence are satisfied at first place, whereas lower-ranking claims are satisfied only if any 
funds remain in the insolvent entity. Losses are allocated on the pro rata basis according 
to the hierarchy of creditors’ claims. Another important principle of general insolvency 
law is that creditors of the same class are treated in an equal manner. This principle recalls 
equal treatment of creditors (par conditio creditorum). It is based on the idea that in col-
lective insolvency procedures creditors of the same ranking must obtain a proportion of 
their claims on an equal footing with other creditors of the same class1379. Categorisation of 
creditors according to classes, for example, by distinguishing tax authorities or employees 
and their claims or by determining that depositors shall (not) be distinguished from the 
general class of creditors. depends on the following factors (i) social priorities of a par-
ticular country and granting of priority to a particular social class; (ii) the intention of the 
legislature. It is important to note that any change in the sequence of creditors or conferral 
of new rights to certain creditors impacts the pecuniary interests of other creditors and the 
final distribution of money from the total asset mass of the bankrupt entity.
The priority of creditor claims in the case of bank insolvency naturally affects the be-
haviour of creditors both before and during the banking crisis. For example, conferring 
“exceptionally high priority” for a certain class of creditors creates funds to finance bank 
rescue operations, affects the probability of the bank facing financial difficulties to obtain 
financing in the market, especially in times of financial distress. It also affects the creditors 
whose claims are ranked lower. Moreover, the priority of depositors’ claims reduces cash 
return rates for other general creditors, encourages stronger monitoring, observation and 
more careful assessment of the potential risks to other bank counterparties. If the loss 
allocation mechanism and the creditor ranking is clear and predictable, the competent 
authorities review the creditors’ loss allocation mechanisms and identify their social ac-
ceptability whenever a bank faces solvency problems. For example, by reason of priority of 
creditor claims, it is likely that losses will cause systemic contagion effect and lead to even 
greater losses for the whole financial system. In this case, as revealed by recent banking cri-
sis, it is likely that public authorities will be more prone to use public financial assistance 
in order to protect specific creditors from losses they would suffer in the case of normal 
bankruptcy procedures or bank resolution. Hence, final bank resolution result is closely 
related to the satisfaction of creditors’ expectations. The question arises as to the types of 
loss distribution mechanisms established in the relevant jurisdictions?
The first principle long reaffirmed in the doctrine pertains to the fact that the bank 
shareholders are the first to bear the losses1380. This legislative direction is based on the fact 
that shareholders have invested their capital and automatically determined equity capital 
1379 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legislative Guide on Insol-
vency Law, 2005, Section 7. 
1380 Hoelscher D.S. Supra note 2. P. 98. 
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risk after the bank became insolvent. Therefore, the initial allocation of losses to share-
holders is logical, since they receive all or most of the bank’s profit earned in successful life 
times of the bank, which means that shareholders should lose their capital when the bank’s 
activities are unsuccessful and the bank suffers losses. Likewise, shareholders should be 
the last persons to recover the cash, if any, after the resolution and/or liquidation of the 
bank and the fulfillment of other creditor claims.
Secondly, subordinated creditors assume other bank insolvency losses. The essence of 
this sequence is that subordinated creditors have voluntarily agreed to act as such with 
regard to other general creditors, if a bank experiences financial difficulties. Basel capital 
standards also provide for the requirement that differences must exist between subordi-
nated debt and other forms of debt when calculating the Tier 2 capital share1381.
Third, general creditors bear the remaining losses. This group of creditors generally 
includes unprotected depositors, conventional lenders, bond holders.
4.4.3.1. Priority of Creditor Claims. EU Regulation
The EU legal framework requires considering the order of priority of creditor claims 
determined in accordance with the applicable national insolvency laws of the EU Member 
States. Losses shall be distributed to the creditors of the bank under resolution after the 
shareholders in accordance with the hierarchy and priority of their claims under normal 
insolvency proceedings, unless expressly provided otherwise1382.
The first exception under the EU legal framework is that resolution authorities should 
apply the bail-in tool in a way that respects the pari passu treatment of creditors and the 
statutory ranking of claims under the applicable national insolvency law. Losses should 
first be absorbed by regulatory capital instruments and should be allocated to sharehold-
ers either through the cancellation or transfer of shares or through severe dilution. Where 
those instruments are not sufficient, subordinated debt should be converted or written 
down. Senior liabilities should be converted or written down if the subordinate classes 
have been converted or written down in full.1383 When complying with the regulatory re-
quirements, write down or conversion powers shall be exercised in accordance with the 
priority of claims under normal insolvency proceedings, in a way that produces the fol-
lowing results: (a) Common Tier 1 items are reduced first in proportion to the losses; (b) 
the principal amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments is written down or converted into 
1381 Tier II capital consists of debt instruments meeting the regulatory criteria with the primary objective 
to seek to cover losses when a bank becomes insolvent. For example, such debt instruments are sub-
ordinated creditors with a minimum of 5 years original maturity. The common feature of the first and 
second level capital is that they can be written off or converted into common shares. when the issuing 
bank cannot afford to attract additional private capital searching for funding in the capital markets. 
Other debt instruments within the framework of Basel III are to be considered as contingent capital 
(convertible capital instruments) or bail-in debt. Later on, these measures are converted into the first 
level capital, until the bank reaches the threshold of non-viability. Basel III rules eliminated hybrid 
bank capital instruments that allowed circumventing capital rules. Chorafas N. D. Basel III, the Devil 
and Global Banking/ Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking And Financial Institutions. Great Brit-
ain. 2012. P. 5.
1382 BRRD. Art. 34 (1), (b).
1383 Ibid. Recital (77). 
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Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or both, to the extent required to achieve theresolu-
tion objectives or to the extent of the capacity of the relevant capital instruments, which-
ever is lower; (c) the principal amount of Tier 2 instruments is written down or converted 
into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or both, to the extent required to achieve the 
resolution objectives or to the extent of the capacity of the relevant capital instruments, 
whichever is lower1384. Where the principal amount of a capital instrument is written 
down, no liability to the holder of the relevant capital instrument shall remain under or in 
connection with that amount of the instrument, which has been written down, except for 
any liability already accrued and any liability for damages that may arise as a result of an 
appeal challenging the legality of the exercise of the write-down power1385.
Another important element of the legal regulation pertains to ranking of deposits in the 
case of bank insolvency. According to the BRRD, Member States must make the appropri-
ate amendments in their national law governing normal insolvency proceedings to ensure 
(i) a part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises which exceeds the coverage level, (ii) deposits from natural persons, micro, 
small and medium–sized enterprises that would be eligible deposits shall have higher pri-
ority ranking than the ranking provided for claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred 
creditors. Covered deposits and deposit guarantee schemes subrogating for the rights and 
obligations of covered depositors in the case of bankruptcy have the same priority ranking 
which is higher than the ranking referred above1386.
One more exemption under the EU resolution regulation is that the Board may recover 
any reasonable expenses properly incurred in connection with the use of the resolution 
tools or powers, as it is treated as a preferred creditor of the bank under resolution. Pro-
ceeds generated as a result of the termination of the operation of the bridge bank or the 
asset management vehicle, shall also be attributed to preferred creditors1387. 
4.4.3.2. Priority of Creditor Claims. US Regulation
The objective of protecting taxpayers from bank insolvency losses is best explained 
by the priority of unsecured creditors, regulated by Art. 210 (b) (1) of the Dodd-Frank 
legislation Art. Such regulation is significantly different from the one contained in the 
Bankruptcy Code, especially with regard to the ranking of claims held by the federal gov-
ernment as a creditor. According to the Dodd-Frank Act, the first priority in the ranking is 
given to administration and/or resolution costs incurred during insolvency.1388 Adminis-
trative expenses consist of either monetary costs incurred by the US government or other 
public institutions. Second priority is given to claims related to salaries and bonuses of or-
dinary employees. Third priority is conferred on contributions reated to employee benefit 
planning. Employee claims are subject to the guarantee threshold of USD 11 725 (indexed 
1384 Ibid. Art. 60 (1).
1385 Ibid. Art. 60 (2). 
1386 BRRD Art. 108. 
1387 SRM Art. 22 (6) (d), (b), (c).
1388 Dodd-Frank Act. 210 (b) (2). Special priority is given to the administration costs incurred by the 
FDIC acting as an administrator of the insolvent bank.
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on the basis of inflation), i.e. same as in the United States Bankruptcy Code, Part 507. After 
meeting the above priority claims, all other general unprotected creditor claims can be 
met. They are then followed by subordinated, unprotected claims relating to wages, sala-
ries and bonuses of senior bank officials (managers) and directors. Any remaining part of 
the ranking goes to equity (capital) instrument holders. It should be noted that the FDIC 
may deviate from the scheme of this ranking only in exceptional cases, when the need 
arises to encourage financial stability in the market. However, the FDIC has broad powers 
to exclude certain classes of creditors from other creditors, contrary to the principle of 
equality, on the grounds that this exclusive treatment maximises the value of the insolvent 
bank’s assets, minimises losses to creditors or is otherwise important for the bank receiv-
er1389. The FDIC, first acting as the receiver, shall immediately pay-off compensations to 
depositors, but also shall be entitled to postpone payments to other creditors1390. Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, concerned with bank insolvency procedure, provides for the 
discretion whereby creditor classes may agree to obtain a smaller portion of the claim, if 
it is a sensible and rational solution. In addition, the borrower can take the opportunity 
to make limited payments to essential suppliers, vendors and other creditors, if such ac-
tion contributes to the preservation of the bank’s assets. The Dodd-Frank Act provides for 
similar regulation1391, which aims to preserve market stability.
Protected creditor claims, set-off and protection measures. In essence, the Dodd-Frank 
Act is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Protected creditor claims are treated more or 
less the same as in Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code1392. The right to set-off is guaran-
teed under the Dodd-Frank legislation as well, unless such set-off cannot run smoothly by 
reason of bank insolvency conditions identified at that particular time. The regulation is 
similar to the provisions of Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code1393. However, some excep-
tions exist. Primarily this concerns the treatment of the right to set off protected creditor 
claims. The most important aspect is that the bank resolution procedure fails to provide 
adequate legal protection analogous to that ensured by Sections 361, 362 (d), 363 (e) of 
the US Bankruptcy Code. If the value of the collateral depreciates or significant differences 
appear in the property, there is no legal solution for the protected creditors to apply to the 
FDIC with a petition for (i) adequate protection; (ii) permission to implement contractual 
rights against the collateral holder. Furthermore, no legal solutions exist to organise the 
release of collateral of financial institutions in the event that a financial institution has not 
entered into capital arrangements on financial collateral. By default, the FDIC needs to 
harmonise the rules and regulations contained in this section with other insolvency laws 
which would otherwise be applicable to financial institution1394. Given that other provi-
sions of the Dodd-Frank require that creditors of the bank under resolution receive no less 
than they would receive in the case of bank liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, it is likely that the FDIC will implement rules in its technical documentation that 
1389 Dodd-Frank. 210 (b) (4).
1390 Ibid. 210 (a) (7) (A).
1391 After analysing Chapter II, it can be stated that the FDIC is granted broad discretion to pay or not to 
pay a part of the claim to creditors.
1392 Ibid. 210 (a) (3) (D) (ii).
1393 Ibid. 210 (a) (12) (A), (B).
1394 Dodd-Frank. 209 sec.
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allow secured creditors to be adequately protected by remedies similar to those provided 
in Sections 361, 362 (d) and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. The FDIC can unify the Dodd-
Frank legislation with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to the extent permitted by 
the Dodd-Frank legislation. There is one important exception, however. The Dodd-Frank 
legislation allows the FDIC to sell assets freely and without creditor claim set-off and with-
out offering adequate legal protection for creditors. When the bank’s assets are sold or 
transferred during resolution, set-off of creditor claims is not allowed both for protected 
(under bankruptcy law) and unprotected creditor claims1395.
Another aspect related to the ranking of creditor claims concerns the requirements 
for managing bodies. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that persons responsible 
for the bank’s insolvency must be removed from the bank’s management and brought to 
justice. This is contrary to the regulation provided in Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code, which usually allows the Board of Governors to maintain their position and to 
continue the company’s business in the insolvent entity. Meanwhile, according to Title II 
of the Dodd-Frank Act and its provisions the legislator seeks to punish the bank’s senior 
officers and the Director who have contributed to the insolvency of financial institutions. 
The FDIC may sue directors, officers, lawyers, accountants and other relevant persons for 
extremely negligent behaviour that led to “inadvertent or otherwise ill-treatment or exer-
cise of the powers or investment in improper assets of a financial institution1396. The FDIC 
may also recover wage-related payments made during the two-year period in administer-
ing the insolvent bank from any existing or former governing body of the bank, which 
has significantly contributed to the bank’s insolvency conditions1397. A compensation is 
defined and understood in a broad sense, including salaries, bonuses, other direct benefits, 
guaranteed compensations and any profits derived from the sale of bank securities1398. In 
addition, it should be noted that the Federal Reserve (or other appropriate public body) 
may ban senior bank officers and directors from working in other financial institutions for 
a maximum period of two years. The legal basis of the sanctions is the evidence that the 
management or directors are directly or indirectly related to or have participated in any 
unsafe or unreliable operations and banking practice related to any other financial institu-
tion; obtained a financial benefit or other benefits granted on the ground that this practice 
and the full or continuous failure to take the company’s security and solvency into account 
has been demonstrated in practice1399.
In conclusion, it must be held that modern bank resolution law provides public au-
thorities with additional powers to suspend contracts (in all relevant jurisdictions) con-
cluded with the bank under resolution, and to continue contractual payments and obliga-
tions during resolution. Contractual commitments may be temporarily suspended until 
the actions of bank resolution are pending. Such powers help ensure the effective transfer 
of bank shares or debt instruments and assets, rights and obligations to a third party. 
1395 Ibid. 204 (d). 
1396 Ibid. 201 (f), (g).
1397 Ibid. 210 (s). Under these rules, it is presumed that the Chief Executive Officer, the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and the Head of Finance bear significant responsibility for the insolvency. 380.7 
(b) (1) (i).
1398 Ibid. 210 (s) (3).
1399 Dodd-Frank. Sec. 213.
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Resolution authorities are also vested with the rights to restrict the ability of collateral 
creditors of the bank under resolution to enforce their rights to collateral associated with 
the assets of the bank under resolution. The resolution authority must carry out their ac-
tions very promptly. Both in the EU and in the United States, certain creditor groups can 
be distinguished by derogation from the principle of equal treatment of creditors. In the 
US, such a situation is permitted because the exclusive treatment helps to increase the 
bank’s asset value, reduce creditor losses or is necessary to secure the public interest and 
this is decided by the administrative authority. The EU legislation prioritises deposits cor-
responding to claims of individuals, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises above the 
insured amount.
4.5. Concluding Comments 
The bank resolution regime in the relevant jurisdictions is important for national 
economies and meets two basic requirements: (i) resolution rules are fairly predictable, 
the end result of applying a particular bank resolution tool is predictable; (ii) the rules 
are sound enough. It should be noted that the new legal regulation has not yet been put 
in practice. In the relevant jurisdictions  , the objectives of bank resolution regime can 
be achieved only in accordance with the applicable resolution principles. The prescribed 
bank resolution regime enables early, swift, broad, and decisive resolution actions taken 
by the resolution authority as soon as the bank’s financial trouble is on the horizon. After 
analysing the legal frameworks of different jurisdictions a conclusion can be made that 
the major objectives of the bank resolution regime are to minimise the costs to the so-
ciety and taxpayers as much as possible, to maintain the stability of the financial system 
and the critical banking functions. The bank resolution process requires legal certainty, 
transparency, and predictability, and these legal principles inevitably presume a certain 
approach towards shareholders and creditors of the bank. One of the key positive features 
of bank resolution is that after repealing the provision implying bank rescue by public 
funds, the chance of resolution should encourage uninsured creditors to better assess their 
investment-related risks. Eventually, financing arrangements for resolution are set up to 
ensure better achievement of resolution objectives. After analysing the practice of Lithu-
anian insolvent banks it appeared that he applied bank resolution tools were characterised 
by both advantages and disadvantages. It is particularly important to avoid the contagion 
effects of a systemic risk. It should be noted that the positive law of the relevant jurisdic-
tions establishes bail-in as a new modern bank resolution tool. This tool is aimed at avoid-
ing formal insolvency procedures through restructuring the bank’s balance sheet and by 
ensuring its going concern to avoid negative consequences of bank insolvency procedure. 
These tools firstly force subordinated creditors and some senior privileged creditors to 
bear losses by writing off their debts or converting them into equity and thereby contribut-
ing to bank resolution. In essence, the bank resolution regime ensures that the legal effects 
arising from bank resolution and/or subsequent liquidation are consistent with the degree 
of legal protection of stakeholders affected by resolution. The safeguards established in the 
bank resolution law optimally balance private and public interests. Upon implementation 
of bank resolution in the jurisdictions at issue, the effect on creditors and shareholders is 
proportionate to the public interest objectives.
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CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
The legal concept of bank insolvency framework
1. Banks perform critical functions in the real economy and the stability of banking 
conduct is in conformity with public interest. Lex generalis rules are inadequate to 
address bank insolvency issues. Firstly, lex generalis fails to ensure the continuity of 
critical functions of banks, national financial stability objectives, fails to reduce costs 
to taxpayers, interrupts and disturbs the bank’s business operations. Secondly, due 
to the specific nature of banking activity, which affects the public interest, and for a 
number of procedural grounds, such as: the need for swift bank resolution decision-
making, specific triggers for bank insolvency, objectives of different procedures, etc. 
Thirdly, if lex generalis was to apply to banks, in the case of bank resolution this would 
cause severe damage to both private and public interests, destabilise financial stability, 
that is why bank resolution regime primarily protects the public interest and only then 
seeks to safeguard private rights and interests.
2. The nature of bank resolution rules affects the judicial review of bank resolution decisi-
ons: the general insolvency procedure takes place under the supervision and control of 
the court, whereas bank resolution process should be conducted expeditiously without 
interruption. Bank resolution tools in all of the compared jurisdictions are therefore 
adopted and applied only by the administrative authorities. An appeal is permissible, 
but only to a very limited extent.
3. Financial stability is an international concern but cannot be resolved by efforts of one 
jurisdiction only. After the recent banking crisis, all of the compared jurisdictions were 
following international financial standards and implemented comprehensive bank in-
solvency regulatory reforms. At the international level, the paradigm of bank insolven-
cy law objectives has changed. All of the relevant jurisdictions have different institutio-
nal and legal systems, and bank resolution legal regimes cannot be directly compared. 
Regulatory reforms were based on the agreements at the level of G20 and the FSB. 
During the recent banking crisis, the US and Swiss legal systems were stronger than in 
the EU Member States at that time. The US and Swiss public authorities did not face 
the challenge of harmonisation across the EU Member States. At the same time, after a 
shift of paradigm, the EU has introduced the most comprehensive regulation of bank 
insolvency law in the form of the Banking Union.
4. Risks common to all jurisdictions that may trigger bank insolvency relate to liquidity 
and systemic risk. The ‘too big to fail’ doctrine analysis has revealed that insolvency 
cases of large, complex banks performing systemically important functions pose a very 
significant legal issue. After analysing the recent banking crisis practice, it is obvious 
that there was a need to diminish the likelihood of insolvency not only of conventional 
but also of systemically important banks and to create a legal regime that would effecti-
vely deal with bank insolvencies without using taxpayer money. The practical analysis 
revealed that Switzerland was the most successful in dealing with the ‘too big to fail’ 
problem during the recent banking crisis.
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5. Banks may turn into insolvency rather promptly, for this reason the determination 
of events triggering bank insolvency and regulation of the qualifying criteria plays an 
important role. Ad hoc solutions are unpredictable, that is why they fail to satisfy the 
objectives of legal certainty. The most comprehensive description of bank insolvency 
conditions and criteria is provided in the EU legal system. As bank financing and liqui-
dity is highly dependent on the confidence of market participants, it is not possible to 
determine bank insolvency relying only on quantitative criteria. If the required quanti-
tative criteria are poorly regulated in bank insolvency law, bank insolvency procedures 
could be wrongly initiated even against a viable, healthy bank(s). Quantitative criteria 
are equally developed in all jurisdictions relevant to the investigation. The EU legal 
framework provides for the most explicit discretionary bank insolvency criteria and 
the related set of rules. The US legal system is characterised by profound, exceptional 
traditions and differentiated bank capital adequacy rules. In the Swiss legal system, 
bank capital requirements are more demanding than in other compared jurisdictions. 
The higher the discretion given to public institutions, the greater the risk for excessive 
control exercised by regulatory authorities. In assessing bank insolvency threshold, 
regulators should focus more on financial viability assessment, based on prospective 
calculations and rely on economic market-based models, instead of retrospective in-
solvency tests based on classic methods. In particular, it is important to determine the 
eligibility of bank liquidity. 
Bank resolution regime
6. Bank resolution is an administrative process, a special banking crisis management 
tool, an alternative to ordinary bank bankruptcy proceedings, aimed to ensure the 
continuity of essential functions performed by the bank, maintain and protect finan-
cial stability and avoid costs for taxpayers and restore long-term viability of the entire 
bank or certain parts of it. A bank is subjected to resolution following the resolution 
objectives pursued by legislation by applying bank resolution tools, such as: sale of 
business, bridge bank, asset separation tool, bail-in tool. The purpose of the bank reso-
lution legal regime is to remove insolvent banks from the financial system at the lowest 
cost, while maintaining private and public confidence in the banking sector, properly 
control legal and economic risks, protect the obligations deserving or even requiring 
protection in order to achieve the public interest objectives of the bank: continuity of 
functions, maximisation of the value of bank assets, initial allocation of bank insol-
vency losses to the shareholders, reduction of adverse economic and social impact for 
the state, protection of public finances and the financial system (including payment 
systems), protection of depositors.
7. First, in all of the compared jurisdictions, the existing bank resolution regime is im-
portant since, in particular, it serves to avoid damage to public interest (by securing 
financial stability, the critical functions of the bank, and protecting deposits, customer 
assets and public funds). Second, it ensures the possibility for the insolvent bank to 
leave the market smoothly, without causing systemic disruptions or by minimising 
such disruptions, creates lower risk to financial stability, reduces moral hazard, and 
helps maintaining or restoring confidence of the market. Third, the bank resolution 
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regime existing in the EU, the US and Switzerland minimises the SIFI effects, positi-
vely affects borrowing decisions, plays a preventive role in enabling public authorities 
to restructure the bank in a manner preventing systemic damage to public and private 
interest breaches. Finally, the new bank resolution framework would enable quick and 
a safe solutions in the case of bank failure, leaving dispute resolution for a later stage.
8. All of the compared jurisdictions contain a rule that a failing bank can be liquidated 
under ordinary bankruptcy procedure, and liquidation should always be considered 
before the transformation of the bank. Bank resolution tools apply only if the bank 
cannot be liquidated under normal bankruptcy procedure, without avoiding negative 
consequences and threats to critical functions of the bank, negative impact on finan-
cial stability, the use of public financial support or deterioration of creditors’ financial 
situation.
9. In all of the relevant jurisdictions, the main legal principles governing bank resolution 
regime duly balance public and private interests: the bank’s shareholders are the first 
to assume insolvency loss, while creditors bear the loss only after the shareholders 
and in accordance with creditor claim hierarchy, senior bank managers are replaced, 
creditors belonging to the same class are treated equally, no creditor shall incur gre-
ater losses than would have been incurred if the bank was subjected to an ordinary 
insolvency procedure, going concern assumption is maintained (public interest), and 
insured deposits are protected.
10. The central principles of the bank insolvency law, balancing private and public inte-
rests, are based on public law. Bank resolution tools shall ensure legal certainty for in-
dividuals, the right ofdefence, must be balanced with the public and private interest, 
proportionate, and provide adequate compensation to the affected individuals after the 
intervention. The legal principles classified in the dissertation and deriving from the EU 
and US legal systems (namely, the principles of legitimate expectations, legitimate aim, 
proportionality) are justified and can be applied both individually and in conjunction, 
by appropriately balancing public and private interests at the time of the bank resolu-
tion procedure. As long as the relevant countries duly implement the above-mentioned 
legal principles and safeguards set forth in the relevant provisions of the bank resolu-
tion law, it is difficult to conceive a situation in which the fundamental private rights 
would be breached.
11. In all of the compared jurisdictions, bank resolution is an administrative process, with 
the primary objective to protect the liquidity requirements of short-term creditors, 
especially depositors, and manage the financial assets of the bank in order to ensure the 
failing bank’s asset and franchise value. Therefore, bank resolution, in particular, seeks 
to avoid systemic contagion in the financial sector, aiming for social welfare, which 
cannot be equated to private objectives and absolute priority of creditors’ claims. Bank 
resolution legal regime can be treated as the result of cost-benefit optimisation.
12. Bank resolution regime both in the EU, the US and Switzerland is a specialised area of 
law designed to address solvency problems faced by a failing bank, by first restructu-
ring and only then liquidating the bank. The aims of bank resolution legal regime are 
fundamentally different from the general insolvency law objectives. Bank resolution 
rules cannot be incorporated into general insolvency law due to the existing dispari-
ties between the bank liquidation procedure and the aim to maintain bank activity or 
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successfully reorganise the latter. Nevertheless, ordinary bank insolvency law (ban-
kruptcy procedure) remains extremely important in the context of bank resolution 
rules. All of the relevant jurisdictions apply ordinary insolvency law only when specific 
bank resolution rules do not apply.
13. In the EU and the US, bank resolution   is financed by contributions from the in-
dustry ex ante to create a single bank resolution fund. The situation is different in 
Switzerland, where resolution and stabilisation fund still remains the prerogative of 
the CB, acting as a ‘lender of the last resort’. In Switzerland, the Fund is established 
on an ad hoc basis when the need to protect exceptional public interest arises. Such 
regulation fails to comply with the features of the new banking paradigm. Where 
pre-financing is not enough to cover bank losses or resolution costs, the EU, and the 
US legal systems provide for the obligation to collect ex post contributions and to 
‘fill’ the fund with the input from the banking industry. The EU bank contribution 
consist of flat-rate payments and the risk-adjustment premiums of the bank. The US 
applies an individual risk-based system. Since the EU single resolution fund system is 
disturbing for large banks, the new legal regulation will compel the Member States to 
reform their systems of deposit guarantee schemes. Although these funding structu-
res may be combined, financing sources remain separate, which requires additional 
administrative resources. At the same time, this will help countries to create a system 
limiting the financial burden at times when private and public financial resources 
are exhausted in the financial markets. Resolution funds will make it possible to pre-
vent destabilisation of the financial markets and to reduce costs to taxpayers as far as 
possible. Both the EU and the US provide for a backstop funding and reorganisation 
instrument, such as the ESM funds in the EU, and the Treasury funds in the US.
Bank resolution tools
14. In all of the compared jurisdictions, bank resolution tools are designed to mitigate 
the adverse effects caused by bank distress rather than to fully avoid the liquidation 
of the bank. Timely and appropriate application of the bank resolution tool and only 
then liquidation of the bank, in view of the advantages and disadvantages of the par-
ticular resolution tool explored in this dissertation, the possibility of a positive social 
impact appears: first, the likelihood of the systemic banking crisis diminishes and the 
protection from economic downturns after the banking sector crisis is ensured, and, 
secondly, the best possible application of the bank resolution tool reduces taxpayer 
losses attributable to the support provided to the bank.
15. In all of the compared jurisdictions, direct liquidation of the bank cannot serve as one 
of the solutions to address the financial difficulties faced by a bank, if other market 
players can swiftly replace critical banking functions. If a bank is failing or likely to 
fail, private sector solutions must be employed in the first place, for example, by selling 
business to other market participants. If such a solution is not possible or proves unsu-
ccessful, other bank resolution measures could be adopted according to the ‚least cost‘ 
principle with regard to the deposit insurer and the public interest.
16. In all of the compared jurisdictions, the bail-in tool will strongly contribute to the po-
wers of public authorities dealing with both large and complex, as well as conventional 
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bank distress problems, when other resolution tools prove insufficient due to the ab-
sence of private buyers or where the latter are not readily available, but even if they are, 
the application of other measures  can increase market concentration or the size of the 
remaining financial institutions. In the case of bank resolution, a bail-in tool provides 
the right to assign the insolvent bank losses to private individuals and to recapitalise the 
bank instead of using taxpayers‘ money.
17. The disadvantage of the bail-in tool in all of the relevant jurisdictions is that, although 
the mechanism increases the creditworthiness of the bank, it fails to provide cash to 
the bank. In addition, regulation requires greater clarity as to the location of the bank 
capital that may be subjected to the measure under consideration, also with regard to 
the form of maintaining the capital, i.e. the legal person of the banking group that dis-
poses of bank debt instruments. In terms of time, it is particularly important, since the 
tool is applied before the use of public funds. In addition, in the result of this measure, 
significant parts of debt instruments held by large banks may remain unused, espe-
cially in cases where banks refinance themselves, i.e. by means of deposits. It cannot 
be excluded that the number of legal disputes will increase with regard to the discrimi-
nation of a particular class of creditors whose claims will be written off or converted. 
An overall advantage of the tool is that it will provide legal certainty with regard to the 
specific amount of funds required to cover bank losses, encourage early recapitalisa-
tion of banks and strengthen the bank’s business continuity assumption. In all of the 
compared jurisdictions, the bail-in tool replaces public support with sanctions against 
private individuals.
18. In all of the compared jurisdictions, financial stabilisation measures are treated as a 
governmental measure of last resort used as an alternative to bank resolution tools. 
These measures are used only after assessing the possibility to apply all other bank 
resolution tools, when the classic bank resolution tools are not sufficient to protect 
the public interest. They can also take the form of public support measures to increase 
bank capital or bank ownership takeover by the state.
Institutional framework of bank resolution decision-making and control 
mechanisms
19. In all of the compared jurisdictions, the infrastructure of public institutions perfor-
ming key role in the bank resolution decision-making process consists of the follo-
wing critical institutions: banking supervisory authorities, deposit insurance agencies, 
courts. Their role is mainly related to the protection of public interest. In order for the 
bank resolution legal regime to function effectively, public authorities need the powers 
to act promptly and in some cases outside the scope of the general corporate law pro-
visions, governance rules, often associated with the fact that intervention requires the 
consent of private individuals.
20. Different opinions exist as to whether priority should be given to administrative or 
judicial bank resolution decision-making procedures. In all of the compared juris-
dictions, bank resolution decisions are taken by administrative bodies, and econo-
mic bank resolution assessments are carried out by public authorities, whereas courts 
must rely on them. However, judicial proceedings remain relevant for the disputed 
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bank resolution decisions in order to guarantee the fundamental rights of private par-
ties (the right to a fair hearing, the right to compensation for property expropriation), 
legitimate expectations, proportionality of action between the public interest and the 
protection of property rights, and the legitimate public interest objective. Adminis-
trative decision-making procedure is more efficient, because it is swifter, which is 
directly related to lesser depreciation of bank assets. In addition, bank resolution de-
cisions require specific expertise, bank resolution procedures are very complex, con-
cerned with complicated legal issues, often undertaken at the time of banking crisis, 
and therefore it is presumed that administrative authorities have better knowledge, 
resources and operating capacity. The core element that outweighs the argumentation 
– is that during bank resolution, a need for cooperation with other public institutions 
arises, and this makes it more efficient for preparing resolution decisions, whereby 
decisions can be taken by a group of people – and in barely a few hours, where neces-
sary.
21. In the EU and the US, courts apply bank resolution tool ex ante, and the application in 
court is subjected to immediate execution. Both in the EU and the US, suspension of 
the resolution decision would run counter the public interest. The parties may appe-
al against the resolution decision ex post. While the judicial review of administrative 
action-based decisions is the central safeguard for the individuals’ rights as a result 
of possible mistakes and abuse, the right of appeal is not absolute and is subject to a 
number of limitations and criteria discussed in the dissertation. In addition, adminis-
trative acts are not automatically affected. In the US, the appeal is only possible against 
bank resolution decisions with regard to the imposition of insolvency threshold and 
whether the bank meets the statutory definition of a financial institution. Expropria-
tion of property rights is justified in emergency situations only, in order to guarantee 
fundamental rights of the individuals. In the EU, bank resolution decisions and actions 
can be appealed against only when the resolution tools are applied to banks that do not 
meet the insolvency conditions, and only in the absence of financial stability objectives 
serving general interest. Both the EU and the United States allow derogations from the 
principle of the rights of the defence, given the primary importance of the financial 
stability objective, which serves the welfare of the people and the public interest.
Impact of the bank resolution regime on creditors and shareholders
22. Creditor claims are related to the administration of property rights. In the EU, the 
US and Switzerland, from the beginning of the bank resolution procedure the rights 
of the counterparties are subjected to contract termination restrictions and certain 
cases of suspension of bank obligations. Such restrictions are necessary for the public 
authorities to obtain an accurate picture of the balance sheet of the insolvent bank, 
disregarding the changes in value and quantity of the bank assets which may result 
from the intense exercise of termination rights.
23. In all of the compared jurisdictions, the hierarchy of satisfaction of creditor claims 
significantly differs from the hierarchy according to general insolvency law. First of 
all, bank insolvency losses are to be absorbed by regulatory capital instruments, and 
losses are distributed to shareholders by writing off shares, or by significantly redu-
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cing the earnings per share, by converting debt into capital. When such measures are 
not adequate, the second step concerns the subordinated debt write-off or conver-
sion. Primary liabilities of the bank are converted or written off after converting all 
the subordinated creditors or writing off their claims. The EU is characterised by the 
fact that different requirements for the sequence of bank deposits apply in the case 
of insolvency. Natural persons and micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises are 
guaranteed a part of the relevant deposits in excess of the insured amount, by giving 
priority over ordinary uninsured priority creditor claims. Such regulation may nega-
tively affect these depositors, since many micro-, small and medium-sized businesses 
are major customers of banks. Better protection of their deposit rights may increase 
lending costs, e.g. banks may increase interest rates. The peculiarity of the US system 
is that the law allows departing from creditor hierarchy provided for in the general in-
solvency law only when the intention is to maintain financial stability in the market. In 
addition, the FDIC may distinguish certain classes of creditors, by way of derogation 
from the principle of pari passu, if this contributes to the increase in the value of bank 
assets and reduction of creditor losses. Switzerland is characterised by the fact that the 
principles governing the conversion of debt into capital and the hierarchy of creditor 
claims specifically is set in the restructuring plan.
24. In bank resolution, the objective of legal safeguards and criteria for balancing private 
and public interests through applying special bank resolution tools is to maximise le-
gal certainty and predictability of the legal consequences arising from bank resolution. 
Predictability of the bank resolution process also guides the conduct of bank sharehol-
ders ex ante. Therefore, clear and predictable rules and principles strengthen market 
discipline. If it is clear that in ‘bad times’ bank insolvency losses will be absorbed by 
private individuals, shareholders and creditors, this accordingly encourages sharehol-
ders and creditors to exercise closer control of the company on their own initiative and 
to take early action to recapitalise the bank or to implement other measures to restore 
market confidence and ensure public interest. An ex post predictable bank resolution 
process allows ordinary and efficient reallocation of economic resources in a way that 
promotes growth and enhances overall well-being.
25. The EU legal framework provides for strong protection of private property rights of 
bank shareholders, while the US legal system foresees more limited legal protection of 
private ownership. If in both the EU and the US bank resolution tools are applied and 
the powers of public authorities are employed to attain public interest objectives and 
are used regardless of the principles of legitimate expectations, the rights of defence 
and the right to compensation, such a limited scope of the shareholders’ rights bre-
aches private interest. At the same time, the principles governing protection of indivi-
dual rights and the related legal principles should be interpreted in conjunction with 
the broader public interest objectives, in order to protect financial stability, interests 
of other public entities, by taking into account the functions performed by banks and 
their importance for the overall economy.
Based on the aforementioned considerations, the following suggestions are provided 
for a more detailed regulation of the following provisions in the Lithuanian law:
1. Decree No. 132 of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania of 7 September 2012 on the 
insolvency of credit institutions. Taking into account the content of Section 8, Chap-
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ter 1 of the dissertation and following the analysis of the EBA guidelines, it is consider 
more detailed regulation of insolvency conditions of credit institutions, in particu-
lar with regard to qualitative and discretionary criteria as bank insolvency triggering 
events. The recommended regulation of the Decree No. 132 concerns the enhanced re-
quirements for the failing and likely to fail criteria of credit institutions, in order to set 
the boundaries based on the criteria governing the competencies, eligibility and good 
repute of the managing bodies and directors and their duty to act in a credible and fair 
manner. It is also recommended to clarify the Decree, by providing the conception 
and the criteria of not only failing, but also likely to fail bank. Taking into account 
the mandatory minimum level of harmonisation of the EU directives, and the EBA 
guidelines, it would be reasonable to specify the conditions for bank failing or likely to 
fail, by considering the following circumstances: (i) it is unlikely that private sector so-
lutions and supervisory actions can protect the bank from failure within a reasonable 
timeframe and when ordinary insolvency laws and procedures might pose a threat to 
the public interest; (ii) in view of the time limits and other relevant circumstances, it 
cannot be reasonably expected that any of the alternative private sector solutions or 
supervisory actions applied to the bank, including early intervention measures and 
the corresponding measures of capital write-down or conversion, would prevent bank 
insolvency within a reasonable timeframe; (iii) the resolution and/or liquidation ac-
tions of the credit institution are necessary to secure the public interest; (iv) the credit 
institution requires emergency public finances, except for situations to avoid serious 
economic disruption or eliminate the latter and preserve financial stability; (v) the 
credit institution’s insolvency should be determined not only on the basis of its finan-
cial and supervisory reports or documents received from other credit institutions or 
persons and/or, where appropriate, on the basis of the credit institution inspection 
(review), but also in view of the results arising from the assessment of bank assets 
and liabilities, prospects of the bank recovery plan, asset quality requirements; (vi) 
the assessment of the bank’s insolvency conditions should take into account whether 
the restructuring actions are necessary to protect the public interest, and to assess the 
business nature of the credit institution, its shareholding structure, legal form, risk 
model, size, interconnectedness with other credit institutions and the financial system, 
the fact whether it provides investment services and performs investment activities, 
its operational capacity to continue the provision of its services, and whether credit 
institution insolvency and subsequent liquidation by initiating normal bankruptcy 
proceedings could have adverse effects for the financial markets and other institutions.
2. The provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Banks on bank director’s 
selection and appointment should provide for more detailed requirements under 
which a bank may be declared insolvent. It is highly recommended to clarify the rules 
under which bankruptcy proceedings can only be instituted on the basis of the conclu-
sion of the supervisory authorities with regard to the bank’s insolvency, and to insert 
the provision to the effect that the absence of any other alternative bank insolvency 
solutions better serving the public interest is one of the grounds for making such a 
conclusion. In addition, it is essential to specify the provisions to the effect that after 
instituting bankruptcy proceedings against the bank, notwithstanding the type of the 
bank resolution tool  applied, losses suffered by bank creditors cannot exceed those 
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suffered in the case of bank resolution. ‘No creditors worse off ’ must be one of the 
cornerstone safeguards of private rights to be enshrined in primary law.
3. The provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Banks should be supple-
mented with regard to the hierarchy of creditor claims, to make it clear that the fourth 
line of creditor claims must concern claims or parts of claims raised by natural per-
sons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, when they exceed the insured 
deposit amount. Regarding the provisions of the Law on Banks relating to information 
on the bank’s liquidation proceedings, it would be useful to clarify the requirements 
and to provide more detailed regulation with regard to the information to be sup-
plied on bank resolution before the decision to open resolution proceedings is taken, 
by providing not only the court’s obligation to inform the supervisory authority and 
obtain the consent of the latter, but also the framework within which the application 
to the court to institute bankruptcy proceedings may be left unconsidered, if the Bank 
of Lithuania fails to notify the court of its intention to undertake resolution actions 
with regard to the distressed credit institution and 7 days have not passed from the 
date of notification. In addition, it is necessary to clarify the framework within which 
the court, in order to ensure the effectiveness of bank resolution, acting on the request 
from the Bank of Lithuania, may for the period requested (which is sufficient in view 
of the objective pursued) suspend any court proceedings or processes to which the 
bank under resolution is or may become a party.
4. The provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Banks relating to the 
administration of bank resolution proceedings, by foreseeing the following: (i) when 
the competent authority adopts a decision to apply a bank resolution tool, it must 
be subject to court approval. The court shall consider the application as a matter of 
urgency and decide within 24 hours from the date of the application; (ii) The courts 
must support their judgment on an integrated assessment of the economic facts, per-
formed by the Bank of Lithuania; (iii) Before taking any bank resolution actions with 
respect to the credit institution, an impartial, careful and realistic assessment of assets 
and liabilities should be carried out. Such assessment shall not be subject to individual 
appeal, but can be appealed against together with the resolution decision; (iv) after the 
application of bank resolution tool, the conditions applied shall be compared with the 
conditions that would have been applied to shareholders and creditors under ordinary 
bankruptcy proceedings; (v) if it is determined that shareholders and creditors have 
received a lower amount for their claims than in the case of bank resolution after ini-
tiating ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, they are entitled to recover the difference. 
The difference, if any, shall be paid out from the reserve (stabilisation) fund. Deposit 
insurance funds can also be used to finance alternative bank resolution measures, in 
order to prevent credit institution’s default.
5. Additional regulation of bank business sale as a resolution tool. It is suggested to 
foresee the provisions that, in the case of forced sale of the bank’s shares, the transac-
tion must comply with specific marketing procedures and requirements laid down in 
the secondary legislation of the Bank of Lithuania. The Bank of Lithuania is advised to 
adopt secondary legislation which, in addition to the criteria listed in Article 25(8) of 
the Law on Banks, would regulate placing on the market of the bank business sale tool 
in more detail, by focusing on and regulating the following key criteria:
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 (a) business sale must be as transparent as possible and essentially abstain from dis-
tortions or fundamental misconceptions on the credit institution’s assets, rights, li-
abilities, shares or other equity instruments which the Bank of Lithuania intends to 
sell, depending on the circumstances and, in particular, the need to preserve financial 
stability; (b) In conducting business sale, priority may not be given to individual po-
tential buyers neither they can be discriminated. Priority is given to the buyers with 
lower liquidity shortage; (c) The law does not prevent the Bank of Lithuania from ap-
plying to certain potential buyers on its own initiative; (d) Before taking a decision to 
enforce the business sale tool, the Bank of Lithuania must assess whether: (i) no less 
anti-competitive alternatives of the bank resolution than the business sale tool exist; 
(ii) if in the case of a failed merger and acquisition transaction the bank will face in-
solvency and the estate of credit institutions will nevertheless be eliminated from the 
market through ordinary bankruptcy procedure; (iii) whether the credit institution’s 
liquidation will not cause more harm to the competitive environment than the busi-
ness sale tool; (iv) it cannot be fairly assumed that a certain commercial offer is better 
than the other offers on the basis of future premiums arising from the transaction, 
payments received for the expected benefits or gains, or impact on the market after the 
transaction is completed; (v) social and economic factors that may be affected after the 
application of the measure, such as labour relations, economies of scale, positive social 
consequences in the community; (e) After confidential agreement has been signed be-
tween the Bank of Lithuania and the potential buyers, the latter have the right to access 
the information relating to the price bid and the sale place and time, the information 
package, including financial data of the credit institution, legal documents, and other 
documents that describe a variety of bank resolution solutions to be considered by 
the Bank of Lithuania. During the meeting with the potential buyer, the due diligence 
process must be discussed, including the legal documents to be submitted. The Bank 
of Lithuania shall advise on the types of property held by the credit institution, classify 
the property according to target groups, set the extent of assets to be transferred to the 
buyer, the assets to be left at the credit institution, terms of sales, loss-sharing princi-
ples, such as option clauses and other relevant circumstances. The meetings should 
be recorded by minutes; (f) The good practice of the US bank resolution procedures 
should be followed in order to create standardised rules for the provision of informa-
tion to potential buyers, certain information package guidelines of the property for 
sale and the forms of appropriate legal documents. In the confidentiality agreements, 
it is advisable, among other things, to disclose to the potential buyers who have signed 
confidentiality agreements: the intervention action plan, by providing the intervention 
code, the means of communication with potential customers, the weekly schedule of 
resolution actions, the list of buyers’ employees entitled to receive information, the 
forms of newsletters to shareholders and creditors. In assessing the proposals, buyers 
need to take account of the geographical location, the competitive environment in the 
market, the financial conditions, asset size, and capital ratios; (g) Potential buyers may 
perform due diligence of a credit institution in no more than 12–15 days.
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Santrauka
Tyrimo problema ir aktualumas. Bankai, nepaisant didelės dinamikos finansinių 
paslaugų srityje, yra labiausiai paplitusios finansų institucijos pasaulyje ir atlieka itin svar-
bias funkcijas valstybių ekonomikoje, todėl bankų krizės yra susijusios su labai painiais 
ir prieštaringais socialiniais, politiniais, ekonominiais, teisiniais įvykiais. Kritines bankų 
funkcijas ir mokumą padeda išlaikyti veiksmingas, patikimas ir nuspėjamas bankų veiklos 
teisinis reguliavimas nacionaliniu ir tarptautiniu lygiu. Nors efektyvus bankų veiklos tei-
sinis reguliavimas yra pirmiausia susijęs su kiekybiniais banko veiklos rizikų valdymo ir 
ribojimo kriterijais, tačiau paskutinė bankų krizė parodė, jog ne mažiau svarbus vaidmuo 
tenka ir kokybiniams bankų veiklos rizikų kriterijams, ypač bankų nemokumo procedūrų 
valdymo kriterijams, teisinėms priemonėms ir procedūroms. 
Banko nemokumo procedūros ir jų kompleksiškumas teisės doktrinoje neretai apibū-
dinamos kaip „Gordijaus mazgas“. Teoriškai nuo modernios finansų rinkų pradžios finan-
sų institucijų nemokumo procedūros ir teisiniai santykiai buvo aktuali tema tiek ekono-
mikos, tiek teisės mokslininkų darbuose. Tačiau praktiškai iki paskutinės finansų krizės, 
pagreitį įgijusios 2008-2009 m., valstybėse įstatymų ir kitų teisės aktų, reglamentuojančių 
bankų nemokumo procedūras, esmė ir procedūros labai skyrėsi, trūko sisteminio požiū-
rio. Paprastai nemokių bankų problemoms spręsti buvo taikomos bendrosios nemokumo 
teisės normos, kartu taikomos ir įprastoms įmonėms, neatsižvelgiant į specialias bankų, 
kaip juridinių asmenų, požymius, funkcijas, paskirtį visuomenėje. Be to, dauguma susi-
jusių teisės aktų tik minimaliai reglamentavo banko pertvarkymo principus, tikslus buvo 
nenuspėjami, neišsamūs, stokojo teisinio tikrumo, stokota alternatyvių banko nemokumo 
problemų sprendimo būdų. Per paskutinę bankų krizę išryškėjo banko nemokumo proce-
dūrose veikiančių asmenų – valstybės, viešųjų institucijų, kreditorių, akcininkų - skirtingi 
interesai, teisių ir pareigų balanso stoka. Todėl nuo finansų krizės pradžios iki šių dienų 
akademikai, priežiūros institucijos, politikos formuotojai, susijusios tarptautinės organi-
zacijos pradėjo ieškoti veiksmingesnių teisinių priemonių, kurios galėtų padėti efektyviai 
spręsti bankų mokumo problemas nesukeliant chaoso finansų sektoriuje ir kitų neigiamų 
padarinių. Kyla natūralus klausimas, kas banko nemokumo procedūrų reglamentavimo 
srityje pasikeitė nuo paskutinės bankų nemokumo (finansų) krizės, pagreitį įgavusios 
2008–2009 m.? 
Praktikoje kilo klausimas, ar bendrųjų nemokumo teisės normų lex generalis pakanka 
veiksmingai spręsti nemokių bankų problemas? Paaiškėjo, kad bankų pertvarkymo teisi-
niai mechanizmai yra silpni, o įprasta bankroto procedūra tik retu atveju tinka bankams. 
Lygiagrečiai ir doktrinoje įsivyravo nuomonė, jog bankrotas (likvidavimo procedūra) ne-
veikia bankams. Kaip valstybė turėtų reaguoti, jeigu vienas ar net keli bankai rodo požy-
mius, kad turi rimtų finansinių ir (arba) operacinių sunkumų, yra nemokūs arba atsidūrė 
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ties nemokumo riba? Kokių teisinių, administracinių priemonių valstybė privalo turėti ir 
imtis, jeigu nori veiksmingai spręsti bankų mokumo problemas? Šie klausimai tapo pama-
tiniais banko nemokumo procedūrų reformų kontekste. 
Iki bankų nemokumo krizės teisinis reguliavimas, susijęs su banko nemokumo proce-
dūromis, daugumoje šalių stokojo teisinio tikrumo, todėl banko nemokumo procedūros 
buvo sukuriamos, administruojamos ir vykdomos ad hoc pagrindais. Sprendžiant banko 
nemokumo problemas valstybės paprastai gelbėdavo bankus panaudodamos valstybės 
viešuosius finansus (angl. bail-out) ir neleisdavo bankams bankrutuoti dėl galinčių kilti 
neigiamų milžiniškų pasekmių visai realiajai ekonomikai. Dėl to atsirado šalutinės rizikos, 
kaip antai: moralinės rizikos, sisteminės rizikos, konkurencijos iškraipymai, indėlininkų 
teisių apsaugos rizikos, grėsmė finansų stabilumui ir t.t. Kompetentingos institucijos ir 
vyriausybės dažniausiai turėdavo dvi vienodai nepageidaujamas išeitis: arba inicijuoti 
brangų mokumo problemų turinčio banko gelbėjimą viešaisiais finansais, arba kaip alter-
natyvą netgi sistemiškai svarbiems bankams su neigiamą poveikį turinčiomis pasekmė-
mis finansų sistemai ir plačiajai ekonomikai taikyti įprastą, priverstinę banko likvidavimo 
procedūrą. 
G20 valstybės, nustatydamos veiksmų planą 2008 m. lapkričio mėn., paragino įstatymų 
leidėjus, reguliuotojus ir kitas kompetentingas institucijas „peržiūrėti bankų restruktūriza-
vimo teisinį reguliavimą ir bankroto įstatymus, atsižvelgiant į naują patirtį, ir užtikrinti, kad 
valstybės sudarys galimybes ir padės tvarkingai likviduoti bankus ir ypač dideles, kompleksiškas 
finansų institucijas“. Buvo nuspręsta, jog yra gyvybiškai svarbu sukurti ir išvystyti veiksmin-
gas teisines priemones, kurios galėtų tvarkingai, t. y. be pašalinių neigiamų pasekmių, įprastu 
būdu likviduoti nemokius bankus išlaikant sistemiškai svarbias bankų atliekamas funkcijas. 
Atsirado nauja banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo idėja, kurio pagrindinė paskirtis – ne 
visiškai išvengti bankų nemokumo, o suteikti „trečiąjį nemokumo kelią“ tarp nevaldomo 
arba prastai valdomo, banko turtą mažinančio ir užkratą skleidžiančio, banko likvidavimo 
(bankroto) ir galimų papildomų rizikų, atsirandančių dėl banko akcininkų ir didžiosios 
daugumos kreditorių gelbėjimo viešaisiais finansais, panaudojant konkrečias pertvarkymo 
teisines priemones, sumažinti dėl banko bankroto atsirandančią neigiamą įtaką. Paaiškėjus, 
kad bankų bankrotas yra nenaudingas, nes labai greitai nutraukia ir sutrikdo banko verslo 
operacijas ir sunaikina tolimesnę turto vertę, o pereinamuoju laikotarpiu ir galutiniam re-
zultate bankas nebeišlaiko veiklos tęstinumo prielaidos, tarptautiniu lygiu valstybės buvo 
įpareigotos sukurti plačią teisinių priemonių visumą, kurios pagrindinis tikslas, visų pirma, 
pertvarkyti (restruktūrizuoti) bankus ir pratęsti jų veiklą, o tuo tarpu negyvybingoms ar sis-
temiškai nesvarbioms banko verslo dalims taikyti įprastas bankroto procedūras .
Autoriui formuluojant socialinių banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo ir susijusių teisės 
normų kilmės šaltinį, kaip bendruomenės konvencijas, iškyla bent penkios principinio 
pobūdžio problemos, nagrinėtinos disertacijoje bei atitinkamai susijusios su viešųjų ir pri-
vačių interesų suderinamumu. 
Pirmiausia, kilo klausimas, ar siekiant pertvarkyti ir (arba) likviduoti banką, ypač pa-
skirstant dėl banko nemokumo atsiradusius nuostolius, tam tikrais atvejais galima viešąjį 
interesą iškelti aukščiau privačių interesų, o jeigu galima, tai kokiu teisiniu pagrindu ir 
kokiais teisės principais vadovaujantis. 
Antra, tyrimui aktualiose valstybėse buvo peržiūrėtas arba sukurtas naujas bankų per-
tvarkymo teisinis režimas, kuris neatsiejamas nuo didelių įgaliojimų suteikimo kompe-
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tentingoms institucijoms (pvz., teisės konvertuoti banko skolos instrumentus į kapitalą, 
siekiant kreditorių finansuojamo banko rekapitalizavimo, atlikti intervenciją į banką ir 
kt.). Kita susijusi problema ta, kad paskutinės bankų krizės praktika aiškiai atskleidė, kad 
banko pertvarkymo teisinių priemonių panaudojimas neišvengiamai paveikia banko kre-
ditorių ir akcininkų nuosavybės teises. Pavyzdžiui, reikalavimas gauti akcininkų pritarimą 
banko pertvarkymo sandoriui, kuriam reikalingas privataus sektoriaus sprendimas, gali 
pratęsti neaiškumą per bankų krizę. Todėl tapo labai svarbu pozityviojoje teisėje tinka-
mai sureglamentuoti teisinius saugiklius ir kriterijus bei įtvirtinti asmenų, dalyvaujančių 
banko nemokumo procedūrose, teisinę apsaugą, subalansuoti privačius ir viešuosius inte-
resus, kas atitinkamai padėtų apsisaugoti nuo galimų neigiamų teisinių pasekmių, pavyz-
džiui, bylinėjimosi procesų. 
Trečia, kadangi bankams, patiriantiems finansinių sunkumų, reikalingas papildomas 
finansavimas, atsirado tarptautiniu lygiu įtvirtinta nuostata, kad viešosios institucijos pri-
valo turėti įgaliojimus taikyti banko gelbėjimo privačiomis lėšomis pertvarkymo priemo-
nes (angl. bail-in) , kas iš esmės reiškia, kad, taikant šią teisinę priemonę, prieš likviduojant 
banką galima nurašyti neapsaugotus ir neapdraustus kreditorių reikalavimus ir atitinka-
mai konvertuoti juos į banko kapitalą. 
Ketvirta, tarptautiniai finansiniai standartai įtvirtino banko veiklos tęstinumo priori-
tetą, pirmiausia panaudojant įvairias išsamiai reglamentuotas bankų pertvarkymo teisines 
priemones. Be to, buvo įtvirtinta ir nuostata, kad bankų pertvarkymo teisinės priemonės 
turėtų būti taikomos atsižvelgiant į „mažiausios kainos“ principą ir tik tada, kai banko 
negalima likviduoti keliant įprastinę bankroto bylą, kartu nedestabilizuojant finansų siste-
mos, reikia imtis priemonių, kad būtų užtikrintas sistemai svarbių funkcijų spartus perda-
vimas bei tęstinumas, ir kai negalima pagrįstai tikėtis alternatyvaus privataus sprendimo, 
įskaitant esamų akcininkų arba trečiojo asmens vykdomą kapitalo padidinimą, kuris būtų 
pakankamas visiškam banko gyvybingumui atkurti. 
Penkta, banko pertvarkymo teisinis režimas yra neįsivaizduojamas neveikiant privačių 
asmenų teisių, įsikišant į sutartinius santykius, ypač finansines sutartis: užskaitos susitari-
mus, užtikrinimo susitarimus, susitarimus dėl finansinio įkaito, pagal kurias perleidžiama 
nuosavybės teisė. 
Atsižvelgiant į konkrečią jurisdikciją, kurioje bankas veikia, skiriasi bankų nemoku-
mo teisinių santykių problemos, jų sprendimo būdai teisinis reguliavimas ir t. t. Be to, 
nėra vienodo požiūrio į bankų nemokumo procedūrų teisinio reguliavimo harmonizavi-
mą tarptautiniu lygiu, todėl naudinga išnagrinėti banko nemokumo procedūrų naciona-
linio reglamentavimo ypatumus lyginamuoju aspektu ir atskleisti, ne tik kaip atskiroms 
jurisdikcijoms pavyko įgyvendinti tarptautines banko nemokumo procedūrų reguliavimo 
gaires, ištirti, kokį teisinio reguliavimo modelį jos pasirinko, palyginti atskirų teisės siste-
mų teisinio reguliavimo ypatumus, rasti konvergencijas ir divergencijas bei ištyrus atskirų 
jurisdikcijų pozityviąją teisę atskleisti, kaip jose pavyko užtikrinti viešųjų ir privačių in-
teresų, pasireiškiančių banko nemokumo procedūrose, pusiausvyrą, pateikti atitinkamus 
pasiūlymus ir rekomendacijas. 
Remiantis tuo, kas išdėstyta, formuluotina pagrindinė šio tyrimo mokslinė problema: 
ar banko pertvarkymo teisinis režimas subalansuoja viešąjį ir privatų interesą?
Tyrimo tikslas – išanalizuoti teorines ir praktines banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo 
problemas, kylančias viešųjų ir privačių interesų derinimo kontekste.
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Šiam tikslui įgyvendinti yra iškeliami tokie tyrimo uždaviniai:
1. Atskleisti banko nemokumo procedūrų paradigmos pasikeitimą lėmusias prie-
žastis ir bendrąsias koncepcines naujosios paradigmos nuostatas. 
2. Išskirti banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo sampratą ir išgryninti skiriamuosius 
požymius, sąlygas, išanalizuoti banko pertvarkymo teisines priemones, rasti jų 
privalumus ir trūkumus.
3. Lyginamuoju požiūriu išanalizuoti viešųjų institucijų, dalyvaujančių pertvarkant 
bankus, vaidmenį bei sprendimų dėl bankų pertvarkymo priėmimo mechaniz-
mus.
4. Remiantis identifikuotomis bankų pertvarkymo teisinio režimo savybėmis iša-
nalizuoti poveikį viešiesiems ir privatiems interesams ir interesų suderinamumą 
atskirų jurisdikcijų pozityviojoje teisėje. 
Tyrimo objektas – banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo veikimas bei įgyvendinimas.
Mokslinio tyrimo naujumas. Banko nemokumo procedūras reglamentuojančių teisės 
aktų silpnosios vietos ir įstatymų leidėjų paliktos spragos tampa akivaizdžios tik bankų 
krizės ir (arba) didesnio tarpvalstybinio banko nemokumo atveju, todėl dėl paskutinės 
finansų krizės šios spragos tapo labai ryškios, susiformavo gausi banko nemokumo teisi-
nius santykius nagrinėjančių teismų praktika, kuri Lietuvoje moksliškai nebuvo analizuo-
ta. Tyrimas išsiskiria ir tuo, kad teisės doktrina banko nemokumo procedūrų kontekste 
yra traktuojama kaip labai svarbus teisės šaltinis. Ši pozicija grindžiama, be kita ko, tuo, 
kad valstybėse daugiausiai egzistuoja bendrosios kompetencijos, nespecializuoti teismai, 
kurie dažnai stokoja žinių apie bankininkystę. Kadangi tiek Lietuvoje, tiek Šveicarijoje 
nėra specializuotų nemokumo bylas nagrinėjančių teismų, todėl manytina, kad tyrimo 
naujumas pasireiškia ir šiuo aspektu.
Atsižvelgiant į išdėstytą darbo problematiką, aktuali ir nauja tiek bankų nemokumo 
procedūrų teisės koncepcija, tiek sistematika, tiek praktinis veikimas. Kaip išspręstos tei-
sinės dilemos skirtingose teisinėse sistemose ir ar jos apskritai išspręstos? Atsižvelgiant į 
šiuolaikinės ekonomikos tarptautinį pobūdį, į tarptautinių bankų paplitimą ir šių bankų 
grupių įtaką pasaulio ekonomikos raidai, banko nemokumo procedūrų analizė reikšmin-
ga ir globaliu mastu. Teisinio apibrėžtumo ir aiškumo stoka lemia neišspręstų problemų 
integraciją į didesnius konfliktus, apipintus įvairiausiomis teisinėmis interpretacijomis. 
Tokiu būdu neužtikrinamas teisės, kaip visuomeninių santykių reguliavimo ir priešingų 
interesų derinimo, funkcijų veikimas. Priešingai, nėra pašalinamos prielaidos, galinčios 
stabdyti visuomeninių santykių stabilumą, nesukuriamos šių santykių vystymosi ir raidos 
priemonės. Autoriaus nuomone, tokia tyrimo objekto ir problemos išties neatitinka teisės 
mokslo ir šiuolaikinio darnaus verslo plėtros tendencijų.
Nepaisant pasaulinio susidomėjimo tyrimo tema, tiek Lietuvoje, tiek Šveicarijoje iki 
šios dienos egzistuoja akivaizdus trūkumas moksliškai patikrintos informacijos, skirtingų 
reglamentavimo modelių ir požiūrių skirtingose pasaulio jurisdikcijose analizės. Atlikus 
kokybišką ir išsamų mokslinį temos tyrimą gali būti sukurtos prielaidos aptiktoms teisi-
nio reguliavimo ir teismų praktikos spragoms pašalinti, tobulinant analizuojamos srities 
teisinio reguliavimo bazę, pateikiant teismų praktikai atitinkamus pasiūlymus ir rekomen-
dacijas. Temos mokslinis naujumas reiškiasi ir tyrimo kompleksiškumu. Taip pat Lietuvai 
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reikia įgyvendinti kai kurias bankų sąjungos direktyvų nuostatas bei perkelti jas į naci-
onalinę teisę, o SRM reglamentą taikyti tiesiogiai, todėl šiuo tyrimu galėtų būti remtasi 
peržiūrint Lietuvos teisinę sistemą. 
Paradoksalu, tačiau Lietuvoje taip plačiai eskaluota ir eskaluojama banko nemokumo 
procedūrų sritis Lietuvoje yra savotiškoje teisinėje nežinomybėje. Šios problemos taip pat 
nepadeda spręsti „įslaptinti“ priežiūros institucijos sprendimai bei itin ribotos apimties 
kompetentingų institucijų studijos, susijusios su banko nemokumo procedūrų analize Lie-
tuvoje. Vadinasi, teorinį siūlomo disertacinio darbo naujumą pabrėžia visuomenėje vyks-
tantys (vykę) didelį rezonansą sukeliantys praktiniai procesai, išreikštų pavienių asmenų 
nuomonių menkas pagrindimas. Problemos sudėtingumą ir tyrimo reikšmę lemia ir au-
toriaus šiame įvade išdėstytos priežastys. Be to, atlikus kokybišką mokslinį tyrimą atsiras-
tų pagrindas tikėtis, kad pateiktos rekomendacijos padės formuoti vieningą ir socialinius 
poreikius atitinkančią teismų praktiką. Manytina, kad tyrimo rezultatai būtų svarbūs tiek 
Lietuvos, tiek Šveicarijos mokslinei teisės doktrinai ir gali būti naudojami pedagoginėje 
ir edukacinėje veikloje. Pavyzdžiui, susidomėjimas tema ir jos analizės poreikis taip pat 
pastebimas Mykolo Romerio universitete dėstomoje bankroto teisės ir bankų teisės ma-
gistrantūros studijų programoje. Manytina, jog autoriaus pateikta išsami banko nemoku-
mo procedūrų analizė paskatintų papildomus šios srities mokslinius tyrimus bei pradėtų 
diskursą, leisiantį toliau sėkmingai puoselėti tiek nemokumo teisės, tiek bankų teisės dok-
trinos formavimą, vystyti ir tobulinti nemokumo procese dalyvaujančių asmenų interesų 
apsaugą, sudarant šios srities veiklai papildomo teisinio užtikrintumo. Iki šiol Lietuvos 
privatinės teisės mokslas tokių poreikių nepatenkino, dėl to autoriaus siūloma disertacinio 
darbo tema laikytina svarbia tiek praktikai, tiek teorijai.
Taip pat pažymėtina, kad gerai funkcionuojanti valstybės teisinė sistema skatina tiek 
finansų rinkų, tiek finansinių tarpininkų veiklą. Literatūroje įsitvirtinusi prezumpcija, pa-
gal kurią galime skirstyti valstybes pagal nacionalinės teisinės sistemos efektyvumą, ypač 
atliekant finansinius sandorius. Tokia nuostata grindžiama tuo, jog skirtingos finansų 
sistemos turi skirtingą teisinio reguliavimo lygį, ypač pabrėžiant kreditorių ir akcininkų 
teisių apsaugą ir susijusias reglamentavimo taisykles. Taigi, finansinis valstybės išsivysty-
mo lygis priklauso nuo egzistuojančių teisinių priemonių visumos ir jų efektyvumo. Be 
kita ko, svarbus tyrimas ir įstatymų leidėjams, ypač valstybių vyriausybėms (vykdomajai 
valdžiai), kurios atlieka ypatingus veiksmus banko nemokumo procedūrų kontekste. Pir-
ma, vyriausybė siekia apsaugoti nuosavybės teises, užtikrinti sutarčių įvykdymą. Antra, 
vyriausybių reguliavimas reikalingas siekiant skatinti tinkamas informacijos nuostatas, 
kad finansuotojų (investuotojų) lėšos būtų panaudojamos tinkamiausiu būdu ir kad in-
vestuotojai galėtų priimti geresnius investavimo sprendimus, panaudodami savo pinigus. 
Trečia, vyriausybės organizuoja finansų institucijų teisinį reguliavimą siekdamos išlaikyti 
jas mokias. 
Tyrimas daugiausiai grįstas lyginamosios teisės metodologija. Įstatymų leidėjai visame 
pasaulyje jau seniai konstatavo, kad daugumai klausimų geri įstatymai negali būti priimti 
be lyginamosios teisės pagalbos: ar analizė vykdoma bendrų studijų tam tikru teisiniu 
klausimu forma, ar ataskaitų, pranešimų, skirtų konkrečiai temai ar klausimui aptarti, 
analizės forma . Be kita ko, lyginamosios teisės teisininkai, mokslininkai paprastai teikia 
siūlymus, ką jų pačių teisinė sistema turėtų priimti ir įdiegti į nacionalinę teisę (kokias 
teisines priemones), atsižvelgiant į atitinkamą nagrinėjamą problemą ir jos sprendimą, 
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kuris pasiteisino užsienio valstybėje bei suderinus atitinkamus aspektus, kaip antai: skirtu-
mai teismų procedūrose, įvairių institucijų įgaliojimai, ekonomikos pajėgumai ar bendras 
socialinis kontekstas. Taip pat ne mažiau svarbu yra tai, kad praktinis lyginamosios teisės 
panaudojimas yra pagrįstas nacionalinių teisinių taisyklių interpretacija, be to, lyginamoji 
teisė vaidina svarbų vaidmenį ir teismams interpretuojant teisės normas ir jas taikant. Ga-
liausiai lyginamoji teisė atlieka svarbią funkciją teisiniame švietime. Manytina, kad ben-
drajame teisės moksle nedovanotina klaida būtų apsiriboti tik studijuojant nacionalinę 
teisę, nes nūdienos visuomenė yra itin mobili, o tai taip pat padeda geriau suvokti savo 
pačių nacionalinę teisės sistemą bei pasimokyti iš kitų. 
Tikimės, kad šis darbas taps efektyviu bei naudingu instrumentarijumi tiek teismams, 
sprendžiantiems tokio pobūdžio bylas, tiek įstatymų leidėjui, tobulinančiam teisinį regla-
mentavimą, tiek ir teisės teoretikams, analizuojantiems su šia tematika susijusias moksli-
nes problemas.
Ginamieji disertacijos teiginiai:
1) Tyrimui aktualiose jurisdikcijose pasikeitė banko nemokumo procedūrų para-
digma. Pokytis pasireiškė tuo, jog privatus akcininkų ir kreditorių interesas tapo 
subordinuotu viešajam interesui – užtikrinti banko veiklos tęstinumą ir tuo pa-
čiu finansų sistemos stabilumą. Banko pertvarkymas ir tik po to sekantis dalies 
banko likvidavimas padeda optimaliai subalansuoti viešuosius ir privačius inte-
resus.
2) Nemokių arba artimiausioje ateityje galinčių tapti nemokiais bankų pertvar-
kymas yra inicijuojamas viešųjų, administracinių institucijų, paprastai teismui 
atliekant tik antrinį vaidmenį. Nors pertvarkymo veiksmai turi poveikį banko 
akcininkams ir kreditoriams, tačiau administracinis pertvarkymo sprendimų 
priėmimo mechanizmas yra operatyvesnis ir veiksmingesnis lyginant su teismi-
niu pertvarkymo sprendimu, išlaikantis finansų stabilumą, geriau apsaugantis 
kreditavimo discipliną rinkoje.
3) Žlungančio banko akcininkų ir kreditorių teisių gynimo priemonės iš esmės ap-
siriboja tik ex post apskundimo teismine tvarka galimybe. Teisinės priemonės, 
skirtos prieštarauti kompetentingų pertvarkymo institucijų sprendimams, yra 
labai ribotos. Toks privačių asmenų teisių apribojimas yra būtinas, siekiant pla-
tesnių finansinio stabilumo tikslų, tačiau turi būti suderintas su fundamentalio-
mis asmenų teisėmis (teisės į gynybą, teisės į kompensaciją) ir teisės principais 
(teisėtų lūkesčių, proporcingumo).
4) Tyrimui aktualiose jurisdikcijose pasikeitus banko nemokumo teisinių santykių 
reguliavimo paradigmai, banko pertvarkymo priemonės yra pakankamos ex ante 
užkirsti kelią banko nemokumui, o ex post - veiksmingai kovoti su banko nemo-
kumo pasekmėmis. 
Tyrimo metodologija. Moksliniame tyrime laikomasi kokybinės metodologijos po-
žiūrio į tyrimą. Šis požiūris, naudojant kokybinės analizės metodus, leidžia suprasti banko 
pertvarkymo teisinį režimą bei susijusias problemas. Pagrindiniai darbe taikyti teoriniai ir 
empiriniai metodai: lingvistinės, sisteminės, loginės ir kritinės analizės, dokumentų ana-
lizės.
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Darbe remtasi metodologinėmis teisės tyrimų nuostatomis (metodologiniai pagrin-
dai), kurios tinkamesnės dinaminei teisės formai. Tyrime vyrauja pozityvioji metodologi-
ja, tradicinis mokslas, kuris suvokia teisę kaip teisės normų visumą, objektyviai išreikštą 
valstybės priimtuose teisės aktuose. Tyrimui būdingi ir hermeneutikos mokslinio paži-
nimo metodai (interpretavimas), kurie padeda pažinti teisę, ją suprasti, aiškinti ir teisei 
veikti. Teisės mokslas kildinamas ne tik iš faktų, jis inter alia reiškia interpretacijas, turi-
mų žinių taikymą naujiems tyrimo objektams. Taigi, tyrimo objektas yra iš esmės grįstas 
interpretacijos ir supratimo teorija bei tyrimui būdingi kokybiniai metodai, derinamos 
patirtys su bandymu suprasti prasmes. Autorius šiame tyrime interpretuoja tekstą bei gry-
nina banko nemokumo procedūras ieškodamas interesų balanso tarp skirtingų viešų ir 
privačių interesų, veikiančių banko pertvarkymo teisiniuose santykiuose. Remiantis šiais 
mokslinio tyrimo metodologiniais pagrindais ir atsižvelgiant į suformuotus darbo tiks-
lus bei uždavinius, atliekant tyrimą, buvo naudoti įvairūs duomenų rinkimo ir duomenų 
analizės metodai. Tyrime laikomasi jurisprudencijos esmės: 1) nustatyti socialinės tikro-
vės faktus ir reiškinius, jų savybes; 2) paaiškinti (atskleisti priežastinius šių faktų ryšius); 
3) įvertinti tiriamą reglamentavimo tikrovę ir jos naudingumą.
1) Lingvistinės analizės metodas naudotas interpretuojant nacionalines banko nemoku-
mo procedūras reglamentuojančias teisės normas, įvairių instancijų ir jurisdikcijų teis-
mų sprendimus, tarptautinių organizacijų atliktas banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo 
studijas, atskiras ES, JAV, Šveicarijos nacionalinių įstatymų formuluotes bei teisines 
sąvokas.
2) Dokumentų analizės metodas pasitelktas renkant ir analizuojant Lietuvos ir ES, JAV, 
Šveicarijos jurisdikcijų norminius teisės aktus, rekomendacinio pobūdžio tarptautinius 
teisės aktus, aiškinamuosius kompetentingų institucijų dokumentus, teismų sprendi-
mus bei teisės doktriną: specialios mokslinės publikacijos, monografijos, vadovėliai, 
konferencijų medžiaga. Metodas taip pat naudotas ir tarptautinių organizacijų ir kitų 
viešųjų institucijų studijų bei publikacijų analizei. Metodas leido ištirti srities profesio-
nalų rengtus ir su banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo veikimu ir principais susijusius 
dokumentus. Pradiniai tyrimo duomenys sekė iš bendrųjų teisės aktų, tyrimo ribose 
aktualių jurisdikcijų bankroto įstatymų, bankų įstatymų, indėlių ir įsipareigojimų in-
vestuotojams draudimo įstatymų, kitų nemokių bankų veiklą reglamentuojančių teisės 
aktų. Renkant disertacinio darbo duomenis naudoti ES, JAV ir Šveicarijos bibliotekų 
fondai bei atitinkamų universitetų duomenų bazės, įvairūs reputaciją turintys interneto 
šaltiniai. 
3) Sisteminis metodas naudotas siekiant sistemiškai įvertinti, suklasifikuoti bankų nemo-
kumo procedūras, jų teisinės aplinkos reguliavimą tiek tarptautiniu lygiu, tiek nacio-
naliniu lygiu. Šis metodas leido ištirti banko pertvarkymo teisinį režimą iš kitų banko 
nemokumo procedūrų kaip kompleksinį teisės reiškinį, kartu atsižvelgiant į socialinį 
ir ekonominį kontekstą, padėjo nustatyti tikslią banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo 
vietą jurisdikcijų teisės sistemose, tiek lex generalis, tiek lex specialis sisteminius ryšius 
(darant pagrįstas prielaidas apie konkrečios bankų nemokumo teisės normos prasmę, 
atskleidžiant prigimtį ir reikšmę). 
4) Loginis metodas taikytas darant pagrįstus surinktų tyrimo faktų, susijusių su banko 
nemokumo teisiniais santykiais apibendrinimus, formuluojant tarpines ir galutines 
tyrimo išvadas.
348
5) Apibendrinimo metodas kartu su loginiu padėjo nustatyti banko pertvarkymo teisinio 
režimo savybes, suklasifikuoti bendruosius ir specifinius požymius, tikslus, sąlygas, 
svarbą, apibendrinti disertacijos skyrius. 
6) Teleologinis metodas padėjo išsiaiškinti tam tikrų banko pertvarkymo teisinių prie-
monių reguliavimo objektyvias priežastis, atskleisti banko nemokumo procedūrų 
tikslus, aiškinimo ribas. Metodas buvo taikytas nacionalinių, užsienio valstybių teisės 
aktų, teismų sprendimų analizei, nustatant veiksnius ir priežastis, banko nemokumo 
pagrindus. Be kita ko, pasitarnavo atskleidžiant banko nemokumo procedūrų, akci-
ninkų, kreditorių, viešųjų institucijų poveikio vertinimą ir atitinkamų teisės normų 
teksto prasmę, interpretavimo galimybių ribas. Pažymėtina, kad metodas naudotas 
lygiagrečiai su istoriniu, lingvistiniu ir sisteminės analizės metodais, nustatant teisės 
aktų kūrėjų pozicijas konkretaus tiriamo klausimo atžvilgiu, tiriant paskutinės bankų 
krizės pamokas, banko nemokumo procedūrų istorines ištakas.
7) Lyginamasis metodas tyrime svarbus lyginant skirtingas banko rūšis, skirtingas banko 
nemokumo procedūrų rūšis, skirtingų valstybių ir teisės tradicijų teisines konstruk-
cijas, susijusias su banko pertvarkymo teisių režimu, veikimu ir vykdymu, vertinant 
skirtingose šalyse egzistuojančias banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo koncepcijas, 
banko pertvarkymo priemonių teisinį reguliavimą ir jų taikymo teisinę praktiką. 
Metodas suteikė galimybę peržengti vienos teisinės sistemos ribas ir ieškoti, ar kito-
se valstybėse nėra sukurtos priimtinesnės ir labiau pagrįstos probleminių klausimų 
sprendimų formulės. Taip pat leido sugretinti skirtingų valstybių banko pertvarkymo 
režimo teisinio reguliavimo ir atskirų jo institutų įgyvendinimo ypatumus, nustaty-
ti naujus požiūrius ir vyraujančias idėjas, išsamiai pagrįsti tyrimo argumentus. Šiuo 
metodu atskleisti skirtingų teisinių sistemų panašumai ir skirtumai, išgrynintos uni-
versalios problemos. Metodas naudotas kaip intelektualinė autoriaus veikla, susijusi su 
teise (objektas) ir palyginimu (procesas), tiek makro (stiliaus ir idėjų lyginimas skir-
tingų jurisdikcijų bei teisėkūros metodų ir procedūrų), tiek mikro (lyginant nebūtinai 
visų trijų jurisdikcijų teisinį reguliavimą ) požiūriu. Tyrimas atliekamas remiantis ir 
tvarkant teisinę medžiagą bei klasifikuojant banko nemokumo procedūras, išsiaiški-
nant konkrečios jurisdikcijos banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo vaidmenį. Taikant 
metodą ieškota, kaip susijusios bankų pertvarkymo taisyklės buvo sukurtos ir išvys-
tytos skirtingų jurisdikcijų įstatymų leidėjų arba teismų. Metodas padėjo nustatyti bei 
išsiaiškinti praktinį pertvarkymo teisinio režimo kontekstą, kuriame jis yra taikomos, 
kad būtų galima suprasti, kodėl užsienio teisinė sistema jai būdingu būdu išsprendžia 
aktualias problemas ir kodėl neišsprendžia. 
8) Analitiniu – kritiniu metodu buvo pažvelgta į banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo, 
pertvarkymo priemonių, poveikio akcininkams ir kreditoriams trūkumus ir įgyven-
dinimo disfunkcionalumą, taip pat banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo atsiradimo 
priežastis. Metodas padėjo atlikti viešųjų ir privačių interesų, sąveikaujančių banko 
pertvarkymo teisiniame režime, tarpusavio santykio įžvalgas. Remiantis šiuo metodu 
įvertinta, kaip teisė tenkina tam tikro meto privačių ir viešųjų asmenų teisių saugos 
poreikius. Metodas pasireiškė ir galiojančios teisės kritika, neigimu bei teisės idealiza-
vimu (geidžiamos teisės vizija).
Moksliniame darbe taip pat naudoti kiti mokslinio tyrimo metodai: genetinis padėjo 
nustatyti nagrinėjamų banko nemokumo procedūrų ir atitinkamų teisės normų atsiradi-
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mą ir raidą; dedukcijos – reikšmingas analizuojant abstrakčias teisės normose įtvirtintinas 
taisykles ir sukonkretinant jų taikymo praktikoje atvejus; indukcijos- nagrinėjant konkre-
čiose bylose teismų spręstus klausimus ir pateikiant jų apibendrinimus su atitinkamomis 
išvadomis; istorinis metodas- atskleidžiant banko pertvarkymo režimo genezę, teisės nor-
mų prasmę, teisės taikymo įvairovę lemiančius veiksnius, reguliavimo skirtingose šalyse 
raidą, veiksnius lėmusius pokyčius; statistinis metodas- apdorojant statistinę tyrimo me-
džiagą.
Darbo struktūra. Atsižvelgiant į suformuotus tyrimo uždavinius, darbo dėstomąją 
dalį sudaro keturios pagrindinės dalys. 
Pirmoje dalyje yra aptariamos bendrosios banko nemokumo procedūrų nuostatos, 
koncepciniai klausimai. Patikslinami kai kurie disertacijos terminologijos aspektai, apibū-
dinamos kertinės bankų funkcijos ir sąveika su viešuoju interesu, aptariamas paskutinės 
bankų krizės poveikis ekonomikai, apžvelgiamos banko nemokumo procedūrų ištakos. 
Aiškinama, kodėl bankų nemokumo problemoms spręsti yra netinkamos bendrosios 
nemokumo teisės normos. Atskleidus bendrąją banko nemokumo procedūrų sampratą, 
be kita ko, išskiriant ir banko pertvarkymo procedūrą, analizuojamas banko nemokumo 
procedūrų tarpusavio ryšys, su banko nemokumo sąlygų nustatymu susiję klausimai, iš-
skiriami tiek kiekybiniai, tiek kokybiniai, tiek diskreciniai kriterijai. Taip pat šioje dalyje 
apibendrinamos banko nemokumo procedūrų regioninio ir tarptautinio unifikavimo ten-
dencijos, atskleidžiamas banko nemokumo procedūrų paradigmų pasikeitimas pasaulyje. 
Toks aptarimas labai svarbus siekiant objektyviai atskleisti banko pertvarkymo teisinio 
režimo kilmę, raidą bei teisines savybes, kurios vėliau buvo inkorporuotos į tirtintų juris-
dikcijų nacionalinę teisę. Be to, prieš detalizuojant konkrečias situacijas, kurios gali būti 
vertinamos kaip bankų pertvarkymo teisiniame režime sąveikaujančių viešųjų ir privačių 
interesų suderinamumas, aptariami bendrieji banko nemokumo procedūrų kvalifikavimo 
požymiai, išskiriami bendrieji visų banko nemokumo procedūrų tikslai. 
Antroji dalis skiriama išimtinai bankų pertvarkymo teisinio režimo, kaip itin svarbios 
banko nemokumo procedūros, analizei. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad bankų pertvarkymo teisinis 
reguliavimas, sekant tarptautiniais finansiniais standartais, turi būti sukurtas taip, kad ne 
tik apsaugotų privačius akcininkų ir kreditorių interesus, bet ir siektų platesnių, viešųjų 
teisinio reguliavimo tikslų, kurie yra gyvybiškai svarbūs efektyviam ekonomikos veikimui, 
šioje dalyje analizuojama skirtingų valstybių taikomos bankų pertvarkymo taisyklės bei su-
sijusi administracinė praktika. Atskleidžiama bankų pertvarkymo samprata, analizuojama, 
kodėl bankų pertvarkymo teisinis režimas toks svarbus valstybėms, pateikiami bankų per-
tvarkymo teisės principai. Didelis dėmesys skiriamas aptariant atskirų jurisdikcijų bankų 
pertvarkymo sąlygas (t. y. kada turėtų būti pradėtas bankų pertvarkymas). Detalizuojami 
specialūs bankų pertvarkymo tikslai. Galiausiai atsižvelgiant į tai, kad efektyvesnės ban-
kų pertvarkymo teisinės priemonės yra būtinos prevenciškai siekiant išvengti žalos, šioje 
darbo dalyje nagrinėjamos konkrečios klasikinės bankų pertvarkymo teisinės priemonės 
(banko verslo pardavimas, banko turto, teisių, sandorių ir įsipareigojimų perdavimas, turto 
atskyrimas, laikinas bankas, banko gelbėjimas privačiomis lėšomis), gryninamas atskirų 
teisinių priemonių veiksmingumas, atsižvelgiant į siekį išsaugoti finansų stabilumą ir kuo 
labiau sumažinti ekonominį ir socialinį bankų mokumo problemų poveikį.
Trečioje dalyje analizuojama viešųjų institucijų, kurios siekia užtikrinti banko pertvar-
kymo veiksmų spartą, garantuoti nepriklausomumą ir išvengti interesų konfliktų, įgalioji-
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mus, sprendimų priėmimo ir kontrolės mechanizmus, teisės skųsti sprendimus galimybė 
(teisė į gynybą), turto ir įsipareigojimų vertinimo tvarka ir tikslai, ieškomas optimalus 
teisinio reguliavimo modelis, kuris būtų veiksmingas, sprendžiant, kas turėtų priimti 
sprendimus dėl bankų pertvarkymo administracinės institucijos – kreditoriai ar teismai? 
Išskiriamos pagrindinės viešosios institucijos ir jų vaidmuo bankų pertvarkymo procese. 
Analizuojama, ar nevertėtų įsteigti atskirų, specializuotų teismų ar teisėjų kolegijų, spren-
džiančių tik finansų institucijų nemokumo problemas.
Ketvirtoje dalyje labiausiai į tyrimo problemą orientuotoje dalyje analizuojamas bankų 
pertvarkymo procedūrų poveikis ir apribojimai banko akcininkams, kreditoriams. Aiški-
nama, kad pagrindinių susijusių asmenų teisių apribojimas yra būtinas siekiant platesnių, 
finansinio stabilumo tikslų, vertinamas tokių apribojimų proporcingumas. Nagrinėjama, 
kokiais atvejais taikant banko pertvarkymo teisines priemones ir įgaliojimus gali būti ri-
bojamos akcininkų ir kreditorių teisės ir ar su pertvarkymo veiksmais susijęs kišimasis 
į akcininkų ir kreditorių teises atitinka pagrindines asmenų teises bei yra proporcingas. 
Aptariami akcininkų ir kreditorių teisių apsaugos ir skirtingų interesų aspektai. Atliekant 
teismų praktikos analizę, išskiriami pagrindiniai teisės principai, kriterijai, balansuojantys 
privačius ir viešuosius interesus, vykdant banko pertvarkymą. Aptariamas poveikis as-
mens nuosavybės teisėms, analizuojama nuostolių, atsirandančių dėl banko nemokumo, 
padengimo tvarka ir kreditorių reikalavimų tenkinimo eilės ypatumai. Išgryninami tei-
siniai saugikliai (pavyzdžiui, poveikį patiriantys akcininkai ir kreditoriai neturėtų patirti 
didesnių nuostolių nei nuostoliai, kurie būtų patirti, jei bankas būtų likviduotas), pade-
dantys užtikrinti viešų ir privačių interesų balansą pertvarkant bankus . 
Tyrimo pabaigoje formuluojamos išvados ir pateikiamos rekomendacijos. 
Pagrindinės tyrimo išvados:
Dėl banko nemokumo procedūrų teisinės koncepcijos
1. Bankai atlieka ypač svarbias funkcijas visai realiajai ekonomikai, todėl jų veiklos stabi-
lumas atitinka viešąjį interesą. Lex generalis normos netinkamos bankų mokumo pro-
blemoms spręsti. Visų pirma, dėl to, kad neužtikrina bankų ypatingos svarbos funkcijų 
tęstinumo, valstybių finansinio stabilumo tikslų, nemažina išlaidų mokesčių mokėto-
jams, nutraukia ir sutrikdo banko verslo operacijas. Antra, dėl specifinės bankų vei-
klos prigimties, kurioje pasireiškia viešas interesas, ir dėl eilės procedūrinių priežas-
čių: operatyvių bankų pertvarkymo sprendimų poreikio, specifinio banko nemokumo 
sąlygų nustatymo, skirtingų procedūrų tikslų ir pan. Trečia, jeigu lex generalis būtų 
taikomos bankams, pertvarkymo atveju tai sukeltų rimtų nuostolių tiek privatiems, 
tiek viešiesiems asmenims, finansų stabilumo destabilizavimą, todėl banko pertvarky-
mo teisės normos pirmiausia gina viešąjį interesą, ir tik po to siekia užtikrinti privačių 
asmenų teises ir interesus. 
2. Banko pertvarkymo taisyklių prigimtis daro poveikį banko pertvarkymo sprendimų 
teisminei kontrolei: įprasta nemokumo procedūra vyksta teismui prižiūrint ir kontro-
liuojant, priešingai, banko pertvarkymas turi būti atliekamas operatyviai ir nepertrau-
kiamai, todėl banko pertvarkymo priemonės visose lygintose jurisdikcijose yra patvir-
tinamos ir taikomos tiktai administracinių institucijų. Apskundimas teismine tvarka 
yra įmanomas, tačiau tik labai ribotoje apimtyje. 
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3. Finansų stabilumas yra tarptautinė problema, kuri negali būti išspręsta vienos juris-
dikcijos pastangomis. Po paskutinės bankų krizės visos lygintos jurisdikcijos, sekda-
mos tarptautiniais standartais, įgyvendino visapusiškas banko nemokumo procedūrų 
reguliavimo reformas. Tarptautiniu lygiu pasikeitė banko nemokumo procedūrų tikslų 
paradigma. Visos tyrimui aktualios jurisdikcijos pasižymi skirtingomis institucinėmis 
ir teisinėmis sistemomis, todėl banko pertvarkymo teisiniai režimai negali būti tiesio-
giai palyginami. Reglamentavimo reformos buvo grindžiamos susitarimais G20 ir FSB 
lygiu. Per paskutinę bankų krizę JAV ir Šveicarijos teisinė sistema buvo stipresnė nei 
ES valstybių narių tuo metu. JAV ir Šveicarijos viešosios institucijos nesusidūrė su har-
monizavimo iššūkiu įvairiose ES valstybėse narėse. Kita vertus, pasikeitus paradigmai, 
ES įdiegė išsamiausią banko nemokumo procedūrų reglamentavimą bankų sąjungos 
formatu.
4. Bendros visoms jurisdikcijoms banko nemokumą galinčios paskatinti pagrindinės ri-
zikos – likvidumo ir sisteminė rizika. Too big to fail doktrinos analizė atskleidė, jog 
didelių, kompleksiškų, atliekančių sistemiškai svarbias funkcijas bankų nemokumas 
yra labai reikšminga teisės problema. Išanalizavus paskutinės bankų krizės praktiką, 
akivaizdu, jog atsirado poreikis sumažinti ne tik įprastų, bet ir sistemiškai svarbių ban-
kų bankroto tikimybę ir sukurti tokį teisinį režimą, kuris leistų veiksmingai kovoti su 
bankų mokumo problemomis be mokesčių mokėtojų pinigų. Praktikos analizė atsklei-
dė, kad per paskutinę bankų krizę sėkmingiausiai too big to fail problemas sprendė 
Šveicarija.
5. Bankas nemokus gali tapti labai greitai, todėl ypatingas vaidmuo tenka banko nemo-
kumą paskatinusių sąlygų nustatymui ir kvalifikuojančių kriterijų reglamentavimui. 
Ad hoc bankų nemokumo sprendimo būdai yra nenuspėjami, todėl neatitinka teisinio 
tikrumo tikslų. Išsamiausiai banko nemokumo sąlygų kriterijai apibūdinami ES teisi-
nėje sistemoje. Kadangi bankų finansavimas ir likvidumas labai priklauso nuo rinkos 
dalyvių pasitikėjimo, nėra įmanoma, nustatinėjant banko nemokumą, vadovautis vien 
tik kiekybiniais nemokumo kriterijais. Jeigu privalomi kiekybiniai kriterijai teisės ak-
tuose silpnai reglamentuoti, yra rizika, kad gyvybingam, sveikam bankui(-ams) gali 
būti neteisingai pradedama banko nemokumo procedūra. Kiekybiniai kriterijai vieno-
dai išvystyti visose tyrimui aktualiose jurisdikcijose. ES teisinėje sistemoje suteikiami 
didžiausi diskreciniai nemokumo kriterijai. JAV teisinė sistema pasižymi ypatingai 
giliomis, išskirtinėmis tradicijomis bei diferencijuotais banko kapitalo pakankamu-
mo kriterijų reikalavimais nemokumo atžvilgiu. Šveicarijoje bankų kapitalo reikala-
vimams keliami didesni reikalavimai nei kitose lygintose jurisdikcijose. Kuo didesnė 
diskrecija suteikiama viešosioms institucijoms, tuo labiau padidėja rizika dėl regulia-
vimo institucijų pernelyg didelės kontrolės. Įvertinant banko nemokumą, reguliuo-
tojai turi labiau koncentruotis į banko finansinio gyvybingumo vertinimą, paremtą 
perspektyviniais skaičiavimais, remtis ekonominiais, rinkos aplinkybėmis paremtais 
modeliais, o ne klasikiniais, retrospektyviais mokumo standartais ir testais. Ypač svar-
bu nustatyti banko likvidumo atitikimą reikalavimams. 
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Dėl banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo
6. Banko pertvarkymas – administracinis procesas, tam tikras bankų krizės valdymo 
įrankis, įprastinės banko bankroto bylos alternatyva, siekianti užtikrinti banko esmi-
nių funkcijų tęstinumą, išlaikyti ir apsaugoti finansų stabilumą, išvengti išlaidų mo-
kesčių mokėtojams ir atstatyti viso banko ar jo tam tikrų dalių ilgalaikį gyvybingumą. 
Bankas pertvarkomas siekiant teisės aktuose įtvirtintų pertvarkymo tikslų, taikant 
banko pertvarkymo priemones: verslo pardavimo priemonę, laikinojo banko prie-
monę, turto atskyrimo priemonę, gelbėjimo privačiomis lėšomis priemonę. Banko 
pertvarkymo teisinio režimo paskirtis – mažiausiomis sąnaudomis pašalinti nemokų 
banką iš finansų sistemos kartu išlaikant privačių asmenų ir visuomenės pasitikėjimą 
bankų sektoriumi, tinkamai suvaldyti teisines ir ekonomines rizikas, apsaugoti tuos 
įsipareigojimus, kuriuos naudinga ar netgi privaloma apsaugoti siekiant viešo intereso 
tikslų: banko funkcijų tęstinumas, banko turto vertės maksimizavimas, banko nemo-
kumo nuostolių pirminis priskyrimas akcininkams, ekonominio ir socialinio neigia-
mo poveikio valstybėje sumažinimas, viešųjų finansų ir finansų sistemos (įskaitant 
mokėjimų sistemą) apsauga, indėlininkų apsauga. 
7. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose dabartinis banko pertvarkymo teisinis režimas yra 
svarbus tuo, jog, visų pirma, padeda išvengti viešojo intereso pažeidimo atvejų (iš-
saugomas finansinis stabilumas, ypatingos svarbos banko funkcijos, indėlių, klientų 
turto ir viešųjų lėšų saugumas). Antra, užtikrina galimybę nemokiam bankui sklan-
džiai pasitraukti iš rinkos, nesukeliant sisteminių sutrikimų arba juos minimizuojant, 
sukelia mažesnio laipsnio pavojų finansų stabilumui, sumažina moralines rizikas, pa-
deda išlaikyti ar atstatyti pasitikėjimą rinkoje. Trečia, ES, JAV, Šveicarijoje dabartinis 
bankų pertvarkymo teisinis režimas minimizuoja SSFI statusą turinčių bankų moku-
mo problemas, teigiamai veikia skolinimosi sprendimus, atlieka prevencinį vaidmenį, 
įgalina viešąsias institucijas banką pertvarkyti taip, kad būtų išvengta sisteminės žalos 
ir viešojo bei privataus intereso pažeidimo atvejų. Galiausiai naujas banko pertvar-
kymo teisinis reguliavimas leidžia greitus ir saugius sprendimus mokumo problemų 
turintiems bankams, numatant susijusius banko pertvarkymo ginčus spręsti vėlesnėje 
stadijoje.
8. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose reglamentuota taisyklė, jog žlungantis bankas iš esmės 
gali būti likviduotas pagal įprastą bankroto procedūrą, o likvidavimas visada turi būti 
apsvarstomas prieš pertvarkant banką. Banko pertvarkymo priemonės taikomos tik 
tuomet, kai bankas negali būti likviduojamas pagal įprastą bankroto procedūrą, nesu-
keliant neigiamų pasekmių, grėsmės kritinėms banko funkcijoms, neigiamo poveikio 
finansų stabilumui, viešosios finansinės paramos panaudojimo arba kreditorių ir jų 
turto padėties pabloginimo. 
9. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose pagrindiniai banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo prin-
cipai tinkamai suderina viešuosius ir privačius interesus: banko akcininkai pirmieji 
prisiima nemokumo nuostolius, kreditoriai prisiima nuostolius tik po akcininkų ir pa-
gal kreditorių reikalavimų tenkinimo eilę, vyresnieji banko pareigūnai yra pakeičiami, 
tos pačios klasės kreditoriai traktuojami vienodai, joks kreditorius negali patirti dides-
nių nuostolių pertvarkant banką nei jis patirtų vykdant įprastą bankroto procedūrą, 
išlaikomas banko veiklos tęstinumas (viešasis interesas), apdrausti indėliai apsaugomi.
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10. Pagrindiniai teisės principai, balansuojantys privačių asmenų ir viešųjų asmenų intere-
sus, pagrįsti viešąja teise. Pertvarkymo priemonės turi užtikrinti privatiems asmenims 
teisinį tikrumą, teisę į gynybą, turi būti subalansuotos su viešuoju ir privačiu interesu, 
naudojamos proporcingai, bei atlikus intervenciją, suteikti adekvačią kompensaciją 
nukentėjusiems privatiems asmenims. Disertacijoje suklasifikuoti iš ES ir JAV teisinių 
sistemų išplaukiantys teisės principai (teisėtų lūkesčių, teisėto tikslo, teisinės pusiaus-
vyros principas) yra pagrįsti, gali būti taikomi ir pavieniui, ir kartu, tinkamai suderina 
viešąjį ir privatų interesą banko pertvarkymo metu. Tol, kol tirtos valstybės tinkamai ir 
pareigingai įgyvendins minėtus principus ir saugiklius sunku numatyti situaciją, kuo-
met pagrindinės asmens teisės bus pažeistos.
11. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose banko pertvarkymas yra administracinis procesas, ku-
rio pagrindinis tikslas apsaugoti likvidumo poreikius trumpalaikiams kreditoriams, 
ypač indėlininkams, ir suvaldyti finansinį banko turtą tokiu būdu, kuris užtikrintų 
žlungančio banko turto vertę ir frančizės vertę. Todėl banko pertvarkymas, visų pirma, 
siekia išvengti sisteminės rizikos išplitimo atvejų finansiniame sektoriuje, antra, siekia 
socialinės gerovės, kuri negali būti sutapatinama su privačių asmenų tikslais, absoliu-
taus kreditorių reikalavimų prioritetu. Banko pertvarkymo teisinis režimas gali būti 
traktuojamas kaip išlaidų-naudos optimizavimo rezultatas.
12. Bankų pertvarkymo teisinis režimas tiek ES, tiek JAV, tiek Šveicarijoje yra specializuota 
teisės sritis, skirta žlungančio banko mokumo problemoms spręsti banką pertvarkant 
ir tik po to likviduojant. Bankų pertvarkymo teisinio režimo tikslai fundamentaliai 
skiriasi nuo bendrosios nemokumo teisės tikslų. Banko pertvarkymo taisyklės negali 
būti inkorporuotos į įprastą nemokumo teisę dėl esančių skirtumų tarp banko likvi-
davimo procedūros ir siekio išlaikyti banko veiklą arba ją sėkmingai reorganizuoti. 
Nepaisant to, įprasta nemokumo teisė (bankroto procedūra) išlieka ypač svarbi banko 
pertvarkymo teisinio režimo taisyklių kontekste. Visose tyrimui aktualiose jurisdik-
cijose įprastos nemokumo teisės normos bus taikomos tik tada, kai specifinės banko 
pertvarkymo taisyklės netaikomos. 
13. ES ir JAV banko pertvarkymas finansuojamas renkant įmokas iš bankų industrijos ex 
ante, sukuriant bendrą bankų pertvarkymo fondą. Kitokia situacija yra Šveicarijoje, 
kur pertvarkymo, stabilizavimo fondas vis dar yra CB prerogatyva, veikiant kaip „pa-
skutiniam skolintojui“. Šveicarijoje fondas steigiamas ad hoc pagrindais tuomet, kai 
reikia užtikrinti išskirtinius valstybės interesus. Toks reguliavimas neatitinka naujo-
sios bankų pertvarkymo paradigmos savybių. Kai išankstinio finansavimo nepakanka 
banko pertvarkymo nuostoliams ar sąnaudoms padengti, ES ir JAV teisinėje sistemoje 
numatoma rinkti ex post rinkliavas, papildomai „pripildyti“ fondą iš bankų industri-
jos. ES bankų įmokos susideda iš fiksuoto dydžio įmokų ir banko individualia rizika 
paremtų įmokų. JAV sukurta banko individualia rizika paremta sistema. ES pertvar-
kymo fondo sistema yra neparanki dideliems bankams. ES valstybes nares naujas tei-
sinis reguliavimas privers reformuoti indėlių garantijų sistemų fondų sistemas. Nors 
ir leidžiama sujungti šias finansavimo struktūras, tačiau finansavimo šaltiniai išlie-
ka atskiri, tai pareikalaus papildomų administracinių resursų. Kita vertus, tai padės 
valstybėms sukurti finansinę naštą apribojančią sistemą, kuomet privatūs ir viešieji 
finansiniai resursai rinkose yra išsekę. Pertvarkymo fondo lėšos leis ateityje lengviau 
išvengti finansų rinkų destabilizavimo ir, kiek įmanoma, sumažinti mokesčių mokė-
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tojams tenkančias sąnaudas. Tiek ES, tiek JAV yra numatyta ir atsarginė pertvarkymo 
finansavimo priemonė (angl. backstop) – ESM lėšos ES, Iždo lėšos JAV.
Dėl banko pertvarkymo priemonių
14. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose banko pertvarkymo priemonės yra skirtos ne visiškai 
išvengti banko likvidavimo, tačiau sušvelninti neigiamus padarinius, atsirandančius 
dėl banko mokumo problemų. Laiku ir tinkamai pritaikius banko pertvarkymo teisinę 
priemonę ir tik po to likviduojant banką, atsižvelgiant į disertacijoje ištirtus konkre-
čios pertvarkymo priemonės privalumus ir trūkumus, atsiranda teigiamo socialinio 
poveikio galimybė: pirma, mažinama sisteminės bankų sektoriaus krizės tikimybė ir 
saugoma nuo ekonominės gerovės nuosmukių po bankų sektoriaus krizių ir, antra, dėl 
tinkamo banko pertvarkymo mechanizmo pritaikymo, kiek įmanoma, sumažinami 
dėl paramos bankui mokesčių mokėtojams tenkantys nuostoliai. 
15. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose tiesioginis banko likvidavimas negali būti viena iš 
banko mokumo problemų sprendimo priemonių, jeigu kritinės banko funkcijos gali 
būti greitai pakeistos kitų rinkos žaidėjų. Bankui esant nemokiam arba artimiausioje 
ateityje tapsiančiam nemokiu, visų pirma, turi būti naudojamos privataus sektoriaus 
sprendimai, pavyzdžiui, atliekamas verslo pardavimas, įtraukiant kitus rinkos daly-
vius. Jeigu toks sprendimas yra neįmanomas arba nesėkmingas – gali būti taikomi kiti 
banko pertvarkymo būdai, vadovaujantis „mažiausios kainos“ principu indėlių drau-
dėjo, viešojo intereso atžvilgiu. 
16. Banko gelbėjimo privačiomis lėšomis priemonė visose lygintose jurisdikcijose reikš-
mingai prisidės prie viešųjų institucijų galimybės spręsti tiek didelių ir kompleksiškų, 
tiek ir įprastų bankų mokumo problemas, kai kitos pertvarkymo priemonės nepakan-
kamos, nes nėra jokių privataus sektoriaus pirkėjų arba jie lengvai neprieinami, o jei-
gu ir yra, kitų priemonių taikymas padidintų rinkos koncentraciją ar likusių finansų 
institucijų dydį. Pertvarkymo atveju gelbėjimo privačiomis lėšomis priemonė suteikia 
teisę priskirti nemokaus banko nuostolius privatiems asmenims ir rekapitalizuoti ban-
ką nepanaudojant mokesčių mokėtojų pinigų. 
17. Bendras visoms tirtoms jurisdikcijoms gelbėjimo privačiomis lėšomis trūkumas tas, 
kad, nors priemonė padidina banko kreditingumą, tačiau nesuteikia bankui grynų-
jų pinigų. Be to, reglamentuojant reikalingas didesnis aiškumas, kur banko kapitalas, 
kuriam gali būti taikoma priemonė, yra ir turi būti laikomas ir kokia forma, t.y. kuris 
bankų grupės juridinis asmuo disponuoja banko skolos priemonėmis. Laiko prasme 
tai ypač svarbu, nes priemonė naudojama dar prieš viešųjų finansų panaudojimą. Taip 
pat didelių bankų reikšmingos skolos priemonių dalys gali būti nepanaudojamos, tai-
kant šią priemonę, ypač tais atvejais, kai bankai refinansuoja patys save, t.y. indėliais. 
Neatmestina ir tai, kad padidės teisminių ginčių dėl konkrečios klasės kreditorių, ku-
rių reikalavimai bus nurašomi arba konvertuojami, diskriminavimo. Pagrindinis ben-
dras privalumas, kad ši priemonė suteiks teisinį aiškumą dėl konkretaus piniginių lėšų 
kiekio, kuris reikalingas padengti banko nuostolius ir paskatins ankstyvą banko reka-
pitalizaciją bei sustiprins banko veiklos tęstinumo prielaidą. Priemonė visose lygintose 
jurisdikcijose pakeičia viešąją paramą sankcijomis privatiems asmenims.
18. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose finansinio stabilizavimo priemonės yra kraštutinė vy-
riausybės lygmens banko mokumo problemų sprendimo alternatyva, naudojama tik 
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įvertinus visų kitų pertvarkymo priemonių panaudojimo galimybes. Šios priemonės 
naudojamos tada, kai klasikinių banko pertvarkymo priemonių nepakanka siekiant 
apsaugoti viešą interesą. Tai ir valstybės paramos priemonės banko kapitalui padidinti, 
ir banko nuosavybės perėmimas valstybės nuosavybėn.
Dėl viešųjų institucijų ir sprendimų kontrolės mechanizmo
19. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose viešųjų institucijų, atliekančių vaidmenį pertvarkymo 
procese, infrastruktūra susideda iš šių pagrindinių institucijų: bankų priežiūros ins-
titucijos, indėlių draudimo institucijos, teismų. Jų vaidmuo yra daugiausiai susijęs 
su viešojo intereso apsauga. Siekiant, kad bankų pertvarkymo teisinis režimas veiktų 
efektyviai, reikalinga, kad viešosios institucijos turėtų įgaliojimus veikti greitai ir tam 
tikrais atvejais nesilaikant įprastų bendrovių teisės nuostatų, valdymo taisyklių, kurios 
paprastai susijusios su tuo, jog atliekant intervenciją reikia gauti privačių asmenų suti-
kimą. 
20. Yra skirtingų vertinimų, ar teikti prioritetą administracinėms, ar teisminėms pertvar-
kymo sprendimų priėmimo procedūroms. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose pertvarky-
mo sprendimai priimami administracinėse institucijose, bankų pertvarkymo ekono-
minius vertinimus atlieka viešosios institucijos, o teismai privalo jais remtis. Tačiau 
teismo procedūros ginčijamiems banko pertvarkymo sprendimams išlieka reikalin-
gos siekiant garantuoti fundamentalias privačių asmenų teises (teisė į gynybą, teisė į 
kompensaciją už nuosavybės nusavinimą), teisėtus lūkesčius, veiksmų proporcingumą 
tarp viešo intereso ir nuosavybės teisių apsaugos, teisėtą viešo intereso tikslą. Admi-
nistracinė sprendimų priėmimo procedūra yra efektyvesnė, nes yra operatyvesnė, tai 
tiesiogiai susiję su mažesniu banko turto nuvertėjimu. Be to, pertvarkymo sprendi-
mai reikalauja specifinių, ekspertinių žinių, o banko pertvarkymo procedūros yra itin 
kompleksiškos, jose sprendžiamos sudėtingos teisinės problemos, dažnai per bankų 
krizę, todėl preziumuojama, kad žinių, resursų ir operacinių gebėjimų daugiau turi 
administracinės institucijos. Kertinis nusveriantis argumentas – pertvarkant ban-
ką iškyla poreikis bendradarbiauti su kitomis viešomis institucijomis, todėl ruošiant 
pertvarkymo sprendimus tai yra operatyvesnis būdas, sprendimai gali būti priimami 
žmonių grupėje, prireikus – vos per kelias valandas. 
21. ES, JAV banko pertvarkymo teisinę priemonę teismai taiko ex ante, prašymo svarsty-
mas teisme yra skubaus vykdymo. Tiek ES, tiek JAV pertvarkymo sprendimo sustab-
dymas prieštarautų viešajam interesui. Ex post šalys gali skųsti pertvarkymo spren-
dimą. Nors administracinių veiksmų sprendimų peržiūrėjimas yra centrinis asmenų 
teisių saugiklis tiek dėl galimų klaidų, tiek dėl piktnaudžiavimo, tačiau teisė pateikti 
skundą nėra absoliuti, taikomi įvairūs, tyrime aptarti ribojimai, kriterijai, be to, admi-
nistraciniai aktai nėra automatiškai paveikiami. JAV galima skųsti tik pertvarkymo 
sprendimus dėl nemokumo sąlygų nustatymo ir dėl to, ar bankas atitinka įstatyme nu-
matytą finansų institucijos sąvoką. Nuosavybės teisių nusavinimas pagrįstas tik esant 
neatidėliotinoms aplinkybėms ir tada, kai garantuojamos fundamentalios asmens 
teisės. ES galima skųsti pertvarkymo veiksmus tik tada, kai pertvarkymo priemonės 
buvo pritaikytos bankams, kurie neatitinka nemokumo sąlygų, ir tik tuomet, kai nėra 
visuotinės svarbos finansų stabilumo tikslų. Tiek ES, tiek JAV leidžiama nukrypti nuo 
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privačių asmenų teisės į gynybą principo, atsižvelgiant į svarbesnį finansinio stabilu-
mo tikslą, kuris tarnauja tautos gerovei ir viešajam interesui.
Dėl banko pertvarkymo teisinio režimo poveikio kreditoriams ir akcininkams
22. Kreditorių reikalavimai susiję su nuosavybės teisių valdymu. ES, JAV, Šveicarijoje ban-
kui pradėjus pertvarkymo procedūras taikomi apribojimai sandorio šalių teisėms nu-
traukti sutartį ir tam tikri banko įsipareigojimų vykdymo sustabdymo atvejai. Tokie 
apribojimai būtini tam, kad viešosios institucijos susidarytų tikrą nemokaus banko 
balanso vaizdą be banko turto vertės ir kiekio pakeitimų, kurie atsirastų dėl intensy-
vaus pasinaudojimo nutraukimo teisėmis. 
23. Visose lygintose jurisdikcijose kreditorių reikalavimų tenkinimo eilė reikšmingai ski-
riasi nuo bendrosios nemokumo teisės numatytos eilės. Pirmiausia tuo, kad banko 
nemokumo nuostolius dengia reguliuojamojo kapitalo priemonės ir nuostoliai akci-
ninkams paskirstomi arba panaikinant akcijas, arba labai sumažinant pelną, tenkantį 
vienai akcijai, konvertuojant skolą į kapitalą. Kai tokių priemonių neužtenka, antras 
žingsnis - subordinuotos skolos nurašymas arba konvertavimas. Pirmaeiliai banko 
įsipareigojimai konvertuojami arba nurašomi po to, kai visi subordinuotos klasės kre-
ditoriai konvertuojami arba jų reikalavimai nurašomi. ES pasižymi tuo, kad skiriasi 
indėlių reikalavimų eiliškumas banko nemokumo atveju. Fiziniams asmenims ir labai 
mažoms bei mažoms ir vidutinėms įmonėms užtikrinama atitinkančių indėlių dalis, 
kuri viršija draudimo sumą, suteikiamas prioritetas prieš paprastus neapdraustus pir-
menybinių kreditorių reikalavimus. Toks reguliavimas gali daryti neigiamą poveikį 
šiems indėlininkams, nes dauguma labai mažų, mažų, vidutinių įmonių yra didelių 
bankų klientai. Esant didesnei jų indėlių teisių apsaugai, tai gali padidinti skolinimo 
kaštus, pavyzdžiui, bankai gali padidinti palūkanų normą. JAV sistemos ypatumas tas, 
kad galima nukrypti nuo bendrosios nemokumo teisės kreditorių eilės tik tada, kai sie-
kiama išlaikyti finansų stabilumą rinkoje. Be to, FDIC gali išskirti tam tikras kreditorių 
klases, nukrypstant nuo kreditorių lygiateisiškumo principo, jeigu tai prisideda prie 
banko turto vertės padidinimo, kreditorių nuostolių sumažinimo. Šveicarija pasižymi 
tuo, jog skolos konvertavimo į kapitalą principai ir kreditorių reikalavimų eiliškumas 
nustatomi restruktūrizavimo plane.
24. Pertvarkant banką, viešus ir privačius interesus balansuojančių teisinių saugiklių ir 
kriterijų, taikant specialias banko pertvarkymo priemones, tikslas – pasiekti kiek įma-
noma didesnį teisinį aiškumą ir teisinių pasekmių nuspėjamumą. Banko pertvarkymo 
proceso nuspėjamumas formuoja ir banko akcininkų elgesį ex ante. Todėl nustatant 
aiškias, nuspėjamas taisykles ir principus sustiprinama rinkos disciplina. Jeigu yra 
žinoma, kad „blogais laikais“ banko nemokumo nuostolius prisiims privatūs asme-
nys, akcininkai, kreditoriai, tai atitinkamai skatina akcininkų, kreditorių ketinimus 
atidžiau vykdyti bendrovės kontrolę savo iniciatyva ir imtis ankstyvų veiksmų reka-
pitalizuoti banką ar įgyvendinti kitas priemones, atstatančias rinkos pasitikėjimą ir 
užtikrinančias viešąjį interesą. Ex post nuspėjamas bankų pertvarkymo procesas lei-
džia įprastą ir efektyvų ekonominių resursų perskirstymą tokiu būdu, kuris skatintų 
augimą ir padidintų bendrą gerovę.
25. ES teisinė sistema suteikia stiprią privačių asmenų nuosavybės teisių apsaugą banko 
akcininkams, tuo tarpu JAV teisinė sistema labiau ribotą privačių asmenų nuosavybės 
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teisinę apsaugą. Jeigu tiek ES, tiek JAV banko pertvarkymo priemonės taikomos ir 
viešosios institucijos įgaliojimai, siekiant viešojo intereso tikslų, panaudojami neat-
sižvelgiant į privačių asmenų teisėtų lūkesčių, teisės į gynybą, teisės į kompensaciją 
principus, tokia apribota akcininkų teisių apimtis pažeidžia privatų interesą. Kita ver-
tus, privačių asmenų teisių apsaugos principai turi būti aiškinami kartu su platesniais 
viešojo intereso tikslais, siekiu apsaugoti finansų stabilumą, kitų viešųjų asmenų inte-
resais, taip pat turi atsižvelgti ir į bankų atliekamas funkcijas ir jų svarbą visai ekono-
mikai. 
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BANK RESOLUTION REGIME.  
BALANCING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS.  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Summary
Issues and interest of the research. Despite their significant dynamics in the field of 
financial services, banks are the most widespread financial institutions all over the world, 
they undertake essential, crucial functions and play a significant role in sovereign eco-
nomies. Consequently, the banking crisis is ever more associated with rather sensitive 
and provocative social, political, budgetary and legislative events. Efficient, reliable and 
predictable regulation of banking activities at national and international level helps to 
maintain critical banking functions and solvency. Efficient and practical legal regulation 
of banking activities primarily relates to quantitative risk management activities of a bank 
and numerous limitation criteria of prudential regulation. However, the recent banking 
crisis highlighted the equally important role of qualitative risk criteria of banking practice 
and their impact assessment important, especially bank insolvency crisis management ru-
les, legal measures and bank insolvency procedures.
Bank insolvency law and procedure, including their complexity, is commonly known 
as a “Gordian knot” in the legal doctrine. In theory, from the very inception of modern 
financial markets, insolvency procedures of financial institutions and correlated legal re-
lations have served as a point of reference for economists, bankers, lawyers and legal re-
searchers. In practice, until the recent banking crisis , the substance and procedure of 
bank insolvency laws largely diverged, and a systematic approach was missing. Typically, 
in order to address the sensitive bank insolvency issues general corporate insolvency law 
- lex generalis - was applied without taking into account and observing the unique cha-
racteristics, functions and purpose of the banks. In addition, most legislation imposed 
minimum regulation with regard to legal principles of bank resolution, and was therefore 
unpredictable, incomplete, lacking legal certainty, with no alternative solutions available. 
Normally, former regulations were restricted to the application of governmental stabili-
sation measures, while alternative solutions describing how to manage cases of bank in-
solvency were neither established nor developed. As time went by, deregulation and the 
lack of balance of rights and obligations of diverse groups of stakeholders operating in 
bank insolvency procedures, namely the state, public institutions, bank administrators, 
creditors, shareholders became more obvious. Due to the lack of proper legal safeguards, 
including the former inadequate legal framework, uncertainty and the risk of litigation 
increased. Accordingly, from the inception of the financial crisis, up to the present day, 
academics, regulators, policy-makers, and related international organisations have under-
taken effort to examine possibilities for more effective sound legal measures that could 
assist in addressing insolvent bank issues without resulting in the chaos of the financial 
sector and by avoiding other severe consequences. At that point, a reasonable question ari-
ses as to the types of bank insolvency regulation procedures that have been modified since 
the recent global banking (financial) crisis, with its peak period in 2008–2009?
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From a practical point of view, a question arose as to whether lex generalis was adequ-
ate to resolve the problems of an insolvent bank effectively. Legal mechanisms for res-
tructuring banks were limited, while ordinary bankruptcy procedure was hardly suitable 
for banks. In parallel, it was generally recognised that ordinary bankruptcy is not suitable 
for banks. An issue arose: how a country should respond to the symptoms revealed by one 
or several banks, showing serious financial and (or) operational difficulties, distress, or 
that a bank is failing or likely to fail, or is insolvent? What are the legal and administrative 
measures that the state must have in place and what are the steps to be taken to deal with 
bank insolvency problems effectively? These issues became fundamental in the context of 
the reforms of bank insolvency law.
Before the recent banking crisis, bank insolvency regulation in most countries lacked 
legal certainty, and the effect of this was that bank insolvency rules and procedures were 
created, administered and conducted on an ad hoc basis, by a spontaneous process of 
banking crisis management. While the states often employed public finances and bail-out 
for solving and addressing bank insolvency problems and saving banks, bank liquidation 
procedure was applied as an alternative. At the same time, banks were prevented from ini-
tiating bankruptcy proceedings, even if they could avoid the adverse consequences for the 
real economy. This resulted in spill-over effects and different risks, such as moral hazard, 
systemic risk, distortions of competition, protection of the depositor’s rights, threat for 
financial stability, etc. In addition, nearly every official bank restructuring decision was 
taken, or at least confirmed, with the approval of the political leadership. The competent 
authorities and the governments could choose one of the two equally undesirable options: 
either to initiate expensive public rescue of the failing banks by using public finances (bail-
out), or to apply ordinary bankruptcy procedures as an alternative even to systemically 
important banks with the ensuing negative impact on the financial system as a whole and 
the economy in general.
G20 authorised an action plan in November 2008, and suggested that the legislators, 
regulators and other competent authorities “review the legal regulation of bank restructu-
ring and bankruptcy laws, according to a new experience and [...] ensure that the states 
would assist for the orderly winding up of banks “. It was concluded that it was vital to 
establish and develop effective legal instruments that could accurately liquidate insolvent 
banks in an ordinary way while maintaining the systemically important banking functions. 
A well-defined approach, namely the bank resolution regime was supported. The central 
purpose of the bank resolution system was to provide the “third insolvency alternative and 
a new direction” between uncontrolled or inadequately managed bank liquidation proce-
dure (bankruptcy), which usually operates together with reducing the impact of bank as-
sets and other bank insolvency jeopardies, covered when the bank’s shareholders and the 
majority of creditors are rescued by using public finances. Bank liquidation proceedings 
generally have an adverse effect. They swiftly interrupt and disturb the bank’s conduct and 
business operations and further destroy the value of the property. During the transitional 
period and in the final outcome, the continuity of critical banking functions and business 
continuity presumption is not met. Therefore, the first priority was to resolve the bank as a 
going concern, by applying resolution tools and avoiding any significant adverse effect on 
the financial system. At the international level, jurisdictions were required to undertake 
a broad range of legislative measures, in particular, to restructure banks while extending 
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banking business activities, meanwhile non-viable or systemically insignificant parts of 
the banking business were subject to regular liquidation procedures. 
Bank resolution procedures are an extremely complicated economic, social and le-
gal phenomena, featuring complexity and interaction of substantial and procedural legal 
norms. Among other items, bank resolution regime needs to be designed not only to pro-
tect shareholders and creditors, but simultaneously to achieve the other objectives set by 
public authorities and vital for the efficient functioning of the economy as a whole. When 
formulating the source of legal regulation of social bank resolution regime and the related 
legal rules in the form of community conventions, at least five principal issues to be dealt 
with and related to the balancing of private and public interests in bank resolution regime 
are addressed in the dissertation. 
First of all, only after making the adjustments at the international level, the issue arose 
with regard to the extent of the loss resulting from a bank’s insolvency and those respon-
sible for the loss. An equally important question then arises: is it possible to rely on public 
interest, placing it above private interests? If so, what is the legal basis and the legal prin-
ciples to be followed. 
Secondly, the existing regulation governing bank resolution was reviewed or modern 
regulation was created in the relevant jurisdictions. The new era of bank resolution regime 
is indissociable from the broad powers exclusively delegated to competent authorities (e.g. 
the right to convert bank debt instruments into capital by financing bank recapitalisation, 
official intervention in the bank, etc.). Simultaneously, as demonstrated in practice, ap-
plying resolution tools can create similar obstacles, where the impact on the ownership 
rights and expenses of creditors and shareholders are potentially interconnected (e.g. the 
sale of a business tool requires neither the consent of the shareholders of the bank nor of 
any third party other than the purchaser). For this reason, it is important to properly regu-
late legal principles and criteria in positive law and to establish legal safeguards that could 
optimally balance private and public interests, which would accordingly help protecting 
public interest against potential counterparty claims. 
Thirdly, given that the banks in distress experience financial difficulties, additional 
funding is needed. This has led to the establishment of provisions on the international 
level, namely that public authorities must have the power to impose bail-in instruments 
for banks, which essentially means that the application of these legal instruments prior to 
liquidation of the bank can write off capital instruments and convert them into the bank’s 
capital (shares). 
Fourthly, international financial standards have encouraged the banks to apply a va-
riety of resolution tools available to them and to assure the assumption of the banks’ going 
concern. Moreover, the provisions were established for bank resolution procedure to be 
applied in accordance with the “least cost” principle or creditors’ “no-worse-off-princi-
ple”. Accordingly, no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if 
the bank had been liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings; otherwise it could 
destabilise the financial system. Additionally, steps should be taken in order to ensure 
that systemically important functions of the bank are rapidly transferred and continued 
where necessary. Notably, when no alternative private sector solutions could be reasonably 
expected, including capital injections of shareholders or third parties, this would suffice to 
recover the viability of the entire bank. 
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Fifthly, a new approach (different from the general insolvency approach) was establis-
hed to consider the satisfaction of creditor claims and a hierarchy of claims in the bank 
insolvency procedures. Bank resolution regime is inconceivable without considering the 
negative impact on creditor and shareholder rights, such as interference in the contractu-
al relations (netting agreements, collateral agreements, financial collateral arrangements 
under which ownership is transferred). As a result, legal protection of creditors and sha-
reholders becomes problematic, encouraging scientists to reconsider whether the existing 
regulation of bank resolution procedures adequately balances public and private interests. 
On the one hand, the bank resolution regime is based on public interest purposes, while 
maintaining financial stability and legal protection of deposits. On the other hand, bank 
insolvency procedures are indissociable from the limitations of private interests – share-
holder, creditor ownership rights.
As long as no equal approach has been adopted towards the treatment of bank insol-
vency procedures, the legal framework, and the international harmonisation, it is useful 
to examine the appropriate national legal framework of bank insolvency procedures from 
the comparative perspective. It is necessary to disclose not only how separate jurisdictions 
succeeded to comply with the international guidelines, but also to research and explore the 
types of legal models that certain jurisdictions have chosen, to compare the particularities, 
to find the convergences and divergences and, after examining the positive law of different 
jurisdictions, to disclose the approaches to the balance of public and private interests, and 
to suggest the recommendations and proposals.
Based on the above, the primary focus of this dissertation is placed on the main ques-
tion of the research: whether the legal regime of bank resolution appropriately balances 
public and private interests?
The aim of the dissertation: to analyse theoretical and practical issues of the bank 
resolution regime in terms of compatibility of public and private interests.
In order to achieve this purpose, the following research tasks are formulated:
1) To disclose the change of bank insolvency paradigm and the reasons behind it; to 
analyse general conceptual terms of a new bank resolution paradigm.
2) To distinguish the scientific conception of bank resolution regime, as compared 
to other bank insolvency procedures, and to crystallise the characteristic features, 
thresholds, to analyse bank resolution tools, by discovering their implementation 
benefits and shortcomings.
3) Following a comparative approach, to examine the public authorities involved in 
bank resolution procedures, the decision-making mechanisms of bank resolu-
tion and the relevant role of public authorities.
4) Based on the identified characteristics of the regime governing bank resolution, 
to analyse the impact of bank resolution on public and private interests and their 
compatibility in the positive law of various jurisdictions.
The objective of the research: operational and functional implications on the bank 
resolution regime. 
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Scope and delimitations of the research
US. Lex specialis of bank resolution originated in the US. The origins of the bank re-
solution institute influenced other legal systems and their development. The United States 
is to be investigated since already in early 1991, the US adopted a separate section in the 
Bankruptcy Code dedicated to regulating banking insolvency procedures. Simultaneously, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act was revised by the policy makers in or-
der that the FDIC, whenever a bank is failing or likely to fail, begins acting as the bank’s 
receiver, while at the same time performing the functions of the regulator. This is exactly 
the opposite model in comparison with classical bank insolvency regulation model, for 
instance, found in the EU. In that case, usual deposit insurance activities are limited to the 
collection of contributions to the fund, payment of compensations to insured depositors, 
in the event of subrogation, the presence of bankruptcy process. In addition, the Dodd-
Frank Act established a new Orderly Liquidation Authority (hereinafter - OLA), which is 
responsible for the administration of all financial companies posing a threat to the sys-
temic risk. The new authority amended the Bankruptcy Code and addressed the moral 
hazard problem created by situations when shareholders, management and unsecured 
creditors were protected from the consequences they would have suffered in liquidation 
under the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, according to the US legal practice, among other 
legal points, several other significant differences between bank insolvency and corporate 
insolvency legal regimes should be considered. Additionally, the recent banking crisis has 
resulted in the diversity of banks failure practices in the US. The Washington Mutual, Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers (in doctrine they are often described as the largest and most 
complicated bankruptcy cases in the history of financial institutions) bank insolvency ca-
ses deserve special mention. Thus, the global financial crisis not only started in the US, but 
also caused enormous losses to the US economy since the Great Depression in 1930 the 
market crash resulted in multiple deposit withdrawal from banks and rapid freezing of all 
credit markets. While the lawmakers of other countries were still in the process of legal 
and regulatory reforms in a sense of bank resolution, on 21 July 2010 the US president 
signed the Dodd-Frank Act, extremely significant in the context of bank insolvency pro-
cedures, which had tremendous impact on the entire financial service industry. As a result, 
other states analysed the US legal regulation and made efforts to adapt.
Switzerland. Switzerland is to be examined since it is an extremely relevant country 
in the global banking sector. Swiss banks were largely created for providing services and 
exporting capital (capital funded both nationally and in foreign countries). By the end of 
2012, the off-balance sheet assets of the two largest Swiss banks – UBS and Credit Suisse – 
amounted to CHF 2.5 trillion, a figure four times exceeding the total annual GDP of Swit-
zerland. The distinguishing feature of this jurisdiction is that the Swiss banking industry 
is dominated by large, universal banks, with a high degree of bank concentration and, at 
the same time, banks are exposed to additional risks that can affect the financial system 
as a whole. Although Switzerland is a particularly strong country in the banking industry, 
historically, however, bank insolvency crisis was not an uncommon phenomenon. Ban-
king crises occurred in the Great Depression period during 1931–1936, after the Second 
World War, and during the housing loan crisis in 1990. The recent international banking 
crisis also influenced the Swiss banking system. Moreover, most notably, Switzerland is a 
unique country on the European continent, as the legal, political and economic system 
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significantly differs from the other European countries. The financial sector is built on 
the basis of self-regulation, based on the assumption that such regulatory approach is the 
most effective and efficient way to manage and monitor banking activities. Switzerland 
was one of the first countries in the world, which in 2004 began developing special bank 
insolvency regulation and subsequently was one of the first countries to comply with the 
requirements of the FSB. Most notably, in response to the 2004 banking crisis, the princi-
ples of Swiss banking law underwent certain changes. The new version of the Banking Law 
entered into force in 2011–2012. The Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Superviso-
ry Authority on the Insolvency of Banks and Securities Dealers of 30 August 2012 (recast) 
(January 1st, 2015), brought significant technical changes in bank insolvency procedures, 
which meant that banks would no longer be obliged to liquidate and revoke their licenses 
if there was a prospect of restructuring a failing bank. Bank insolvency procedures were 
accompanied by the legal act of FINMA, which came into force on 1 November 2012, and 
was improved on 1 January 2013. The general legal provisions governing bank insolvency 
were fully transformed to the lex specialis. Finally, it should be noted that the Swiss regu-
latory reforms were influenced by recent cases of banking insolvency. Two globally and 
systemically important financial institutions faced financial difficulties (UBS and Credit 
Suisse ). Although losses related to the bank insolvency procedures were very significant 
(e.g., UBS wrote off non-performing loans worth about USD 53.1 billion), we will mention 
the entirely successful and unprecedented bank resolution cases in this dissertation.
The EU. The recent bank insolvency crisis fully revealed the loopholes of the EU legal 
system in the field of bank insolvency procedures, the absence of transparent and pre-
dictable regulation that would allow managing financial restructuring of distressed banks 
and/or normal liquidation (bankruptcy). Between 2007 and 2009, most EU Member Sta-
tes had no regimes governing bank resolution that could ensure ordinary bank restructu-
ring and/or the liquidation of failing banks. The EU insolvency law was mainly regulated 
by national legal systems, and the lack of harmonisation was apparent. When a significant 
number of banks faced severe distress problems in 2008, including the major market play-
ers such as Fortis, Dexia, the effective bank resolution regime was absent. For the reasons 
stated above, public authorities of the EU Member States were required to take legal bank 
restructuring measures in a chaotic way, and they therefore struggled to fight the problems 
of distressed banks, froze their property and seized bank assets located within their juris-
diction. In addition, national authorities have taken ad hoc legislative measures providing 
government guarantees and capital injections into a failing financial institution. The EU 
bank insolvency regulations developed very dynamically. Before the entry into force of the 
Banking Union, bank resolution procedures lacked even the minimum level of harmoni-
sation, their substance and procedures diverged significantly, depending on the Member 
State. Prior to the adoption of the Banking Union’s proposals, some Member States indivi-
dually began adopting the related amendments to the bank insolvency laws at the national 
level, while the others waited until the harmonisation of the bank resolution framework at 
the EU level. However, eventually, the need for an efficient bank resolution regime arose. 
The aim was to ensure a standardised bank resolution mechanism, to manage bank insol-
vency cases at the home Member States’ disposal, which could ensure that the use of inter-
nal markets was not limited and the right of establishment of banks was not restricted due 
to the financial resources designed to manage their failure. Prior to the legal project of the 
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Banking Union, it was possible to classify bank insolvency legal regulation both in general 
and special terms, but the main regulation governing insolvency procedure in EU clearly 
excluded the specific regulation of financial institutions, and banks, from the scope and 
operation of primary insolvency law. Initially, only the procedural aspects of insolvency 
law were harmonised at the EU level. Eventually, the EU’s legal system should be consi-
dered also because of the fact that, in practice, insolvency proceedings were initiated for 
such significant banks as Northern Rock, Fortis, Dexia. It must be noted that in Lithuania, 
the two resonant and unprecedented bank insolvency cases where those of bank Snoras 
and Ūkio Bankas.
The originality of the research. The scientific analysis of bank insolvency law issues 
is valuable and novel in many scientific aspects. The vulnerabilities of the legal acts go-
verning bank insolvency procedures and the gaps left by legislators become evident only 
during the banking crisis and/or in the case of systemically important cross-border bank 
insolvency. As a result, after the latest banking (financial) crisis, these loopholes became 
particularly sharp and resulted in abundant case-law on bank insolvency, which was not 
scientifically analysed neither in Lithuania nor in Switzerland. Moreover, this study is dis-
tinguished by the fact that in the context of bank insolvency procedures the legal doctrine 
is regarded as an essential source of jurisprudence. This position is based on the fact that 
most countries have ordinary, non-specialised courts, which often lack knowledge about 
banking activities necessary for handling bank insolvency cases. Since there are no speci-
alised insolvency courts in Lithuania and Switzerland and the case-law analysis is lacking, 
this research provides novelty and explores new possibilities.
Based on the above-mentioned analysis and the problematic perspectives of existing 
banking and insolvency law, systemic and practical aspects of the research are beneficial. 
What solutions were adopted to resolve the legal dilemma in different jurisdictions, and 
have the problems been resolved? Given the intimate link between the international natu-
re of modern economy (globalisation), the spread of international (multinational) banks 
and the prevalence of banking group influence on the development of the world economy, 
bank insolvency law and research analysis is now the international point of reference. The 
lack of legal certainty and clarity affects the integration of unresolved problems into larger 
conflicts related to the variety of legal interpretations. Hence, the effect of the function of 
the law in terms of governing public relations and regulatory harmonisation of conflicting 
interests and functional performances is not ensured. On the contrary, the hypotheses that 
could prevent the stability of social ties are not eliminated, and this seems inconsistent 
with the individual development of certain relations and the extension of interpretations. 
To summarise, that does not meet the purposes of legal science and modern, sustainable 
business development trends, that is why the analysis of the research will also be useful in 
this particular regard.
Despite global attention for the research subject, to date Lithuania and Switzerland 
clearly lack the analysis of scientifically approved information, different regulatory models 
and approaches in different jurisdictions. After performing a qualified and comprehensive 
scientific study on the subject at issue, assumptions could be established for addressing 
these gaps, by improving the analysis in the field of legal and regulatory framework of 
bank insolvency procedures, by presenting the relevant proposals and recommendations. 
The originality of this scientific topic finds its expression in the complexity of the investi-
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gation. Moreover, in the nearest future Lithuania will have to implement particular Ban-
king Union directives and transpose them into national law , meanwhile the SRM regu-
lation will be directly applicable, that is why this study could form the basis of a review of 
the Lithuanian legal system.
In Lithuania and Switzerland, the extensively escalated bank insolvency law is still 
at the level of legal uncertainty. The supervisory response is further prevented by ‘secret’ 
decisions of the supervisory authority and the strongly restricted scope of the studies con-
ducted by the competent authorities related to the analysis of the insolvency procedures in 
Lithuania. Henceforth, the resonating practical processes taking place in the society and 
poor justification of scattered individual opinions also highlight the intended theoretical 
novelty of the dissertation. The complexity and significance of the research is determined 
by the reasons stated in this introductory part. In addition, the introduction itself likewise 
describes the grounds for research. It is anticipated that this qualitative scientific study will 
encourage to produce other reliable studies and help formulating uniform case-law mee-
ting social needs. It is assumed that the research conclusions will serve the Lithuanian and 
the Swiss scientific legal doctrine and could be employed for pedagogical and educational 
activities. Among other things, the interest in the subject and the need for the analysis was 
also noted at the time of the author’s lecturing work at Mykolas Romeris University on the 
subjects of bankruptcy law and banking law. It is assumed that the author presents a com-
prehensive study on bank insolvency law, which will encourage the scientific community 
to perform additional research in the aforementioned area and will prompt a discourse 
that will empower and foster bank insolvency law and banking law in general. What is 
more, the doctrine of the structure, development and improvement of the bank insolvency 
procedures also serves the interests of the related public and private interests and their 
legal protection through providing greater legal certainty in this field. So far, in Lithuanian 
and Swiss private law, the current status of education is disappointing. Additionally, the 
dissertation proposes an important topic both in practice and in theory.
It should be further noted that a well-functioning legal system of the state encoura-
ges both the operation of financial markets and financial intermediaries. The established 
presumption found in the literature states that countries can be divided into categories 
by comparing the efficiency of the national legal system, especially that of financial tran-
sactions. . Such a position is based on the fact that different financial systems have diffe-
rent regulatory levels, especially with regard to the protection of creditor and shareholder 
rights and the related regulatory rules. Thus, the financial development of each state also 
depends on the level of sound legal measures as a whole and their efficiency. Among ot-
her elements, the research might be relevant for lawmakers, especially governments per-
forming particular operations in the context of bank insolvency procedures. First, the 
government aims to protect ownership rights and guarantee the execution of contracts. 
Second, governmental regulation is needed to encourage the appropriate legal provisions 
on the protection of investor funds, so that their money is used in the most appropriate 
manner, and that the investors are able to adopt suitable investment decisions by using 
their funds. Third, governments organise legal regulation and supervision of financial ins-
titutions in order to maintain bank solvency. 
The study is mostly based on comparative law methodology. It was presumed that 
most regulatory questions could not be resolved by laws without sound comparative legal 
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assistance , whether it takes the form of a general study or any kind of comparative ana-
lysis, or an analytical report on a particular topic. Among other things, comparative law 
specialists normally provide suggestions to be adopted and implemented in their national 
legal system, taking into account the relevant problems at issue and their solutions that 
proved successful in other countries, including differences in judicial procedures, powers 
of different institutions, economic capacity, and the general social context. An equally 
important fact is that comparative law is based on the interpretation of national legal ru-
les. In addition, comparative law plays a significant role for the courts while interpreting 
and applying the law. Finally, comparative law plays a significant part in legal education. 
Limiting general legal education to the studies of national law would be unexcusable, as 
modern society is very mobile, and it also helps better understanding one’s own domestic 
legal system and learning from others. 
The author expects that this study will serve as a practical and useful tool to courts 
dealing with such types of cases, to legislators in terms of improving and developing legal 
regulation, and to legal theoreticians and related experts. It is also assumed that the study 
will assist in analysing scientific problems.
The review of references. No comprehensive research on bank insolvency law and 
procedures, in particular in the field of bank resolution, has been conducted in the Li-
thuanian jurisprudence so far. Nor is there any comprehensive research on these issues in 
Switzerland. In Lithuania, general insolvency law has long been overlooked and as such 
is in the embryonic state. In principle, the subject of bank insolvency law has been largely 
abandoned. Examination of the literature reveals that bank insolvency law remains terra 
incognita in the Lithuanian educational system. Besides the author’s publications on bank 
insolvency procedures, some research work could be found in several research papers in 
Lithuanian language. In their publication entitled ‘Bankruptcy Law’, Kavalnė and Norkus 
give a general insight in banking and other financial institutions and their bankruptcy 
features, providing a brief description of bank liquidation procedures, key elements, and 
general characteristics of bank bankruptcy. Toločko and Černius provide a very general 
description of bank reorganisation, liquidation and bankruptcy procedures. Some cau-
ses and consequences of commercial bank insolvency were analysed by Šadžius from a 
economical, historical perspective. Šenavičius published the original idea of the Banking 
Union in the context of public administration (before the political agreement on the Ban-
king Union legislation was reached). The author of the article briefly refers to the essential 
elements of the Banking Union. 
It is necessary to point out that scientific publications referred above are committed 
to fragmented extent. However, they do not primarily analyse specific issues. In the abo-
ve-mentioned works, bank insolvency procedures are examined restrictedly in order to 
introduce to conventional regulatory trends without reflecting the recent change of pa-
radigm. Consequently, due to a significant change in the legal base of bank insolvency 
procedures, previous researches no longer satisfy the existing rules and regulatory cir-
cumstances. None of the individual studies examine bank insolvency procedures using 
a complex approach: examination of banking law, finance, corporate and insolvency law. 
None of the aforementioned studies have comprehensively accomplished and considered 
the bank resolution regime or examined the conditions for establishing bank insolvency, 
nor have they investigated the protection of shareholders’, depositors’ and other creditors’ 
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rights, etc. In conclusion, this relevant subject receives little attention in the Lithuanian 
and Swiss doctrine and practice.
Compared to the Lithuanian legal doctrine, foreign legal sources devote much more 
attention to regulation of bank insolvency procedures, uncertain aspects of bank insol-
vency treatment, and various regional and international unification trends related to bank 
insolvency legal relations. Swire , Hüpkes, Asser and Hoelscher are the pioneers of bank in-
solvency procedures. In addition, problematic aspects of bank insolvency law were discus-
sed by a number of other notable scientists, such as Lastra, Bliss and Kaufman, Marinč and 
Vlahos. It should be noted that the vast majority of international legal scientists dealt with 
the problem of compatibility of public and private interest in bank resolution regime indi-
rectly, by investigating various legal principles or institutes. For example, they have analy-
sed the “too big to fail“ doctrine, the interaction of private and public authorities (Deposit 
Insurance Agencies, Ministry of Finance, the judiciary system, the Central Bank), by le-
gally assessing the systemic banking insolvency crisis, examining creditors’ and sharehol-
ders’ rights, etc. At the same time, from the banking crisis up to now, regulation of bank 
insolvency has been swiftly progressing. The most relevant pieces of legislation were adop-
ted quite recently, providing the author with an excellent opportunity to provide a critical 
insight into bank insolvency law-related doctrine of different jurisdictions.
However, only some scientific papers analyse and disclose the legal aspects of bank in-
solvency related to the research object. In particular, the interaction of public and private 
interests is examined by Hüpkes, Alexander, Hadjiemmanuil. Individual issues of bank re-
solution regime, such as the bail-in mechanism, are analysed by Huertas, Smits, Coffee. Le-
gal and regulatory reforms of bank insolvency are discussed by Sarra, Boonstra, also Gio-
vanoli. Furthermore, a variety of authoritative publications of international organisations 
and public institutions, such as the International Bank of Settlements, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and others analyse bank resolution and liquidation-related 
and regulatory problems. It is equally important to note that due to the extreme sensitivity 
of the topic, various scientific studies, often in collaboration with the academics, were 
commissioned by the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parlia-
ment, the Financial Stability Board, etc. The study is also based on authoritative conference 
materials or publications issued on their basis .
Ultimately, it must be noted that the object of the research is rather limited in the Swiss 
jurisprudence. Excluding above mentioned Hüpkes scientific works, only a few materials 
can be distinguished as a scientific projects. Some cross-border bank resolution aspects of 
the EU dealt within Grünewald dissertation (the thesis is written based on undeclared EU 
legislation before a compromise was taken in the EP – aut.note). Deposit insurance related 
issues in the context of financial stability discussed by Reiser. The interaction of banks and 
the Swiss economics is addressed in the Drechel dissertation.
The published references were addressed and taken into account up to 1 January 2015.
Interdisciplinary nature of the research. This study has an interdisciplinary charac-
ter. This is determined by the selection of the object under investigation and the specific 
nature of bank insolvency law. This branch of law couples the accomplishments of se-
veral scientific disciplines. Among them, the most important ones are economic and legal 
sciences. Occasionally, the study discusses theories based on economic criteria, impact 
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assessment, and the definitions provided by the science of economics. For example, the as-
sessment of bank insolvency conditions is related to the economic analysis and criteria, or 
the effect of bank insolvency on the market and its participants. However, the study takes 
into account the fact that it has been prepared by a legal researcher and will be defended 
in front of the Committee of Doctoral Legal Studies, which is why the scientific analysis is 
concentrated and based on traditional private law instruments. Particular attention is paid 
to addressing the current and potential regulatory mechanisms.
Defensive arguments of the dissertation:
1. The paradigm of bank insolvency procedures has changed recently in the juris-
dictions relevant for the purposes of the research. The change resulted in the 
particular aspect, namely that private interests of shareholders and creditors have 
become subordinated to the public interest, which is to secure the continuity of 
banking services and at the same time the stability of the financial system. Bank 
resolution in the first place and then the ensuing ordinary liquidation of the bank 
helps to ensure the optimal balance of public and private interests.
2. Public administrative authorities initiate resolution of failing or likely to fail 
banks, while the court plays a secondary role. Although actions in the field of 
bank resolution affect the bank’s shareholders and creditors, the administrative 
model of resolution decision-making is more rapid and efficient, as compared 
with judicial solutions of bank resolution, by maintaining financial stability and 
better protecting credit discipline in the market. 
3. The procedural rights of the creditors and shareholders of the bank that is failing 
or likely to fail are essentially limited to the ex-post option of judicial review, so 
that the legal framework for opposing the decisions of the competent resolution 
authorities is very limited. Such limitation of individual rights is necessary in or-
der to achieve wider purposes of financial stability, but at the same time it should 
be compatible with fundamental rights (the right of judicial review, the right to 
compensation) of related persons and the legal principles developed in case-law 
(principles of legitimate expectations and proportionality).
4. After the shift in the paradigm of legal regulation governing bank insolvency 
in the relevant jurisdictions, bank resolution measures are sufficient to prevent 
bank insolvency ex ante–and to effectively deal with the consequences of bank 
insolvency ex post.
The approval of research results. The results of the research are published in three 
peer-reviewed, official Lithuanian publications. The principal results of the thesis were 
presented in six different international conferences and accordingly published in their 
official collections of materials . The outcome of the research was also delivered in diffe-
rent universities, public lectures, debates and workshops . In addition, in May 2013 the 
author co-organised, managed and presented a report at the national scientific conference 
“Fraudulent bankruptcy: causes, typology, legal consequences”, hosted by Mykolas Rome-
ris University, under the presentation title “Fraudulent bankruptcy features of the banks. 
Lithuanian case study”, and the author also discussed certain aspects of bank insolvency 
procedures in the same workshop. The results of the research were also relied on in 2013 
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and 2014 in cooperation with the expert in the Council of the EU in Brussels, in the Lithu-
anian Presidency team responsible for an extremely important field of the EU legislation, 
namely the Banking Union project. The author also relied on the results of the research by 
reading lectures in civil law and banking law at Mykolas Romeris University, and by con-
ducting his practical and professional activities. To continue, the research results were also 
deliberated and reflected in the work of the Lithuanian Insolvency Law Network. Several 
review articles were published on the network’s website. It is also necessary to highlight 
that the author relied on the results of the study while preparing and submitting a legal 
opinion together with the Business Law Department of Mykolas Romeris University on 
a resonant case heard in the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, revealing the interpretati-
ve peculiarities of the legal regulation concerning setting-off counterclaims, hierarchy of 
bank creditors in the event of bank insolvency and the related issues of bank insolvency in 
Lithuanian positive law.
Research methodology. The research is based on the qualitative methodological 
approach. This approach, relying on qualitative methods, allows perceiving the bank 
resolution regime and liquidation procedures together with the relevant obstacles. The 
research was largely based on theoretical and empirical methods: linguistic, systematic, 
logical, critical, document analysis. The research is dominated by active methodology, 
conventional science, conceiving law as an entirety of legal rules, accurately reflected in 
national legislation. The research also employed the methods of typical scientific know-
ledge, hermeneutics (interpretation), all helpful for understanding, interpreting and exe-
cuting the law. Legal science is determined not only by the facts, as inter alia it implies 
interpretations and application of the existing knowledge to new fields of research. Thus, 
the object of the research is mainly based on the theory of analysis and understanding and 
characterised by qualitative methods, by combining experience and effort to explain the 
genuine meaning. The author of this study construes the text, crystallises and defines bank 
insolvency relations, by exploring the balance of public and private interests in the bank 
resolution regime. Based on such methodological grounds and according to the formula-
ted aims and objectives of the study, various methods of data collection and data analysis 
were applied. The research is in compliance with the jurisprudence: (1) to determine social 
certainty of the facts, phenomenon and their characteristics; (2) to explain these facts and 
expose causal connections; (3) to assess the factual basis of the regulation at issue and to 
examine its value.
1) The method of linguistic analysis was applied for interpreting the diversity of na-
tional laws, court judgments, internationally acknowledged guidance and rele-
vant readings, including the wording of international and the EU, US, Swiss laws 
and legal concepts.
2) The method of document analysis was employed by collecting and examining 
the regulation, non-binding international legislation, explanatory documents 
of competent authorities, court judgments and legal doctrine, such as special 
scientific publications, monographs, textbooks, journals in Lithuania, the US, 
Switzerland and the EU. The aforementioned method was also used for the pur-
poses of the research to analyse different publications of international bodies and 
public institutions. The abovementioned method had no improper influence on 
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the approach selected by the researcher. Initial research data was obtained from 
general law, insolvency law, banking and financial law, administrative law, depo-
sit insurance law, and other legislation governing failing or likely to fail banks in 
the relevant jurisdictions. The same method was also used for collecting the data 
for the dissertation in the EU, the US, Swiss and Lithuanian universities libraries 
and databases or internet references. 
3) The method of systemic approach was used to estimate and classify the prevai-
ling bank insolvency procedures, more specifically bank resolution procedures, 
their legal context and regulation at national and international level. This method 
allowed the author to examine the bank resolution regime as a complex legal 
phenomenon together with social, economic context and assisted in determining 
the correct position of bank insolvency law in the legal systems, the systemically 
connection between lex generalis and lex specialis. 
4) The logical method was applied by consciously reviewing the available facts and 
details related to bank resolution relationships, by inferring interim and final 
conclusions of the research. 
5) The method of generalisation was applied in conjunction with the logical method, 
in order to highlight the features of the regime governing bank resolution, clas-
sify common and specific components, abstracted in the conclusions and recom-
mendations. 
6) The teleological approach encouraged the author to disclose the objective reasons un-
derlying regulation of different bank resolution tools; in addition, this method was 
adopted in examining and revealing the purposes of bank insolvency law and the 
limits of interpretation. Similarly, this method served the analysis of national and in-
ternational laws, different court judgments, and was useful in identifying the factors 
and circumstances triggering bank insolvency cases, impact on shareholders’ and 
creditors’ rights, public institutions’ activities and decision making mechanisms. 
The method proved helpful for revealing the meaning of legal texts and diagnosing 
limits of interpretation. It should be noted that this method was used in parallel 
with the historical, linguistic and systematic methods of analysis in determining the 
position of the legislator with regard to a particular issue of the research. 
7) The comparative method remained crucial for distinguishing diverse classes of 
banks, different types of bank insolvency procedures, legal constructs of different 
countries and distinct legal traditions, as well as for the evaluation of enduring 
scientific concepts, their legal framework and practice. In principle, the method 
implies a comparison of the EU, US, and Swiss legal systems and countries. It is an 
intellectual activity with the law as its objectives, limitations and the comparison 
as its process. This method allowed crossing the boundaries of one legal system 
and investigating more acceptable and reliable solutions applied in other juris-
dictions. It also enabled the author to align the specific features of regulation and 
the implementing institutes applied in different countries and to identify innova-
tive approaches and controlling ideas in order to maintain the argumentation of 
the research. This method reveals differences and similarities of the legal systems 
and purifies universal problems. It determines original alternatives for resolving 
enduring puzzles. To be noted, the method was used both in terms of macro (to 
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compare the spirit and style of various legal systems, legislative practices and 
procedures) and micro (compare a range of specific, selected legal systems, the 
particular rules used to solve relevant problems or particular conflicts of interest) 
approach. The study draws an admittedly flexible dividing line between macro 
and micro comparison. The research was performed by relying on and processing 
legal materials and procedures. The aforementioned method explores how the 
related rules have been designed and developed by legislators or courts of diffe-
rent jurisdictions, in an attempt to identify and clarify the practical context of 
application, so that the reader can understand the reasons for particular solutions 
of the relevant problems in foreign legal systems. 
8) The method of analytical and critical thought was used to analyse the weaknesses 
and implementation dysfunctional, the causes of bank resolution and (or) the 
liquidation legal regulatory procedures, and consideration of the public and pri-
vate interests. Relying on this method, it was evaluated how the law is satisfying 
the protection requirements of a special period of law. The method applied for 
legal critique and desired law vision.
Some other research methods were employed in the scientific study: the genetic met-
hod served in establishing the emergence and development of bank insolvency law; the 
deductive method was relevant for analysing general rules established in legal norms and 
by specifying their practical application; the inductive method assists in examining the 
case-law specific matters and the appropriate conclusions; the historical method was ap-
plied for revealing the genesis of the bank resolution regime, the meaning of legal rules 
and the factors determining the variety of regulation and interpretation of the law and the 
development of regulation in different countries, and the factors influencing insolvency of 
the banks, seeking to identify the fundamental elements of the legal relationship; while the 
statistical method was useful for processing the statistic material.
The structure of the research. In line with the formulated tasks of the research, the 
operative part of the study consists of four main chapters. 
In the first chapter, which is the opening chapter of the study, author addresses and ana-
lyses the general provisions, preconditions for and the conceptual framework of bank insol-
vency procedures. This chapter clarifies several terminological aspects of the thesis, defines 
the essential features of banks, highlights the public interest-related functions of the banks, 
overviews the influence of the recent banking crisis on the economy, and comments on the 
roots of the bank insolvency proceedings. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates why bank 
insolvency dilemmas are irrelevant from the perspective of general insolvency law. This 
section explores the conception of bank insolvency procedures, analyses the interrelation of 
bank insolvency procedures, problematic issues related to the establishment of bank failure, 
by distinguishing quantitative and qualitative as well as discretionary criteria. This chapter 
concludes with a summary of the types of bank insolvency procedures in different juris-
dictions, reviews and summarises the unification of regional and international trends, and 
analyzes the recent change in the paradigm of bank insolvency law. 
The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the bank resolution regime itself. Gi-
ven that the regulation of bank resolution should be designed not only to protect the pri-
vate interests (shareholders and creditors), but must also to serve broader objectives of 
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public regulatory nature that are vital for the effective functioning of the economy, this 
section analyses the concept of bank resolution in different jurisdictions and the related 
administrative practices. The concept of bank resolution is revealed and the reasons de-
termining the importance of bank resolution are analysed. Relevant focus is placed on the 
resolution conditions of banks in different jurisdictions, by detailing the specific objectives 
of resolution. Eventually, given the fact that the efficiency of the legal measures for bank 
resolution is necessary in order to avoid preventable damages in the banking industry, this 
part of the thesis is dedicated to the crystallisation of specific bank resolution tools (sale 
of bank business, the bridge bank, bail-in, asset separation tool) and their implementation 
schemes, depending on the objective to preserve financial stability and minimise the eco-
nomic and social impact of bank insolvency. 
The third chapter analyses the public authorities that aim to ensure swift measures 
of bank resolution and to guarantee sovereignty, seeking to avoid conflicts of public and 
private interests. Particular consideration is given to decision-making and controlling 
mechanisms in the field of bank resolution, the right to judicial review (the right to due 
process and effective remedy), and the procedures and objectives underlying valuation of 
assets and liabilities. This chapter researches the optimal regulatory model that would be 
the most productive in addressing the possible decision-makers in the field of bank reso-
lution: administrative authorities, creditors or courts? This chapter inter alia assesses the 
decision-making models in different jurisdictions, overviews the key public authorities 
and their role in the bank resolution procedures.
The fourth chapter, which is the most crucial chapter, administers the main question 
of the research, analyses bank resolution procedures and their impact on the bank’s sha-
reholders and creditors. It explains that the restriction of fundamental rights of indivi-
duals is necessary for the sake of broader financial stability objectives, by assessing the 
proportionality of such limitations. The resolution objectives are examined in cases where 
the application of resolution measures and legal powers can limit shareholders’ and credi-
tors’ rights and whether the interference of the resolution-related actions with the rights 
of creditors and shareholders complies with the fundamental rights of individuals and 
is proportionate. The review also establishes the rights and interests of shareholders and 
creditors from different perspectives. The presented case-law analysis identifies the fun-
damental legal principles and legal safeguards best balancing private and public interests 
in the bank resolution regime. This chapter discusses the impact on individual property 
rights, by analysing the loss allocation order, the implementation of creditors’ claims and 
priority of claims. It also discusses the options of different treatment of creditors, inves-
tigates legal safeguards (by analysing the impact on shareholders and creditors), explains 
the concept that creditors should not incur losses that exceed the ones incurred in case of 
straight liquidation of the bank (based on ordinary bankruptcy procedure) supporting the 
balance of public and private interests in bank resolution procedures. 
Key findings
The legal concept of bank insolvency framework
1. Banks perform critical functions in the real economy and the stability of banking 
conduct is in conformity with public interest. Lex generalis rules are inadequate to 
address bank insolvency issues. Firstly, lex generalis fails to ensure the continuity of 
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critical functions of banks, national financial stability objectives, fails to reduce costs 
to taxpayers, interrupts and disturbs the bank’s business operations. Secondly, due 
to the specific nature of banking activity, which affects the public interest, and for a 
number of procedural grounds, such as: the need for swift bank resolution decision-
making, specific triggers for bank insolvency, objectives of different procedures, etc. 
Thirdly, if lex generalis was to apply to banks, in the case of bank resolution this would 
cause severe damage to both private and public interests, destabilise financial stability, 
that is why bank resolution regime primarily protects the public interest and only then 
seeks to safeguard private rights and interests.
2. Banks may turn into insolvency rather promptly, for this reason the determination 
of events triggering bank insolvency and regulation of the qualifying criteria plays an 
important role. Ad hoc solutions are unpredictable, that is why they fail to satisfy the 
objectives of legal certainty. The most comprehensive description of bank insolvency 
conditions and criteria is provided in the EU legal system. As bank financing and liqui-
dity is highly dependent on the confidence of market participants, it is not possible to 
determine bank insolvency relying only on quantitative criteria. If the required quanti-
tative criteria are poorly regulated in bank insolvency law, bank insolvency procedures 
could be wrongly initiated even against a viable, healthy bank(s). Quantitative criteria 
are equally developed in all jurisdictions relevant to the investigation. The EU legal 
framework provides for the most explicit discretionary bank insolvency criteria and 
the related set of rules. The US legal system is characterised by profound, exceptional 
traditions and differentiated bank capital adequacy rules. In the Swiss legal system, 
bank capital requirements are more demanding than in other compared jurisdictions. 
The higher the discretion given to public institutions, the greater the risk for excessive 
control exercised by regulatory authorities. In assessing bank insolvency threshold, 
regulators should focus more on financial viability assessment, based on prospective 
calculations and rely on economic market-based models, instead of retrospective in-
solvency tests based on classic methods. In particular, it is important to determine the 
eligibility of bank liquidity. 
Bank resolution regime
3. Bank resolution is an administrative process, a special banking crisis management 
tool, an alternative to ordinary bank bankruptcy proceedings, aimed to ensure the 
continuity of essential functions performed by the bank, maintain and protect finan-
cial stability and avoid costs for taxpayers and restore long-term viability of the entire 
bank or certain parts of it. A bank is subjected to resolution following the resolution 
objectives pursued by legislation by applying bank resolution tools, such as: sale of 
business, bridge bank, asset separation tool, bail-in tool. The purpose of the bank reso-
lution legal regime is to remove insolvent banks from the financial system at the lowest 
cost, while maintaining private and public confidence in the banking sector, properly 
control legal and economic risks, protect the obligations deserving or even requiring 
protection in order to achieve the public interest objectives of the bank: continuity of 
functions, maximisation of the value of bank assets, initial allocation of bank insol-
vency losses to the shareholders, reduction of adverse economic and social impact for 
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the state, protection of public finances and the financial system (including payment 
systems), protection of depositors.
4. First, in all of the compared jurisdictions, the existing bank resolution regime is im-
portant since, in particular, it serves to avoid damage to public interest (by securing 
financial stability, the critical functions of the bank, and protecting deposits, customer 
assets and public funds). Second, it ensures the possibility for the insolvent bank to 
leave the market smoothly, without causing systemic disruptions or by minimising 
such disruptions, creates lower risk to financial stability, reduces moral hazard, and 
helps maintaining or restoring confidence of the market. Third, the bank resolution 
regime existing in the EU, the US and Switzerland minimises the SIFI effects, positi-
vely affects borrowing decisions, plays a preventive role in enabling public authorities 
to restructure the bank in a manner preventing systemic damage to public and private 
interest breaches. Finally, the new bank resolution framework would enable quick and 
a safe solutions in the case of bank failure, leaving dispute resolution for a later stage.
5. All of the compared jurisdictions contain a rule that a failing bank can be liquidated 
under ordinary bankruptcy procedure, and liquidation should always be considered 
before the transformation of the bank. Bank resolution tools apply only if the bank 
cannot be liquidated under normal bankruptcy procedure, without avoiding negative 
consequences and threats to critical functions of the bank, negative impact on finan-
cial stability, the use of public financial support or deterioration of creditors’ financial 
situation.
6. The central principles of the bank insolvency law, balancing private and public inte-
rests, are based on public law. Bank resolution tools shall ensure legal certainty for 
individuals, the right ofdefence, must be balanced with the public and private inte-
rest, proportionate, and provide adequate compensation to the affected individuals 
after the intervention. The legal principles classified in the dissertation and deriving 
from the EU and US legal systems (namely, the principles of legitimate expectations, 
legitimate aim, proportionality) are justified and can be applied both individually and 
in conjunction, by appropriately balancing public and private interests at the time of 
the bank resolution procedure. As long as the relevant countries duly implement the 
above-mentioned legal principles and safeguards set forth in the relevant provisions of 
the bank resolution law, it is difficult to conceive a situation in which the fundamental 
private rights would be breached.
7. In all of the compared jurisdictions, bank resolution is an administrative process, with 
the primary objective to protect the liquidity requirements of short-term creditors, 
especially depositors, and manage the financial assets of the bank in order to ensure 
the failing bank’s asset and franchise value. Therefore, bank resolution, in particular, 
seeks to avoid systemic contagion in the financial sector, aiming for social welfare, 
which cannot be equated to private objectives and absolute priority of creditors’ claims. 
Bank resolution legal regime can be treated as the result of cost-benefit optimisation.
8. Bank resolution regime both in the EU, the US and Switzerland is a specialised area of 
law designed to address solvency problems faced by a failing bank, by first restructu-
ring and only then liquidating the bank. The aims of bank resolution legal regime are 
fundamentally different from the general insolvency law objectives. Bank resolution 
rules cannot be incorporated into general insolvency law due to the existing dispari-
380
ties between the bank liquidation procedure and the aim to maintain bank activity or 
successfully reorganise the latter. Nevertheless, ordinary bank insolvency law (ban-
kruptcy procedure) remains extremely important in the context of bank resolution 
rules. All of the relevant jurisdictions apply ordinary insolvency law only when specific 
bank resolution rules do not apply.
9. In the EU and the US, bank resolution is financed by contributions from the industry 
ex ante to create a single bank resolution fund. The situation is different in Switzer-
land, where resolution and stabilisation fund still remains the prerogative of the CB, 
acting as a ‘lender of the last resort’. In Switzerland, the Fund is established on an ad 
hoc basis when the need to protect exceptional public interest arises. Such regulation 
fails to comply with the features of the new banking paradigm. Where pre-financing is 
not enough to cover bank losses or resolution costs, the EU, and the US legal systems 
provide for the obligation to collect ex post contributions and to ‘fill’ the fund with the 
input from the banking industry. The EU bank contribution consist of flat-rate pay-
ments and the risk-adjustment premiums of the bank. The US applies an individual 
risk-based system. Since the EU single resolution fund system is disturbing for large 
banks, the new legal regulation will compel the Member States to reform their systems 
of deposit guarantee schemes. Although these funding structures may be combined, 
financing sources remain separate, which requires additional administrative resour-
ces. At the same time, this will help countries to create a system limiting the financial 
burden at times when private and public financial resources are exhausted in the fi-
nancial markets. Resolution funds will make it possible to prevent destabilisation of 
the financial markets and to reduce costs to taxpayers as far as possible. Both the EU 
and the US provide for a backstop funding and reorganisation instrument, such as the 
ESM funds in the EU, and the Treasury funds in the US.
Bank resolution tools
10. In all of the compared jurisdictions, bank resolution tools are designed to mitigate 
the adverse effects caused by bank distress rather than to fully avoid the liquidation 
of the bank. Timely and appropriate application of the bank resolution tool and only 
then liquidation of the bank, in view of the advantages and disadvantages of the par-
ticular resolution tool explored in this dissertation, the possibility of a positive social 
impact appears: first, the likelihood of the systemic banking crisis diminishes and the 
protection from economic downturns after the banking sector crisis is ensured, and, 
secondly, the best possible application of the bank resolution tool reduces taxpayer los-
ses attributable to the support provided to the bank.
11. In all of the compared jurisdictions, direct liquidation of the bank cannot serve as one 
of the solutions to address the financial difficulties faced by a bank, if other market 
players can swiftly replace critical banking functions. If a bank is failing or likely to 
fail, private sector solutions must be employed in the first place, for example, by selling 
business to other market participants. If such a solution is not possible or proves unsu-
ccessful, other bank resolution measures could be adopted according to the ‘least cost’ 
principle with regard to the deposit insurer and the public interest.
12. In all of the compared jurisdictions, the bail-in tool will strongly contribute to the po-
wers of public authorities dealing with both large and complex, as well as conventional 
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bank distress problems, when other resolution tools prove insufficient due to the ab-
sence of private buyers or where the latter are not readily available, but even if they are, 
the application of other measures  can increase market concentration or the size of the 
remaining financial institutions. In the case of bank resolution, a bail-in tool provides 
the right to assign the insolvent bank losses to private individuals and to recapitalise 
the bank instead of using taxpayers’ money.
13. The disadvantage of the bail-in tool in all of the relevant jurisdictions is that, although 
the mechanism increases the creditworthiness of the bank, it fails to provide cash to 
the bank. In addition, regulation requires greater clarity as to the location of the bank 
capital that may be subjected to the measure under consideration, also with regard to 
the form of maintaining the capital, i.e. the legal person of the banking group that dis-
poses of bank debt instruments. In terms of time, it is particularly important, since the 
tool is applied before the use of public funds. In addition, in the result of this measure, 
significant parts of debt instruments held by large banks may remain unused, espe-
cially in cases where banks refinance themselves, i.e. by means of deposits. It cannot 
be excluded that the number of legal disputes will increase with regard to the discrimi-
nation of a particular class of creditors whose claims will be written off or converted. 
An overall advantage of the tool is that it will provide legal certainty with regard to the 
specific amount of funds required to cover bank losses, encourage early recapitalisa-
tion of banks and strengthen the bank’s business continuity assumption. In all of the 
compared jurisdictions, the bail-in tool replaces public support with sanctions against 
private individuals.
Institutional framework of bank resolution decision-making and control 
mechanisms
14. Different opinions exist as to whether priority should be given to administrative or 
judicial bank resolution decision-making procedures. In all of the compared juris-
dictions, bank resolution decisions are taken by administrative bodies, and economic 
bank resolution assessments are carried out by public authorities, whereas courts must 
rely on them. However, judicial proceedings remain relevant for the disputed bank 
resolution decisions in order to guarantee the fundamental rights of private parties 
(the right to a fair hearing, the right to compensation for property expropriation), 
legitimate expectations, proportionality of action between the public interest and the 
protection of property rights, and the legitimate public interest objective. Administra-
tive decision-making procedure is more efficient, because it is swifter, which is directly 
related to lesser depreciation of bank assets. In addition, bank resolution decisions 
require specific expertise, bank resolution procedures are very complex, concerned 
with complicated legal issues, often undertaken at the time of banking crisis, and the-
refore it is presumed that administrative authorities have better knowledge, resources 
and operating capacity. The core element that outweighs the argumentation –is that 
during bank resolution, a need for cooperation with other public institutions arises, 
and this makes it more efficient for preparing resolution decisions, whereby decisions 
can be taken by a group of people– and in barely a few hours, where necessary.
15. In the EU and the US, courts apply bank resolution tool ex ante, and the application in 
court is subjected to immediate execution. Both in the EU and the US, suspension of 
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the resolution decision would run counter the public interest. The parties may appe-
al against the resolution decision ex post. While the judicial review of administrative 
action-based decisions is the central safeguard for the individuals’ rights as a result 
of possible mistakes and abuse, the right of appeal is not absolute and is subject to a 
number of limitations and criteria discussed in the dissertation. In addition, adminis-
trative acts are not automatically affected. In the US, the appeal is only possible against 
bank resolution decisions with regard to the imposition of insolvency threshold and 
whether the bank meets the statutory definition of a financial institution. Expropria-
tion of property rights is justified in emergency situations only, in order to guarantee 
fundamental rights of the individuals. In the EU, bank resolution decisions and actions 
can be appealed against only when the resolution tools are applied to banks that do not 
meet the insolvency conditions, and only in the absence of financial stability objectives 
serving general interest. Both the EU and the United States allow derogations from the 
principle of the rights of the defence, given the primary importance of the financial 
stability objective, which serves the welfare of the people and the public interest.
Impact of the bank resolution regime on creditors and shareholders
16. Creditor claims are related to the administration of property rights. In the EU, the 
US and Switzerland, from the beginning of the bank resolution procedure the rights 
of the counterparties are subjected to contract termination restrictions and certain 
cases of suspension of bank obligations. Such restrictions are necessary for the public 
authorities to obtain an accurate picture of the balance sheet of the insolvent bank, 
disregarding the changes in value and quantity of the bank assets which may result 
from the intense exercise of termination rights.
17. In all of the compared jurisdictions, the hierarchy of satisfaction of creditor claims 
significantly differs from the hierarchy according to general insolvency law. First of 
all, bank insolvency losses are to be absorbed by regulatory capital instruments, and 
losses are distributed to shareholders by writing off shares, or by significantly redu-
cing the earnings per share, by converting debt into capital. When such measures are 
not adequate, the second step concerns the subordinated debt write-off or conver-
sion. Primary liabilities of the bank are converted or written off after converting all 
the subordinated creditors or writing off their claims. The EU is characterised by the 
fact that different requirements for the sequence of bank deposits apply in the case 
of insolvency. Natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are 
guaranteed a part of the relevant deposits in excess of the insured amount, by giving 
priority over ordinary uninsured priority creditor claims. Such regulation may nega-
tively affect these depositors, since many micro, small and medium-sized businesses 
are major customers of banks. Better protection of their deposit rights may increase 
lending costs, e.g. banks may increase interest rates. The peculiarity of the US system 
is that the law allows departing from creditor hierarchy provided for in the general in-
solvency law only when the intention is to maintain financial stability in the market. In 
addition, the FDIC may distinguish certain classes of creditors, by way of derogation 
from the principle of pari passu, if this contributes to the increase in the value of bank 
assets and reduction of creditor losses. Switzerland is characterised by the fact that the 
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principles governing the conversion of debt into capital and the hierarchy of creditor 
claims specifically is set in the restructuring plan.
18. In bank resolution, the objective of legal safeguards and criteria for balancing private 
and public interests through applying special bank resolution tools is to maximise le-
gal certainty and predictability of the legal consequences arising from bank resolution. 
Predictability of the bank resolution process also guides the conduct of bank sharehol-
ders ex ante. Therefore, clear and predictable rules and principles strengthen market 
discipline. If it is clear that in ‘bad times’ bank insolvency losses will be absorbed by 
private individuals, shareholders and creditors, this accordingly encourages sharehol-
ders and creditors to exercise closer control of the company on their own initiative and 
to take early action to recapitalise the bank or to implement other measures to restore 
market confidence and ensure public interest. An ex post predictable bank resolution 
process allows ordinary and efficient reallocation of economic resources in a way that 
promotes growth and enhances overall well-being.
19. The EU legal framework provides for strong protection of private property rights of 
bank shareholders, while the US legal system foresees more limited legal protection of 
private ownership. If in both the EU and the US bank resolution tools are applied and 
the powers of public authorities are employed to attain public interest objectives and 
are used regardless of the principles of legitimate expectations, the rights of defence 
and the right to compensation, such a limited scope of the shareholders’ rights bre-
aches private interest. At the same time, the principles governing protection of indivi-
dual rights and the related legal principles should be interpreted in conjunction with 
the broader public interest objectives, in order to protect financial stability, interests 
of other public entities, by taking into account the functions performed by banks and 
their importance for the overall economy.
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